PREFACE

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1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF14 Central China AF14

PREFACE

This is one of five monographs prepared by the staff of the China Project at Stanford University in fulfillment of a twelve-month subcontract with the Human Relations Area Files, Incorporated, New Haven, Connecticut. 121

The main purpose of this monograph is to present insofar as possible a concise account of the social, economic, and political conditions and problems of the Central-South China Region, which is comprised of the provinces of Honan, Hupeh, Hunan, Kiangsi, Kwangtung (including the island of Hainan), and Kwangsi. Although primary emphasis is placed on developments since the Chinese Communists assumed the reins of government in the latter part of 1949, whenever necessary the region's past is touched upon.

It may be helpful to point out to readers unfamiliar with the Chinese source material used for the preparation of this monograph that, generally, official publications published before 1949 in Nanking or Chungking were of Nationalist origin, whereas those dated from 1949, unless their place of publication is Taipei, Hong Kong, 113 or some other non-Communist area, are Communist sources. Moreover, two sources, the *Survey of China Mainland Press* and *Current Background*, although prepared by the American Consulate General in Hong Kong, are compilations of translations from Chinese Communist publications; unless the citations contained therein are specifically attributed to American editors, they refer to translations from Communist newspapers and magazines and neither represent nor reflect the views of the United States Government. The critical use of Communist and pro-Communist sources has been the principal means of analyzing developments in Soviet Russia. Scholars of China are now obliged by circumstance to employ similar sources in their study of contemporary China. 113

The regional approach embodied in this monograph represents an attempt to conform with the suggestion of our Prime Contractor. Although certain topics which cannot be properly treated on a regional basis have been discussed in more general terms, the bulk of this monograph is comprised of regional information. Since Communist China is undergoing many rapid changes the studies contained in this monograph should be brought up to date at frequent intervals. 121

This monograph is to be regarded as a co-operative project, and no attempt will be made to identify the authors of the individual studies included. It is enough to mention the members of our staff. 600

000

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Economic -- Hsien-chang Ling, Yüeh-ch'iung Pu Tung, Yüan-li Wu

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We are also grateful to our consultants who have rendered us invaluable assistance: Professor T'ung-ho Tung of the Academia Sinica, Dr. Kia-ngau Chang, Loyola University of Los Angeles, Dr. Shun-hsin Chow, now of the College of William and Mary, Dr. Ch'i-yün Chang and Dr. Yün-t'ien Chiang of Formosa, and Dr. Shann Yau Wang of Hong Kong. We are also grateful to Professor Joseph E. Williams, executive head of the Department of Geography, Stanford University, for his supervision of our cartographic work. We should like to express our sincere appreciation to the staff of the Hoover Library, Stanford University, for their patient co-operation, and particularly to Dr. Mary C. Wright, curator of Chinese Collections, for her unfailing support.

The views and opinions expressed in this monograph are those of the staff of the

China Project and are not necessarily those of Stanford University. 000

Shau Wing Chan, Director

March 26, 1956
Stanford University
Stanford, California

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
SINKIANG
NORTHWEST
TIBET
INNER MONGOLIA
NORTH-EAST
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CENTRAL
SOUTHWEST
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INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY
REGIONAL BOUNDARY

[facing p. 1 (2)]

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
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CENTRAL SOUTH CHINA
TOPOGRAPHIC

[facing p. 1 (b)]

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

CENTRAL–SOUTH CHINA
PRECIPITATION

IN
YEARLY
MM
114.1
3000
78.7
2000
68.8
1750
59.0
1500
49.2
1250
38.3
1000
29.5
750
19.6
500
9.8
250
108
112
116
36
32
28
24
20
A
B
C
D
E
F
PROVINCES
A-Honan
B-Hupeh
C-Hunan
D-Kiangsi
E-Kwangsi
F-Kwangtung
Scale in Miles
0
100
200
300

[facing p 1 (c)]

1: Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF14 ~~4-6~~ Central China AF 14

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
CENTRAL-SOUTH CHINA
MEAN ANNUAL TEMPERATURE
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E
F
PROVINCES
A-Honan
B-Hupeh
C-Hunan
D-Kiangsi
E-Kwangsi
F-Kwangtung
Scale in Miles
0
100
200
300

[facing p. 1 (d)]

GEOGRAPHICAL SETTING

131 From the drought-and flood-harassed northwestern Honan Province to verdant, tropical Hainan Island, this region embraces a wide geographical variety. The depth of 32 degrees of latitude (4° - 36° N.) exceeds that of the United States by about 10 degrees; its area of 1, 166, 000 square kilometers (451, 000 sq. mi.), ranking fourth in size among all the regions in China, is three times the territory of Japan, and equals the combined areas of England, France, Italy, Holland, Denmark, and Luxembourg.

This region consists of Honan, Hupeh, Hunan, Kiangsi, Kwangtung, and Kwangsi provinces.

I. TOPOGRAPHY

A. Mountains

133 Topographically, this region, from north to south, includes southern fringes of the North China plain, the major alluvial plains of the Yangtze and the Han rivers studded with a few towering mountains, the alluvial plains of the Tungting and Poyang lakes. the South Yangtze hills, and the hills of Kwangtung and Kwangsi, and a narrow strip of flat land along the Gulf of Tonkin and the South China Sea.

The region presents a general west-to-east decline with the main mountain ranges of 3, 000 feet or over on the western side of the region. The Fu-niu Mountain of the Pei-ling system overlooks the region from the northwest; the Wu-tang, Wu-shan, and Hsüeh-feng Mountains form the western boundary, leading to the Yunnan-Kweichow tableland at the southwestern corner. On the east side, a few mountains of lesser altitude, the Ta-pieh, Huai-yu, and Wu-i, help define the limits of the region on the east. The only range that separates the southern third of the region from the rest is the Nan-ling system, which enters from the west as Tu-p'ang-ling, reaches the center of the region as Ta-yü-ling, and emerges in the east to join the Wu-i.

B. Rivers

The turbulent Yellow River cuts across the northern tip of this region, but the main river systems dominating this area are composed of, from north to south, the Hwai, the Yangtze, and the Hsi (West River; known in its lower reaches as the Pearl River).

The Yellow River enters this region from the northwest, where it forms the boundary between Shansi and Honan provinces and where the river is walled between the T'ai-hang and the Ch'in-ling mountain ranges. As it rushes eastward past Meng-chin, its water is suddenly unleashed onto the North China plain. It is choked with silt from the loess highlands, and in many places its bed is higher than the surrounding land. It has changed its course many times in history, and over 1,600 inundations have been caused by breaks in the dikes. Since 1949 the dikes on the Yellow River in this region have been repaired and strengthened and at least one major flood-control project has been undertaken west of Kaifeng.

The upper reaches of the Hwai with its numerous tributaries constitute the major water supply in Honan Province. However, the Hwai River also threatens inhabitants of this area with floods, especially as it flows eastward to Anhwei and Kiangsu; it is on this river that the Peking regime in the winter of 1950 began a historic five-year flood-control project to alter the age-old sequence of "big rain, big disaster; little rain, little disaster; and no rain, drought disaster."[1]

Like the Yellow River, the Yangtze also enters this region from the west, carving out deep gorges through the Wu-shan Range, where the river is imprisoned within tremendous canyon walls, which rise a sheer 2,000 feet in some places.[2] West of I-ch'ang the swiftness of the current is greatly reduced and the river is navigable for boats up to 1,000 tons.[3] Steamers up to 6,000 tons (10,000 tons in the summer) regularly ply the waters between I-ch'ang and Hankow, where a flood-diversion project was completed in 1952 -- a project which, it is claimed, will be effective in preventing floods for the next twenty to forty years.[4]

The Hsi River constitutes the main line in the river system of the southernmost part of this region. At Wu-chou, in Kwangsi Province, the river is about half a mile wide. Its navigability from here eastward is curtailed only by the relatively great fluctuation of the water level (an extreme variation of 75 feet).[5]

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[1] *Chih Huai* *[The Harnessing of the Hwai River]*, Shanghai, Hua-tung jen-min Ch'u-pan-she, 1952.

[2] George B. Cressey, China's Geographic Foundations, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1934, p. 280.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 283.

[4] Ou-yang An, Ching-chiang Fen-hung, *[Diverting the Flood of the Ching River]*, Shanghai, Hsin chih-shih ch'u-pan-she, 1954, p. 73.

[5] Cressey, *op. cit.*, p. 349.

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The lower course of the Hsi River, also called the Pearl River, receives water from the Pei River in the north and the Tung River in the east. Both the Pei and Tung rivers are partially navigable in high-water seasons. Upon the crisscrossing waterways of the delta at the mouth of the Pearl River, water transportation has been developed to a high degree. The delta, Kwangtung's only flatland of any size, has the greatest density of population in China -- 2,900 per square mile.[6] [61]

In addition to the several main rivers, lesser waterways which feed the two largest lakes in China, Tungting and Poyang, are of considerable volume and cover a large area in the middle of the region. The Hsiang, Tzu Yüan and Li Rivers empty into Tungting Lake, filling it in summer until it becomes a 2,000 square-mile body of water, which is reduced one-third in size in the winter. This annual fluctuation in volume formerly caused frequent damage, but the Peking regime claims that three separate hydraulic projects in the lake region assure the inhabitants a growing season free from drought or flood. The Poyang Lake in Kiangsi Province, fed by the Kan River and its tributaries, covers an area of 1,730 square miles. But accumulation of silt has been steadily reducing its capacity, and summer waters have often flooded the adjacent land. The flood threat on Poyang Lake, according to the Peking regime, has been reduced since the completion of the new dikes and the repair of the old.[7]

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[6] Ibid., p. 362.

Perhaps the most interesting topographical feature of this region is that, with the exception of the two southernmost provinces, each of the other provinces occupies a natural basin with its center in a main river valley or lake. To be sure, these basins are not of perfect geotectonic formation, but the general orientation of the mountains does yield a few level centers. Here the populations of these provinces concentrate and the separate river systems converge. South of the Nan-ling Range, however, the hills crowd out the level land, which is estimated at less than 10 per cent of the total area.[8]

The coastline of Kwangtung and Kwangsi Provinces is China's southern gateway to the outside world, but, despite its length (estimates range between 1,200 and 5,000 kilometers, or 750-3,100 miles), the coast is isolated from the hinterland by mountains. New highways and railways are under construction. These developments will link the inland provinces with some of the promontories and bays which are protected by 562 large and small islands, thus promising excellent maritime transportation and exploitation.[9]

C. South-China Sea Islands

The island of Hainan tilts toward the north.

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[7] *Chung-hua Jen-min Kung-ho-kuo Fen-sheng Ti-t'u /Atlas of the People's Republic of China/*, Shanghai, Ti-t'u ch'u-pan-she, August, 1953.

[8] Cressey, *op. cit.*, p. 348.

[9] Hsü Chün-ming, *Fu-jao Ti Hua-nan /The Rich South China/*, Canton, 1951, p. 12.

Its highest mountain (the Wu-chih-shan, 1, 350 m. or 4, 320 ft.) stands in the central south, while the northern one-third is rather flat. The main rivers on the island are the Nan-tu, which flows northward and is navigable for boats up to 20 tons on its lower reaches and the Wan-ch'üan, which flows eastward. 133

Geological evidence indicates that at one time Hainan Island, fifteen miles off the Kwangtung coast, was connected with the Lei-chou Peninsula. Today, the strait is extremely shallow, 504 and the port of Hai-k'ou (Hoihow) on Hainan, facing the Lei-chou Peninsula, is of little value because of its shallowness and the rough water which blocks its entrance. Ships must anchor a mile offshore. Whenever the wind is high, passengers debarking are lowered into launches by a crane-operated basket. The southern coast of the island offers better harbor prospects with its port of Yü-lin.[10]

The extent of China's claim to jurisdiction 131 over the South China Sea has been a matter of 133 long-standing dispute. The official Peking description includes within its territorial waters the sea almost to the shores of the Philippines and Borneo, reaching as far south as 4° North Latitude.[11] Wider in the north and tapering toward the south, this sea claimed by China covers roughly 650, 000 sqaure miles, or an area about eight times the size of Kwangtung Province. Within this body of water are located hundreds of small islets and shoals, of which 160 bear definite names.[12] 131

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[10] Ch'en Chih, Hai-nan Hsin-chih [The New Geography of Hainan], Shanghai, Commercial Press, 1949.

[11] Jen-min Jih-pao [People's Daily], Peking, August 16, 1951.

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These islands fall into four groups: (a) the Tung-sha group, also known as Pratus. The main island, Tung-sha (about 2.7 sq. mi. in size), lies only 170 nautical miles southeast of Hong Kong and is a center for commercial fishing; (b) the Hsi-sha group, also known as Paracel, about 144 miles from the island of Hainan. The largest island in this group is Yung-hsing (0.7 sq. mi.); (c) the chung-sha group to the east of the Hsi-sha, which is hardly more than a cluster of submerged shoals; (d) the Nan-sha group, the most extensive of the four, some of its far-flung rocks only 434 miles from the Chung-sha. Of this last group, the largest is T'ai-p'ing Island (0.044 sq. mi.), but prime importance should be attached to Nan-wei Island, which could be developed as a strategic harbor. Rich phos- [135] phorous resources and marine products are common features of these islands.[13]

648 The ambiguous status of these islands is indicated by the fact that for centuries the Chung-sha (Central Sand) group was known to the Chinese as Nan-sha (Southern Sand), while the present Nan-sha had borne the designation of T'uan-sha (Mass of Sand). Apparently the Chinese considered the Chung-sha group the southernmost territory and were not very much concerned with jurisdiction over T'uan-sha. The 1951 Japanese Peace Treaty, to which Communist China was not a party, stipulates that Japan forfeits her claim over these islands, but fails to specify under which country their adminstra-

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[12] Hsü Chün-ming, op. cit., pp. 9-10.

[13] Ibid., pp. 9-12.

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[facing p. 8 (a)]

Table 1. Major Riverports in Central-South China */

	Chiu-chiang (Kiukiang) 九江	Hankow	Yüeh-yang 岳陽	Changsha 長沙	Ch'ang-te 常德	Sha-shih 沙市	I-ch'ang 宜昌	Nanning 南寧
Location	On Yangtze R. in Kiangsi Province	114 17'E 30 50'N	113 E 29 24'N	112 46'E 28 13'N	111 31'E 28 55'N	112 12'E 30 20'N	110 23'E 30 43'N	108 20'E 22 48'N
Depth of basin	12	—	7-16	6-12	7-12	7-15	120 (in middle of Yangtze River)	6-24
Mean difference between high and low water (in ft.)	—	10	—	—	—	—	50	—
Capacity of service	Boats up to 8,000 tons	—	Boats up to 5,700 tons	Boats up to 2,000 tons	Boats up to 1,000 tons	—	Boats up to 3,000 tons	Boats up to 600 tons
Docking facilities	9 docks	6 docks	None	26 docks 14 floating docks	—	4 docks	8,000 tons	—
Cargo storage capacity (in tons)	12,000	26,752	—	—	—	2,0000	—	—
Latest available service record								
Year	1937	1937	—	1937	—	1937	1937	—
Number of boats served	7,342	13,983	—	11,933	—	1,688	3,003	—
Total tonnage	7,327,630	6,247,320	—	700,946	—	1,082,254	1,260,666	—

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*/ Wang Kuang 王洸 Chung-kuo Hai-chiang Chih 中國海港志 [China's Harbors], Taipei, Chung-hua wen-hua ch'u-pan shih-yeh wei-yüan hui, 1954, pp. 201-4, 210-11.

Table 2 . Lesser Harbors in Central-South China */

PART I	拱北 Kung-pei	江門 Chiang-men (Kongmoon)	電白 Tien-pai	北海 Pei-hai (Pakkoi)
Location	113 30'E 22 10'N	113 5'E 22 26'N	111 25'E 21 30'N	109 4'E 21 30'N
Area of Harbor (in sq.mi.)	—	—	46.4	139
Depth of basin (in ft.)	25	12	15	19
Docking facilities	—	2 docks	—	—
Capacity of service	Boats up to 2,000 tons	Boats up to 450 tons	—	Boats up to 3,000 tons
Latest available service record:				
Year.	1946	1946	—	1935
I[redacted]	¥3,133,857,000	¥3,632,824,000	—	—
Export	¥3,794,257,000	¥4,978,866,000	—	—
Number of boats served	—	22,250	—	566

---

*/ Wang Kuang 王洸 Chung-kuo Hai-chiang Chih 中國海港志 /China's Harbors7, Taipei, Chung-hua wen-hua ch'u-pan shih-yeh wei-yüan-hui, 1954, pp. 171-190.

[facing p. 8 (b)]

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Table 2 . Lesser Harbors in Central-South China */

PART II	Hai-k'ou (Hoihow) [illegible]	Yü-lin [illegible]	San-ya [illegible]	Pa-so [illegible]	Ch'ing-lan [illegible]	Ma-niao [illegible]
Location	110 E 20 3'N	109 32'E	2.5 miles west of Yü-lin	On western Hainan coast	On NE Hainan coast	On Northern Hainan coast
Area of Harbor (in sq.mi.)	16.3	9.5	—	—	3.8	15.2
Depth of Basin (in ft.)	2-33	5-30	9	21	18-30	21
Docking facilities	1 dock (250 ft.)	1 dock (1,000 ft.)	1 dock (300 ft.)	1 dock (2,000 ft.)	—	—
Capacity of service	Boats up to 1,000 tons	Boats up to 10,000 tons in outer harbor	Boats up to 2,000 tons	—	Boats up to 1,000 tons	Boats up to 1,000 tons
Latest available service record						
Year	1937					
Import	US $ 2,000,000	—	—	—	—	—
Export	US $ 4,000,000	—	—	—	—	—
Number of boats served	1,023	—	—	—	—	—

---

*/ Wang Kuang [illegible] Chung-kuo Hai-chiang Chih [illegible] /China's Harbors/, Taipei, Chung-hua wen-hua ch'u-pan shih-yeh wei-yüan-hui, 1954, pp. 171-190.

(Table 2, Parts I and II, follows Table 4.)

[facing p. 8 (c)]

tion is to fall. Although this treaty does not help to clarify the situation, the Peking regime continues to insist on its rights to the islands on the basis of their historic affiliation with China, dating back some four hundred years to the Ming Dynasty. Some proponents of this claim go so far as to cite the records of the Sung Dynasty (A. D. 960-1279) to support their argument.[14] 648

II. CLIMATE

The climate of this region is more affected by its topographical features than by its latitude. The latitude is a major weather determinant only at the northernmost and southernmost ends. 132

In the summertime the Fu-niu Mountain area in the northwest is pleasantly cool, but in the heart of the eastern Honan plain the mercury rises to an average of 29°C. (84° F.), or higher. The bulk of the average annual precipitation of 500-800 millimeters (16-32 in.) falls in July-August. In western Hupeh Province the average summer temperature on the mountains holds at 25° C. (78°F.) level. In summer high humidity and sultry heat are common in the lowland area along the Yangtze and Han rivers; of an average annual rainfall of 1,200 millimeters (48 in.), over 400 millimeters (16.5 in.) is measured in June alone. In late spring the Mei rain, or "plum rain," drenches Hupeh Province. The Hsüeh-feng (Snow Summit) Mountain in western Hunan is not a cold area despite its chilly name. On the east side of Hunan Province the climate resembles that of Central China or the Yangtze Valley; the maximum rainfall of an annual average of over[15] 750 millimeters (29 in.) occurs in April-June. Temperatures reach 29°C. (86°F.) in the warm belt of the Nan-ling Mountains. ~~Even~~ on the northern approach to the mountains, the summer season is of reasonable duration. Kwangtung and Kwangsi, on the south side of the Nan-ling Mountains, are the warmest provinces in China and have a tropical climate. Long summers have an average temperature of 29°C. (86°F.) and about one-half of an average annual rainfall of 1,500-2,000 millimeters (58-77 in.) occurs in July-August. The warm climatic zone includes Hainan Island, where[16] temperatures sometimes reach 33.9°C (92°F.), and the humidity is higher than that of the lake areas 1,000 kilometers (600 mi.) to the north. On Hainan it rains about 1,500 millimeters (58 in.) a year.

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[14] Ibid., p. 10.

In the wintertime the upper reaches of the Hwai and Yellow rivers may freeze for about two weeks and a month, respectively. In Honan Province the month of November is miserable because of the zero temperature and the biting wind, which usually carries a large amount of yellow dust and sand. The local people call it "Blow Yellow Sand." In Hupeh Province, winter temperatures may drop as low as -3°C (27°F), but in the warm belt farther south the mercury seldom drops below 10°C. (50°F.). On Hainan Island, winter is cool and dry, and November to March is considered a most pleasant season.

Nature harasses Honan Province with an unpre-

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15. Cressey, op. cit., p. 72.
16. Ch'en Chih, op. cit., p. 25.

[Table 3 follows p. 9]

Table 3. Climate at Selected Localities */

	Mean Temperature (F)		Rainfall (inches)	
	January	July	Annual Average	Rainy Season
Kaifeng (on Honan Plain)	30	84	24	July - August
I-ch'ang (Western Hupeh)	42	84	43	July
Hankow (on Yangtze River)	40	86	50	June
Changsha (Central Hunan)	43	90	55	May - June
Chiu-chiang (Northern Kiangsi)	41	86	57	June
Canton (Southern Kwangtung)	55	81	66	May - August
Nanning (Central-South Kwangsi)	58	86	62	June - August

*/ Based on Cressey, op.cit.; Ko Sui-ch'eng, Chung-kuo Ti-li Hsin-chih [New Geography of China], Shanghai, Chung-hua shu-chü, 1940.

dictable rainfall in the winter, which in turn annually threatens the inhabitants with the possibility of drought. Along the coast of Kwangtung, typhoons from time to time descend upon that area with all their tropical fury. They come on the average of 8.5 times a year, usually in May, but no part of the year is completely free from the threat.[17] 132

III. SOIL AND VEGETATION

Northern Honan Province lies on the fringe of the North China plain, which is covered with a layer of alluvial soil. In colors ranging from light yellow to dark brown, the soil varies from saline to calcareous. South of Kaifeng in Honnan Province the land lies under sandy loam which is most non-calcareous. Farther south in Hupeh Province there are belts of non-calcareous alluvial soil, brown clay, and dark grey soil with varying acid content. Hunan, Kwangsi, and Kwangtung provinces are extensively covered with red and dark red soil of various ages. In these provinces, spotty patches of light and dark grey soil are also found. In the Pearl and Hsi river valleys the soil is mainly alluvial and non-calcareous. The same soil is found along the shores of Hainan Island. In the middle of Hainan Island, red soil predominates, with dark grey soil at higher elevations. 134

Coniferous forests are common in central and southern Honan. Tropical forests occupy most of the low hills and river valleys. In Hunan and Hupeh provinces, coniferous and evergreen plants grow on higher mountains. Kwangtung has a rich variety of tropical and semi-tropical plants, and throughout the province fruits are extensively cultivated in addition to the staple crop of rice. Tropical plants such as sugar-cane and cinnamon are found also in southern Kwangsi and on 137

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[17] Cressey, *op. cit.*, p. 67.

Hainan Island. Hardwood and maple forests are found at different places on the mountains of northern Kwangsi. 137

IV. IMPORTANT COMMUNICATION LINES AND CENTERS [18]

The Peking-Hankow, Hankow-Canton and Canton-Kowloon railways, together, run the entire length of the Central-South Region and constitute the main north-to-south transportation trunkline. The main communication lines traversing this region from East to West are the Yellow River, the Lunghai Railway, and the Yangtze River. There is also a railway cutting diagonally through Kiangsi, Hunan, and Kwangsi provinces. 361 489

The Peking-Hankow Railway enters this region at a point a short distance north of Anyang in Honan Province. The industries in Anyang prosper because of the nearby Liu-ho-kou Coal Mine. South of Anyang, the railway passes through another large city, Hsin-hsiang, which is expanding along with the Chiao-tso industrial and mining center to the west. There is a spur line between Hsin-hsiang and Chiao-tso. Hsin-hsiang marks the beginning of a large irrigation and flood-diversion ditch, which runs parallel to the railway to reach the Yellow River. After crossing the river by way of a steel bridge, the railway reaches Chengchow. The Chengchow bridge, 3,010 meters

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18. Ch'eng Kuang-yü, Chung-kuo Tu-shih [The Cities of China], Taipei, Chung-hua wen-hua ch'u-pan shih-yeh weu-yüan hui, 1953; Jen-min Shou-tse; [People's Handbook], Tientsin, Ta-kung pao, 1955; Ya-chou Tien-hsün [Asia Foundation Bulletin], San Francisco, July 6, 1955; New China News Agency Dispatch from Peking, March 1, 1955, quoted in Survey of China Mainland Press, No. 998, Hong Kong, U.S Consulate General, p. 28.

(9, 700 ft.) in length, is the largest of its kind in China. West and east of the bridge is the flood-diversion project, for which a main dike to harness the Yellow River was completed in 1951. At Chengchow, the present provincial capital of Honan, the Lunghai Railway intersects the Peking-Hankow Railway. Its location at the junction of two of China's main railroads contributes greatly to Chengchow's position as the largest cotton market in this section of the country. The Peking-Hankow Railway beyond Chengchow runs due south and leaves Honan Province to enter Hupeh through a strategic tunnel a few miles south of Hsin-yang. 361 489

The first key city on the Lunghai Railway in eastern Honan Province is Shang-ch'iu, where a part of the extensive flood-control system for the Hwai Valley is located. Both Shang-ch'iu and Kaifeng to the west are ancient cities. At present Kaifeng still ranks among the four top commercial centers in China. Farthern west the Lunghai Railway passes through Chengchow to Loyang, another ancient metropolis often mentioned in history and classic literature.

Some geography books include the Pai River basin, in southwestern Honan Province, among the most extensive river basins in China. The area of the basin is not as large as the Chengtu Basin in West China which supported the Nationalist Government and almost all of its troops during World War II, but the Pai River region is a clearly defined basin. In the basin's center is 361 489 133

Nan-yang, which has a well-developed network of 361
highways extending south to Hupeh Province, west to 489
Shensi Province, and into all parts of Honan Province. 133

Wuhan, the largest municipality in Central China 361
and the provincial capital of Hupeh, comprises the tri- 489
city of Wuchang, east of the Yangtze River; Hankow,
north of the Han River and west of the Yangtze; and
Haryand, south of the Han River. A 1952 estimate [162]
placed the population of Wuhan at 1,200,000. Of the
three parts of Wuhan, Hankow was a center of bristling political activities in the 1920's when the Nationalist and Communist parties quarreled through their
first short-lived coalition, and both parties were, at
the same time, torn with internal strife. At Hanyang, [389]
an ordnance plant that has done a great deal for China's growing armament is being expanded under Communist direction. In this community, sprawling over the confluence of the Han and Yangtze rivers, a large-scale reconstruction program has been launched to remodel the parks and to build a people's square, a worker's cultural palace, a martyr's memorial, and other structures for public use.

In August 1955, the plan for a modern railway bridge on the Yangtze River at Wuhan was reaching its final stage. When this bridge is completed there will be direct connection between the Peking-Hankow and Hankow-Canton railways.

The section of the Yangtze River in Hupeh Province is navigable for river steamers all year round. West of I-ch'ang, the Yangtze River flows through the famous gorges, which pose a difficult problem for the most experienced navigator. The Communist press has reported sufficient improvement on this stretch of the waterway to make the claim that the Yangtze Gorges "bows to the will of the proletariat." East of the I-ch'ang the Yangtze River widens, and its current is less swift until it reaches Chiang-ling, where more tributaries swell the Yangtze River and create a flood threat to the nearby lowlands. In 1952, according to Communist reports, a massive project of flood control was pushed to completion within the unbelievably short time of two months; this project is located on that stretch of the Yangtze River known locally as the Ching River, immediately south of Chiang-ling.

Another important city located on the Yangtze River in eastern Hupeh Province is Huang-shih, which is being rapidly built up into an industrial center in order to utilize the product of the well-known Tayeh Iron Mine in the west. The Hua-ch'ang Iron and Steel Company and the Hua-hsin Cement Company are housed in Huang-shih.

The Han River is a large waterway which empties from the northwest into the Yangtze River at Wuhan. River-boat traffic starts on the Han River at Lao-ho-k'ou, a city which controls the only highway linking Hupeh Province directly with Shensi Province to the northwest across rugged mountains. Downstream from Lao-ho-k'ou about sixty miles is the twin-city of Hsiang-fan, composed of Hsiang-yang and Fa'-ch'eng. Legends originating in the period of the Three Warring Kingdoms have made Hsiang-fan a familiar place to most readers of Chinese lore. The city is a key communication center in northern Hupeh Province.

Among the important cities on the Hankow-Canton Railway in Huan Province are Yüeh-yang, Changsha, Chu-chou, and Heng-yang. Yüeh-yang is located on the east side of Tungting Lake, and is the eastern gateway to this province. The strategic value of Yueh-yang on the Yangtze River has been long recognized, and remnants of ancient river defenses are still found in this vicinity. Besides being an old provincial capital, Changsha has won national fame as the city where Mao Tse-tung spent his early years studying and shaping his philosophy of Communist revolution. Hunan University occupies a scenic spot on the Hsiang River. At Chu-chou, the Hankow-Canton Railway connects another railway running east to the well-developed P'ing-hsiang Coal Mine in Kiangsi Province. From Chu-chou westward, the new Huanan-Kweichow Railway is open to traffic as far as Hsiang-t'an. Mao Tse-tung's birthplace lies in a mountain village to the northwest of Hsiang-t'an. The position of this city as a communication point in central Hunan Province is strengthened by the proximity of the Hsiang River and one of its fairly navigable tributaries. At Heng-yang the Hankow Canton Railway connects with the Hunan-Kwangsi Railway, and this junction aids the development of a rich coal field south of Heng-yang.

The Communists plan that the new Hunan-Kweichow Railway will run from Hsiang-t'an westward through a tin-mining area not far north of Shao-yang, a highway hub in southwestern Hunan Province. Later the new railway will be extended through Huai-hua in the mountains between Hunan and Kweichow, where the inhabitants are mainly of the Miao minority.

The railway from Chu-chou enters Kiangsi Province to the east, extends to the center of the province, and reaches the provincial capital of Nanchang. Nanchang, the birthplace of the Chinese Red Army, is served by two other railways: the Nanhsün Railway leads to the Yangtze River port of Chiu-chiang (Kiukiang); and the Chekiang-Kiangsi Railway goes through the city of Shang-yao to reach Shanghai on the coast. Nanchang, moreover, has waterway transportation on Poyang Lake and the Kan River, which is navigable for river boats of small tonnage all the way upriver to Kan-hsien. At Kan-hsien the two rivers of Chang and Kan merge. Their confluence coincides with the intersection of several highways serving the three adjacent provinces. One of these highways cuts through the mountains along the Hunan-Kiangsi-Kwangtung border by way of Ta-yü. Since this is the only highway that breaks the natural barrier between the three provinces, Ta-yü becomes a strategic spot. The Communist troops used this route during their campaigns in the early 1930's. In northeastern Kiangsi, a railway has been planned to link the province with Anhwei Province. The proposed line will run through Ching-te-chen, the "porcelain capital" of China.

The Hankow-Canton Railway enters Kwangtung Province from the north and reaches Shao-kuan, also known as Ch'ü-chiang, the largest city in northern Kwangtung. The railway runs south, parallel to one of the Pearl River's tributaries, en-route to the terminal at Canton. At the time of the birth of the Chinese Republic, Canton had been the seat of the revolutionary government under Sun Yat-sen. It had also been the scene of a feverish struggle for power between factions within the Nationalist Party, and between the revolutionary government and the warlords. As the capital of the province with probably the densest population in China, Canton's trade has been handicapped by the restrictive Pearl River waterway and diverted by the development of Hong Kong. Seagoing vessels now dock at the

Whampoa Harbor about 30 kilometers (20 mi.) down river from this city. The Pearl River cuts the city into two parts, but a steel bridge joins them. The No. 1 Machine Manufacturing Plant is located in this city. On October 1, 1954, the seven-story Nan-fang-ta-hsia (The Great Southern Hall) was opened. It is located on the bank of the Pearl River. The neon-lighted red star on top of its observatory tower is a landmark that can be seen for miles.

Canton is connected by highways with such seaports as Swatow and Chan-chiang. The water in Swatow Bay averages 20 meters (62 ft.) in depth and offers excellent harbor possibilities. The Nan-ch'i River, emptying into the sea at Swatow, is not a large river; however, Swatow has adequate transportation facilities to reach the hinterland by way of Ch'ao-chou to the north, which is located on the larger Han River.

At Chiang-men (Kongmoon), T'ai-shan (Toishan), and Fo-shan (Fatshan), on the crowded Pearl River delta in southern Kwangtung Province, are the former homes of most of the Chinese in America. These cities are linked by highways and waterways and are prosperous commercial centers. All the roads on the Lei-chou Peninsula lead to Chan-chiang, a port on the bay of Kwangchowan, at one time leased to the French, who fortified it by building Fort Bayard. Chan-chiang has a well-protected harbor. The Chan-chiang--Li-t'ang Railway has been completed; thus, cargoes unloaded at Chan-chiang can be shipped directly to Kwangsi Province. On July 4, 1955, the State Council at Peking decided to launch a large-scale construction program to build this port into a naval station. Dovetailed into this construction program is the plan to develop the port of Pei-hai to the west. Pei-hai on the Gulf of Tonkin is capable of accommodating vessels up to 3,000 tons.

The navigable Hsi River connects Canton with Wu-chou on the Kwangsi side of the Kwangsi-Kwangtung provincial boundary. Wu-chou is the center of water transportation in eastern Kwangsi and is also a chemical industrial center. From Wu-chou up the Liu River small boats can reach Liu-chou at the intersection of the Hunan-Kwangsi and Kweichow-Kwangsi railways. One of the machine-manufacturing plants operated by the provincial government is in Liu-chou. North of Liu-chou on the Hunan-Kwangsi Railway is the former provincial capital of Kweilin. This city is well known for its scenic beauty and remembered as a gathering place for the writers and artists of China during World War II. From Liu-chou westward the Kweichow-Kwangsi Railway passes by Nan-tan; but this railway is only half-completed, and from Nan-tan northward traffic still depends on a highway. From Liu-chou southwestward the Hunan-Kwangsi Railway runs all the way to the frontier town of Mu-nan-kuan, formerly known as Chennankwan. Perhaps the change of the city's name from "Suppress-South-Gate" to "Befriend-South-Gate," brought about by the Peking regime, is not without political significance. With the reopening of the Hanoi--Mu-nan-kuan Railway in Indochina on February 28, 1955, the city of Mu-nan-kuan has become a key point on the international boundary. Between Liu-chou and Mu-nan-kuan the Hunan-Kwangsi Railway passes Nanning, the provincial capital and a highway hub in central-south Kwangsi. From Nanning a highway runs northwest to western Kweichow Province by way of Pai-se, the largest city in western Kwangsi Province.

There is a highway circling the Island of Hainan, 361
with the port of Hai-k'ou as its most important termi- 489
nal. The Nan-tu River, the largest and most navigable waterway on the island, provides Hai-k'ou with convenient transportation to the center of the island.' From Hai-k'ou, highway traffic can reach the port of Yü-lin, which has natural features far superior to those of Hai-k'ou. However, because Yü-lin is at the extreme southern tip of the island and is somewhat isolated from the rest of the island by mountains, it remainds to be developed as a valuable port.

HISTORICAL SETTING

I. INTRODUCTION

Historically, the Central-South Region of China cannot be appraached as an entity. The six provinces which comprised the region during its brief existence from 1949 to 1954 present as much diversity and similarity in historical and cultural growth as would any other six provinces of China proper. 101

Their historical-cultural development divides them into three areas: (1) Honan, at the center of developing Chinese civilization; (2) Hupeh-Hunan-Kiangsi, transitional provinces between North and South China; and (3) Kwangtung-Kwangsi, constituting a naturally defended and economically self-sufficient unit that was brought relatively late into the traditional Chinese complex and has since shown tendencies toward separatism.

In one respect, the six provinces share a common characteristic. Their indoctrination in Communist ideology and their accomodation to land reform have been carried forward at about the same pace. This rate of progress has been considerably behind that of the North and Northeast regions, somewhat behind that of the East, and considerably ahead of the Southwest and part of the Northwest regions. 668

II. TRADITIONAL DEVELOPMENT

A. The Cradle of Chinese Civilization

The upper area of Honan, the most northern of the Central-South provinces, has been at the center of the mainstream of developing Chinese civilization from prehistoric times. From this hub, Chinese culture spread in all directions, integrating elements of other cultures with which it came in contact, to the limits of arable land and topographical barriers. The first organized state of which we have concrete evidence -- the Shang (c. 1520 to c. 1030 B.C) -- was centered on the present-day city of Anyang in this region.[1] Loyang in northwestern Honan was the political center of the expanding Chinese state from 771 to 221 B.C. (the Eastern Chou period) and again during the Later Han Dynasty (A.D. 25 to 221). The city was one of two capitals under the T'ang (618 to 906), but thereafter the political center of the unified state gravitated to the northeast. Until A.D. 221, the province was also increasingly important as a center of agricultural production for the empire. By the time of China's reunification under the Sui (581 to 618) and the

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[1] On Chinese prehistory and the Shang civilization, see H. C. Creel, The Birth of China, London, Jonathan Cape, 1936; and Wolfram Eberhard, A History of China, Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1950, pp. 3-21.

T'ang dynasties, the province had lost its key economic position to the Yangtze Valley area.[2]

Culturally, however, Honan continued to contribute leadership to Chinese civilization. An early ninth-century Honanese, Han Yü, is doubly famous throughout China; he was the originator of a prose style that is still considered a model and, as a leading and upright Confucianist, he sacrified his high position at court in an unsuccessful attempt to discredit the alien religion of Buddhism at a time when it was competing with native Confucianism for political supremacy.[3] Another Honanese, Ssu-ma Kuang (1019 to 1086), wrote one of China's greatest histories, the Tzu-chih t'ung-chien. This epic work in a nation which placed an extremely high value on history was written during periods of retirement from court occasioned by temporary defeats in Ssu-ma's struggle to uphold conservative Confucianism against the reformist tendencies of a Sung Dynasty prime minister, Wang An-shih.[4] At the present time, Honan is represented by Feng (Fung) Yu-lan. One of China's leading modern philosophers, he is currently aligned with the Communist regime, although his previous philosophy was far removed from Marxism.[5]

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[2] See Chi Ch'ao-ting, Key Economic Areas in Chinese History, London, George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1936, pp. 40-42, 67-69.

[3] K. S. Latourette, The Chinese, Their History and Culture, 2nd ed., rev., (Two volumes in one), New York, the MacMillan Company, 1934, Vol. I, pp. 211, 217; also H. A. Giles, A Chinese Biographical Dictionary, London, B. Quaritch, Shanghai, Kelly and Walsh, 1898, pp. 254-56.

[4] Latourette, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 253-56; Giles, op. cit., pp. 804-07.

B. The Integration of Hupeh, Hunan, and Kiangsi

Hupeh, while not in the original cradle of Chinese civilization, appears to have been a part of the Shang state by at least 1300 B.C.[6] The rest of the Central-South provinces were slower in coming into the orbit of Han civilization. For one thing, they were separated from it by inhospitable terrain and the Yangtze River. For another, the peoples of the Yangtze River were products of a different group of interacting cultures than those of the North. Hunting and farming cultures grouped loosely in tribes persisted in the South until the North developed the improved military and agricultural techniques that made possible their expansion beyond the Yangtze.[7]

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[5] Fung Yu-lan's A History of Chinese Philosophy, 2 vols., tr. by Derk Bodde, Princeton, N. J., Princeton University Press, 1953, is one of the best surveys by a Chinese available in the English language.

[6] See map in Albert Herrman, Historical and Commercial Atlas of China, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1935, p. 9.

[7] For a readable account of the differences between the northern and southern cultures of China and their integration, see references, Footnote 1.

Before the end of the Shang Dynasty, the northern parts of Hunan and Kiangsi had been incorporated into the Chinese state.[8] Chinese influence was slight, however, until the Ch'in Dynasty (221 to 207 B.C.) settled colonies of drafted soldiers from the North as farmers and military reservists in the provinces.[9] With the rise of the Han, the Sinifying process was intensified and completed. 175

The most famous names of Hupeh and Hunan in the traditional period are those of semihistorical figures. Some of the greatest battles of the Three Kingdoms period (221 to 226) took place in Hupeh. The military heroes of the time, such as Kuan Yü, have been enshrined in popular tales, which were evolved between the thirteenth and sixteenth centuries into one of China's greatest novels -- The Romance of the Three Kingdoms.[10] This work was a particular favorite of Mao Tse-tung, and he has repeatedly drawn on it in his conversations and writings.[11] Hunan is one of China's 703 773 000

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[8] See map in Herrman, op. cit., pp. 10-11.

[9] Harold Wiens, China's March Toward the Tropics, Hamden, Conn., The Shoe String Press, 1954, p. 9.

[10] The novel is available in an English translation by C. H. Brewitt-Taylor, San Kuo, or The Romance of the Three Kingdoms, 2 vols., Shanghai, Kelly and Walsh, 1926.

[11] See for instance his autobiography as told in Edgar Snow, Red Star over China, rev. ed., Garden City, N. Y., Garden Publishing Co., Inc., 1939, pp. 111-67.

Hunan is one of China's main sources of myths and legends. The yearly celebration of the nation-wide Dragon Boat Festival, for instance, is attributed to the search for the body of Ch'ü Yüan, a statesman of the Ch'u Kingdom, c. 300 B.C. He had reportedly drowned himself near Changsha to add emphasis to his advice to his prince.[12]

Kiangsi's most famous personality was the Sung prime minister Wang An-shih (1021 to 1086). His attempts to introduce reforms directed against the rich and in favor of the peasant included the idea of government loans and intervention in agriculture to assure "an ever-normal granary."[13] The program was broadly analagous to the United States Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933.

C. The Slow Process of Integration in Kwangtung and Kwangsi

Kwangtung and Kwangsi were nominally subjected to Chinese rule by the Ch'in Dynasty, but the two provinces did much as they pleased, until conquered by a Han military expedition in 112 B.C. The subsequent settlement of Chinese officials and military agricultural colonies in Kwangtung and Kwangsi tied the[14] provinces more firmly to the Chinese Empire.

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[12] Latourette, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 53, 68.

[13] Ibid., pp. 253-57.

[14] Weins, op. cit., pp. 132-39.

The Sinification process in Kwangtung was advanced by the T'ang Dynasty (618 to 906) through the establishment of military agricultural colonies in the area and through its use as a place of exile for political and literary figures who had fallen into disgrace in the North. So great was the T'ang influence, that large sections of the Kwangtung people still refer to themselves as T'ang-jen (men of T'ang), rather than as Han-jen (men of Han) as is done commonly in most of China.[15] Under the Sung Dynasty (960 to 1279), Kwangtung became thoroughly Chinese in culture when the nomadic conquest of North China caused a large number of its great families to flee south and settle there. Until recent times, nearly all of the prosperous clans of Kwangtung traced their history back to migration during the Sung period.[16] 175 173

While Kwangsi was subject to similar influences, its progress lagged until the end of the Ming Dynasty (1368 to 1644) and the beginning of the Ch'ing Dynasty (1644 to 1911). At least eighty per cent of the families calling themselves Han Chinese today in Kwangsi arrived there since the seventeenth century.[17] 173 579

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[15] Ibid., p. 41.
[16] Ibid., pp. 143-44.
[17] Ibid., p. 144.

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The rugged terrain of the province, particularly the western portion, has made it a natural haven for bandits and political dissidents. They have posed a problem for every ruler there, including the current Communist regime.[18]

D. Division of North and South

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While the native cultures of Honan, Kwangsi,

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[18] A western traveler in Kwangsi around 1910 remarked on the prevalence of robbers in the province; William E. Geil, Eighteen Capitals of China, Philadelphia, J. B. Lippincott Co., 1911, pp. 118-20. In the first half of 1951, a Communist summary of bandit suppression campaigns in South China (Kwangtung and Kwangsi) reported 261, 686 "bandits" killed, wounded or captured. Of this total, 242, 730 were accounted for in Kwangsi: Survey of China Mainland Press, Hong Kong, American Consulate, 172, p. 17. These figures should not be taken as estimates of the actual number of robbers in the two provinces, but as indicative of the relative incidence of overt social and political dissidence in Kwangtung and Kwangsi. The figures evidently do not include members of the Kuomintang army. See Ibid., 212, pp. 23-28; and Current Background, Hong Kong, American Consulate, 39, pp. 18-20. The citations from Survey of the China Mainland Press and Current Background refer to literal translations of material in Communist magazines and newspapers, and should be evaluated accordingly.

Kiangsi, and Kwangtung were being amalgamated with the predominant Han culture, Honan and northern Hupeh were being subjected to alien influences. The nomads from the north and west of China ruled the North for most of the fourth, fifth, and sixth centuries. Again, from 907 to 1279, it was largely under alien, nomadic rule.[19] 175

Some differences between North and South in dress, spoken language, and habits of daily life did arise from this separation of China and the admixture of its culture with two alien cultures. Also, the long years of division developed a consciousness within North and South of their separate identities and some antagonism between the regions which has never been eradicated. These differences should not be stressed too much, however. Sufficient numbers of the old families stayed in the north to fill most of the administrative jobs under the alien dynasties and instill Chinese 184 values and forms of organization in the conquerors.[20] Moreover, since the Mongol conquest of China in 1279, the country has been almost continuously united until the middle of the nineteenth century, when the Taiping Rebellion opened the way for an upsurge of provincial autonomy. 184

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[19] The best accounts of the nomadic conquest and rule of North China are: Eberhard, op. cit., pp. 110-77, 207-39; Wolfram Eberhard, Conquerors and Rulers, Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1952, pp. 64-120; and Karl A. Wittfogel, Feng Chia-sheng, et al. History of Chinese Society: Liao (907-1125), issued as Transactions of the American Philosophical Society, n. s. 36, 1946, Philadelphia, The American Philosophical Society, 1949.

III. THE MODERN PERIOD

A. Political and Social Upheaval

The last hundred years of China's history have been marked by great social and political upheaval. The shape these movements took can be almost wholly attributed to the impact of the modern West. Beginning in the nineteenth century, economic and military penetration made wide inroads into the economy and political control of China. Along with this intrusion came new religious and secular ideas that worked to undermine Chinese loyalty toward 177 the traditional political and social system. 177

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[20] Eberhard, A History of China, pp. 178-79, makes much of the differences that grew between North and South during the first period of division. In his Conquerors and Rulers, pp. 65-121, however, Eberhard demonstrates the persistance of the Chinese culture and political administration in the North under alien rule. Joseph Needham, Science and Civilization in China, Cambridge, England, The Unversity Press, 1954, Vol. I, page 11~~9, minimizes~~ the difference that grew out of the period of division.

178 But the causes of upheaval are not wholly attributable to the western impact. It coincided with a phenomenon which had been repeated many times over the centuries in China -- the decline of the ruling dynasty with an accompanying abuse of power and growth of disorder.

The internal and external forces for change were most acutely present in the Central-South Region. Kwangtung provided the top leadership and a great part of the manpower for the Taiping Rebellion, the Reform of 1898, and the revolutions of 1911 and 1923-27. The Communist movement drew its leaders primarily from Mao Tse-tung's home province of Hunan, and to a lesser extent from Hupeh.[21] Kwangsi and Kiangsi provided terrain favorable to the growth of illegal movements spawned in the neighboring provinces to the north and south. Significantly, Honan, at the center of traditional Chinese civilization, made little contribution to any of these movements.

B. The Key Role of Kwangtung

The prominent position of Kwangtung in the first seventy-five years of this period of turbulence stemmed from the unique experience of the province in relation to the ruling Ch'ing Dynasty and to the outside world. Secret societies kept alive bitter memories of ruthless persecution in the early years of the Ch'ing Dynasty and schemes for restoring the previous Ming Dynasty. A small but significant part of the province's coastal population had long filled the atypical and despised role of businessman for the nation. From Kwangtung had also come the great majority of Chinese overseas migration. These emigrants sent letters home from Southeast Asia, the Americas, Australia, and Hawaii. Many returned with wealth and ideas acquired abroad. As a result, the Cantonese and their neighbors in the surrounding territory became aware of new concepts and the actualities of the outside world long before the rest of China began to doubt the superiority of the Chinese state and way of life.[22]

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[21] R. C. North, Kuomintang and Chinese Communist Elites, Stanford University Press, 1952, pp. 65-71.

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The coastal area of Kwangtung was also the first place in China to experience the adverse effects of the western penetration. The introduction of opium into the country by the British at the beginning of the nineteenth century turned China's trade from a favorable to an unfavorable

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[22] H. F. MacNair, China in Revolution: An Analysis of Politics and Militarism Under the Republic, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1931, pp. 6-7.

balance. In its wake came a rise in prices. The inflation hit hardest at the peasants and other poor classes in the vicinity of Canton, i.e., in eastern Kwangsi and southern Kwangtung.[23] Their livelihood was further reduced when English manufactured goods began to displace the handicraft industry on which the Chinese peasant relied for a necessary supplement to his farm income. The hardships, discontents, and resentments against the ruling power were further intensified by drought and famine. The result was the Taiping Rebellion. 177 458

C. The Taiping Rebellion

The rebellion started in Kwangsi just before the middle of the nineteenth century as disorganized pillaging and robbing by secret societies and bandit gangs.[24] These traditional outlets for social discontent were often indistinguishable one from the other and frequently became the nuclei for movements seeking political power. At the same time, numbers of Canton's businessmen and gentry became disgusted with Manchu corruption 669

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[23] H. B. Morse, The International Relations of the Chinese Empire, Vol. I, London, Longmans, Green and Co., 1910, pp. 173-92. Also see Teng Ssu-yü, New Light on the History of the Taiping Rebellion, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1950, pp. 43-47, which includes an analysis by Tseng Kuo-fan of the causes of unrest in 1852.

[24] Teng, op. cit., p. 48.

669 and weakness in resisting foreign encroachment. They moved into adjoining Kwangsi and helped give the unorganized bandit and secret society groups cohesion and a goal -- the establishment of a new regime and social order. From Canton's lower class, numbers of unemployed migrated to Kwangsi to swell the essentially peasant ranks of the rebels.[25]

669 177 The head of this movement, Hung Hsiu-ch'üan, was a native of Kwangtung. He had met repeated failure in the official examinations, but had acquired a smattering of Christianity and western socio-economic reformism in Canton. Convinced in a dream that he was the brother of Jesus, Hung fused his limited knowledge of those western secular and religious concepts with traditional Chinese ideas to evolve a reform program that became the ideology of the Taipings. With the ambition of becoming emperor, Hung led the rebels north in 1850 to overrun most of China and threaten the existence of the throne for fifteen years.[26]

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[25] *Ibid.*, p. 59.

[26] On the Taiping Rebellion, see Teng, *op. cit.*; G. E. Taylor, "The Taiping Rebellion: Its Economic Background and Social Theory," *The Chinese Social and Political Science Review*, Peiping [Peking], January, 1933, pp. 345-614; and Morse, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 438-71; Vol. II, pp. 64-110.

Today, the Communists laud the Taiping Rebellion, minimizing its effect in weakening the central government's power to resist foreign penetration. At a time when the western powers were making new demands and using force to back them up, the dynasty was reduced in prestige and deprived of revenue from its richest provinces. The destruction wrought by the Taipings cut into the throne's revenue for years afterward. 669

The Communists also make much of the revolutionary peasant nature of the Taipings. Although peasant unrest did have a major share in instigating the movement, it was rejected by a large part of the peasantry. The small landowners found no attraction in the Taipings' promise to communalize land-holding and institute other radical departures from the traditional social, political and economic system. Never instituted on any broad scale, the doctrine showed many affinities to an enlightened Communism. Furthermore, it was at the hands of a predominantly peasant army that the Taipings met their first serious setbacks and final defeat. The force was organized and directed by a Hunanese scholar-official, Tseng Kuo-fan.

D. Tseng Kuo-fan

Tseng is vilified by the present Chinese regime as an utterly ruthless, feudal-minded representative of the scholar-gentry class. In truer perspective, Tseng was one of the last great Confucian statesmen and one of the greatest exemplars of the highest traditions of the scholar 175 645 gentry class.[27] He was born near Changsha in circumstances as poor as those of the rebel leader he defeated. Unlike Hung Hsiu-ch'üan, Tseng met with brilliant success in the examination system and attained cabinet rank. His full public life thereafter was guided by the high moral principles of the Confucian tradition. In line with this tradition, he understood the economic causes of peasant discontent and the responsibility of scholar-officials to rectify these grievances.[28]

He was also aware of the part western economic penetration played in ruining Chinese businessmen and impoverishing the common people. Advising the emperor to resist further expansion of western business activity in China, Tseng urged that the Chinese foreign office should pay greatest attention to faithfulness, righteousness, and determined resolution in arguing on the basis of th welfare of the common people.[29] On the other hand, he recognized the necessity of China to acquire for herself the technical know-how of the West if the nation were to survive. He recommended the training of students abroad and the attempt at home to produce the modern artifacts and arms of the West. During the Taiping Rebellion, he established some of China's first modern arsenals. To his organization of the Hunan peasant militia can be traced the beginnings of China's modern army. 175 645

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[27] The main source on Tseng Kuo-fan is W. J. Hail, Tseng Kuo-fan and the Taiping Rebellion, New Haven, Conn., Yale University Press, 1927.

[28] See Tseng's report on causes and cures of peasant unrest as cited in Teng, op. cit., pp. 43-47.

[29] See Teng Ssu-yu and J. K. Fairbank, China's Response to the West; A Documentary Survey, 1839-1923, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1954, pp. 62-64.

Inadvertently, Tseng contributed to the disunity of China. In defeating the rebellion, he and his subordinate commanders were seldom able to obtain imperial direction and financial aid. To finance and organize efficient fighting forces, they introduced such innovations as personal armies, the likin (a tax on the movement of commercial goods within and across provincial borders), and provincial discretion in the collection and allocation of taxes. These measures laid the foundations for local autonomy and warlord rule that were to plague China up through World War II.

D. Monarchial Reform and Republicanism

For much the same reasons that made Kwangtung a leader in the Taiping Rebellion, that province again played a major part in the monarchial reform and republican movements. The two promotors of the Reform of 1898 were K'ang Yu-wei and his follower, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao.[30] Both 185 of these men were from Kwangtung. When the Manchu Dowager Empress Tz'u Hsi resisted the new measures of the "Hundred-Day Reform" of 1898 and proved incompetent to resist encroachment by the foreigner, a large part of the reform sentiment turned toward revolutionary republicanism. In that camp also, the leader was a native of Kwangtung -- Sun Yat-sen. 185

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[30] On K'ang Yu-wei, see Feng, op. cit., pp. 676-91. On Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, see J. R. Levenson, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and the Mind of Modern China, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1953.

Until the May 4th Movement of 1919, the membership of the various revolutionary organizations evolved by Sun Yat-sen was largely composed of natives of Kwangtung. It consisted mostly of youths educated abroad or in missionary schools, merchants and overseas emigrants from Kwangtung, and opportunistic militarists and their armies based in Kwangsi. Working with, if not within, the various revolutionary organizations was the membership of various secret societies. They were strongest in the Central-South Region below the Yangtze River.[31] 668

E. Kwangtung and Kwangsi Separatism

The separatist tendency of Kwangtung and Kwangsi was strengthened with the failure of the 669

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[31] S. Chen and R. Payne, Sun Yat-sen, A Portrait, New York, John Day. Co., 1946, pp. 52-54 and passim. Also see Lyon Sharman, Sun Yat-sen, His Life and Meaning: A Critical Biography, New York, John Day Co., 1934, pp. 61-63; and MacNair, op. cit., pp. 8-9, 25-26, 65-72.

1911 revolution. Between 1913 and 1923, various Kwangsi-Kwangtung warlords maintained a series of independent regimes. Open military rule was on three occasions varied by a show of republican government headed by Sun Yat-sen.

By 1925, Sun with Russian aid and advice had built up an effective party and army at Canton which were able to establish supremacy over the warlord element. The Kuomintang consolidation of power was helped immensely by a combined strike and boycott in Canton and Hong Kong against the British from June 1925 to October 1926. While anti-imperialist and revolutionary enthusiasm was at its height, the Kuomintang under the leadership of the Russian agent Borodin and Chiang Kai-shek began the northward expedition to uniteall China.[32]

No sooner was China nominally united by the Kuomintang in 1928 than the two southern provinces reasserted their autonomy under military leaders who had participated in the northern march. In Kwangsi, Li Tsung-jen and Pai Ch'ung-hsi maintained a semi-autonomous provincial government. It was noted as a model of discipline and organization. Both men were highly critical of Chiang Kai-shek, but they rallied to the national cause when Japan attacked China in 1937. Li Tsung-jen won new fame by leading his troops to one of China's few victories at T'aierhchuang in 1938.[33] 669

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[32] The degree to which the revolutionary movement up to 1928 was almost exclusively a Kwangtung and Central-South affair is clearly evident in the detailed account of MacNair, op. cit., which takes the account up to 1930.

G. Sun Yat-sen

Overshadowing the militarist Ch'en Chi-t'ang, who controlled Kwangtung for most of the period from 1928 to 1937, were the province's civilian contributions to the revolution. Sun Yat-sen stood head and shoulders above the rest.[34] He is still a revolutionary symbol which neither the Communists nor the Kuomintang can completely ignore. 668

Born in 1868, Sun was active in every phase of revolutionary work during the three decades following Japan's defeat of China in 1895. The organizations he evolved -- the Hsing Chung Hui

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[33] H. Freyne, China's New Deal, New York, The Macmillan Co., 1943, pp. 174-75; and P.M.A. Linebarger, The China of Chiang K'ai-shek [sic]: A Political Study, Boston, World Peace Foundation, 1941, p. 102.

[34] The main sources for Sun Yat-sen are Chen and Payne, op. cit., Sharman, op. cit., and M. B. Jansen, The Japanese and Sun Yat-sen, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1954.

(Revive China Society) in or before 1895, the T'ung Meng Hui (Common Alliance) in 1905, the Chung-hua Komintang (Chinese Revolutionary Party) in 1914, and the Chung-kuo Kuomintang (Chinese Nationalist Party) in 1919 -- were the principal channels of Chinese revolutionary endeavor in those years. In his travels about the world, he solicited funds from overseas Chinese and arranged for material aid from French and Japanese government representatives to finance a series of uprisings. He had a great part in the planning and leadership of most of the revolutionary attempts made in China between 1895 and his death in 1925, with the exception of the 1911 outbreak that overthrew the Manchu regime. 668

His[1] most lasting influence, however, was as a theoretician. Sun's thinking was cast in a western mold but was ingrained with traditional ideas. This was a reflection of his early training in the classics, overlaid with a higher education in western schools, an adult life lived outside China, largely in Europe and American, and extensive reading in the writings of western social, political, and economic thinkers. 829

The result was a syncretic, propagandistic doctrine that never reached the stage of logical systematization and planning. Its main features are: the Three People's Principles (San-min Chu-i) -- nationalism, democracy and improved livelihood; the three-stage attainment of responsible government -- military conquest and dictatorship, party tutelage, and democracy; and the five-power constitution, adding an examination and censorate branch to the tripartite western

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[1] [i.e. Sun Yat-sen.-- Analyst]

system of executive, legislative, and judicial branches. They are still the foundation of the Kuomintang on Formosa. 829

Sun's will exhorting his comrades to attain these and other principles he had worked out was read every Monday morning to the school children and officials throughout China during the ascendancy of the Kuomintang on the Mainland. The short-lived alliance with the Soviet Union, negotiated by Sun after being rebuffed by the West when he sought material and financial aid in building a strong China following World War II,[1] has put Sun in the Communist camp as well. His birthday and death are still officially observed and commemorated by the new regime. In his *New Democracy*, written in 1940, Mao Tse-tung placed himself in line as the heir to, and completer of, the revolutionary work, which the bourgeois Sun Yat-sen had initiated.[35] 668

H. Hu Han-min and Wang Ching-wei

Just below Sun stood Hu Han-min and Wang Ching-wei. Both men were eager for power and 665

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35. Mao Tse-tung, "China's New Democracy," Sharaf Athar Ali, tr., reproduced in U. S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, *The Strategy and Tactics of World Communism*, Supplement III, *Communism in China*, Washington, D. C. U. S. Government Printing Office, 1949, pp. 67-91, and especially pp. 80-84.

[1] [errata: should be World War I.- -Analyst]

critical of Chiang Kai-shek, a native of Chekiang and a relative latecomer to the revolutionary ranks. Though Chiang maintained real power throughout the pre-war period, at times of crisis he was forced by public opinion and the necessity of showing unanimity in the nation to include the names of Hu and Wang in the party and government hierarchy.

Until his death in 1937, Hu represented the right wing in Chinese politics. He had been a revolutionary collaborator with Sun since the founding of the *T'ung Meng Hui* (Common Alliance) in 1905. Many influential people in China looked on Hu's stand for a strong, orderly, civilian government and the slow extension of democracy as embodying the real will of Sun Yat sen. After 1931, Hu lived in exile and refused to accept a commanding post with the government as a form of protest against its appeasement policy toward Japan.[36]

Wang Ching-wei represented the left wing in Chinese politics and was far more ambitious than Hu. Having been with Sun at his death and conveyed his will to the people, Wang had a

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36. Hu's life and influence must be pieced together from newspaper accounts and isolated references in such works as T'ang Leang-li, *The Inner History of the Chinese Revolution*, London, George Routledge and Sons, 1930; MacNair, *op. cit.*, and Linebarger, *op. cit.*

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strong claim on Sun's mantle. Wang stressed immediate social betterment and democratic procedure. From the time of the Kuomintang-Communist split in 1927, he had repeatedly and unsuccessfully attempted to establish a government in opposition to Chiang. As foreign minister from 1931 to 1935, Wang was held responsible for China's failure to resist Japanese encroachment. When the decision was made at Hankow in 1938 to continue the fight against the enemy, Wang urged negotiations with Japan and was forced to flee China with the label of traitor. In May 1940, he returned to Nanking as head of the puppet Chinese government. It was in that capacity that he died in 1943.[37]

I. The Soong Family

The Soong Family, with its roots in Hainan, has represented all sides of the Chinese political spectrum. China's financial wizard was T. V. Soong. As Minister of Finance from 1928 to 1931, and, thereafter, head of the Central Bank of China, he largely determined China's fiscal policies. At the same time, he amassed a personal fortune which enabled him to retire to the United States when the Communists overran China. The two most famous of his three American-educated sisters are the widow of Sun Yat-sen and the wife of Chiang Kai-shek. Madame Sun opposed Chiang while he was in control on the Mainland, continued to stress the leftist, social-reform side of her husband's program, and now holds high official position in Red China. Madame Chiang is credited with converting her husband to Christianity, tutoring him in the civilian graces, and inspiring and advising him in his conduct of government. She still heads the equivalent of a women's auxiliary of the Kuomintang and continues to be active in social welfare work at her husband's side on Formosa.[38] 665

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[37] See references in preceding footnote and the undocumented generally sympathetic work by Don Bate, Wang Ching-wei, Puppet or Patriot, Chicago, Ralph Fletcher Seymour, 1941.

F. The Revolutionary Center at Wuhan

The other great center of both the 1911 and the 1923-27 revolutions was Wuhan, a complex of the three cities of Wuchang, Hanyang, and Hankow, in Hupeh Province. Wuhan was the collection and trans-shipment center for the rich Yangtze Valley and one of China's first industrial centers based on a modern iron and steel mill at Hanyang. Revolutionary propaganda had made its mark among the city's workers and the imperial 669 troops stationed nearby, and it was in this city that the 1911 revolution was ignited. The accidental explosion of a bomb at the revolutionary headquarters in Hankow on October 10th forced the plotters to begin action prematurely. They were joined by large numbers of imperial troops, and the city became the center of revolutionary resistance against the government forces until the Ch'ing Dynasty was forced from the throne.[39]

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[38] On T. V. Soong, see references in footnote 36. On Madame Sun and Madame Chiang, see Emily Hahn, The Soong Sisters, Garden City, N. Y., Doubleday, Doran & Co., Inc., 1943.

In 1927, Wuhan again became a revolutionary focal-point after one element of the Kuomintang army captured that city. It then became the scene of a power struggle between the Communists and the Kuomintang led by Chiang Kai-shek. With the support of Shanghai industrialists and the forces of warlords within the ranks of the revolutionary army at Wuhan or in the vicinity of the city, Chiang emerged victorious. He turned the revolution to the right. The Russian advisors were expelled from the country and the Communists from the Kuomintang.[40]

J. The Battleground of Honan, Hupeh, and Hunan

From the time of the Taiping Rebellion until the invasion of China by Japan, the provinces of Hunan, Hupeh, and Honan were a frequent battleground. During the political chaos that followed the death of Yüan Shih-k'ai in 1916, Honan was subjected to the exploitations of various warlords, ambitiously moving northeast with the intent of seizing Peking or retreating to the southwest after being ousted from the national capital. Hupeh and Hunan were likewise exploited by warlords, as those in the North tried to extend their power southward and the Kwangsi-Kwangtung faction attempted to establish themselves in the North. During and after the northward march of the Kuomintang armies, the provinces were the scene of violent peasant uprisings and suppressions. With the National Government seated in Nanking in 1928, the three provinces became an area of contention between the Kwangtung-Kwangsi warlords and the central government's forces.[41] 669

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[39] Chen and Payne, *op. cit.*, pp. 90-97.

[40] The most detailed account of the Kuomintang-Communist split, written from a leftist point of view, is Harold Isaacs, *The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution*, rev. ed., Stanford, Calif., Stanford Univ. Press, 1951, expecially pp. 111-237. A shorter, neutral account is given in R. C. North, *Moscow and Chinese Communists*, Stanford, Calif., Stanford Univ. Press, 1953, pp. 66-121.

K. Mao Tse-tung

Out of the turmoil in Hunan and Hupeh in these years came a number of the Communist leaders who today hold high places in the current regime. Hunan's most famous revolutionary product is Mao Tse-tung. The leader of the 668 vanguard of the proletariat, the Communist Party, is by his own admission the son of a stern, rich-peasant, petit-bourgeois father. With slight education in the classics and a smattering of western education, Mao was impressed by K'ang Yu-wei's monarchical reformism, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao's moderate republicanism, Sun Yat-sen's radical republicanism, Ts'ai Yuan-p'ei's "idealism," and Ch'en Tu-hsiu's pragmatic science and democracy before committing himself to Communism at the age of twenty-eight.[42]

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[41] That these provinces were continually overrun by one group after another was due to their lack of natural defenses and their position between the center of political power at Peking and the natural havens for lawless or revolutionary elements in the South and West. Being food surplus producing provinces, they also were coveted by ambitious factions.

Mao's main contribution to the 1925-27 revolution was the rousing and organizing of peasants in Hunan and Hupeh. The most militant of them, along with like-minded groups under other Communist agitators, became the nucleus of an armed force by which Mao was able to begin establishing soviets in China and gain personal ascendancy in the Party. Besides force and power politics, Mao owes his leadership to his ability to see and deal with actualities. Many of his actions and much of his thinking in accommodating to reality before 1949 would have been counted as Communist heresy if he had failed or lost the leadership of the Party. Because he suceeded, Mao is hailed in Communist China and accepted, perhaps only warily and grudgingly, in the Soviet Union as a theoretician who has made a major contribution to Marxist revolutionary theory.

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[42] On Mao Tse-tung, see his autobiography as related in Snow, op. cit., pp. 111-67.

With the establishment of the People's Republic, Chinese Communist thought and action have outwardly, at least, conformed more closely to Communist dogma. At the same time, Mao surrendered the ideological spotlight to another Hunanese, Liu Shao-ch'i. Liu has closely followed the international Communist line in his writings but has shown a strong tendency to explain and reinforce it with elements of Chinese traditional thought.

Another Hunanese of lesser rank is Li Li-san, the first head of the All-China Labor Union. He has had more experience outside the country than most of the Communist leaders. Having studied as a student in France before he joined the Party in the early twenties, he also spent more than a decade in Moscow after he fell into disgrace as a Party leader. P'eng Te-huai is a name well known to Americans. He commanded the "Chinese People's Volunteers" in Korea for all but the initial months of their participation in the conflict and represented China in the peace negotiations at Panmunjom.

The most notable current Communist figure from Hupeh is Lin Piao. A graduate of Whampoa Military Academy, he commanded the Red Army which swept through the Central-South Region after winning victories at Peking and Tientsin, and led the Chinese troops during their initial intervention in Korea.

IV. THE RISE AND VICTORY OF COMMUNISM

A. The Prewar Period

When the struggle for power at Wuhan ended in a Kuomintang victory, a small Communist-indoctrinated part of the original force which had captured the city retreated south. These and other elements that had been organizing peasant uprisings in Kwangtung, Kwangsi, Hunan, Hupeh, and Kiangsi maintained a wandering and precarious existence for the next three years.

By 1930 they had established small, isolated bases throughout the Central-South Region from the Hunan-Hupeh border south. The strongest concentration was in Kiangsi, where the Communists organized the first Chinese Central Soviet Government in 1931.[43]

The fifth of a series of "annihilation campaigns" launched by the National Government against the Kiangsi Soviet between 1930 and 1934 was successful. The Communists' main body was forced out of the Central-South Region on its

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[43] The events of this period are not yet altogether clear, but informative accounts are available in B. I. Schwartz, Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1951, pp. 46-171; North, Moscow and the Chinese Communists, pp. 79-146, Isaacs, op. cit., pp. 111-322; Snow, op. cit., pp. 42-56, 140-62, 350-53.

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six-thousand-mile "Long March" which finally ended in north-central Shensi.[44] Remnants of the former soviets in the region became active again only during the war. Their greatest strength was in the Pearl River delta area, Hainan Island, and the Leichou Peninsula across from it on the Mainland. Other remnants were formed into the New Fourth Army. It operated in East China but extended its guerrilla activities along the Yangtze River into easter Hupeh, Hunan, and Kiangsi. After 1944, the Communist Eighth Route Army expanded its operations steadily southward until it controlled a large part of Honan.[45]

B. Post-war Victory

A government offensive launched in July 1946 drove the bulk of the Communist forces out of the Central-South Region.[46] The only

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[44] Snow, op. cit., pp. 162-96.

[45] See Gunther Stein, The Challenge of Red China, New York, Whittlesey House, McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1945, pp. 314-15, 322-25, 326-31 and map facing p. 458; also Agnes Smedley, Battle Hymn of China, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1943, pp. 247-493.

[46] The names, dates, and campaigns in this section are largely taken from a Communist source, which is accurate in regard to those facts as far as can be determined by checking against other, scattered sources: Liao Kai-lung, From Yenan to Peking, Peking, Foreign Language Press, 1954, pp. 15-17, 32-38, 49-50, 62-65, 90-107.

Communist activity there until mid-1947 consisted of thrusts by the regular army at the Lunghai Railway between K'aifeng and Hsüchow, and guerrilla actions in various places, including Kwangtung and Hainan.

The Communists began their return in force to the Central-South Region on August 23, 1947, when units of the Red Army under Ch'en Keng and Hsieh Fu-chih crossed the Yellow River from southern Shansi into western Honan. They spread over the whole region between the Yangtze and the Yellow rivers and from the Han River in the west to the sea in the east. At the end of 1947, the Communists established there what they called the Central Plain Liberated Area. It consisted of isolated stretches of countryside, particularly along strategic communication lines. The major cities with their communications hubs and environs remained in Kuomintang hands.

After winning decisive victories in Manchuria during the summer and early fall of 1948, the Communists reorganized their forces. The armies which had originally fought in the Northwest, the Central Plain area, the East, and the Northeast were renamed respectively the First, Second, Third, and Fourth field armies. Between November 1948 and January 1949, the Second Field Army under Liu Po-ch'eng and the Third Field Army under Ch'en I waged the "Huai-Hai" campaign, winning key victories at Hsüchou, in northern Kiangsu, and at Yungch'ang in eastern Honan. With the latter victory, January 19, Kuomintang resistance north of the Yangtze River was broken.

In the following three months, the opposing camps talked peace while each moved its troops into position for the battle shaping up south of the Yangtze. Meanwhile, the Kwangsi General Li Tsung-jen, newly elected vice president of the National Government, took over as chief executive when Chiang Kai-shek resigned the presidency on January 21, 1949. Less than a month later, the capital of the National Government was moved from Nanking to Canton. At the same time, government financial resources, official personnel, and members of the armed forces began to be withdrawn to Formosa.

By April 20, 1949, the Communists were ready to move with the Second and Third field armies. They struck across the Yangtze River between Hankow and Nanking. As they swept southward in East China, the Fourth Field Army under Lin Piao smashed into Wuhan on May 17. Five days later, Nanchang, capital of Kiangsi Province, was in the hands of the Third Army.

In less than two months, the bulk of the Fourth Field Army was in position along the Yangtze from Wuhan westward to the gorges above Ichang. On July 12, it thrust simultaneously into southern Hupeh and northern Hunan while the Second Field Army crossed the Kan River into eastern Hunan. The governor of Hunan, Ch'eng Ch'ien, and the commander of the government's First Army Group in the province, Ch'en

Ming-jen, defected to the conquerors less than a month later as the Red Army moved in on Changsha. 669

By October, the Red Army was fighting in Kwangtung. Canton fell October 14, and twelve days later the main forces of Yu Han-mou's Kwangtung Army were destroyed. Between November 7 and December 11, the "People's Liberation Army" overran southwestern Kwangtung and all Kwangsi. The deciding point was reached December 4 when two army groups under the Kwangsi general Pai Ch'ung-hsi were encircled and routed on the Kwangtung-Kwangsi border. With a part of his force, Pai escaped to Indo-China. From there he made his way to Formosa where he occupies a position in strategic military planning. At about the same time, Li Tsung-jen left China for the United States. Hainan Island, off the coast of Kwangtung, was taken in April 1950, bringing the entire Central-South Region under Communist control.

The rapid occupation of the five southern provinces of the Central-South Region indicates the extent of Kuomintang collapse by mid-1949. The people of the region were thoroughly sick of fighting after a century of rebel invasions, warlord conflicts, Japanese occupation, and civil war. Any regime that promised peace and stability would have been welcomed. To the great majority of China's population, the peasants, the struggle for power was none of their business. They stood aside waiting for the winner to emerge, and accepted the victory of the Red Army as the beginning of a new dynasty which had inherited the "mandate of Heaven" from the discredited Kuomintang.

1: Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF14 ~~S-5~~ Central China AF14


CENTRAL-SOUTH CHINA
POPULATION
DISTRIBUTION
PROVINCES
A-Honan
B-Hupeh
C-Hunan
D-Kiangsi
E-Kwangsi
F-Kwangtung
A
B
C
D
E
F
108
112
116
36
32
28
24
20
Scale in Miles
0
100
200
300

[facing p. 54]

POPULATION

I. POPULATION DISTRIBUTION AND DENSITY

On November 1, 1954, the Communist Statistical Bureau made public a communique on the results of the 1953 census,[1] giving the total Chinese population as 601,938,035. If we deduct the estimated figures for Taiwan (Formosa) and overseas Chinese, the total Chinese population in Mainland China is 582,603,147. Of this number, the figures for the six provinces constituting the Central-South Region are as follows:

Table 1. Population of Central-South China */

Honan Province	44,214,594
Hunan Province	33,226,954
Hupeh Province	27,789,693
Kiangsi Province	16,772,865
Kwangsi Province	19,560,822 #/
Kwangtung Province	34,770,059 #/
Total	176,334,987

*/ Based on Kuang-ming Jih-pao [Enlightenment Daily], Peking, November 1, 1954, p. 1.

#/ An adjustment of the boundary between Kwangtung and Kwangsi was made on July 1, 1955, which may have affected population figures of these two provinces. (See chapter on Geographical Setting.)

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[1] "Kuan-yü Ch'üan-kuo Jen-k'ou Tiao-ch'a Teng-chi Chieh-kuo Kung-pao" ["Communique on Results of Census and Registration of China's Population"], Jen-min Jih-pao [People's Daily] , Peking, November 1, 1954, p. 1; also see George B. Cressey, "Changing the Map of China, " Far Eastern Quarterly, Vol. 14, No. 3, pp. 387-88.

The accuracy of the figures in Table 1 is, of course, still open to question. Doubt may easily be cast upon these figures on the basis of any one or all of the following facts: (1) the 1953 census-taking was not thorough; in certain areas where direct counting of noses was not possible, undefined "indirect" methods (possibly estimates) were employed; (2) before the results of the census were announced, the responsible Communist quarters had already started a campaign to "correct the undesirable habit of filing false reports," and the Bureau of Statistics had begun to criticize the lack of reliability in the statistical work at various government levels.[2] Until 1952, the estimates on China's population cited by Communist officials had remained under 500 million. Early in 1953, several months before the census figures were completely tabulated, the same Communist officials stepped up their estimates to about 550 million. Thus there is ground for suspicion that the Peking government might have made a conscious effort to exaggerate the figures for propaganda purposes.[3]

However, until substantial evidence is discovered to justify suspicion of fabrication, the figures in Table 1 will stand as the result of the first and hereto only direct nation-wide census. Relative reliability seems to be supported by the following points: (1) They generally tally with the figures on the electorate, delegates and their representation in the general election for which the census was initiated.[4] (2) The fact that

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[2] Jen-min Jih-pao [People's Daily], Peking, Mar. 31, 1954, p. 1.

[3] Tsui-chin Ch'i-ko-yüeh Lai Chung-yao Fei-ch'ing Tsung-ho Pao-kao [Comprehensive Report on Important Developments in Communist China in the Last Seven Months], Taipei, The Sixth Section, Central Committee, the Nationalist Party, 1954, pp. 22-23.

[4] Yüan-li Wu, An Economic Survey of Communist China. New York, Bookman Assoc., 1956, pp. 13-22.

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scattered reports on the basic-level elections are available, roughly covering all parts of China, should serve to indicate the geographic extent to which, if not the degree of thoroughness with which, the census-taking was carried out. This thoroughness is unprecedented in China. (3) The Communists as far back as 1949 began their study of population, and it appears possible to say that the Peking regime had exercised considerable discretion in checking the 1953 census against the previously released figures. (4) Only a comparatively small portion of the 1953 population figures (about eight million) was derived from the so-called "indirect method of census-taking." (5) The above cited communique also reported on the review of these figures by the Bureau of Statistics. It states that after rechecking 9 per cent (or 52,950,000) of the total population in a cross-section of many different localities, the duplicates amounted to only 0.139 per cent and those uncounted in the initial registration only 0.255 per cent.

With the above observations and reservations, we will proceed to discuss the population figures in Table 1.

The total number of over 176 million for the Central-South Region is about 30.3 per cent of the total Mainland population. A comparison of the population figures and land areas by regions shows that the Central-South Region is first in population and third in land area. Its density of 151.23 per square kilometer (391.68 per sq. mi.) ranks third. A breakdown by provinces is as follows: 161

Table 2. Density of Population in Central-South */ 161

	Population	
	Per Sq. Km.	Per Sq. Mi.
Honan Province	280.1	725.4
Hunan Province	151.2	391.6
Hupeh Province	115.0	297.8
Kiangsi Province	98.2	254.3
Kwangsi Province	79.3	205.3
Kwangtung Province	155.6	403.0
Regional Average	151.23	391.6

*/ Based on the 1953 census and Chung-hua Jen-min Kung-ho-kuo Fen-sheng Ti-t'u [Atlas of the People's Republic of China by Province], Shanghai, Ti-t'u ch'u-pan-she, 1953.

A region in the United States approximating the Central-South China Region in size and with some similar climatic and topographical features would consist of Missouri, Arkansas, Louisiana, Alabama, Tennessee, Kentucky, Illinois, and Georgia. The average population density in this part of the United States is 61 per square mile. A comparison shows that the Central-South China Region is more than six times as crowded.

II. COMPOSITION AND RATE OF GROWTH

Very few reports have been published in conjunction with the 1953 census. What little information that is available pertains mainly to the Chinese population as a whole. For example, the national average ratio between male and female is 51.82 per cent and 48.18 per cent.[5] 162

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[5] Pai Chien-hua, "Liu-wan-wan Jen Wo-kuo She-hui-chu-i Chien-she Ti Wei-ta Li-liang," ["Six Hundred Million People--A Great Strength for Socialist Construction of China,"] Jen-min Jih-pao [People's Daily], Peking, November 1, 1954, p. 3.

An investigation into other sources, such as gazetteers and yearbooks of various provinces published from 1920 to 1945, reveals that the early statistics are often inconsistent and frequently based on guesswork. The following table is the latest available: 162

Table 3. Sex Ratio in Central-South China Population (1948) */

Number of Males per Hundred Females	
Honan Province	103. 72
Hunan Province	111 . 55
Hupeh Province	109. 15
Kiangsi Province	107. 88
Kwangsi Province	109. 08
Kwangtung Province	113. 27
Regional Average	108. 91

*/ Based on Chung-hua Min-kuo T'ung-chi T'i-yao [Statistical Abstract of the Republic of China] , Taipei, Executive Yüan, Directorate-General of Budgets, Accounts and Statistics, 1955, p. 20.

As of June 1953, the national average ratio between rural and urban population in China was 86. 74 per cent and 13. 26 per cent. Explaining the preponderantly rural section of the nation's population, the Communist authorities add that there has been a remarkable increase in the urban population (40 per cent in certain cities) compared with their 1950 figures. Earlier statistics, such as those in the following table, indicate a larger percentage for urban population. This apparent contradiction to the Communist claim of an increase in urban population is possibly the result of a discrepancy in definitions of "urban." While the Nationalist Government in the past used the farming population as the basis for rural population figures, the Communists may have drawn the line to include in the 1953 rural population the communities below a certain size. 162

Table 4. Rural and Urban Population in Central-South China (1948) */

	Rural	Urban
Honan Province	88.42	11.58
Hunan Province	74.31	25.69
Hupeh Province	90.80	9.20
Kiangsi Province	80.02	19.98
Kwangsi Province	79.62	20.38
Kwangtung Province	71.47	28.53
Regional Average	80.74	19.26

*/ Based on Chung-hua Min-kuo T'ung-chi T'i-yao [Statistical Abstract of the Republic of China], Taipei, Executive Yüan, Directorate-General of Budgets, Accounts and Statistics, 1955, p. 34.

The same Communist sources disclosed that, as of June 1953, the young and young-adult groups constitute an overwhelming majority of the total population. A 15.6 per cent figure is assigned to the 1-4 years age group and 11 per cent to the 5-9 years age group. Within the age bracket 18-79, the figure is approximately 58.9 per cent. No statistical data are available to indicate the exact age-group composition of the Central-South China population.

Based on 1953 census information, the national average birth rate is 3.7 per cent per year and the death rate is 1.7 per cent, a natural rate of increase of two per cent per year, which would be considered a high rate in any nation in the world. The Communists tend 161 163

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to attribute the significant increase in population during recent years to the improvement in medical service and sanitation measures and betterment of economic conditions generally. As specific evidence the Peking regime pointsto such places as the village group of Shen-chuang _hsiang_, Lu-shan _hsien_, in Honan Province. The information on population of this locality shown in Table 5 was obtained from the 1953 census:

Table 5. Population of Shen-chuang Hsiang */

Children		Sex Ratio		
Age	Number	Age	Male	Female
1	93	1	42	51
2	80	3	32	33
3	65	4	22	20
4	42	5-59	1,273	1,041

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*/ Chu Wei, "What the Population Figures of a _Hsiang_ Tell," _People's China_, June 16, 1954, pp. 16-18.

Lacking additional details, the figures in Table 5 may be open to any of the following interpretations: (1) The infant mortality in this locality through the past four years has been startlingly high. (2) Infant girls die more frequently than infant boys. (3) The birth rate has increased. (4) Social conditions have improved in general, including the abolition of such practices as infanticide, of which infant girls used to be common victims. The Communists do not hesitate, of course, to conclude that the two latter possibilities are actual fact, and there is no way to prove or disprove their claim since the mortality rate and other relevant information on the population of Shen-chuang has not been released.

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Another typical Communist claim pertaining to the growth in population is the report on the situation in central Honan Province. The two *hsien* of Hsi-hua (Sihwa) and Fu-kou (Fukow) had experienced many floods from the Yellow River system, and as a result the population in this area had been dwindling. However, the 1953 census figure of 706, 963 for this area was described in the Chinese Communist press as representing a "tenfold increase" as compared with 1947.[6] Similar situations have been reported in other areas within this region where natural disasters once held down or reduced the population. Since "liberation," the population has grown rapidly. This trend is being cited repeatedly to substantiate Peking's claim of economic and social improvement throughout the region. 161

III. INTERNAL MIGRATION

There is no study available on the migration of population during World War II when the Central-South Region was despoiled. A national trend of return to war-ravaged areas once occupied by the Japanese was evident in 1945-49, and this region was no exception. The trend, however, was not well-defined and no accurate measurement of it was made because of the ensuing civil war and the chaotic conditions that prevailed throughout China immediately after the Japanese surrender. It probably will never be possible to compile statistics to show what percentage of the population in this war-dislocated region went back to urban centers in 1945-49 or drifted out of the cities in quest of a means of livelihood. After the establishment of the Peking regime, a systematic effort was made to relocate the population by (1) encouraging the surplus urban population to move to the countryside, to reclaim old abandoned farms or develop new ones, and (3) inducing or forcing people from congested 166 areas to go to work on large-scale construction projects. In this region the following trends can be observed: 166

A. Migration to Industrial Centers

The Central-South Region has been designated in Peking's five-year plan as a center for steel and iron industries. Many cities in this region were marked for expansion. In early 1954 modernization and public works construction programs were started in the nine cities of Chengchow, Loyang, and Hsin-hsiang, in Honan Province; Wuhan and Huang-shih in Hupeh Province; Hsiang-t'an and Chu-chou in Hunan Province; and Canton and Chan-chiang in Kwangtung Province. (See chapter on Geographical Setting.) Of these cities, Huang-shih and Chan-chiang are both newly developed centers. Huang-shih, situated on the Yangtze River about fifty miles east of Wuchang, is the river port for the coal mines of Tayeh, and has been described as already having expanded from a one-street town to one of six streets in a few years.[7] In the city of Hsiang-t'an a new textile factory is reported to be under construction.[8] Toward these centers the migration of population in the region is generally oriented. 166 178

B. Labor Exodus to Construction Centers

Large numbers of workers and their families have been moving near the government-operated construction projects in this region. The partially completed Ching-chiang Flood Diversion Project in wes- 166 464 tern Hupeh Province, the steel bridges across the Han and Yangtze rivers, and other projects at various stages of completion have been drawing tens of thousands of people. Press reports in Communist China reveal that the general plan seems to be to move these "migrant workers" from project to project, according to the schedule of completion. No end of these projects is in sight. (For details, see related chapters in Economic Section.) 166 464

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[7] Jen-min Jih-pao [People's Daily], Peking, April 19, 1954, p. 2.

[8] Ibid., February 21, 1954, p. 2.

C. Settling on New and Reclaimed Farms

The development of collective farms by reclamation of wastelands in Honan, Kwangtung, and elsewhere in this region calls for the settlement on the new farms of farm laborers drawn from varying sources -- surplus rural population, convicts sentenced to forced labor, and the unemployed from large cities. Migration does not flow in one direction, nor is it confined within the Central-South Region. Not a few of the migrants have been directed to the northeast in Heilungkiang Province, to the north in Inner Mongolia, to Sinkiang Province in the northwest, and south to the Vietminh territory in Indo-China.[9] Anti-Communist sources have reported that from April 16 to May 10, 1955, 60,000 people representing 15,000 families had been moved from the Yellow River area, including Honan Province, to the Northeast Region. The same source also reported that 5,000,000 people were to be sent from Hupeh, Hunan, Kiangsi, and other provinces, according to Communist plan.[10] These reports are generally borne out by information from Communist sources, although Communist re- 166 ports understandably differ in the number of people 166 concerned, and the manner of, as well as the people's reaction to such migrations.

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[9] Ya-chou Tien-hsün [The Asia Foundation News Bulletin], San Francisco, October 20, November 11, Dec. 2, 1954; Jan. 6, Feb. 21, Apr. 21, May 17, 1955.

[10] Ibid., May 27, 1955.

Anti-Communist sources, claiming access 167 to informants in Mainland China, further report the flight to large cities of rural people in search of food confiscated in lieu of taxes by the Communists. A number of these reports trace some of these emigrants from Kwangtung to Hong Kong or Macao, which are foreign territories.[11] If such reports could be supported by facts, and the number of emigrants were substantial, it would follow that discontent among some sections of the population in Central-South China had developed to a critical degree.

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[11] Ibid., March 8, 9, 14, 15; April 14, May 24, 1955.

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
HUI
MIAO
TUNG
CHUANG
YI
YAO
LI (Loi)
THAI
HONAN
HUPEH
HUNAN
KIANGSI
KWANGTUNG
KWANGSI

THE DISTRIBUTION OF MAJOR NON-HAN ETHNIC GROUPS IN THE CENTRAL SOUTH

[Facing p. 65]

ETHNIC GROUPS

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Ethnic minorities are herein defined as minorities bound together by common ties of race, nationality, or culture, living together within an alien civilization but remaining culturally distinct. The Chinese Communists, following the practice of the USSR, have termed the ethnic minorities within the Chinese territory "nationalities" or "national minorities" in juxtaposition to the Han nationality. Therefore, the term "nationality" as used in China today is nothing but a designation for an ethnic and geographical community. Owing to the fact that the Hui people, neither racially homogeneous nor concentrated in one area, are also regarded as a separate nationality by the Chinese Communists, the latter's main principle governing such a classification seems to be the presence of customary laws and practices peculiar to a group of common origin which have, over a period of time, regulated their standard of behavior and given rise to group consciousness and distinctive characteristics. It is on this same broad principle that we base our classification of the ethnic groups in China. Accordingly, the Han Chinese, though by far the great majority of the Chinese population (94%), are also considered as one of the many ethnic groups in China.

I. INTRODUCTION

Of the more than 176 million people in the Central-South,[1] non-Han ethnic groups number from 8 to 9 million, constituting approximately one-twentieth of the total regional population.[2] The great majority of the non-Han ethnic groups are found in Kwangsi Province where they constitute 40 per cent of the total provincial population. The largest single non-Han ethnic group, the Chuang, totaling nearly 6 million, is also found in this province.

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Honan has a number of Hui people scattered around Kaifeng; Hunan has a large number of Miao in the western part of the province and also some Hui people; and Kwangtung has Yao people in the north, Yao and Miao in the west, and Tan people on the Yüeh River. But the provinces of Hupeh and Kiangsi are very seldom mentioned in connection with ethnic minorities. As far as official Chinese history goes, no "barbarian group" has been found in Kiangsi since 617 A.D. The same can be said of Hupeh Province. This does not mean that there have never been any non-Han Chinese in Kiangsi and Hupeh; perhaps the fact that they have preferred to live like the Han Chinese makes mention unnecessary.[3] Those who were unwilling to adapt themselves simply migrated south into Kwangtung and Kwangsi. 162

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[1] Based on the 1953 Census as reported in the NCNA release of November 1, 1954.

[2] Jen-min Jih-pao [People's Daily], Peking, Feb. 18, 1952.

II. THE HAN CHINESE

Han Chinese constitute only 60 per cent of the total provincial population in Kwangsi Province, whereas in the other five provinces of the Central-South Region the Han Chinese constitute a greater majority.

At the beginning of the Christian era, Honan and Hupeh were already populated by Han Chinese.[4] Although Hunan was first claimed and colonized by the Han Chinese in A. D. 47, Kiangsi in 138 B. C., and Kwangsi and Kwangtung in 221 B. C.,[5] intensive Han migration into Hunan and Kiangsi began only in the T'ang dynasty (A.D. 618-907). The loss of Kaifeng, Honan, by the Sung to the Chin Tartars further intensified the southward migration of the Han Chinese. Only during Mongol rule in China did 162 166

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[3] Li, Chi, The Formation of the Chinese People, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1928, pp. 248-50.

[4] Ibid., p. 231.

[5] Ibid., p. 248.

permanent occupation of Kwangtung and Kwangsi 162
by the Han Chinese occur.[6] 166

The Han Chinese in the provinces of Honan, 166
Hupeh, Hunan, and Kiangsi speak Mandarin and
are more homogeneous than the Han Chinese in 197
Kwangtung and Kwangsi. There have been three major migrations of Han Chinese into Kwangtung and Kwangsi, each resulting in their settling in a different geographical locality and their speaking a different dialect:

1. From Kiangsi came the first group of Han Chinese who crossed Ta-yü-ling(Mountain) and reached the fertile Yüeh River delta by the Pei River. From this delta they spread along the Tung, Pei, and Hsi rivers. This group now speaks the Cantonese dialect.

2. From Fukien came the second group of Han Chinese by the sea route. They occupy the coastal plains ranging from the Han River delta to Hainan Island. This group now speaks the Ch'ao-chou and Hainan dialects.

3. The third group of Han Chinese immigrants are the Hakka, who migrated from Honan to Kiangsi before they came to occupy the interior mountain and river valleys in eastern

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[6] Ibid., p. 236.

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Kwangtung, at the end of the Ming dynasty (A. D. 1368-1644) and the beginning of the Ch'ing dynasty (A. D. 1644-1912). The Hakka dialect, different from the Cantonese and Fukienese dialects, more closely approximates the dialects in Central China.[7] On the other hand, because there are verbal similarities between Thai and Hakka,[8] the Hakka people are often confused with non-Han tribes, especially since they have some physical characteristics which resemble those of their neighboring tribal peoples in Kwangtung and Kwangsi.[9]

The Han Chinese in Kwangtung and Kwangsi moved from east to west in their attempts to find places in which to settle. Consequently today there are more Han Chinese in Kwangtung than in Kwangsi.

On Hainan Island, Cantonese-and Fukienese-speaking Han Chinese are found along the coastal plain, with large concentrations of Fukienese-speaking Han Chinese in the northeast, while 166 the Hakka-speaking Han Chinese are found in the 197 northwestern corner intermingled with Thai immigrants from Indo-China.[10]

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[7] Ch'u Chao-t'ang, Hsin Chung-kuo Ti-li, [The Geography of New China], Shanghai, Ta Chung-kuo t'u-shu chü, 1953, pp. 192-93.

[8] Wilhelm Credner, Cultural and Geographical Observations Made in the Tali (Yunnan) Region with Special Regard to the Nan-Chao Problem, Bangkok, the Siam Society, 1935, p. 16.

[9] Harold J. Wiens, China's March toward the Tropics, Hamden, Conn., The Shoe String Press, 1954, p. 272.

Comparing the Han Chinese in Kwangtung 142 and Kwangsi with the northern Chinese, the former are generally shorter in stature, showing the effect of a series of admixtures of non-Han blood in the course of Han migration. It can be stated, therefore, that the Han Chinese are more homogeneous in civilization than in racial composition. (For cultural characteristics of the Han Chinese, see chapters on Social Structure and Family in this handbook.)

III. THE NON-HAN ETHNIC GROUPS

The attached ethnographic map indicates 563 the distribution of non-Han ethnic groups, and a table contains some detailed information concerning the six most numerous non-Han ethnic groups.

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[10] Ch'en Chih, Hai-nan-tao Hsin-chih, [A New Gazeteer of Hainan Island], Shanghai, 1949, p. 89; Li Tai-ch'en, Hai-nan-tao Chih Hsien-chuang, [The Present Situation on Hainan Island], Shanghai, Shih-chieh shu-chü, 1947, p. 18.

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NAME OF GROUP	ORIGIN	NUMERICAL STRENGT
Hui (Hui-hui, Hui-tsu)	1. Arabian and Iranian soldiers and merchants who moved into China from the 7th to 13th centuries and intermarried with the Chinese and aborigines. 2. Chinese children adopted by Hui families. Most of the Hui people in the Central-South are found around Kai-feng, Honan, resulting probably from the Yuan Dynasty military colonization.	350,000
Chuang (Pien-jen, Nung-jen, T'u-jen)	A Thai race who entered Kwangsi from the west out of Hunan and Kweichow, where the Mongol armies conquered the Southwest in the 14th century.	About 6,000,000
Tung	Unknown. Probably a branch of the Chuang.	250,000
Yao (Called White-trouser Yao, red-turban Yao, from their attire; also Plain Yao, Cross-Mountain Yao from their dwelling places; other names from occupational and cultural levels.	They came from the east into Kwangsi province, probably after the immigration of Chuang.	460,000
Miao (Miao-tzu)	The Miao in Hunan are the aborigines. Most of those on Hainan Island came from the Chinese mainland during the Ming Dynasty (1366-1644).	480,000
Li (Loi, according to local pronunciation; Ha and Chi are two branches of the Li, distinguished from the Li proper.)	Aborigines of Hainan Island.	300,000

[facing p. 71; part A]

THE SIX NON-HAN ETHNIC GROUPS IN CENTRAL-SOUTH CHINA

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DISTRIBUTION	APPEARANCE
Settled among Han Chinese communities — cities and towns. Most are found in Honan, a few in West Hunan. About 2,000 on Hainan Island around Ya Hsien.	In the Hui of the Central-South, the Han Chinese blood overshadows the Turkish and Iranianblood. It is difficult to distinguish the Hui from the Han Chinese except by their different religious practices and customs.. Hui on Hainan Island have prominent noses and other Semitic features.
Most found in West Kwangsi.	Not noticeably different from the Han Chinese.
On the Hunan-Kwangsi border, near Kweichow, usually in mountainous areas over 6,800 feet above sea level.	Those who live on the plains are assimilated into Chinese communities. Those remaining on mountains wear peculiar costumes like the Miao.
Mountainous areas in Kwangsi, and some in Kwangtung and northern Hunan.	Shorter than the average Han Chinese. Most costumes have wide embroidered trimmings; women wear large earrings.
Western Hunan in connection with the Miao in eastern Kweichow (300,000); Northern Kwangsi at Ta-Miao-shan area (100,000); Northwestern Kwangsi around Si-lung (80,000); Hainan Island.	Deep-chested, rosy-cheeked hardy mountain-dwelling people; men dress like Han Chinese peasants; women wear costumes of colors peculiar to their tribes
Hainan Island with concentrations in Wu-chih-shan and Lo-tung, Pao-t'ing, and Pei-sha. The Chi live in the most inaccessible areas. The Ha live close to the coast, in the south and southwest of the island.	Men and women wear 6-cornered hats while working. The tamed Li resemble the Han Chinese; the wild Li (Sheng Li) preserve their tribal customs; women tatto their faces to mark tribal differences; both men and women have curious coiffures with big knots tied in various shapes, and do not wear many clothes.

[facing p. 71; part B]

	OCCUPATION	LANGUAGE	RELIGION
162 142 197 771	Most are small merchants and handicraftsmen; a small number engaged in agriculture; some are big merchants and landlords.	Chinese, supplemented by Arabian and Iranian phrases of a religious nature.	Islam (Ch'ing-chen chiao)
	Agriculture, primiarly wet-rice paddy culture.	They have their own dialect, but no written language. Most can speak Cantonese. A written Chuang language is being created for them under Communist sponsorship.	Ancestral cult; magicians and the belief in transformation of animals; doll sorcery.
	Agriculture, in mountainous areas.	Not clear.	Not clear.
	Agriculture on mountain slopes; wood-chopping, charcoal-making, bamboo basketry are sidelines.	They have their own dialect, but not written language.	Not clear.
	Agriculture (slash and burn); hunting.	Dialects; no written language; using Chinese when necessary.	Some Chinese gods have been taken into their temples.
	Agriculture Hunting Fishing	Li dialect, written language unknown	No organized religion; but superstitious beliefs; magic, sorcery, chicken divination are common; shrines where offerings can be made to please various spirits who preside over the locality; also cattle cult or cattle sacrifice.

[facing p. 71; part C]

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With the exception of the 2,000 *Hui* people on Hainan Island, the *Hui* in Central-South China are almost indistinguishable from the average Chinese in physical appearance. *Hui* cohesiveness is attributable to factors other than racial and physical differences. Their language, religion, and their customs which follow religious practices and observances, make them cohesive as an ethnic group in spite of outside influences, and the fact that in the Central-South the *Hui* do not have large and contiguous communities.

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The *Hui* intermarry with the *Han* Chinese. However, when a *Han* Chinese wishes to marry a *Hui* woman, he must embrace Islam, whereas a *Han* woman who wishes to marry a *Hui* man, need not change her religion. Therefore, although different ancestry sets apart the *Hui* people from the *Han* Chinese, the lack of racial prejudice on the part of the *Hui* facilitates the assimilation of other groups into the *Hui* community.

In contrast to the *Hui* people in the Southwest, who have been antagonistic toward the *Han* Chinese as a result of the oppressive policies of previous Chinese governments, the *Hui* in the Central-South Region mingle closely with the *Han* Chinese in daily life. The Kuomintang government seemed to take for granted that *Hui* were sufficiently assimilated into Chinese communities and did not merit recognition as a separate ethnic group. In the 1930's, the *Hui* were treated as "believers

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11. The *Hui* is an ethnic designation which does not include all the believers in Islam, Many Islamic groups in China have their own ethnic names, i.e., Urgurs, Kazaks, Mongolian Moslems, Tibetan Moslems, etc.

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in Islam," and their ethnic differences were minimized.[12] The present Chinese Communist government has reversed the Kuomintang practice. By reviewing past grievances between the Hui (mainly of the Northwest and Southwest) and the Han, and by condemning the policies of the previous governments, the Peking Government is claiming its ethnic policy as the most enlightened of all times. However Peking's reversal of Kuomintang policy so far does not seem to have aroused enthusiastic response among the Hui communities in the Central-South Region. This situation has probably led to new Communist propaganda among the Hui people: Pai Shou-i, a noted historian of Hui origin, has recently expounded the thesis that foreign imperialists, more than anyone else, were responsible for the former "unprosperous" state of the Hui people in Central-South and East China.[13]

Since more of the Hui people in the Central-South are small merchants and handicraftsmen, with few of them engaged in agriculture and still fewer as landlords, the Communists' land reform has little effect on the Hui people in this region. 563 Even the practice of polygamy, as sanctioned by [535] their religious belief, is not common among the Hui people of this region, since their economic status does not permit it.

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[12] This is evident in the several yearbooks compiled during that period. In these yearbooks, Hui people are not separately listed.

[13] For instance, Pai accused the British of helping the Manchu government suppress the Taiping rebels. Since the Manchu government suppressed the Hui people, the British were also regarded as the enemy of the Hui people. The Japanese were also accused of having destroyed many mosques and killed many Hui from 1931 to 1945. Cf. Jen-min Jih-pao [People's Daily], Peking, Nov. 21, 1950.

According to a report at a meeting held by 563 the Hui Cultural Association at Peking, ten 63- autonomous hsien and chou have been established for the Hui people in China; however, there has been no news release concerning the establishment of any Hui autonomous unit in the Central-South Region, although there are indications that scattered Hui have representation in the local governments as well as in the autonomous government units of some other ethnic groups.[14]

In lieu of the Hui people's own political organization, the Hui people's associations, like the one in Wuhan, are said to be active under Communist leadership, looking after Hui people's interest and voicing their opinion.[15] In reality, they serve the Peking government mainly as propaganda instruments among other Moslem peoples in the world, especially the Indonesians.

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[14] NCNA, April 15, 1955, Survey of the China Mainland Press, No. 1031, April 20, 1955, Hong Kong, American Consulate-General, pp. 32-33.

[15] Jen-min Jih-pao, Peking, August 17, 1952.

B. The Chuang People

Because the Chuang are better off economically than the other non-Han ethnic groups in Kwangsi and live in close association with the Han Chinese, they are not easily distinguishable from the latter.[16] Chuang people readily intermarry with the Han Chinese, and many who intermarry are not certain whether their ancestors were Chuang or Han. The Chuang's own traditional marriage system is free of the service of a middleman, and marriage is usually performed at festival times. The bride stays with her parents until the child is born, and only then is the marriage considered consummated.[17] In these customs, they are more like the Miao than the Han Chinese. 563 582 563 583

Many Chuang speak, read and write Chinese. They are not despised by the Han Chinese as much as are the other non-Han ethnic groups. However, many Chuang people who regard themselves as intellectuals and upper-class people do not like to admit that they are Chuang. Like the Pu-yi in Kweichow, the Chuang of Kwangsi as a minority group actually do not pose any minority problem for the Chinese administration. 563

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[16] Min-tsu Cheng-t'se Wen-hsien Hui-pien [Compendium of Documents on Nationalities Policies], Peking, Jen-min ch'u-pan-she, 1953, p. 52-53.

[17] Wiens, op. cit., p. 53.

The Chinese Communists recently claimed 563
that they had sponsored a revival of the almost 198
obsolete Chuang dialect, and that a written Chuang language was in the process of being created.

The Chuang have long been engaged in 563
agriculture; many Chuang own the land they cul- 565
tivate, and many are landlords. When the Communists carried out land reform in the Central-South, the Chuang landlords, like the Han Chinese landlords were accused as exploiters of the Miao and Yao peasants.[18]

C. The Tung People

The Tung people who live on the plain have been assimilated into Han communities. Those living in the mountainous areas resemble the Miao and Yao and have their own customs.[19] Ethnically, they are probably related to the Chuang. Like the Chuang, the Tung have long been accustomed to an agricultural economy, and many are landlords. Like the Chuang landlords, the Tung landlords, too, were accused of having exploited the Yao peasants during the land reform.[20] 563 565

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[18] Jen-min Jih-pao [People's Daily], Peking, Feb. 18, 1952.

[19] Li Tsung-jen and Pai Chung-hsi, Kuang-hsi Chih Chien-she, [The Reconstruction of Kwangsi], Kweilin; Kuang-hsi Chieh-she Yen-chiu Hui, 1939, p. 512.

D. The Yao People

The Yao community is divided into two classes: the landlord and the tenant. The landlords who own land on the mountain slopes are called Shan-chu (mountain proprietors). They usually wear their hair long, and are thus called Ch'ang-mao Yao [Long-haired Yao]. The Yao peasants, who move from one mountain to another when the soil is exhausted, are called Kuo-shan Yao [Cross-mountain Yao].[21] However, the number of Yao landlords is small, and most of the Yao peasants cultivate fields owned by Han Chinese or Chuang landlords.[22] Thus, Yao intermingle with Han and Chuang people in their daily economic life. [302]

A Kuomintang source states that Yao readily intermarry with the Han Chinese,[23] but recent 563 582

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[20] Min-tsu Cheng-t'se Wen-hsien Hui-pien, [as cited in footnote 16], pp. 155-56.

[21] An ko-ming, Chung-kuo Shao-shu Min-tsu Feng-kuang, [Life of the Chinese Minority Nationals], Hong Kong, Hsüeh-wen shu-tien, 1955, pp. 109-10.

[22] Min-tsu Cheng-t'se Wen-hsien Hui-pien, pp. 53-54.

[23] Li Tsung-jen and Pei Chung-hsi, op. cit., p. 512.

Chinese Communist sources state that Yao 563
people have strictly forbidden their children to [582]
intermarry with the Han Chinese since the latter are hated and distrusted by the Yao people.[24] Taking account of the Kuomintang government's desire to assimilate the minorities, and the Communists' exaggeration of minority sufferings under "undemocratic government," the real attitude of the Yao toward the Han Chinese must be somewhere between the two extremes. One must not ignore the fact that the superiority of Han Chinese culture is readily recognized by the Yao people, and this recognition often leads to ready assimilation of the Yao people into Han communities, provided that the latter do not
raise too high a barrier against the Yao. The 563
hardships of the Yao people are due to the follow- 182
ing conditions detrimental to a prosperous 427
community:

1. Yao peasants have to pay high rent for land under their cultivation; not infrequently, rent runs as high as 70 per cent of the total crop yield.

2. The land under their cultivation is 563
generally low in productivity; consequently, Yao 182
peasants are usually short of food a part of every 426
year. To alleviate the situation, Yao peasants

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[24] *Min-tsu Cheng-t'se Wen-hsien Hui-pien*, p. 103. (cited above).

often resort to mortgaging to their landlords 563
the green plants standing in the field for two- 82
or three-tenths of the regular crop price, and [-26]
thus further aggravate their next year's economic situation.

3. Lack of incentive and indulgence in liquor are prevalent in *Yao* communities and stem from the impossible economic situation in which the peasants find themselves.

Under the Communists, several *hsien* governments in Kwangsi have started moving *Yao* people from the mountains to the flat land to clear new land for cultivation or to share agricultural land confiscated from *Han* and *Chuang* landlords.[25] However, the *Han* and *Chuang* communities on the flat land are probably not very cordial to these immigrant *Yao* people, for there are cases in which some *Yao* people, after being given land in *Han* and *Chuang* communities, chose to return to their old habitat in the mountains. Recent Chinese Communist news dispatches claim an unusual effort on the part of the Communist cadres to foster friendliness between these ethnic groups.

Yao people have the custom of cultivating 563
each other's fields in groups. This custom is 476

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[25] *Jen-min Jih-pao*, Peking, March 11, 1950; June 25, 1952.

highly praised by the Chinese Communists since 563
it resembles the "mutual-aid teams" in the old 476
Liberated Areas in North China. Today, this traditional practice of the Yao people may facilitate the task of the Chinese Communists in the organization of the "co-operative labor teams" among the Yao people.

E. The Miao People

In the Central-South most of the Miao 563
people live in West Hunan where there is today
a Miao Autonomous Region. It is interesting to 657
note, however, that the Miao people comprise only one-fifth of the population of this so-called Miao Autonomous Region.

In contrast to the situation in the Southwest, 563
where Miao tenants are exploited by their Yi landlords, in West Kwangsi the Miao have been persecuting the Yi minority to such an extent that the latter group has dwindled in number in the last one hundred years from 10,000 to 3,000[26] [62]
Although most of the Miao, as an immigrant group on Hainan Island, are tenants of the aboriginal Li landlords and are controlled by them, they do not mingle or intermarry with the Li. The Miao on Hainan are said to be more intelligent and literate than the Li. Unlike the Miao

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[26] Liu Chieh, *Kuang-hsi T'e-chung Chiao-yü*, [*Special Education in Kwangsi*], Kweilin: Kuang-hsi sheng-cheng-fu pien-i wei-yuan hui, 1940, p. 2.

Unlike the Miao
in Kweichow, the Miao on Hainan are united; 563
and unlike the Li, the Miao do not form large 361
villages.[27]

There is little social stratification in Miao 563
communities in the Central-South. The Miao 562
women work in the field together with their men. They do not observe the marriage bond as strictly as the Han Chinese women. They do not suffer particularly under the marriage system, and the enforcement of the new Marriage Law by the Communists make no material difference to the status of Miao women in their own communities.

F. The Li of Hainan 'sland

Althoug the Ha and the Chi are actually two 563
branches of the Li people, the Li proper and the Chi and Ha differ culturally and discriminate against each other. The Ha, who daim to be Han immigrants during the Han dynasty are more advanced culturally.

All of the Li people use wooden plows and depend upon Han Chinese merchants for the importation of iron farming implements, which have always been inadequately supplied in the Li areas. Land holdings are scattered, and most of the Li landlords have Miao as their tenants.[28] 563

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[27] *Min-tsu Cheng-t'se Wen-hsien Hui-pien*, pp. 53-54.

A traditional Li tribe consists of three to ten villages, and each village contains a number of clans. The heads of the clans as well as the heads of the tribes exercise life and death power over the Li people under their control. 563 361

IV. GENERAL ETHNIC PROBLEMS AND THE CHINESE COMMUNIST ETHNIC POLICY AND ADMINISTRATION

In the Central-South Region there is a higher degree of interpenetration on the part of the various ethnic groups, especially in Kwangsi Province, than in the Southwest. Consequently, social problems of the Central-South, especially in areas where ethnic groups abound, cross the ethnic lines. For instance, so-called exploitation is usually (1) by Han Chinese landlords of Yao or Miao peasants, (2) by Han merchants of handicraftsmen minority of the nationalities, (3) by Tung and Chuang landlords of Miao and Yao tenants, and (4) by the Li landlords of Miao tenants on Hainan Island. Consequently, in the land reform conducted by the Communists, Yao, Miao and Han peasants were often gathered 563 together to accuse Han, Chuang, and Tung landlords.[29]

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[28] Ibid., pp. 53-54.

Except for the Hui people, ~~the~~ non-Han ethnic groups in the Central-South Region do not have strong internal organizations and are not tightly knit. This situation is readily reflected in the Communist ethnic policy in this region when compared with the policy in the Southwest, where Communist concentrate on minority leaders who have influence with their people. In the Central-South Region, ethnic work depends heavily upon Han Chinese cadres and non-Han cadres from the local population trained by the Communists.[30] The Communist Party, the New Democratic Youth League, and the Women's Federation have all been very active in the Central-South , and have as their goal the recruitment of large numbers of minority people.[31]

A Yao, Ho[illegible]i-feng, became the chairman of the Soviet Government in Kuo-te, Kwangsi, in 1929; and the Li and Miao on Hainan Island, Yao and Miao at Shih-wan-ta-shan, and the Yao and

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[29] *Jen-min Jih-pao*, Peking, Feb. 8, 1952.
[30] *Ibid.*, Feb. 18, 1952.
[31] *Ibid.*, July 5, and July 7, 1954.

Chuang in Kwangsi were engaged in anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare "under Communist leadership."[32] These past events are now widely publicized by the Communists among the non-Han ethnic groups in the Central-South in order to link the non-Han ethnic groups more closely to the Communist cause.

In the Central-South, the superiority of the Han Chinese culture is recognized. There is no competing culture, such as the one emanating from Tibet among the Tibetans in the Southwest. Therefore the ethnic problems in the Central-South are not particularly concerned with the possibility that a minority group may be attracted by a foreign power or that it may demand independence; effort is placed on the solving of inter-ethnic group conflict within the region. These conflicts are more frequently due to differences in economic status than to cultural organizations which maintain barriers between groups and prevent their amalgamation. It may be due to this fact that the Chinese Communists' main ethnic policy in the Central-South is the better organization of the labor force of the various ethnic groups in order to increase food production. Arid mountain fields are being abandoned and Miao and Yao peasants are fully utilized in land clearing or work on more productive lands. To the extent that the economic situation of the various ethnic groups in the Central-South can be improved, the Communists ethnic policy will have a chance of achieving success. The Communist have promised much in economic betterment, and it is still too early to appraise the results.

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[32] Ibid., Feb. 6, March 11, Sept. 28, 1950; Feb. 18, 1952.

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
CENTRAL-SOUTH CHINA
LINGUISTIC
A
B
C
D
E
F
SINO - TIBETAN FAMILY
CHINESE GROUP
N. MANDARIN
E. MANDARIN
HSIANG DIALECT
HAKKA
DIALECT OF AMOY
S.W. MANDARIN
WU DIALECT
KAN DIALECT
CANTONESE
FOOCHOW DIALECT
HWEICHOW DIALECT
KAM - TAI GROUP
KAM, SUI, ETC.
CHUNGCHIA, CHUANG, ETC
SHAN, LU, ETC
LI
MIAO - YAO GROUP
MIAO
YAO
TIBETO - BURMAN GROUP
LO-LO, MO-SO, ETC
PROVINCES
A-Honan
B-Hupeh
C-Hunan
D-Kiangsi
E-Kwangsi
F-Kwangtung
Mary Carmine

[facing p. 85]

LANGUAGES

I. MAJOR LANGUAGES AND DIALECTS

In this region both Chinese and non-Chinese languages are spoken. Major dialect groups of the Chinese language spoken are: Northern Mandarin, Southwestern Mandarin, Kan-Hakka, Cantonese, and Min. In the provinces of Hunan, Kwangtung, and Kwangsi and Hainan, side by side with Chinese dialects, specimens of such non-Chinese languages as Li, Chuang, Tho, Miao, and Yao are spoken.

II. GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION AND NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF SPEAKERS

A. Northern Mandarin

Northern Mandarin, the largest Chinese dialect group and spreading all over the northern part of China, is spoken throughout the province of Honan, where local dialects do not form a sub-unit of this major dialect group. There are approximately 44,000,000 speakers of this group of dialects in the region.

B. Southwestern Mandarin

Southwestern Mandarin, China's second biggest dialect group, with approximately 56,000,000 speakers, is spoken in a large part of this region, as follows:

1. Hupeh, except some of its southeastern and southern districts;
2. Northern Kiangsi, along the Yangtze River;

3. Hunan, except a few districts on the eastern border adjacent to Kiangsi;
4. Northern Kwangsi.

The dialects spoken along the three rivers, Hsiang, Tzu, and Yuan in Hunan and in a few districts in southern Hupeh near the Tungting Lake may be grouped under the name of Hsiang.

C. Kan-Hakka

The Kan dialect group with 10,000,000 speakers in the region, is spoken in Kiangsi along the Kan River and in some districts in southeastern Hupeh and eastern Hunan. The Hakka dialect group covers the area of southern Kiangsi, northern Kwangtung, and a small part of Western Fukien, and has approximately 11,000,000 speakers. Offshoots of the Hakka dialect are spoken in Formosa and elsewhere and scattered as speech islands in a few districts in Hunan and Szechwan. Since the Kan and Hakka dialect groups have some important features in common, they are treated as a single group.

D. Cantonese

The Cantonese dialect group, with approximately 40,000,000 speakers, is spoken in southern and western Kwangtung and throughout Kwangsi with the exception of its northern part. There are some Cantonese speakers also in Hainan. Most of the overseas Chinese speak dialects of this group.

E. Southern Min

In addition to southern Fukien which is outside this region, Southern Min is also spoken in south of Amoy, parts of eastern Kwangtung, and in Hainan. There are approximately 8,000,000 speakers in the region. 197

F. Non-Chinese Languages

As regards the non-Chinese languages in this region, Li is spoken in the mountainous areas in Hainan; the T'ai dialects are spoken in southern and western Kwangsi, under various tribal names; Miao is spoken in the mountainous areas in western Hunan; Yao is spoken in some mountainous districts in Kwangtung and Kwangsi. There are still some unknown languages, such as that of Ke Lao, spoken here and there in Hunan and Kwangsi. Altogether speakers of these non-Chinese languages in the region number approximately 7,500,000. 198

III. DISTINGUISHING FEATURES OF THE DIALECTS

A. Northern Mandarin

Dialects of the Northern Mandarin have in common the following distinguishing features: 197 194

1. There are two kinds of affricative consonants which are not voiced and voiceless as b, d, g, dz and p, t, ts in English, but voiceless and unaspirated, commonly expressed in phonetic symbols of the Wade-Giles system of Romanization as p, t, k, ts and p', t', k', ts' respectively. Roughly speaking, p, t, k sound like English p, t, k in speak, still, and skill; and p', t', and k' sound like English

p, t, k in peak, till, and kill. Voiced consonants such as b, d, g of English do not exist in Northern Mandarin.

2. There is a set of retroflex affricatives and fricatives distinguishable from dental affricatives and fricatives. For example:

Chu (pig) : tsu (to rent)
Ch'eng (city wall) : ts'eng (storey, layer)
Shan (hill) : san (three)

3. The gutteral nasal ng does not occur in the initial position of a word as it usually does in many other dialect groups.

4. A vowel scheme such as the following exists:

	Front		Central	Back	
	Unrounded	Rounded		Unrounded	Rounded
High	i	ü			u
Mid	e		ə	ə̂	o
Low			a		

With an additional symbol for the apical vowel, the above scheme will suffice to indicate all the vowel sounds of these dialects. Ordinarily, e and ə, or ə̂ and o, are not distinguishable.

5. Only two final nasals, n and ng are found, except in Shansi, and they are distinguishable regardless of the vowel preceding them.

Lan (indigo) : lang (wolf)
Chen (true) : cheng (to steam)
Min (people) : ming (name)
Sun (grandchild) : sung (loose)
Ch'ün (a crowd) : ch'iung (poor, impoverished)

6. There are four tones. The pitch of the first tone is high-level; that of the second, high-rising; that of the third, low-dipping and that of the fourth, high-falling. Graphically, these four tones may be represented as follows: ˥ , ˧˥ , ˨˩˦ , and ˥˩ , respectively. However, the dialects spoken in Shansi and areas adjacent to it have an additional fifth tone, which is always associated with a glottal stop in a final position. The dialects spoken in northwestern Honan adjacent to Shansi are rather like those spoken in Shansi. That is to say, they have a fifth tone, originating from the ancient "entering" tone and associating with a final glottal stop. Another characteristic of these dialects is that n and ng rarely occur after the vowels a and e.

B. Southwestern Mandarin

Southwestern Mandarin does not differ very much from Northern Mandarin, and it has the following distinguishing characteristics:

1. Such syllables as fu and hu, and sometimes fei and hu(e)i or fung and hung are not distinguished. The resultant merged forms are either fu, fei, or hu, hu(e)i, hung.

2. The initials n and l are not distinguished except in some Yunnan dialects. However, there is a tendency to treat these two sounds as conditioned variants or partially conditioned variants of a sound unit. That is to say that l is heard before mid and low vowels while n is heard before high vowels, or that while either n or l may occur as free variants before mid and low vowels, n occurs reguarly be-before high vowels.

3. Retroflex initials are not as commonly used as in Northern Mandarin. 197
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4. The glutteral nasal ng usually precedes the Northern Mandarin zero-initial when the latter is not a high vowel. Thus, words pronounced like ai (to love), e (forehead), and en (favor) of Northern Mandarin, become ngai, nge, and ngen, respectively.

5. The common Northern Mandarin unrounded back vowel ə̂, found in such words as kə̂, written as ke in the Wade-Giles system of Romanization, (elder brother), hə̂ or he (river), is replaced by a rounded o generally. The same back vowel in other Northern Mandarin words such as te (to obtain, se (color), che (this), k'e (guest), etc., is replaced by a front vowel e (which sounds like a in chaotic) in many Southern Mandarin dialects.

6. There is only one final nasal after the vowels ə, i, u, ü, and it is generally n.

7. While in a few special areas there are five or even six tones, most of the dialects of this group have four tones. The ancient "entering" tone is mixed with the "even" tone of words with voiced initials.

As to the Hsiang dialects, those spoken in western Hupeh, western Hunan, and northern Kwangsi closely resemble Southwestern Mandarin. However, those spoken in central Hupeh, especially around Wuchang, Hankow, and Hanyang, present two special features. One is the diphthongization of the simple vowel u after dental initials. For example, tu (stomach) becomes tou, and nu (angry) becomes nou;

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The other is the substitution of palatal initials for retroflexes, and the front vowel ü for the back vowel u in certain words. For example, ts'u (to go out) becomes ts'ü, tsu (pig) becomes tsü and su (book) becomes sü. The dialects spoken in eastern Hupeh and northern Kiangsu differ from those spoken in Wuchang, Hankow, and Hanyang in their tonal system which more or less preserves the ancient "entering" tone without any association with the final glottal stop. In some dialects spoken in eastern Hupeh, we find the ancient "falling" tone developed into two tones, depending on the voiced or voiceless quality of the initial. Consequently these dialects have five and even six tones.

A major characteristic of the Hsiang dialects that distinguishes them as a whole from Southwestern Mandarin is their preservation of the ancient voiced stops and affricatives either completely or incompletely in the initial system. This is of special historical significance since these consonants have been preserved in no other dialect within the entire Mandarin group.

C. Kan-Hakka

The Kan and Hakka dialects are grouped together for discussion for two reasons. One is that in both the ancient voiced stops and affricatives have changed to aspirated voiceless sounds in all cases. The other is that in many places in Kiangsi, the Hakka speaking and non-Hakka speaking peoples have mingled so well that it is difficult to say whether the dialects they speak are pure Hakka, pure Kan, or just a mixture of both. However, when the two dialects are not mixed, they are distinguishable.

1. Kan

Kan differs from Hakka mainly in the tonal system and final consonants. The number of tones varies from six to seven, but the ancient "entering" tone remains undifferentiated. In some extremely simple dialects within the group, the final p, t, k, once associated with the "entering" tone, have totally disappeared. As to the nasal finals, m is scarcely heard, while n and ng are seldom differentiated before i, e, u, etc.

Like Southwestern Mandarin, most Kan dialects do not differentiate between initial n and l, but unlike Mandarin, Kan dialects substitutes t and t' for retroflex initials. For instance, Mandarin chih (to know) becomes ti, and ch'uan (a stream) becomes t'uan, etc. Another unique characteristic of Kan is its simplification of common diphthongs such as ai and ao. Thus, Mandarin tai (to substitute) becomes ta, and kao (to tell) becomes kə (ə sounds like a in all). Finally, it may be added that the loss of final n after the vowel a and the nasalization of the vowel often occur in Kan.

2. Hakka

Hakka has the following special features:
a) It replaces the Mandarin zero-initial with a voiced labio-dental fricative when it is followed by the vowel u. For instance, Mandarin u (black), uei (to surround), uan (ten thousand), and uen (to interrogate), written as wu, wei, wan, and wen respectively in the Wade-Giles romanized spelling, become vu, vi, van, and ven. Moreover, words of this category which originally had an initial m in ancient times,

have retained the ancient initial. Thus, the word for "ten thousand" is also pronounced *man*, and that for "to interrogate" may also be pronounced *men*.

b) Before mid and low vowels, *ng* and the zero-initial are contrasted: thus, *ngon* (bank, coast): *on* (table); *ngao* (proud) : *ao* (difficult).

c) While its *h* is the same as that of Mandarin, it becomes an *f* when it precedes the vowel *u*. Thus, Mandarin *hung* (red) becomes *fung*, and *hua* (flower) becomes *fa*.

d) It has no *ü* sound. For instance, Mandarin *ch'ü* (to go), *yüan* (round), and *yün* (cloud) become *k'i*, *ien*, and *iun* respectively.

e) Final *m*, *p*, *t*, and *k* are retained: Mandarin *chin* (gold) *tsa* (mixed), *sha* (to kill), and *shih* (stone) becomes *kim*, *ts'ap*, *sat*, and *siak* respectively.

f) There are six to seven tones, two of which are derived from the ancient "entering" tone and associated with final *p*, *t*, and *k*.

D. Cantonese

Since the dialects within the Cantonese group often differ quite noticeably, an attempt is made here to deal mainly with standard Cantonese, which is the dialect of the metropolis of Canton. The remarkable features of the "Si Yap" dialects, however, will also be touched upon.

As the development of ancient voiced stops and affricatives is an important criterion for the grouping of dialects, it must be pointed out here that in this respect Cantonese is very much like Mandarin. That is to say, they both have unvoiced such voiced stops which have become aspirated or unaspirated as conditioned by the tone.

The special features of the initial system of Cantonese are:

1. *F* replaces the *h* and in certain cases of Mandarin when they are followed by *u*. Thus, Mandarin *hu* (tiger) and *k'u* (bitter) both become *fu*, *huo* (fire) becomes *fo*, and *k'uai* (fast) becomes *fai*.
2. In some other cases Mandarin *k'* is replaced by *h*: Mandarin *k'e* (can, may) becomes *ho* in Cantonese.
3. There is no retroflex initial.
4. Its preservation of the ancient final consonants *m*, *n*, *ng*, *p*, *t*, and *k* seems to be more perfect than that of Hakka and Southern Min. By "perfect" is meant that not only the exact number of six, but also the distribution of words in each of the categories.
5. The number of tones in Cantonese dialects varies from six to nine. The nine tones of standard Cantonese are: high-falling (ancient "even" voiceless initials), low-falling (ancient "even," voiced initials), high-rising (ancient "rising," voiceless initials), low-rising (ancient "rising," voiced initials), mid-high level (ancient "falling," voiceless initials), mid-low level (ancient "falling," voiced initials) high-level short (ancient "entering," voiceless initials and relatively high vowels), mid-level short (ancient "entering" voiceless initials and relatively low vowels), and low-level short (ancient "entering," voiced initials). Of these, the first one had a sandhi form, that is, it changes to high-level when preceding another word in connected speech.

E. Southern Min

The Swatow and Hainan dialects in this region belong to the Southern Min group, which includes also the eminent Amoy dialect. As a whole, the Southern Min group of dialects is closely related to the Northern Min group, which is typified by the dialect of Foochow. All Min dialects have the following features in common:

1. There is no labial fricative sound. For example, Mandarin f is replaced by h, p, or p'. Hence, Mandarin fa (law) becomes Foochow huak, Amoy huat, and Swatow huap; Mandarin fan (cooked rice, meal) becomes Foochow puong, Amoy and Swatow pong; and Mandarin fang (fragrant) becomes p'ang in Foochow, Amoy and Swatow alike.
2. Words with dental or retroflex affricative initials in other dialects are replaced by dental stop initials. Thus, Mandarin ch'ih (pond), ch'ou (to extract), and chung (middle) become tie, t'iu, and tüng respectively in Foochow, ti, t'iu, and tiong in Amoy, and ti, t'iu, and tong in Swatow.
3. Ancient voiced stops and affricatives have lost their voiced quality just as what has happened to those of the Mandarin dialects. But, unlike Mandarin, they have all become unaspirated instead of being both aspirated and unaspirated as conditioned by tones. Thus, Mandarin p'o (old woman), po (to bind), t'i (topic, title), tan (but), ts'ao (trough), and chin (to exhaust) become po, puok, te, tang, tso, and tseing in Foowchow, po, pak, te, tan, tso, and tsin in Amoy, and po, pak, ti, tang, tso, and tsen in Swatow.
4. There are generally seven or eight tones, and a very elaborate system of tone sandhi, especially in Northern Min.

Southern Min further characterizes itself by the following features:

1. There is a tendency to oralize the nasal initials

when they are not immediately followed by nasalized vowels or the nasal ng. Thus, b, l, g and m, n, ng are distributed complementarily in general. 197 194

2. Nasalized vowels and diphthongs are popular in daily speech, though usually not recorded in dictionaries dealing only with the literary pronunciations.

3. Tone sandhi is very common, but its system is not as elaborate as that of the dialects of Foochow. Each tone has only one sandhi form, no matter what tone the following word may have.

F. Non-Chinese Languages

1) Miao

The Miao language is now generally grouped together with the Yao language as a separate branch of of the vast Sino-Tibetan family of languages, which includes Chinese, T'ai, Annamese, and the Tibeto-Burman languages. Miao and Yao as languages are known under various tribal names in Southwestern China and Indochina. 198

Miao dialects have five tones: high-level, high-rising, low-rising, high-falling, and low-falling. Since most Miao people speak the local dialects of Southwestern Mandarin as well as their own language, many Chinese words have found their way into the Miao dialects. Naturally, such loan words have undergone modifications in pronunciation. For instance, final n is usually replaced by ng, because n does not occur in the final position in the Miao language as a rule.

2. Yao

The Yao language, unlike Miao, has no prenasalized stops, retroflex initials, or distinction between gutteral and uvular sounds, as are popular in Miao. On the other hand, voiced stops such as b, d, g, final consonants such as m, n, p, t, k, and the distinction of the duration of some vowels found in Yao, have no counterpart in Miao.

Generally speaking, Yao has received more influences from Chinese than Miao has, and, in a number of its dialects, T'ai influences are also discernible. Chinese loan words come from both Southwestern Mandarin and Cantonese. Hence, the Yao language is rather complicated. However, by their careful studies, linguists have been able to discover the close relationship between the Yao and Miao languages, especially the many parallel features in these two languages-- including those of their tone systems-- which reveal the historical connection between them.

3. T'ai

The languages popularly named Li, Nung, Chuang, T'u, etc., spoken in this region are, linguistically speaking, members of the T'ai group of the Sino-Tibetan language family. They are closely related to such well-known languages as Siamese, Laotien, Shan (in Yunnan as well as in Burma), and so forth.

T'ai resembles the Chinese language in some essential aspects, such as the development of ancient voiced initials and the tonal system. However, unlike Chinese the adjective in T'ai usually follows the substantive it modifies.

Generally speaking, the T'ai languages may be divied into two sub-groups by the criterion of the development of some consonants. It happens that specimens of both sub-groups are found in western Kwangsi.

The following comparison is interesting:

	Sub-group A		Sub-group B	
	Lung-chou	Lung-an	Wu-ming	Lai-pin
Aunt	pa	pa	pa	pa
Palm	p'a	p'a	va	va
Cloud	p'a	p'e	fe	hu
Fish	pja	pla	pla	pja
Hill	p'ja	p'la	pla	pja
River	ta	ta	ta	ta
Eye	t'a	t'a	ta	ta
Chicken	kai	kai	kai	kai
Kill	k'a	k'a	ka	ka
Rice	k'ao	hao	hao	hao
Egg	k'jai	hlai	klai	kjai

T'ai speakers in Kwangsi number less than half a million. Loan words from the Chinese language (Southwestern Mandarin as well as Cantonese) form a huge portion of their vocabulary, and almost all of the T'ai speakers can speak and read Chinese.

IV. DEGREE OF AUDITORY INTELLIGIBILITY

Although it is rather difficult to point out the exact degree of mutual auditory intelligibility of the languages and dialects spoken in this region, the previous section dealing with their distinguishing features should have made it reasonably clear that the non-Chinese languages, although not entirely free from Chinese influences, bear little resemblance to the various Chinese dialects. Hence they are not intelligible to the Chinese-speaking people of the region. Furthermore, they are sufficiently different from one another to be mutually unintelligible.

As to the Chinese dialect groups, despite differences in pronunciation, intonation, and syntax, Northern Mandarin and Southwestern Mandarin are mutually intelligible for practical purposes. But speakers of these two dialect groups will have a great deal of difficulty in trying to understand or to get themselves understood by the speakers of Kan-Hakka, Cantonese, and Southern Min dialects. As it has been noted in the previous section, the degree of mutual intelligibility on the part of Kan and Hakka is quite noticeable, but speakers of Cantonese and Southern Min will understand very little of them. Similarly Kan and Hakka speakers can hardly communicate orally with speakers of Cantonese and Southern Min. The degree of mutual intelligibility between Cantonese and Southern Min is such that the speakers of the two dialect groups can hardly converse.

V. THE NATIONAL LANGUAGE OR KUO-YÜ

Since there is no standard spoken Chinese, and since the various Chinese dialects in general are sufficiently different to make them mutually unintelligible to various degrees, many difficulties naturally arise. The Chinese themselves have long felt the need for a national language that will help them solve such difficulties. Consequently, as early as 1911, a movement was launched to unify the national language, and a system of thirty-nine phonetic symbols which were later reduced to thirty-seven was devised primarily for the purpose of indicating speech sounds. In the following year the pronunciation of Northern Mandarin as typified by the dialect of Peiping was adopted as the standard for the new national language. With the strong support of the government and educational leaders, the movement soon gained momentum and swept the entire country. Gradually more and more speakers of other dialects began to make an effort to learn the new national language or kuo-yü. 197

During the years of China's war of resistance against Japan when people speaking various dialects were squeezed into the hinterland, dialectal barriers were gradually broken down. A situation like that proved to be favorable to the further popularization of the national language. Although it may be exaggeration to say that now the national language has replaced local dialects in the Central-South Region, it is nevertheless true that kuo-yü is gaining wider acceptance than ever before.

VI. THE CHINESE WRITTEN LANGUAGE

Despite the fact that the Chinese people in this 212 region speak different Chinese dialects and even non-Chinese languages, the fact still remains that they use one and the same system of writing. None of the non-Chinese languages spoken in the Central-South Region has a written language of its own. As Chinese is the second language of these non-Chinese speaking peoples, they write in Chinese as well.

China's written language consists of thousands of uniformly understood logographs or "characters" as they are commonly called. They can be understood only with reference to their ancient forms.

A. Pictographs

Chinese characters are traditionally classified into six main categories, the first of which is pictographs. The characters in this category all originated from simple pictures: jih, now written 日, is the character for "the sun," yüeh , now written 月, is the character for "the moon," etc. However, they have long lost their function of picturing things and become merely conventionalize visual symbols of spoken words.

B. Ideographs

The second category is that of the ideographs, which are characters indicating in a diagrammatic manner simple ideas, as shang 上 for "up, above", hsia 下 for "down, below", i 一 for "one", erh 二 for "two", san 三 for "three", etc. Pictographs and ideographs, presumably bases of ancient Chinese characters, however, amount to only one-tenth of the entire stock of China's written symbols.

C. Compound Ideographs

The third category is that of the compound ideographs or characters whose meanings are determined by the combined meanings of their component parts, as ming 明, which is a combination of the "sun" and "moon", stands for "bright"; hsin 信, which is a combination of "man" and "word", hence, the "words of a man" stands for "honesty."

D. Phonetic Loan Characters

The fourth cetegory is that of phonetic loan characters. These characters were all borrowed from existing words homophonous with the new ones for which written symbols had to be coined. For example, when a written symbol had to be created for the new word lai, meaning "to come", instead of resorting to pictographic or ideographic devices for the coining of such a symbol, the old character 來, meaning "barley", also similarly pronounced, was borrowed for that purpose. Often such a borrowed character displaced the original source. Thus, 來 is now used exclusively to mean "to come" rather than "barley". Similarly, ch'i 其, the third personal pronoun, is now used invariably as such rather than as a symbol for "basket", the meaning of the original word similarly written and similarly pronounced.

E. Phonetic Compounds

Phonetic compounds constitute the fifth and perhaps the most numerous category of Chinese characters. They consist of two portions, a "signific" or meaning portion, and a "phonetic" or pronunciation portion. The former reveals the general meaning while the latter indicates the pronunciation of the compound. Thus, jan 燃 "to burn" has huo 火 "fire" as its signific, and jan 然, "so, thus" as its phonetic. Similarly, t'ang 糖 "sugar" has mi 米 "rice, cereal" as its signific, and t'ang 唐 "bold talk" as its phonetic. It may be pointed out here that the phonetic element of such compounds may or may not have been a "phonetic loan compound", that the pronunciation of the phonetic may or may not be exactly identical with that of the compound even on the basis of ancient Chinese pronunciation, and that the meaning indicated by the signific at best is categorical rather than minutely accurate.

F. Derivative Characters

The last of the six categories consists of what may be called derivative characters, the origin of which is still uncertain. Some scholars think that the characters of the category resulted from graphic inversion, such as lao 老 "aged, old" and k'ao 考 "aged, old";[1] others think that they resulted from changes brought about by modifications in sounds accompanied by modifications in meanings, such as heng 亨 "propitious" and hsiang 享 "to enjoy". At any rate, this is the smallest category.

VII. CHINESE SCRIPT AND THE HIGH INCIDENCE OF ILLITERACY

It is true that written Chinese is uniformly understood throughout the country and has created no difficulty for literate Chinese in communicating ideas to one another regardless of their dialectal affiliation. But it is also true that although Chinese characters might have been devised for writing the spoken language in ancient times, now the great majority of symbols have become merely conventionalized written equivalents of individual spoken words. Some of the characters for most commonly used words such as 鹽 "salt" and 鐵 "iron", for instance, consist of twenty-four and twenty-one strokes respectively. To say the very least about them, they are time-consuming for the average Chinese to learn and memorize. As there are thousands of characters in everyday use, many of which are comparable in complexity and clumsiness, it should be apparent that it will take an average person many years to become adequately literate. It is entirely possible and highly probable that there is a definite connection between the complicated and clumsy Chinese script and the high incidence of illiteracy in China, although other equally convincing factors, too, must have contributed substantially to that fact.

[1] [errata should be "to examine." --Analyst]

VIII. LITERARY CHINESE

Besides the many different dialects, many of which have their own written counterparts of varying degrees of completeness, there is yet another language in China known as the literary language, as it is usually called by Western writers. It is the language of China's undying classics and owes its preservation to the inflexible and conservative system of writing of the country. As such, it has no standard pronunciation of its own. In other words, it has as many standards of pronunciation as there are dialects in China. That is to say that if a passage written in wenli is read by a speaker of Northern or Southwestern Mandarin, Kan-Hakka, Cantonese or Southern Min, it will sound like the dialect he speaks. Moreover, in grammar and syntax, literary Chinese is so different from any of the dialects that it is almost a different language, entirely free from the influences of the changes that have taken place in the dialects. Hence, it is possible for a lettered Chinese at the same time to speak his own dialect and write literary Chinese without any strange feeling on his part at all. As a language, literary Chinese is noted for its conciseness, frequently leaving out many things which are ordinarily expressed, thus creating a kind of ambiguous terseness all its own, requiring its readers to fill in the missing elements as they go along. This characteristic accounts for the reason why a passage written in literary Chinese, when read aloud, can seldom be fully understood by a listener even though he may speak the dialect of the person reading.

Despite such a shortcoming, literary Chinese has been exerting a tenacious influence on the Chinese, especially the lettered segment of the population. It

is literary Chinese that has kept China's classics 212
alive and perpetuated the many pithy dicta of wisdom 195
unsurpassed in the living language of the Chinese people despite dialectal barriers of any kind. Although the written national language has been gaining wider and wider acceptance, the great majority of government and commercial organizations are still using literary Chinese in the transactions of their routine business.

IX. LANGUAGE REFORMS

Attempts to introduce language reforms in China 212
began on a nationwide basis with the movement to 185
unify the national language shortly after the establishment of the Chinese Republic in 1911. The movement was followed closely by efforts to reform the written language. Those who advocated such reforms were of the opinion that since the characters were so complicated and time-consuming for the average person to learn, and since literary Chinese was so unrealistic and impractical, something had to be done to make the written language of China more effective, so that it could be within the grasp of the average Chinese citizen in a relatively short period of time.

A. Phonetic Symbols

One type of reform advocated the use of phonetic 198
symbols as an aid to the illiterate to learn to read. 185
However, since the sole function of these symbols is phonetic, they are effective when they are used as a guide to correct pronunciation in accordance with the standard of the national language for the purpose of leveling down dialectal differences in pronunciation. They are helpful only to those who have not yet acquired such a knowledge. They cannot possibly add

anything to the attempt to make the Chinese language system simpler or more readily accessible to the illiterate masses. 198 185

B. Alphabetization

Another type of reform advocated was the alphabetization of Chinese in order to get away from ideographic writing. 212 185 As a matter of fact, the use of the Roman alphabet for the transcription of sounds of the Chinese language is no novel suggestion. As early as the beginning of the sixteenth century, Matteo Ricci, a Jesuit missionary to China, began to transcribe the then Mandarin sounds with the Roman alphabet on the basis of the speech sounds of his own native Italian language. Later, other systems of romanization were devised by others to meet the needs of those speaking other Western languages. The most widely used system among English-speaking peoples is the so-called Wade-Giles system, originally devised by Sir Thomas Wade, a member of the British legation in China, and later revised by the British sinologist, Herbert A. Giles. Another system in current use in this country is devised by the linguists at Yale University and is known as the Yale System.

In 1928 the Chinese Ministry of Education adopted a system of romanization known as Gwoyeu Romatzyh or National Language Romanization, devised by a group of Chinese linguists and intellectual leaders such as Dr. Yuen Ren Chao, Dr. Lin Yutang, and others. Its distinguishing feature is that instead of indicating Chinese intonation by means of superior figures or diacritical marks, it spells the different tones of Chinese words with different letters: mai (second tone, Wade-Giles mai 2) "to bury"; mae (third tone, Wade-Giles mai 3) "to buy"; may (fourth tone, Wade-Giles mai 4) "to sell".

Between 1929 and 1931 another system of romanization known as Latinxua was devised mainly by Professor A. A. Dragunov, a linguist of Leningrad, primarily for teaching the Chinese workers in the USSR to read. It has been very popular, for obvious reasons, with the Chinese Communists, who have been doing all they can to promote and popularize it. However, since the system makes no attempt, except in an ad hoc manner, to distinguish tones in Chinese, it is not only inadequate and unsatisfactory, but often misleading.

C. Simplified Characters

Yet another type of proposal advocated the simplification of Chinese characters, especially the more complicated ones in common use, by reducing the number of their strokes. Advocates of this proposal believed that a simplified system of writing would make the whole process of learning to read and write Chinese much easier and less time-consuming. For example, ts'ai "then" has been reduced to look like 才 , and [illegible] t'ieh "iron", to look like 鉃. If a satisfactory principle of simplification that is philologically sound can be worked out, so that the simplified characters, if necessary, can be identified with the original characters, the adoption of such a system may turn out to be a boon to China's millions of illiterate people in their effort to become literate.

D. Basic Chinese

A fourth type of proposal advocated the reduction of the number of characters to be meant for general use in order to simplify the written language. For example, the series of textbooks for teaching the illiterate compiled by Dr. Yen Yang-ch'u, leader of the Mass Education Movement, who is better known abroad as James Y. C. Yen, represents an effort made in this direction. On the basis of some 1, 200 characters chosen by him in terms of their frequency, he compiled texts that he believed would enable China's illiterate people to meet their basic needs in expression. As another effort made more or less in the same direction, we may mention the list of characters chosen by Hung Shen, the famous dramatist. In 1935 he published his Method of Teaching and Using 1, 100 Basic Chinese Characters. Instead of basing his choice of characters on frequency and limiting their usefulness and expressiveness to a rudimentary plane, he chose them on the criteria of their flexibility in forming compounds with other characters and their adequacy for general use in everyday situations.

X. DEVELOPMENTS UNDER THE COMMUNISTS

The Chinese Communists have been cautious in their efforts to reform the Chinese language. They frequently quote Stalin who said that the language of a people cannot be artifically changed and that the evolution of any language has to follow a natural course.[1]

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[1] See quotation and discussion in Ts'ao Po-han, "Yu-wen Wen-t'i P'ing-lun Chi [Critical Essays on the Language Problem], Shanghai, Tung-fang shu-tien, 1954, p. 95.

However, to combat illiteracy the Communists also 212
see the immediate need of simplifying the Chinese 185
written language. In this regard the government policy is based on Mao Tse-tung's statement in his On New Democracy that, "under certain conditions, the written language of China must be reformed."[2] Envisaged as an ultimate goal of language reform is the complete Latinization of the Chinese written language. In other words, the characters will be replaced by the Latin alphabet. Communist promoters of Latinization often cite Lenin's pronouncement that "Latinization is the great revolution of the East,"[3] to substantiate their argument.

The Communists are trying to cultivate a politi- 192
cally conscious proletariat in China; China's spoken 185
language, as reflected in songs, plays, and speeches, is becoming more proletarian and drifting away from the set phrases and expressions traditionally used by the intellectual class. Extensive use of professional jargon and local expressions is the vogue of the day. Political terms and scientific terms, particularly those of Russian origin, are apparently on the lips of every Chinese who has had Communist indoctrination.
It must be noted that the Communists, in adopting 191
many new terms heretofore unfamiliar to the average 185
Chinese, are aware of the danger of corrupting their language. The People's Daily of Peking (the Pravda of China), in an editorial on June 6, 1951, urged the

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[2] Mao Tse-tung, Mao Tse-tung Hsüan-chi, [Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung], Vol. II, Peking, Jen-min ch'u-pan-she, 1952, p. 680.

[3] John de Francis, Nationalism and Language Reform in China, Princeton University Press, 1950, p. 90.

use of correct Chinese and stressed the need for the 191
study of grammar so that "the Chinese language will 185
not become corrupt and impure."[4]

In the movement to eradicate illiteracy, the cur- 212
rent trend is to promote accelerated methods of 185
language teaching and to standardize and formalize many simplified characters already used by the people in handwriting. The Peking government, however, is applying little effort to the popularization of Latinized Chinese. One of the most publicized methods to accelerate language learning was introduced in 1948 by Ch'i Chien-hua, a cultural cadre attached to the armed forces. Ch'i champions the use of the "National Phonetic Symbols" (not to be confused with the Gwoyeu Romatzyh discussed in foregoing sections of this chapter) as the "walking stick" for new learners. The phonetic symbols are employed as an aid to pronunciation. This method was said to be so successful that the Peking government in May 1952 recognized Ch'i's contribution by inviting him to the capital and awarding him a citation.[5]

Simplification of written characters has received official blessing. When the Committee on the Study of Language Reform under the Ministry of Education compiled 798 such simplified characters and recommended that they be adopted, the recommendation was given immediate attention. On May 1, 1955, the committee announced that 57 of the simplified characters would be adopted by six national periodicals for experimental purposes.[6] On October 15, 1955, an All-China Conference on Language Reform was called by the committee to revise and enlarge the proposed list of simplified characters.

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[4] Quoted in Jen-min Chiao-yu [People's Education], (Monthly), Peking, March 1955, p. 28.

[5] [People's Education] , May 1952, p. 4.

[6] Hua-ch'iao Jih-pao [China Daily News] , New York, May 2, 1955, p. 1.

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The Latinization movement, although without much official promotion, is by no means dead. There are publications printed in this new form of Chinese. One ardent supporter of this movement, Ni Hai-shu, claimed that in 1949 there were over 300 such publications, with a total circulation of about 500,000, already on the market.[7] In December 1951, there were evidences to show that active support for this movement was discernible in Central-South China.[8]

There are other recent developments in language reform. One is the attempt to standardize the use of punctuation. On October 5, 1951, the Government Administration Council in Peking issued a directive on the correct use of punctuation marks.[9] Since that time the general trend has been moving toward standardization. It has also been advocated that Chinese be written horizontally and from left to right. Such a practice is not new, but the Peking government is the first Chinese regime to sanction it. Following lengthy discussions on such a practice, national publications like the Englightenment Daily and New China Monthly, since January 1, 1955, have been printing their texts horizontally.

As to the languages of minority nationality groups, the over-all Communist policy is to help them create

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[8] Hsin-wentzu Pan-yüeh-k'an [New Language Semimonthly] , Shanghai, Dec. 16, 1951, p. 28; Jan. 16, 1952, p. 20.

[9] Jen-min Shou-ts'e, 1952 [People's Handbook, 1952] , Shanghai, Ta-kung pao, 1952, p. 437.

their own written scripts. The theory is that these 212
people must first be given their own languages; then 185
it will be easier for them to learn Chinese (Latinized Chinese, most probably). In Central-South China, a script is being developed for the Chuang Minority Nationals in Kwangsi Province.[10] These newly created scripts are based on the Latin alphabet.

XI. SPEAKERS OF FOREIGN LANGUAGES

Before 1949, the use of foreign languages, mainly English, was found in a few large port cities in Central-South China such as Canton and Hankow. Contact with English-speaking people in such cities and inclusion of English in school curricula accounted for the popularity of English. However, with the exception of a few foreign missionary schools in which English was emphasized and taught by native speakers, instruction in English in other schools did not amount to much. This was true even of the colleges of the region. Although some college students could read a publication in English with reasonable ease, they could hardly converse in it. On the average, it may be safely assumed that no more than one-tenth of the secondary school graduates and no more than one-third of the college graduates could, with some difficulty, read English. The over-all percentages of those who could speak it would be even smaller. 191

The Communist policy is to discourage the use of English or any other Western language except for advanced specialized studies. But as late as 1953,[11] 191 871

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[10] Survey of China Mainland Press, No. 1068, Hong Kong, American Consulate-General, June 14, 1955, p. 1.

[11] I-chiu-wu-ssu-nien T'ou-k'ao Ta-hsüeh Chih-tao, Guide to Taking College Entrance Examinations in 1954, Hong Kong, Hsueh-sheng shu-tien, 1954, pp. 98-100.

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871

knowledge of simple English was still required for enrollment in colleges. It appears reasonable to assume that the number of senior middle school (secondary school) and college students able to read or speak English has not changed. Foreign language instruction has been eliminated from junior middle school and primary school curricula.[12] Although the study of Russian has been encouraged by the Communists, it is doubtful if much has been achieved during the past five years.

There is no statistical information on the number of people able to read or speak English in Central-South China, but if the curricula for senior middle schools and colleges are any indication, then there could not possibly be more than 50,000 with this ability.[13] As to the number of people in this region who can speak or read other Western languages, there is even less information to serve as a basis for conjecture.

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12. Wu-nien-lai Ti Kung-fei Chiao-yü Kung-tso [Communist Education in the Past Five Years], Taipei, Sixth Section, Central Committee, Nationalist Party, 1955, p. 16.

13. The total number of senior middle school graduates in China from 1949 to 1953 was 216,000. It is believed that of this number no more than one-fourth could be in this region. People's Handbook, 1955, pp. 571-73.

SOCIAL STRUCTURE

The social structure in the Central-South Region closely resembles those of other regions in China. It has, however, some unique features which can be traced to the region's geographical location and past history.

I. THE TRADITIONAL SOCIAL STRUCTURE

A. Social Classes

The people of traditional China often viewed society as being comprised of four occupational groups: the literati, the farmers, the artisans, and the merchants. Soldiers had no social status and were not members of any group. Although this classification indicates that all members of society recognized the prestige of the literati and the low status of the merchants, it fails to account for two things: the wide diversity in wealth, standards of living, and cultural and recreational interests within each occupational group; and the free interchange of occupations among the top layers of the farming, merchant and governing groups.[1]

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[1] In some dynasties, sons of merchant families were not allowed to join the governing group. However, with the help of economic resources, it was relatively easy for the third generation to come into the governing group. It was quite common for retired bureaucrats to engage in commerce.

In reality, social stratification in Chinese society was not entirely based on occupational lines. Rich merchants and wealthy landlords were often linked by marriage, retail merchants and middle peasants were socially compatible, the social distinction between a craftsman and a simple peasant was even more difficult to draw, and bureaucrats were often wealthy landlords as well. Thus, if we employ the term social classes to mean the stratification of society on an economic basis, we will find that class lines cut across the traditionally accepted occupation-status classification. 565

However, members of all the occupational groups regarded the possession of land as the true indication of prestige and security. A landless peasant hoped to posses land, a peasant with some land hoped to acquire more, and the wealthiest landlord wished to do likewise. Artisans who had acquired savings would invest them in land. Merchants invariably put excess capital that might have been used for business expansion into land, although often they did not count on income from it as their principal means of support. Bureaucrats were even more preoccupied with owning land concomitant with their rise in officialdom. This is a common phenomenon in any society where other tangible assets for accumulation are lacking. 556

Although the possession of land was a criterion for determining prestige and, to a large extent, the sign of real power, prestige did not always result from wealth and the land-holdings of any one family seldom remained constant for more than two or three generations.[2] These conditions accounted for the lack of a permanent ruling caste in China. There were definite ideals in traditional Chinese culture which conditioned the upward and downward mobility of the people within the social hierarchy. 556

B. Social Mobility

1. The family ideal. Large families, especially of the extended type, were the ideal in China.[3] However, in practice the ideal was limited by economic means. Primogeniture in China had been done away with long before the Manchu dynasty (1644-1912). Land was divided equally among sons. After successive divisions, individual holdings became infinitesimally small. This contributed to the decline of the economic status of even the wealthiest families, particularly when land was the sole source of income. On the other hand, because of the existence of extended families and the clan structure, less fortunate members of these groups might be helped by relatives to gain a living or an education. A substantial amount of land was usually allotted to the communal family or clan for 596 428 618

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[2] Martin Yang, A Chinese Village, New York, 1945, p. 132; Francis Hsu, Under the Ancestors' Shadow, New York, Columbia University Press, 1948, p. 4.

[3] Consult the study of the Family.

religious, educational, or charity purposes by illustrious members of the family or clan. Nepotism was simply a projection of the family ideal of mutual help among the members. Clan nepotism often accounted for a man's rise on the social and economic ladder. This practice contributed to the upward movement of poorer segments of the population who otherwise might not have advanced socially and economically in a relatively short period of time. 596 428 618

2. The scholar ideal. Learning was much esteemed, especially when combined with wealth. The prestige of the wealthy was never complete until their wealth was adorned with culture. Indication of respect for learning was common in China, as typified by the saying: "Although your children may be of low intelligence, you as parents should make them study the Classics."[4] The emphasis on learning was buttressed by the imperial examination system, the means by which official positions were obtained, which in turn, was the quickest means to the acquisition of wealth and social prestige in China during peace time. The saying, "After I have studied I will take a government position," was indicative of the usual goal of education. Wealthy families as a matter of course and poorer families at great 555

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[4] This stress on learning and cultivation of the Chinese was studied by Max Weber in his Religion of China. Weber goes so far as to conclude that this emphasis caused the lack of capital accumulation necessary for the development of modern capitalism in China.

sacrifice educated one or more of their children 555
in the Classics in order to obtain immediate
prestige in the eyes of the community and with
the hope of eventual success in the examinations,
which might lead to an official position and enrichment of the family fortune. Thus, education
contributed to the upward movement of the
families, be they of the landlord, merchant, or
bureaucrat groups. On the other hand, the 558
allocation of family income to the support of one
or more unproductive persons through years of
study, with no assurance of economic returns,
often dissipated the fortune of the family and led
to the loss of economic status. Too, the belief
that those who used their brains were superior
to those who used their brawn contributed to the
scholars' contempt for manual skills and commercial activity. Therefore, if a scholar did
not pass the examination or, having passed it,
failed to obtain official appointment, and if the
successive divisions of his family property
reduced his own holdings to a small plot, he
would find it difficult to improve his economic
status. At the same time, his lack of economic
means would deprive his children of the opportunity to study. Thus, the scholar ideal also contributed to the downward movement of families in
the social hierarchy.

The scholars, therefore, are not to be re- 517
garded as a separate class or a separate occupational group, except as they relied for their
livelihood on the teaching profession or the use
of their literary skills in a clerical capacity.
but rather as "leisurely" members of families of

varying degrees of wealth of the bureaucratic, 517
agricultural, artisan, or commercial classes. When recruited by the government to study at the imperial academies, scholars were protégés of the government, and were regarded as potential bureaucrats even if they were engaged only in the compilation of historical documents. Certainly the majority of those who devoted their full time to study considered themselves potential bureaucrats. To those who did not cherish the dream of becoming bureaucrats and who had other economic means, education was only an additional sign of their prestige.

The road to status and wealth through 554
education and government service was often bypassed in time of chaos; military skills would enable individuals to obtain high positions in the bureaucracy. But military men seldom won social esteem until they had become cultivated, and such esteem generally accrued to their children, who were given the opportunity by reason of the parents' wealth to acquire learning under the tutelage of well-known scholars.

C. Social Organizations

Social organizations which had no basis in 571
kinship were not recognized as approved parts 182
of the social hierarchy or as approved means for gaining social prominences. However, they would help to supplement relationships which the social order might neglect. The sucess of organizations of this sort served as a disintegrating influence on the existing social system. Most

of the traditional non-kin social organizations had an economic motivation. 571 182

In rural areas, organizations such as the Red Spear Society (Hung-ch'iang Hui) and the Mutual Protection Society (Lien-ya Hui) existed for the protection of the inhabitants against roving bandits. These voluntary associations arose in areas where the government failed to maintain order and peace, and their organization cut across class and occupational lines. When landlords were forced to move into towns during periods of disorder, peasants and tenants would become so powerful that at times they defied the landlords' demand for exorbitant rents. 575

Among the artisans and workers in China there were for generations both craft builds (hongs) and regional guilds (pongs). As in Europe, these guilds were not intended to serve the interests of workers as a class, but to promote the crafts and guard their monopoly and secrets. Both employers and employees were members, but the employers usually dominated the guilds' activities.[5] 467

Another kind of association existed to serve travelers, who were usually merchants, in 184 cities outside their home county or province. These associations *t'ung-hsiang hui*, organized 484 on a county or provincial basis, facilitated by maintaining buildings and personnel in distant cities the dealings of their constituents who might have language or other types of difficulties.

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[5] Nym Wales, The Chinese Labor Movement, New York, The John Day Co., 1945, p. 7.

Most significant and disturbing to the 575 social structure were the secret societies. They were, in fact, hierarchical societies within a society. A notable example was the *Ko-lao Hui*, which was called *Hung-pang* in the Central-South Region. The bulk of the membership of this secret society was drawn from the unemployed in the rural areas and organized under strict and severe discipline. They were instructed to rob the rich, to help the poor, rescue the oppressed, and overthrow Manchu rule. Its leadership, however, was in the hands of the landlord class. The *Ko-lao Hui* became such a strong underworld force that Sun Yat-sen had to solicit its co-operation in his efforts to overthrow the Manchu dynasty. After the fall of the Manchu regime, many warlords of North China obtained power by way of the *Ko-lao Hui* hierarchy and by utilizing its mass followings.[6]

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[6] , *Ko-lao Hui and Ch'ing-pang*, Hsi-pei Yen-chiu she, 1941, pp. 5-6.

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While societies like the *Ko-lao Hui* aimed at the overthrow of the existing order, others like the *Ch'ing-pang* were utilized by the Manchu government to prolong its power by extralegal means. The *Ch'ing-pang* was originally organized among the boatsmen and the urban unemployed along the Grand Canal and the Yangtze River. It later spread to big cities and gained recruits among the city poor, handicraftsmen, apprentices, industrial workers, policemen, shopkeepers, self-employed, and even civil servants. Its highly organized strength provided a strong bargaining position for the support of politicians, warlords as well as capitalists. Even the Kuomintang leaders had to come to terms with the society in their campaign against the warlords, and the Japanese occupation forces during 1937-45 utilized *Ch'ing-pang* organizations to rout Communist underground agents.[7]

II. DISRUPTION OF THE TRADITIONAL SOCIAL STRUCTURE

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Just as the scholar ideal and the family ideal helped to preserve the stability of the total social order of China, the disintegration of the traditional family system and the abolition of the imperial examination system for recruiting the ruling elite became contributing factors to the dislocation of the traditional social structure. 178

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[7] *Ibid.*, pp. 64-65.

There was no change in the social composition of the rural population in the past several decades. As of old, the village community consisted of farm laborers at the bottom and landlords at the top. Peasant landowners and tenants constituted the bulk of the village population; and village peddlers, merchants, and artisans were members of peasant families, most of which owned land; the village gentry, that is to say the local leaders, were mostly retired officials or educated members of landlords' or rich peasants' families.[8]

However, the growth of rural population without a comparable increase in arable land together with more opportunities for employment in the cities caused the migration of some peasants to the urban centers. The continued high premium placed on learning, practical or otherwise, induced the wealthier rural inhabitants to send their children to city schools 369 178

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[8] Olga Lang, Chinese Family and Society, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1946, p. 68.

which offered new opportunities. Thus, the 369
cities became the centers from which the forces 178
of change radiated into the surrounding countryside.

Some of the rural immigrants became permanent residents in the cities; others returned to their home villages. Among the permanent residents, some left their families in the country while others brought their immediate families (wives and children) to the cities. In either case, it meant the breakup of family and clan relations. Industrial work and other city employment changed the outlook of these rural people; new professions such as modern medicine, law, engineering, and banking attracted the attention of those who otherwise might have been occupied in the study of the Confucian Classics. This was especially true after Confucian training had been found impractical in a modern society and not in keeping with the changing conditions.
Education in the secondary schools and 871
universities, however inadequate and artificial 178
it might seem, was designed for better citizenship.[9] Their curricula opened a new and different world, far more interesting and intelligible to the younger generation than the classics of old. If modern education had not

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[9] Hu Shih, The Chinese Renaissance, the Haskell Lectures, University of Chicago, 1933, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1934; Ssu-yü Teng and John K. Fairbanks, China's Response to the West, A Documentary Survey 1839-1923, Cambridge, Mass. Harvard University Press, 1954.

always succeeded in giving new skills to the 871
student, it at least had taught him not to be 178
satisfied with his lot, but to look to the future
rather than to the past for betterment. With
the increase of schools, there emerged in the 565
cities a considerable professional class and 178
a large number of students cut off for years
from their original environment. Students and 517
intellectuals, seeking some common meeting
ground, banded together, and with their newly-
found organizations came a semblance of
separate class consciousness. Although many
students depended for their subsistence on
their families, they had nothing to do with the
cultivation or management of land. Alienated
from the land and anxious to find a new channel
of social advancement, the intellectuals were
confronted with the problems of social disorder.
Furthermore, in contrast to the situation in
Europe during a comparable cultural period,
when the landed aristocracy contested with
the merchants, industrialists, and bankers for
positions in the ruling elite, political power
and economic power in modern China continued
to be in the hands of a single group. When
social mobility was made difficult by the lack
of a clear and recognized channel for upward
social movement, social roles were less clearly
defined; the sons of high government officials
became industrialists, bankers' sons became
diplomats, and all owned land. Intermarriages
between the new and the old upper-class ele-
ments were taken for granted. Modern intel-
lectuals, mostly from middle-class families,
were unable to obtain position and status in

the new business or political hierarchy and 565
yet were unwilling to return to their home 178
villages. They had been too long removed
from their original environment to feel any- 517
thing but estranged from it.

Influenced by the idea of democracy which they had discovered in school, the intellectuals began to solicit support from the masses, a move which traditional scholars would not have considered. Robert North's study of Kuomintang and Communist leaders shows that the majority of them came from middle-class, land-owning, and merchant families and were graduates of modern schools.[10] The labor unions, the peasant associations, the rural reconstruction experiments, and the Communist Party became the milieu in which the intellectuals began their new careers.

During this period of social and political 178
disorder, military men began to gain power, 701
obtaining offices by virtue of their military
success. Rather than despising the military
as the older scholars did, many intellectuals
began to seek similar careers as a means to
power. This tendency began with the opening [874]
of the Huang-p'u (Whampao) Military Academy
in Kwangtung for the training of officers for the
1923-27 campaign against the warlords. In the

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[10] Robert North, Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Elites, Stanford University Press, 1952, pp. 116-121.

war against Japan the prestige of military men 701
was greatly enhanced. A military career has 178
now become a major attraction to ambitious intellectuals as a possible channel for social advancement. Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Tse-tung, who owe much of their popular success to their military skills, suggest the prestige granted military men in the modern period.

III. SOCIAL STRUCTURE UNDER THE COMMUNIST REGIME

The Chinese Communists interpret the 565
existing social structure from a Marxist view- 668
point, and extoll the ideal of a classless society. Their belief that the transition from a class society to a classless society is inevitable justifies the liquidation of certain surviving classes.

A. Class Differentiation among the Chinese Population

In his book On the People's Democratic Dictatorship (1949), Mao Tse-tung divided Chinese Nationals into those who because of their anti-revolutionary character and their "crimes against the Chinese nation" were deprived of the right to be numbered among the People, and those who were to enjoy the rights of the People. In the first group were included the Kuomintang leader Chiang Kai-shek, "bureaucratic capitalists" such as H. H. Kung and T. V. Soong, "feudalistic" landlords, and a host of other anti-Communist leaders. The second group consisted of workers, peasants, the petty bourgeois, and the national bourgeois. Workers were considered the elite of the nation; the peasants were to be converted into rural workers, through collectivization of agriculture, or into urban workers, through the development of industry; the petty bourgeois were needed during the New Democratic Stage and were to be "re-educated" in the process of reconstruction; and the national bourgeois, once "enslaved" by capitalism were now "free" to contribute to the industrialization of China. Mao's classification of the Chinese population and his stipulation of the task of each class at the New Democratic Stage formed the conceptual basis from 1949 to 1954 for the Communist policy toward each of the classes.

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The convocation of the National People's Congress in 1954 is considered by the Chinese Communists as the conclusion of the New Democratic stage and the beginning of a transitional stage which, will lead China to socialism. Land reform is completed and the landlords as a class are eliminated, the wings of the bourgeois industrialists and merchants have been clipped by the Three-Anti and Five-Anti campaigns, and the ideology of the working class has been established in all sectors of China.

B. The New Social Ladder

The Communists distinguish between persons "from the working class" and those "possessing the ideology of the working class." 565 They acknowledge that not all Communists are 668 from the working class but those who have accepted its ideology belong to it. By the same logic, the working-class character of the People's Liberation Army is fixed. The Communists say that, since the People's Liberation Army is led by the working class, viz. the Communist Party, although the bulk of the soldiers and commanders may not be from the working class, the army remains of the working class. Conversely, many workers may not possess the ideology of the working class. The Communists explain that most Chinese workers are fresh from the villages where "feudalistic ideas" abound and therefore have not had time to learn modern political ideology as it is understood by the working class.

The classification of people according to 156 the ideology they prefer is one of the underlying 668 principles governing the activities of Communist-sponsored organizations where membership cuts across class lines. The New Democratic Youth Corps, the Federation of Democratic Youth, the Young Pioneers, the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association, the Democratic Women's Federation, the labor unions, and the study circles at schools and in factories help to disseminate Communist ideology. Participation in these mass organizations, whether voluntary or compulsory, serves to separate the individual from his family, absorbing his time and energy outside the family circle. Enforcement of the Marriage Law, principally through the promotion and supervision of the Democratic Women's Federation, encourages women to leave the confines of the family. The recruitment of candidates for institutions of higher learning and the assignment of jobs to graduates when they have completed their education also serve to uproot the individual from his immediate environment and make him dependent for advancement on the Communist regime. The weakening of family loyalty forces the individual to look toward the mass organizations sponsored by the Communists, who regard the Party itself as a desirable substitute for the traditional social structure. Since the individual relies on mass organizations for political advancement, which is the prerequisite for economic and social betterment, the mass organizations are most important for stabilization of society under the current regime. The regime exercises the power to control the career expectancies of the members of mass organizations, reward the achievement of those who work for the goals of the Party leadership, and punish with ostracism or more severe penalties those who rebel against the order. For the first time since the abolition of the imperial examination system, a main channel of social advancement has emerged. The mastery of an officially approved body of doctrine is the quickest road to social advancement. The Communist channel of social advancement leads to the selection of conformists. This state of affairs resembles, to some extent, that which prevailed in monarchical times when the mastery of dogmas

contained in the classics and their commentaries 156
was the prerequisite to success in the imperial 668
examinations.

The Communist regime has found it 668
necessary to promote as replacements for the 178
old ruling group Communist-reformed and Communist-trained administrative, technical, and scientific personnel. Compared with traditional social movement, that which is in favor under the present regime does not spring from ideals embodied in Chinese culture but from expedient manipulation by the Communist Party.

The development of industry, waterway and irrigation projects, the settlement of the Northwest, and the nationalization and collectivization of many enterprises may conceivably absorb a good portion of the ambitious younger generation. If social movement continues to depend on Party loyalty, purges may be used to secure loyalty, to provide a flow of scapegoats for the many grievances which accumulate under a totalitarian system, and to furnish opportunities for advancement for the coming generation, whose continued devotion to the regime is crucial to its survival. But to date in the Central-South Region the purge of local cadres and officials at the regional level has been limited to the elimination of "old social elements" rather than to the "revolutionaries" themselves.[11]

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[11] Consult the study of Political Dynamics in this handbook.

THE FAMILY

I. INTRODUCTION

Until almost the end of the imperial period (221 B.C. to A.D. 1912), the family was a vital and universal aspect of the centralized state in China and most characteristic of the society which sustained it. Since then, the family has been in flux. The direction of change and the major causes and problems involved will be sketched out in this section. A more precise picture, as Marion Levy has pointed out, is not feasible with the existing incomplete state of material on Chinese society both before and since the inauguration of the Communist regime.[1]

The traditional family still persists. It proved resistant, but not impregnable, to the influx of modern Western techniques and ideas after 1842 and to the political revolutionary efforts to realize democracy and equality in the present century. The traditional family is still proving tenacious, in the face of the Communist regime's persistent effort to turn Chinese society inside out.

To understand the nature of the Chinese family today, it is necessary first to take account of the structure, function, and attitudes of the traditional family. Second, consideration must be given to the incidence and nature of change in the family preceding the Communist regime. Only then can intelligent consideration be given to the family under the Central People's Government. Finally, attention will be devoted to the unique factors that characterize the family in the Central-South Region.

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[1] Marion J. Levy, Jr., The Family Revolution in Modern China, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1949, p. 273.

II. THE TRADITIONAL FAMILY

The term "family" in China has been most usefully defined as "a unit consisting of members related to each other by blood, marriage, or adoption and having a common budget and common property.[2] Three main types of family structure have been distinguished -- the conjugal, the stem, and the joint forms. The joint family, consisting of several married brothers, their wives, children, and sometimes one or both parents, was the ideal type in China. It was typical only of the gentry and well-to-do merchant classes. The conjugal family, consisting of a man, his wife, and unmarried children, and the stem family, consisting of the conjugal family plus one married son with his wife and children, were most typical of the peasant, artisan, and small merchant classes. For all classes, however, the joint family was the ideal to be achieved if an improvement in family circumstances permitted.[3]

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[2] Olga Lang, Chinese Family and Society, New Haven, Conn., Yale University Press, 1946, p. 13. Cf. Levy, op. cit., pp. 5-6.

The status of every member of the family was fixed relative to every other member by the criteria of age, sex, and generation. At the top of the family pyramid stood the head of the house, the oldest living male. In practice, he might consult with other adult members of the family on matters vital to its welfare; theoretically, and often in fact, he exercised complete control over the activities, income, property, training, punishment, and marriage arrangements of the family and its members.[4]

However old his sons, their position in relation to him was one of service, obedience, and dutiful respect. A lesser but similar expression was expected of a man toward his elder brother and relatives of an older generation.

Females generally were subordinate to males as well as to elders. The wife was subject to the will of her husband and to that of her son when he became head of the house. While a man's parents lived, his wife was expected to be more subservient than he toward them. In her mother-in-law, the son's wife more often than not encountered a tyrant. The mother-in-law, rather than her son, governed and judged the actions of the son's wife. 596

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[3] Ibid., pp. 13-16. Cf. Levy, op. cit., pp. 42-60.

[4] The material presented in this and the following paragraphs on the traditional and changing family is based largely on the comprehensive works on the family by Levy, op. cit., and Lang, op. cit.

B. Social Role

The principle social function of the family in China was the bearing, rearing, and training of children. Sons were more highly valued than daughters, because only the former remained with the family after marriage, contributing to its labor and income, and only sons could perpetuate the family and perform the yearly rites in honor of the father and the family ancestors after the father's death. Implicit in the ceremony was the idea that the ancestors had a life after death, watched over the family's fortune, and were comforted by the periodic ministrations of the family. For the living, the rites provided an occasion for awe and respect during which the continuity of the family over time was reemphasized and the solidarity and duties of the family unit in the present reasserted. 596 182

The veneration of ancestors was so important to Chinese society that the absence of sons to carry on the yearly observances was regarded as a major failing on the responsible male's part and a tremendous catastrophe for the family. Concubinage and adoption were socially and legally sanctioned as means of providing sons, if marriage produced only daughters or no children at all. Because of the necessity of providing against a high death rate, the premium on sons resulted in over-population, only partly offset by a high rate of female infanticide. 596 182

Just as sex, age, and generation determined an individual's status within the family, so did these factors determine his behavior and position in the community and the world at large. An additional determinant of his standing was the status of his family in society. 554 596

Authority and dominance were the province of males. Women might, and occasionally did, exercise overt leadership. More frequently, they were the power behind the throne. Such cases were exceptional, however. In modern times at least, supremacy was neither desired by women nor readily admitted to when possessed. 596

Age was honored relatively and absolutely. Long life automatically gave its possessor higher standing in the community, but whatever age he attained, he was to show respect to his elders and members of an older generation. In the society of traditional China, age implied the accumulation of wisdom and experience vital to society in times of decision or crisis. 888

Individual status also improved with education, more particularly with the attainment of a degree in the official examinations and appointment to official position. An individual's educational or official career was usually dependent 554 596

← on the willingness and ability of the family to support him during a long period of study. A particularly promising youngster of a poor family might occasionally be underwritten by the clan or village. Whatever his means of financial support, his success in the examinations was a reflection of proper upbringing and honored his family and, to a lesser extent, his clan and village almost as much as himself. The wealth usually accumulated by an official during his career also materially enhanced the village and clan as well as the family. For these reasons, reflected glory accrued to the kin of an illustrious scholar or official for generations after his death. 554 596

C. Political Role

To a remarkable extent, the Chinese imperial system operated by moral suasion with a minimum use of force and without a developed, codified system of law. This achievement was made possible through the state's utilization of the family as a training ground for loyalty to the state and the virtues prized by it as part of the machinery of government. The root virtue of filial piety was extolled above all others in the Confucian system. It denoted not only the obedience and devotion of the son to his father but of the younger to the elder, and of the subject to the ruler. 829 577

Two types of organizations built on the foundation of the family were utilized by the state in maintaining peace and uniformity throughout the empire. One was the clan, or tsu. It 618

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bound together families with a common ancestor to promote their security and advancement. Relying for strength on the maximizing and formalizing of kinship ties, the *tsu* reinforced the authority of the family head and the values he imported to the younger generation. The *tsu* settled disputes between families, conducted ancestor rites for any member of a family whose line died out, provided help and protection in times of trouble for the lower class members, and safeguarded the social and economic position of the well-to-do. Where the *tsu* was strong, it governed the village with little interference from the central government, except in matters of high crime and taxes. The advantages to the Confucian state of the *tsu* were deemed sufficient to compensate for its encroachment on the state's jurisdiction.[5]

In gathering together all the members of the *tsu* for the yearly rites honoring its ancestors, this social institution served to bring the poor and uncultured into contact with, and under the influence of, the well-to-do and educated gentry. Its more accomplished members headed the clan and represented the closest approximation to the ideal of the "superior man" (*chün-tzu*).

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[5] On the clan see Hu Hsien-chin, *The Common Descent Group in China and Its Functions* (Viking Fund Publications in Anthropology, No. 10), New York, The Viking Fund, Inc., 1948.

Meetings with such men, whose behavior was patterned by leisure and education beyond the means of the great majority of society, provided the lower classes with living models for emulation and opportunities to impress the young with the proper attitude of respect toward their social superiors. 618

Another institution based on the family utilized by the state was the pao-chia system. As it was constituted in the Ch'ing Dynasty (1644 to 1912) and again in the 1930's by the Nationalist Government, ten adjacent families were grouped as a p'ai, ten p'ai as a chia, and ten chia, or one thousand households, as a pao. The head of each unit was responsible for the conduct and defense of those households under him, and the head of the pao had to answer to the government for the conduct and protection of the thousand households. 631

D. Economic Role

As the definition of the term "family" infers, it was the basic economic unit of the society. Real property such as land, houses, and workshops were owned by the family rather than by individuals. When disharmony caused the breakup of a joint family, its real property was divided among the constituent conjugal families, each as a new family claiming title to the portion of property which fell to its share. 596

The peasant, artisan, and small-merchant families were units of both production and 596 462

consumption. Male family members worked 596
together in the fields, workshop, or store to 462
produce the goods on which the family mainly relied for a living. Sons nearly always followed their father's occupation and seldom left home. Women worked in the home, taking care of the children and turning out the family's clothes and shoes. Where sericulture was practiced, women managed the entire industry from the cultivation of mulberry trees to the weaving of cloth. Food and clothing were allotted each member according to his needs, as they were determined by the head of the house and permitted by the family's circumstances.

Some variation from this pattern occurred 596
among the upper-class families. Gentry-officials and merchants were often away from home; they frequently had personal income from salaries or business, from which they met their expenses without resorting to the family treasury.

The family and its extensions in China also 596
functioned to provide security in old age, food 888
or material help to the poor, and employment for needy or deserving relatives when possible. That a son should fail to provide for his parents in their old age was unthinkable. Were the sons dead or in some other way unable to assist their parents, the aged would be cared for by other close relatives or by the clan. Deeply sanctioned by kinship morality and firmly rooted in Chinese government and business, nepotism was one of the most resistant factors to the advance of the modern political, industrial, and business systems in the twentieth century.

systems in the twentieth century. 000

III. THE CHANGING FAMILY

A. Influence of Modern Technology

The transition which occurred in the traditional Chinese family from approximately 1842 to the advent of the Communist regime is traceable to three major influences: (1) modern technology with its attendant factory system and modern business organization; (2) the new enviroment consisting of rapid transportation, modern government education, rural education organizations, and modern books and periodicals; and (3) the revolutionary political and social ferment which followed in the wake of the Western penetration of China. Change came first and most penetratingly in the ports, which were initially influenced by Western trade and later by the growth of native industry centered on those cities. The same influences also reached into the rural environs of the city ports in the decades before World War II. The great mass of the Chinese people -- the population of the traditional villages, towns, and cities in the interior -- felt the modern impact only in minor ways, if at all. 596 178

The first influence of modern technology in China came in the form of an influx of manufactured goods. Their availability at cheap prices changed the consumption and production habits of the family. Articles formerly made at home were bought with cash, necessitating new types of spare-time or full-time occupation removed from the family sphere.

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Much more important in effecting a change in the old family pattern was the introduction of modern factory and business methods into China. For one thing, it organized economic activity on a non-family basis. Persons from rural areas attracted to the city by the opportunity to earn an independent income or the necessary supplement to the family's farm income were forced to make their homes near their jobs for at least a part of the year. Either permanently or temporarily they were removed from direct family control and subjected to the new ideas associated with industrial society everywhere.

Another consequence of the factory and business system was a new criteria for employment. The efficient operation of modern production and management required that personnel be hired on the basis of the possession of such skills as a particular job demanded rather than on the old basis of personal or kin relationship to the owner or responsible management. The solidarity of blood relationship and the old employment function of kinship were prime resistants to the spread of modern business enterprise in China, but where the latter succeeded in establishing itself, it forced a fundamental break in the old Chinese familial process.

B. Influence of Modern Environment

In many places where the Chinese population was sheltered from direct contact with modern industrial life, an indirect influence was exerted

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by the environment. The modern curriculum taught in foreign missionary schools in the late nineteenth and the twentieth centuries was approximated by the new government schools and offered to a broader segment of the population in the decade before World War II. New social, political, and economic ideas thus disseminated were supplemented by the outpourings of the press. Some rural villages formerly a day's journey or more away from the nearest great city were brought hours closer by modern methods of transportation, particularly the railroad and the steamship. All these media brought the people and especially the young into contact with ideas and ways of life alien to their own. Awareness of new opportunities, comforts, and pleasures to be had in the modern city planted a seed of dissatisfaction with the old manner of living.

C. Influence of Revolutionary Thought

An even more disturbing influence in the old way of life was the increasing spread of revolutionary social and political doctrines after 1916. The monarchical reformer K'ang Yu-wei had brought the traditional family under attack as early as 1898 by castigating the "virtues" associated with it as either non-existent or harmful to society. These ideas did not achieve any widespread currency in China until the rise of the New Culture Movement in 1916, a revolution in Chinese thought and expression. It emphasized individualism, the equality of the sexes, and the duty of service and loyalty to the nation. Ideas of this sort were spread by the May Fourth Movement of 1919, in the revolutionary propaganda of the Kuomintang during its struggle for power in the mid-twenties, by the student anti-Japanese agitation of the thirties, and in the socially conscious writings of China's new and popular authors.

D. Effects on Family Nature and Structure

In the relatively small area where these influences were felt, traditional family organization and the roles and functions dependent on it were forced to give way. With a part of the family temporarily or permanently in the city, the authority of the traditional family head was undermined. He was still needed at home to carry on the farm work, and so it was generally the daughters, the sons not needed for agriculture, and, occasionally, the wives who entered the cities to seek part-time or full-time work. They sent home from the cities whatever part of their wages that could be spared from their own living needs. The family head thus controlled only their excess earnings and not their full income. He no longer directed the production of the family as a unit nor determined wholly every member's share in consumption. For at least part of the year, he could exert no direct control over the city-dwelling members of the family. With the possibility of an independent livelihood in the city, adult family members in nearby villages had an alternative to harsh treatment by the family head. This factor tended to have a moderating influence on paternalistic authoritarianism.

The family in the rural areas adjacent to 596
industrialized cities was also affected in other 562
ways. Men of advanced years, particularly if they had a classical education or held official position, continued to be honored. However, their position of influence and authority was challenged by younger men with the personal qualities of dynamic leadership and success. Ancestor worship continued to give a greater primacy to males in the family, but the ability of daughters to earn a wage enhanced their value to the family and made their early marriage into another family less desirable. It should be noted, however, that women of farming and laboring families worked outside of the home only out of sheer economic necessity. Neither sex approved of female employment in the factory; whenever possible, it was avoided or terminated. Among upper-class families, women with modern education began gradually to seek employment in the professions and to regard such work as a means of establishing permanent personal and economic independence.

The independent family in the modern city 594
was most subject to change. Although the influence of the past remained strong, the city families tended toward the nuclear, democratic form. Thus, the old criteria of status based on sex, age, and generation were undermined. This tendency was strongest among the new clerical, managerial, and professional groups in the city. They came mostly from the old well-to-do merchant and gentry class which could afford modern education, sometimes abroad, for their children.

Having a higher education, the younger members 594 of this group were far more influenced than were the less literate lower class youth by such modern Western ideas as the right to individual happiness, the equality of the sexes, and the duty of the citizen to give his first loyalty to the interests of the nation.

While modern education gave youth increased 578 stature in the eyes of the family elders, it also served to decrease youth's respect for parents. Olga Lang's 1936 survey of youthful attitudes toward parents disclosed that while only 20 per cent of the boys and 16 per cent of the girls in high school were willing to answer the question as to whether they ever disapproved of their parents' behavior, 58 per cent of the men and 62 per cent of the women in college were willing to answer, and their answers were overwhelmingly critical. The greatest objects of censure were the father, his political views, and his personal habits. He was criticized as "conservative," "feudal," acting "against the trend of the time"; as "immoral," "corrupt," "lazy," "egotistic," "too cautious"; and for gambling, smoking opium and frequenting brothels. Mothers were more gently and less often criticzed, but were reproached for "political backwardness," "unhygienic habits," gossiping, playing mah-jong, quarreling, [and] ill treatment of young daughters-in-law." College students also reported more actual disagreements with parents than did high school students. The most frequent subject of disagreement were marriage, politics, education, participation in the students' movement, recreation, modern hygiene, and fashions, friends, and future professions.[6] 578

E. Effect on Family Economic Role

The decreasing ability of the family to function as a production and consumption unit or as an employment agency in an industrial society has already been pointed out. The initial break with the old form of employment was forced by foreign firms of government services headed by foreigners. Their prohibition against officers hiring or recommending relatives was only beginning to be copied by wholly Chinese institutions such as banks, factories, and schools in the years before World War II. Where the employment of relatives was forbidden, friendship, a common birthplace, training in the same school, or membership in the same secret society often provided the basis for a personal link between an employer and a prospective employee and for the rise of cliques in business and government offices. 466 596

Scattered surveys of various strata of the population in industrial areas indicate that only at the upper managerial or owner level, where the facts of economic operation were most pressing, was the majority in favor of impersonal, rational selection of employees. Even in modern

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[6] Lang, op. cit., pp. 284-87.

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colleges, only about half the students appeared to favor that choice. With each successively lower economic level, the preference was more overwhelmingly for selection on the basis of kinship.[7] 466 596

F. Effect on Social and Political Role

With the collapse of the imperial system in 1912, the family was no longer fitted to serve as the social and political training ground of China. The political parties and modern schools, particularly the colleges and universities, now began to train youth for the new political world which was coming into being after 1911. No comparable institutions existed to inculcate in youth a moral and ethical code that would serve as a common guide in the new society. Attempts by the Kuomintang leaders during the period of the National Government to restore filial piety along with a revised Confucian code to the service of an increasingly authoritarian-minded state met with failure among the nation's youth.[8] 596 867

IV. THE FAMILY UNDER COMMUNISM

A. The Marriage Law

In reconstructing Chinese society, the 671 582

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7. Ibid., pp. 186-89.

8. Mary C. Wright, "From Revolution to Restoration: The Transformation of Kuomintang Ideology ," Far Eastern Quarterly, August, 1955, pp. 515-32.

Communist regime has undertaken to change the nature and function of the family. The first step in this direction was the new Marriage Law promulgated in May 1950. It is one of the three legal pillars of the state. The other two -- the Labor Union Law and the Land Reform Law -- were announced at a later date but put into effect within a much shorter time and with greater immediate success.[9]

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Essentially, the outward provisions of the Marriage Law are comparable to the laws affecting marriage and the family in the civil and penal code announced by the National Government in 1930 and 1931.[10] The basic features of the new law are summed up in its first three articles, which provide for:

> (1)...The abolition of arbitrary and compulsory marriage and the putting into effect of freedom of marriage for men and women.
> (2)...The abolition of the feudal system of marriage...based on the superiority of man over woman, and the putting into effect...of monogamy, and equal rights for both sexes.

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[9] See comment by the American editors of Current Background, Hong Kong, American Consulate, 236, pp. 1-3; hereafter cited as C.B. Unless editorial comment is indicated, as here, citations from Current Background refer to literal translations of material in Communist magazines and newspapers, and should be evaluated accordingly.

[10] See comment of American editors of C.B., 236, p. 3.

> (3)... The abolition of the feudal system 671
> of marriage, which neglects the interests 582
> of the children, and the putting into effect of the New Democratic system of marriage, which protects the lawful interests of women and children.[11]

In propagandizing and implementing the 684
Marriage Law, the regime struck hard against 668
the old authoritarianism of the family head, child marriages, mistreatment of women and discrimination against them as inferior to men, and the mistreatment of children by parents. Wives, especially wives of arranged marriages, were encouraged to seek divorce from intolerant, unrepentent husbands. However, if husbands could be made to adopt the new attitude toward women, partners of arranged marriages were urged to remain united.

To help traditionally-minded families attain the new Communist-established goal of "democracy" and "harmony," Family "struggle" meetings were arranged under cadre supervision. Each member was pressed to confess his own past sins and suffering and to help other family members to remember theirs. The particular transgressions sought out for exposure,

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[11] "Document 7," C.B., 236, pp. 22-29.

condemnation, redress, and rectification were 684
the mistreatment and beating of wives by husbands, 668
similar behavior by mothers-in-law against daughters-in-law, and interference by parents in young people's free choice of marriage partners. Much was made in the Communist press of the suicides or murder of women and young people, attributed to "the old feudal system of marriage."[12]

Whatever the humanitarian by-products, the 668
Marriage Law aimed at a basic change in Chinese 462
society with two utilitarian purposes in view. One was to change the popular basis of loyalty from the family to the state. The other was to free the Chinese woman from her preoccupation with the home and children so that she might become a laborer in the field and factory. These aims were quite openly expressed.

For instance, an article in the Peking News
Chung-kuo ch'ing-nien pao [China Youth] on the 668
correct attitude toward parents, asserts that 596
under the Confucian system with its emphases on filial piety, parents had the right to regard their children as private property and demand sacrifices of them. Under the new regime, the article pointed out, "children are not the private

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[12] See especially C.B., 273, pp. 1-8; 236, pp. 4-14; and Survey of the China Mainland Press, Hong Kong, American Consulate, 932, p. iv; hereafter cited as S.C.M.P. The same conditions apply to this source as to Current Background; see footnote 9.

property of their parents, but belong first of all to the state and to the people, and...the interests of the people should be the highest criterion governing our actions toward our parents."[13] 668 596

An editorial in the People's Daily in March 1955 notes that remnant feudal ideologies still obstructed "the participation of women in Socialist construction and various political activities." The editorial then goes on to state that it is in order to promote the political and production zeal of women that their rights must be promoted and protected and the Marriage Law implemented.[14] Various comments on the Marriage Law inspired by the regime stress Lenin's dictum that sex relationships and family problems are not individual or small affairs but matters of great social, economic, and political significance.[15] 668 562

B. Implementation of the Marriage Law

As the Nationalist Government had made no attempt to put into effect the marriage and family provisions of its 1930-31 codes among the rural population, the spirit and provisions of the Marriage Law were new and alien to the great 671 582 majority of the Chinese people. They were still bound to the traditional family and had not encountered the economic experience and education which had pushed the family in Western-influenced cities toward new types of social organization from the beginning of the twentieth century. Moreover, the new law offered no immediate or apparent economic benefits as had the Land Reform Law.

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[13] S.C.M.P., 973, p. 31.

[14] Ibid., 106, p. 15.

[15] See, for instance, C.B., 275, p. 4; and S.C.M.P., 1048, pp. 30-31.

The result was apathy, when not open resistance, toward the reorientation of marriage and family practices among the farming population. These attitudes were as typical of most of the village cadres as of the rural people generally.[16] However, Liu Ching-fan's criticism in 1953 of the use of force by village cadres to achieve acceptance of the new Marriage Law's provisions indicates that up to that time violence accompanied this measure as it had other measures in Communist China.[17]

The regime became aware only slowly of the failure of the Marriage Law to take automatic effect. A preliminary investigation gave such cause for concern that a thorough investigation was made at the end of 1952.[18] The results impelled the Communists to launch a drive for the thorough implementation of the Marriage Law and intensive indoctrination of the people in its principles. The movement was restricted to Han Chinese areas where land reform had been completed.[19] 671 582

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[16] See comment of American editors of C.B., 136, pp. 3-4

[17] C.B., 273, p. 4.

[18] See comment of American editors of C.B., 136, pp. 3-4.

Summing up the result of the campaign before the Government Administrative Council on November 11, 1953, Liu Ching-fan reported satisfactory indoctrination of 80 to 90 per cent of the adults in 15 per cent of the nation's hsien and municipalities where land reform had been completed and, to a somewhat lesser degree, 60 to 70 per cent of the people in 60 per cent of similar local areas. Almost no progress was indicated in the remaining 25 per cent of the localities.[20] Assuming the population in these areas to be roughly equal, these figures would mean that on an over-all basis even partial success was claimed for only 48 to 55.5 per cent of the population subjected to the indoctrination process.

C. The Communists' Vague Picture of Success

Unfortunately, we cannot judge how successful the regime has been in implementing the Marriage Law nationally or regionally. Communist evaluations are too generalized to reveal a definite picture, and statistics released by the regime are sketchy and, when available, rarely provide a basis for significant comparison. For instance, in the spring of 1955 the Ministry of Internal Affairs reported on the prevalence of free marriages during the first quarter of 1954, stating that of the 402,025 applications for marriage registration in 562 hsien and municipalities of 15 provinces, only 1.07 per cent were denied because the contemplated marriages had been forced or arranged without the willing consent of the couples concerned.[21] No figures were given on the remaining, roughly three-quarters of the country's hsien and municipalities, nor was any indication given to show whether the figures cited were typical of the whole country, the only figures available, or figures selected for purposes of propaganda. If the figures can be given credence, they indicate a remarkable advance over the situation existing two years earlier. After an investigation of Marriage Law implementation in 1952, a woman minister of justice, Shih Liang, reported that in only three of the country's 2,086 counties were families reformed up to perfect Communist standards, and that in the East and Central-South regions freely contracted marriages and other reforms had gained no acceptance with the people.[22]

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[19] C.B., 273, p. 1.

[20] Ibid., p. 3.

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[21] S.C.M.P., 1002, p. 30.

[22] China New Analysis, Hong Kong, No. 5, p. 3.

A further study of figures issued by Com- 671
munist sources indicates that the regime did not 582
have exact knowledge of the situation in many 762
areas. To cite one example, an announcement of 674
the results of the 1952 investigation of Marriage Law implementation included "incomplete statistics" on deaths attributed to the existence of problems and mistreatment connected with the "feudal family" system. According to these figures, 4,105 women were killed or driven to suicide in the East China Region between January and August, 1952; and 356 women and 161 young men suffered the same fate in the Northwest Region during the first half of 1952. In lieu of figures for the Central-South Region, the report mentioned 606 young men and women met violent deaths as a result of marriage disputes in 39 hsien (out of a total of 86) in Hunan.[23]

It seems reasonable to assume that the figures are incomplete and the categories not comparable because the Communists had no more accurate material to offer. If the incidence of violence in connection with marital and family disputes is truly reflected in these figures, their extension into yearly rates shows these deaths occurred at the rate of less than two per hundred-thousand population in the Northwest Region, less than four per hundred-thousand in the East China Region, and less than nine per 674 hundred-thousand in Hunan. It should be remembered, however, that these ratios are based on incomplete figures and that the incidence of violence may have resulted as much from Communist pressures as from the authoritarian character of the traditional family. 674

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[23] C.B., 236, p. 5.

Divorce and marriage figures released by the Communists are equally difficult to render meaningful because of gaps in statistics and the different time spans and categories which are given for the figures cited. For the nation as a whole, the number of divorces was reported to have risen from 186,000 in 1950 (the last seven months of it under the new Marriage Law), to 409,500 in 1951, and to 398,000 in the first half of 1952.[24] The latter figure is only slightly higher than the number of divorces for all of 1952 in the United States, which has about one-quarter the population of China.[25] The Communist press announced that between January and May, 1951 the Justice Department in the Central-South Region handled 32,881 cases dealing with marital disputes, constituting 60 per cent of the total number of civil cases in the region. Of the marital disputes, 25,992 were divorce suits, and most of these were initiated by the wives, according to the press announcement[26] A similar source at a later date reported 586

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[24] Ibid., 243, p. 3.

[25] Divorces in the United States during 1952 totaled 292,000. See the World Almanac and Book of Facts for 1955, Harry Hansen, ed., New York, New York World Telegram and The Sun, 1955, p. 312.

[26] S.C.M.P., 171, p. 16.

that from May 1950 to January 1952 in Kiangsi, 586
121,000 free marriages had been arranged with the assistance of the Democratic Federation of Women, more than 72,900 divorces had been instituted after the failure of attempts at reconciliation, the marriages of 16,454 child brides had been annuled, 40,920 engagements arranged by parents had been terminated, and 33,834 couples had been aided in establishing harmonious homes by the intercession of the People's Government.[27]

D. Reorientation of Family Reform

Between the time of the publication of these 185
divorce figures in March 1953 and the end of the 596
year, the Communist approach to marriage and 581
family reform seemed to have undergone a change. There are indications that the regime's emphasis on new freedom for women and the prominent publicity given statistics on divorce had led to the Marriage Law being popularly termed the "Divorce Law."[28] At the same time, resistance in the rural areas to sudden changes in the old institutions of marriage and family relations were becoming evident to Party leaders as the result of the late 1952 investigations were tabulated.

A shift in the pace and in the propaganda emphasis on marriage and family reform was

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27. C.B., 236, p. 4.
28. China News Analysis, 5, p. 2.

evident in Liu Ching-fan's report to the 185
Government Administrative Council at the end 596
of 1953. Although the better treatment and 581
greater freedom given to women was not to be neglected, greater emphasis was placed on the establishment of "harmonious" and "democratic" relationships within the family, whether originally of the old or new type, and to the positive benefits that would accrue to all members of the family as a consequence of reform.[29]

Analyzing the then current situation, Liu noted that the people still maintained a feudal ideology and consciousness in regard to many social problems, and that this attitude in respect to marriage problems was "a more universal and serious one." Liu admitted that the abolition of the feudal marriage system and the establishment of the new system was "a long term and difficult process in the ideological and social reform of the people" To accomplish this reform, he added, the regime would have to co-ordinate its efforts with the people's personal interests and levels of attainment, persuade the people patiently, and raise their level steadily. The process of implementing the Marriage Law, Liu concluded, would have to be made part of the regular tasks of the government and people's organizations at all

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[29] C.B., 273, pp. 5-6.

levels and co-ordinated with the central tasks 185
of production, construction, and elections.[30] 576
These recommendations have become the prin- 581
ciples by which the government still seems to be guided in marriage and family reform.

In the cities where modern influences had prepared the people for acceptance of new marriage and family principles, the regime encountered a different kind of problem. Just before International Women's Day, March 8, 1955, an authoritative statement in the Communist press added a new note to the usual references to lingering remnants of feudal obstruction and the long-term nature of family reform. The statement charged that bourgeois ideology had reached into marriage and family relationships. The bourgeois influences detected were love of luxury and disparagement of labor, "carelessness" in choosing marriage partners or the desire for new partners after marriage, and devotion to self-interest. They had respectively given rise to the sins of marriage based on money, the "belittlement of sexual relationships," and maltreatment, desertion, and irresponsibility toward parents and children.[31]

The nation's young people were evidently 185
the most prone to this subversive influence. A 883

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[30] Ibid., pp. 4-6.

[31] S.C.M.P., 1022, p. 4.

campaign was launched in the large cities 185
during the spring of 1955 to guard youth against 883
"bourgeoise concepts." In connection with the drive, the Communist press evidenced concern regarding romantic love, heart-break, unsolved marriage problems of workers in sparsely populated areas, and the attractions and diversions of a carefree social life in the cities. These things, the press warned, were subverting many young people from their primary duty of devoting their whole effort and attention to study and work in the national interest. The advice of the Communist editors "to place love in a secondary position in one's life" is hardly likely to solve the problem.[32]

A different sort of problem confronted 185
youth in the countryside. Apparently the possi- 584
bility was not present there for youth to develop love and marriage attachments through the ideal and officially sanctioned method of mutual participation in production, indoctrination, and study. A 1955 report on Marriage Law implementation admitted that "in the extensive rural districts...the conditions for adequate communal life and avenues for social intercourse" are lacking. As a result, "most marriages are still being contracted after both parties were first introduced to each other by third parties." The

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[32] Ibid., 1006, pp. 15-18; 1052, pp. 25-33.

report hastened to explain that as the bride and groom gave their previous agreement to the marriage it was to be regarded as a marriage of free will and not to be confused with the old and outlawed practice of arranged marriage.[33] 185 584

E. Replacement of the Family's Social, Economic and Political Role

A second step taken by the Communist regime to change radically the nature and function of the Chinese family was accomplished with the establishment of organizations to regiment every phase of human endeavor. The labor unions in the city, the peasant associations, mutual aid teams, and co-operatives in the country became the center not only of economic life, but of social, political, and indoctrination activities as well. Unions were organized in the cities almost as they fell to the Communist armies, but the formation of comparable institutions in the countryside awaited the gradual process of land reform. Until it was completed in any area, no alternate organization to the family existed to assume its socio-economic role. This fact seems to explain why the Communist during the spring of 1953 limited their Marriage Law campaign in the countryside to those areas where land reform had been accomplished. 596 185

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[33] Ibid., -002, p. 3.

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Special organizations were set up to train and absorb the energies of women and children who might otherwise be free of the constant direct influence of the government. These two groups were absorbed respectively into the All-China Democratic Women's Federation, and into the Young Pioneers, Federation of Democratic Youth, and the New Democratic Youth Corps.

Aside from its primary role as a unit for procreation and for child-care until the young reached an age when they would prove adaptable to molding by the state, the family was left only with the secondary duty of supporting the state training process. An editorial in the People's Daily in mid-1955 pointed out the "deep solicitude" of the government toward children, made manifest by the establishment of nurseries and schools and the teaching of proper attitudes toward children and the correct methods for educating them. "The new Socialist generation" was to be brought up "physically strong, courageous, honest, fond of study, patriotic, and imbued with collective spirit." The editorial also stated that trade unions were to help office employees and workers to learn how to educate their children: Teachers and directors of the Young Pioneers were to assume the "important responsibility" of guiding children in classrooms, meetings, and extra-curricular activities.[34]

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[34] Ibid., 1064, pp. 11-13.

With the Communist regime's emphases on youth, loyalty to the state, socialist construction, and the rooting out of feudalistic and bourgeois ideas, the problem of the proper attitude of youth toward parents needed clarification. An article on the subject in the January 1955 issue of China Youth emphasizes that "respect for one's parents is part of...individual or social Communist morals," but the attitude "must be governed by the interests of the Revolution." If the parents are counterrevolutionaries, they should not be respected but treated as enemies; if they are counterrevolutionaries who have been pardoned by the people and are still able to work, they should be made to "reform through labor," and should not be pitied or helped. Only if they are unable to support themselves should they be aided by the children, "for if the children do not support them, then the burden will fall on the state, which is obviously undesirable." As to bourgeois parents, they should normally be shown respect and concern; but if they break the law, "the children should justly and dispassionately examine their crime." Working class parents "should of course be respected, loved, and taken care of." They should not be discriminated against or ridiculed because of the shortcomings they have inherited from the old regime, but "should be patiently persuaded to see the light."[35]

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[35] Ibid., 973, pp. 30-32.

V. CENTRAL-SOUTH CHINA

A. Strength of Family and Clan

Although by the twentieth century the vitality 618 of the clan had deteriorated in most of China, it retained a strong position in the provinces of Hupeh, Hunan, Kiangsi, and Kwangtung. In Kwangtung, it had reached its highest degree of development and continued to play a major role in the society up to World War II.[36]

On reason for the strength of the clan in 618 Hupeh, Hunan, Kwangtung, and Kiangsi was 621 that entire villages in these provinces consisted of members of only one or a few clans. For instance, of the 1, 291 villages in Kao-an *hsien* in western Kiangsi, 86. 5 per cent had one surname only, 8. 05 per cent two surnames, and only . 69 per cent more than four. By contrast, a study of Ting *hsien*, a *hsien* in Hopei, showed only one of 62 villages with a single *tsu*, and in none of them did it play a significant part in village administration.[37]

Daniel Kulp's investigation of a small village near Chaochow in the 1920's and Olga Lang's study of twenty-four Kwangtung clans just before

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[36] Hu, *op. cit.*, pp. 10-11; Lang *op. cit.*, pp. 173-79.

[37] Hu, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

← World War II indicate that in Kwangtung, at least, clan administration of the village was the rule rather than the exception.[38] Independent of the state except in the matter of taxes, major crimes, and the necessity of registering marriages, the village governed itself through enforcement by the clan of centuries-old customs inculcated by the family. Clan rule was not weakened when the Republic introduced officials at the village subdistrict levels, where none had existed under the imperial government. The new officials were recruited from the same group which had managed the clans, and clan and government posts were often held by the same individual.[39] 618 621

Leadership in the clan was theoretically based on age and scholarship. In reality, however, control was held by a few wealthy and influential families belonging to the strongest branches of the clan. When Kulp and Lang made their investigations, leadership in the village was beginning to be challenged by younger men who had demonstrated their natural abilities by the acquisition of individual wealth, a modern education, or an official position. Lang found that the Kwangtung clans she studied were led 618

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[38] D. H. Kulp, *Country Life in South China: The Sociology of Familism,* Vol. 1. *Phenix Village, Kwangtung, China,* New York, Columbia University, 1952; and Olga Lang, *op. cit.*, pp. 173-78.

[39] Lang, *op. cit.*, pp. 177-78.

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by 26 landlords, 16 merchants, 2 officials, 2 rentiers supported by overseas businessmen sons, 1 teacher 1 school principal, 1 geomancer, and 11 peasants -- 8 of them well-to-do.[40]

Leadership in the clan was sought because those in power controlled immense wealth which could be manipulated to increase individual or family influence and wealth. Besides its duties, which included the keeping of the peace among the clan's composite branches and families, the clan was responsible for the maintenance of the ancestral temples, the conduct of ancestor worship, the defense of clan interests before the government authorities, and the administration of clan property. The twenty-four clans studied by Lang controlled anywhere from 10 to 90 per cent of arable land, the majority holding between 50 to 70 per cent.[41]

Even in its last stronghold, the clan is a dying institution. Its authority was being undermined by the growing disproportion of wealth among its members, the dissatisfactions arising from misappropriation of clan wealth, and the subversive forces of industrialization, modernization, and modern city life. With the victory of Communism in the Central-South Region in 1949, the clans ceased to have any functional existence. They have left behind a pattern of

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40. Ibid., p. 175.
41. Ibid., p. 174.

independence of central government control and of familial order and loyalty that may not be easily erased by the Communist's authoritarian regime. 618

B. Overseas Communities

A peculiarity of the family in the coastal area of Kwangtung (and Fukien in the East China Region) has necessitated much innovation and adjustment by the Communist regime. From the coastal area of Kwangtung has come the overwhelming majority of Chinese emigrants to Southeast Asia and other parts of the world. The Communists calculate that the Kwangtung people abroad and family dependents in China number 13,000,000, or one out of every three of the province's population. Overseas family dependents in Kwangtung itself number 6,000,000, according to the Communists.[42] 167

Before the Japanese invasion of China, the family in these overseas communities was similar in solidarity, values, and social role to the family elsewhere in China, but unique in that often the male head was separated from his wife and their children for most of his adult life. If he could affort it, he maintained a concubine and a separate family in the overseas community. Although it was usual for the children of this overseas union to be sent to China 595 596 for their education and to share in inheritance of family property, the concubine rarely came with her Chinese mate when he returned to his native village.[43] 595 596

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[42] S.C.M.P., 985, p. 15.

During the absence of the male head from his Chinese home, his wife usually acted as head of the household. She and her children were supported in great part by funds periodically remitted from abroad by the male head, and she had control of the dispersion of this and other family income derived from labor or property in the home village. The usual source of income at home was from agriculture.[44] 596 434

Although the economic status of emigrant families ranged from poor to wealthy, the overseas communities were on the whole wealthier than non-emigrant neighboring villages. The excess of the wealthier families' dual income was largely invested in land and houses.[45] When the Communists took over the area, they were faced with the problem of what attitude ought to be taken toward these landlord families whose income from abroad was a vital source of foreign exchange for the government. 596 457 668

Evidently, no special privileges or status 457 668 were initially allowed members of such families, and their real property was expropriated on the same basis as that of any other element considered to be exploitive by the regime. On the other hand, the government exerted every effort to influence members of overseas families to write letters to their relatives abroad, setting forth the benefits of land reform and Communist reconstruction in order to woo overseas Chinese sympathy and investments in every way possible.[46]

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[43] Ta Chen, Emigrant Communities in South China: A Study of Overseas Migration and Its Influence on Standards of Living and Social Change, ed. by Bruno Lasker, N. Y., Institute of Pacific Relations, 1940, pp. 140-43.

[44] Ibid., pp. 58-85, 106-17.

[45] Ibid., p. 110.

The Communists did gain a favorable response from a part of the overseas element, but it was apparently not up to Communist needs and expectations, for various experiments and temporary shifts have marked the regime's subsequent policy toward the overseas Chinese and their dependents in China. New efforts to attract their sympathy were initiated in early 1955. Much publicity was given to the reclassification of overseas landlords as "no longer enemies of the state" before the expiration of their five-year probationary period. Buildings expropriated from overseas Chinese for government use were reportedly being returned to their former owners or paid for. The press reiterated the theme that measures were being taken to assure the right to ownership of overseas remittances and their delivery into the proper hands.[47]

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[46] *C.B.*, 211, p. 40.

[47] See section entitled, "Overseas Chinese" in *S.C.M.P.* during the first six months of 1955; for instance, 985, p. 15.

C. The Pace of Reform

In the pace of family reform, as in all othe 185 changes instituted by the Communist regime, the Central-South Region is behind the North, Northeast, and East China regions. For one thing, the Central-South Region has been for a shorter time under Communist control. For another, the development of modern industry in China, with its influences for change in family form and function, took place largely outside the Central-South Region. The trends forced by industrialization in many cases parallelled the objectives sought in the Marriage Law or, at least, prepared the people for a change in the old institution.

Another factor in the pace of family reform 563 which has not been considered in this chapter is the existence of ethnic minorities in the Central-South Region. Constituting some five per cent of its population, largely concentrated in Kwangsi, these non-Han Chinese people have a variety of unique customs. However, the largest single minority group, the Chuang people of Kwangsi had closely associated and readily intermarried with their Han-Chinese neighbors and were becoming largely indistinguishable from them in appearance and custom before the establishment of the Communist regime. The new regime's special treatment of ethnic minorities has been extended to the Chuang people, and their trend toward integration with the Han-Chinese may therefore have been reversed. (See the chapter on Ethnic Groups in this handbook.)

Groups in this handbook.)

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If and as the new regime fulfills its plans for industrialization and the organization of rural areas in co-operatives or collectives, more insistent pressures than mere propaganda will be brought to bear on the traditional family. But even this kind of force will not completely wipe out the old attitudes and loyalties of the elder generation. No such drawbacks characterize the heavily indoctrinated youth of today, more enthusiastic than their parents for the new order, but the urge manifested by many emancipated young people toward individualism and romanticism in love and marriage may pose a problem of equal calibre for the new masters of China.

SOCIAL VALUES
AND PATTERNS OF LIVING

I. CUSTOMS AND CHARACTERISTIC WAYS OF LIFE

The Chinese imperial system was strikingly 184 successful in fostering common basic attitudes among the peoples which it absorbed within its ever-widening sphere, but local and regional sub-cultures, brought into the imperial order at different times throughout more than two millenia, did not lose all their characteristic traits. In the Central-South Region, for example, the oldest "Chinese" area was Honan, a land-locked agricultural region. When, centuries later, the coastal areas of Kwangtung were absorbed by imperial China, the terrain and climate, the dependence on the seas and rivers for livelihood, meant that a way of life, a culture markedly different from any in North China, persisted and developed. A rough analogy may be drawn with Western Europe. Many basic attitudes and values are common to "Christian Europe" from Sicility to the Arctic, yet history and geography have made this area diverse in customs and ways of life. The diversity is less in the 1,000-mile long arc of Central-South China, partly because its cultures were never set off from one another by the nation-state boundaries that divide modern Europe.

There are other factors which give to most of the 241 area we are now considering important uniformities 181 in culture. The expansion of "Chinese culture" from Honan into the whole of south China was essentially the steady outward push of an efficient agricultural technique which displaced the more primitive aboriginal food-gatherers and primitive slash-burn agri-

acre for each person.[1] Farm families save everything; [161]
fecal matter and refuse go into a pit, which 511
also serves to feed the family pig, and at the time of spring fertilizing the material from the pit is mixed with topsoil and spread on the fields. Grass and grainstalks are carefully husbanded to be used as fuel for cooking and, rarely, for heating the house. Cloth is scarce and clothing is worn until it falls apart; after that the rags are used to make the soles of cloth shoes. The shortage of wood for all purposes has long been acute, and farm buildings are made of pounded earth, mud bricks and, in the rice region, of bamboo lathe and mud plaster. Floors are of earth, and only the dwellings of the wealthier farmers have glass windows. The dominant fact of life in the Chinese countryside is poverty. This has grown steadily worse during the last hundred years as factory-made goods destroyed village handicrafts, usury and tenancy increased, wars and ineffectual governments brought disruption and oppression, and overpopulation lowered the standard of living. "The most bankrupt countryside in Asia is the Chinese. The worst crisis of over-population China has yet had to face has been accompanied by a breakdown of traditional ideas and traditional authority so complete as to lead to a state of near anarchy."[2]

The characteristic way of life of the peasants has 511 182 culturists, absorbed most of these people into its operation, and drove the remnants higher and higher into the hills. The characteristically Chinese agriculture was intensive, that is, it uses large quantities of human labor in irrigating, fertilizing, and cultivating land for maximum yields. Its units of socio-economic organization is the village, composed of those families which cultivate the land within easy walking distance of its center. It was in the villages of rural China, spread over a vast area to exploit the land through a common technology, that the characteristic way of life developed. It is his family's village which is "home" to Chinese of all classes, no matter how far he may wander or how Westernized his life may have become. There are ties with his own family's past, symbolized by the ancestral temple and the family or clan burial ground. There are the other families with which his own has built an enduring network of reciprocal favors and obligations. It is in the farming villages that Communist Party workers now seek to bring about fundamental changes in the way of life and to break up the old complex of family and local loyalties. 241 181 621 181

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[1] George B. Cressey, Asia's Lands and Peoples, New York, 1944, p. 87. Cressey cites C. C. Chang "An Estimate of China's Land and Crops," Nanking, 1932; Cressey, p. 88: "...an average farm family of 6.2 persons must obtain its entire livelihood from a farm of 4.18 acres of which but 3.76 acres are actually in crops."

[2] Maurice Zinkin, Asia and the West, London, 1951, p. 111.

What are the common patterns of village life from the plains of Honan to the delta of the Pearl River? We shall sketch these before discussing variations represented by urban life.

A. Village Life

First of all, life in the farming village is meager. In Honan in 1932 there was about one-half an acre of cultivated land per person; in the richer, semi-tropical province of Kwangtung there was one-fifth of an 161 571

been slowly disintegrating under manifold pressures. 511
In prosperous periods in the past a delicate balance 182
of human and economic factors fostered a crowded, conformist, but on the whole, harmonious village life. Recent decades have seen the old harmony replaced by tension and a predatory struggle for survival. And, despite the isolation of most villages, ideas and ideals from the West have slowly undermined the authority of the older mores and customary laws.

Despite all the fissures that have developed, it 178
is well to remember that peasant life everywhere has a tremendous inertia, that it is incredibly resistant to all the forces of change. Thus, much of the sweeping change that occurred in city life under comparable pressures did not occur in the peasant villages.

The main economic and social unit of the village 527
is the family, and a special study is devoted to that 262
subject. Here we shall sketch the rhythm of village life and something of its annual cycle of activity.

The New Year holiday, for the people of China the first fifteen days of the year, is the main period of leisure for the villagers. Food is prepared in advance, and even the women may rest from their cooking during the first five days of the holiday. The town is decorated with nien-hua (New Year's pictures) and ch'un-lien (paired New Year's Day mottoes). Visiting friends and relatives, gambling, eating the best food of the year, wearing the best clothes, and indulging the children make this the most festive period of the year. For many familities it is the only time in the year when they can afford to eat meat dishes. The special dishes of the season vary from province to province. In a northern province such as Honan, chiao-tzu (meat dumplings) are particular favorites; as one moves south, rice-based delicacies such as nien-kao (year cakes) figure more prominently in the New Year's feasts. Besides being a time of celebration, the New Year is also the time for settling accounts, and, for many farmers there has been little left for celebrating when the creditors have all been dealt with. 527 262

The regular work of the agricultural year begins immediately after the New Year. In Honan the farming cycle is governed by the need to conserve water and by the demands of the principal crops: wheat, millet, kaoliang. From the Yangtze south through the Central-South Region, the year is phased by the steps in wet rice cultivation. In early spring, the Honan farmer begins his year-long effort to conserve moisture that has accumulated in the soil during the autumn and winter rains. About half of the fields are then in winter fallow awaiting the spring planting; the rest are planted in winter wheat. Fertilizer from the household pit is spread on the fallow fields. The wheat is brought to maturity by careful hoeing and by hand irrigation using well water -- a back-breaking operation in which the farmer is helped by his whole family. 221

In April or May comes the time to plant his remaining fields in millet, kaoliang, or cotton; often he must irrigate to assure the germination of seeds. Then comes the time to harvest the wheat, and once again the farmer calls on his whole family and often on his neighbors for harvesting, threshing, and winnowing, all done by hand with the greatest care to preserve every grain and the stalks and straw as well. Then the winter wheat land is planted in soybeans and corn. The farmer and his family may then slacken their pace, but not for long, for autumn brings the harvest of the summer crops, the fall plowing and then the planting of winter wheat. 221

Autumn, too, is the traditional time for the tax collector to appear with his demands for taxes in money or in kind.[3] And, before the Communist abolition of tenancy, it was the time when the landlord was given a portion of his share of the crop. If the weather had been favorable and the tax gatherer was not unduly rapacious, the farmer might retain enough grain to see his family through to the next harvest. If things had gone badly, a grim winter season lay ahead. Winter was in any case the time for repairing farm implements, weaving thatch, repairing buildings, spinning and weaving rough cloth, and other household chores. With the approach of the New Year the farmer might look forward to some festivity, perhaps to slaughtering the family pig; if debts loomed large, the pig might have to be sold to help.[4] 221 651

The farmer's life south of the Yangtze is similarly dominated by the need for the most intense toil throughout the year if his tiny plots of land are to support him and his family. Rice sets the rhythm and dominates the economy. Much of the rice culture 221 of this area is on level plains, but in recent years the 651 terraced fields have been pushed higher and higher up denuded mountains and hillsides. In the early spring, after the New Year, the farmer brings up his rice plants in nursery beds near the farmhouse. Then he prepares his fields by plowing and removing, in some areas, his winter crop stubble. Fertilizer is carefully spread over the ground, and then water is admitted; when the water reached a certain depth, the ground is carefully harrowed. The ground is now ready for the transplating of the young rice from the nursery beds, and this backbreaking job, done while crouching in the water, completes the Spring work. Save for repeated cultivating and trampling of weeds, the farmer has an easier life during the ripening of the grain. As the grain ripens, the fields dry, and at last it is harvest time. The harvesting and threshing are again the work of all available hands and are done with primitive implements. The harvest in, the farmer must deal with the tax collector and then ready his fields for the winter crops; in some parts of the Central-South Region, this may be winter wheat and rape; in others two or three rice crops are produced in a single agricultural year. The rice farmer, like the wheat farmer of the north, uses winter for work on tools, handicrafts, repairs, and the women of his family may carry forward their raising of silk worms, spinning and weaving of silk. In other areas, tea is an important supplement to rice agriculture.[5]

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[3] The tax rate was high. The average land tax in 1929-32 was US$1. 79 as compared with $0. 46 for all farm land in the United States in 1932. Cf. Olga Lang, Chinese Family and Society, New Haven, 1946, p. 69.

[4] J. L. Buck's study of 16, 786 farms showed that 39 per cent of these were in debt in the period 1929-32. Cited in Lang, op. cit., p. 69.

B. Annual Festivals

The farm year, toilsome in north and south alike, 527 is punctuated by other activities and festivals which 769 relieve some of the monotony of the long seasons of work. The first of the annual festivals after the New Year is that of Ch'ing-ming which corresponds in time to the Western Easter. Also like the Western Easter, it was once a Spring fertility festival. On this occasion the ties of the living and dead members of the family and clan are celebrated. Families often take picnics to the family or clan graveyard, make food offerings to the dead, sweep the graveyards, and then enjoy their feast. All relatives make special efforts to join in this annual celelbration of family solidarity, and the outing makes the occasion a pleasant relief from winter and indoor work.[6]

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[5] On the agricultural year cycle, see excellent description in Gerald Winfield, China, The Land and The People, New York, 1948, pp. 34-61.

On the fifth day of the fifth lunar month is the Dragon Boat Festival. This is of southern origin and is traced by Eberhard to the human sacrifical rites of the Tai aborigines of south China.[7] In modern times it has been somewhat less popular in the north than in the south. It is in the south that the dragon boat races were held on rivers and lakes. For most rural families the festival meant somewhat better food than usual and particularly steamed rice dumplings known as tsung-tzu -- a counterpart to the rice sacrifices made on this occasion to the shade of Ch'ü Yüan -- an ancient political martyr and poet of the feudal state of Ch'u.

On the fifteenth day of the seventh moon, usually in late August, is the feast of souls, the primitive origin of which has been transmuted by Buddhist belief and symbolism. It is at once a festival for the souls of one's ancestors and a community salute to the dead. Ancestral graves are cleared, sacrifices of food are made, and paper replicas of desirable objects are burned. The salute to the dead takes the form 527 769 of floating paper boats with lanterns in them on some body of water, symbolizing the communities' concern that all the dead may be guided to the "other shore" -- Buddhist metaphor for salvation. Many pay visits to a nearby temple and pay for masses for the souls of all the dead, particularly for the souls of the people in the community who died without descendants to commemorate their passing. In this festival, too, special food is prepared for the dead and for the living, and the farmers and their families enjoy leisure and conviviality.

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[6] Wolfram Eberhard, Chinese Festivals, New York, 1942, pp. 113-127.

[7] Eberhard, op. cit., pp. 69-96.

The mid-Autumn festival on the fifteen night of the eighth lunar month is basically a moon festival, and the ceremonies in honor of the moon carried out at moon-rise on this autumn night are full of the symbols of fertility and longevity. In modern times it has been mainly a festival of women, and the Old Man in the Moon is sacrificed to as the one who arranges all marriages on earth. The moon cakes, in the shape of the full moon, are one of the special delicacies of this season. This too was perhaps originally a fertility festival, and in some areas it is a popular time to make pilgrimages to nearby mountains.

These are the festivals that have continued to have the most significance for the Chinese farmer into modem times. Many of them have changed drastically through time and we shall shortly see that the Chinese Communists are greatly altering the meaning and symbolism of those few which they have allowed to survive.

In addition to the annual festivals, the farmer's 527 life of toil may be relieved by ceremonial family events. A wedding meant, for those who could afford it, a great feast and ample wine; even the poorest familes made every effort to make a marriage ceremony festive. 527 Practical jokes were played on the bridegroom, traditional songs were sung, and the guests, particularly the men, thoroughly enjoyed themselves. The births of male children were often celebrated as were the initiations of boys into adulthood, betrothals, and the like. In modern times the government of the Republic of China has decreed certain national holidays, but these were little observed by the farm villages.

In addition to these occasions for relaxation, 517 there were activities which interested some of the villagers and helped to vary their lives. Itinerant dramatic troupes occasionally performed, and the storyteller spinning out his tales to the villagers until very recently was often seen. The election of a headman for the village often involved political maneuvering and a town meeting. Pilgrimages to famous mountains or shrines were often undertaken in the slack agricultural season for religious reasons or purely for relaxation. Perhaps the most universal recreation was, as in all illiterate communities, gossip and desultory conversation about the weather, the crops, the iniquity of the government, local disputes, and, on their rare occurrence, lawsuits involving fellow villagers. Despite the grim struggle for 156 survival, the average villager tended to be cheerful, self-respecting, with a robust sense of humor. He went through life with a continuous concern for his own "face" or prestige among his fellows and with the strong determination that, despite all, the fortunes of his family might steadily improve.

C. Urban Life

City life, although it meant a different pattern of 369 work, was closely akin to life in the villages. Town and city dwellers kept their ties with their native villages, returned there whenever possible, and many saw commercial activity in the town only as means of the acquisition of sufficient wealth to buy farming land upon their return to the village. The town population, then, is mostly made up of artisans and peasants, plus a small number of landlords, retired officials, county functionaries, and established merchant families. The county seats (hsien capitals) were the centers for tax collection and administration of the surrounding farm-villages and also served as market towns where the peasant might sell his crop and purchase the manufactured goods he could not produce. 369 [162] [634]

Town life for the average artisan was as meager as that of his relatives in the village. Long hours, hard work, low pay, few holidays were the lot of most, and living conditions were generally poorer and more crowded than those in the villages. Proprietors of many shops required their employees to live on the premises, so that they seldom visited their families. The diet of the town dweller was as poor as that of the poor farmer -- mostly cereals, vegetables, and some condiments, and meat and fruit on holidays only. Brief holidays were allowed at the New Year, the Ch'ing-ming festival, the mid-Autumn festival, and the Dragon Boat festival. On these occasions, townspeople usually tried to return to their villages; if this was impossible they enjoyed such delicacies as they could afford and strolled the streets, perhaps visiting friends and attending seasonal fairs and theaters. 369 511 [466] [262] 369 527

Life in the towns was, then, closely linked with village life. But in the provincial capitals, such as 369

Kaifeng, Changsha, and Canton, life in some respects 369
has been greatly altered by the modernization that
has spread from the coastal to the inland cities. The
streets are paved, and schools, newspapers, movies,
and radio make the people more aware of the outside
world than their cousins in the towns and villages. In
the cities, major industries built large dormitories
for workers, labor unions and political clubs developed
as new foci for social activity. Yet the living
conditions grew worse as workers moved into the
cities. Crowding reached unbelievable proportions.
The only comparable figures are for Chengtu, a city
outside the Central-South area, but they suggest the
dimensions of this problem in all urban centers.
Chengtu, with predominantly one-storied buildings,
had a population density of 50,000 per square mile
as compared with 22,500 per square mile in New York
City.[8] One survey suggests that workers in the newer [466]
industries were somewhat better off than workers in
the traditional trades,[9] but their traditional holidays
were shortened without, in most cases, the introduction
of a six-day week. In the crowded cities the [527]
festivals of the agricultural year continued to determine
the holidays, and (although national holidays
were increasingly observed), like the town dwellers,
city dwellers tried to return to their families villages
for at least one of the holidays. Another link to one's 369
native place was the system of clubs composed of 575
those city-dwellers who had a common provincial

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[8] Winfield, op. cit., p. 88. These figures would seem to be for the period 1945-47.

[9] Lang, op. cit., pp. 88-89.

origin; the clubs operated hostels and sometimes arrangements for mutual aid. Secret societies provided another focus of social life, particularly in the towns and cities. Their rituals, passports, and secret signs of greeting were all subordinate to their basic aim, which was to provide members with security-through-association, with an insurance against the hazards of a disintegrating and increasingly predatory society. 369 575

It will be noted that the ties of kinship and custom were strong even between the large modern cities and the farm villages. The ways of life tended increasingly to diverge, yet one of the strongest cohesive forces of all was the common set of attitudes and values which, even when change has been accounted for, held together all Chinese of village and town and city. 369

D. The Influence of Communism

In discussing Communist efforts to alter the Chinese way of life, it should be stressed that our material is unsatisfactory. Statistics, declarations, news releases give few realistic details of life in the villages under Communist domination, and most refugees from Communist China have come from the citie 668

First of all, the farmer's annual routine is basically unchanged. Pilot collectives are in operation, but these are few and have no immediate bearing on the farmer's work year. The most striking change in the farmer's life is the new network of associations which the government has imposed upon him and the daily barrage of advice and exhortation to which he is subjected. No longer does he cultivate his land in the manner of his ancestors with the assistance of his family, his clan, and his neighbors. He no longer sets the periods of work and of rest. The Communist leadership is determined that the peasant shall be transformed in three ways: he must be made to produce more; he must become a politically conscious, active supporter of the Communist regime, and his attitudes and values must be radically changed. 668

The instrument of this transformation, which is visible and active in the villages, is the Party cadre. Party cadres act as the eyes, the ears, and the mouths of authority.[10] "They are called upon to take the leadership in organizing production and to participate in all types of farm work, such as mobilizing the peasants for cultivation, teaching new farming methods, distributing new seed, performing grain requisitioning, helping in planting, building and repairing dikes, etc."[11] The village cadres have been mainly outsiders, "foreigners," but the Party has been recruiting youths from specific localities and training them to return there as cadres. The cadre was the instrument of land redistribution and brought into the countryside the first major change decreed by Peking. The cadre organized the Peasants' Association in the village and manipulates its meetings and its officers. It was the cadre who worked up sentiment and organized the "speak bitterness" meetings in the days of the Land Reform Movement -- occasions used to the full to attack the old familial order in the villages. It is the cadre who organizes the "struggle meetings" in which villagers are made to engage in criticism and self-criticism in order to undermine the old values and instill the new. 668 241

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[10] Walter E. Gourlay, The Chinese Communist Cadre: Key to Political Control, Harvard, Russian Research Center, 1952, p. 25.

[11] Gourlay, op. cit., p. 28.

The cadres also pushed the organization of "mutual-aid teams" for the sharing of labor and equipment, an effort that struck at the familial organization of farm labor and apparently met with serious difficulties.[12] More recently the cadre has been the instrument for the concerted attempt to build producer co-operatives in the countryside. In such major efforts as the attempt to put Hunan rice farming on a two-crop basis (hitherto only done further south), the cadres were reportedly responsible for training 100,000 farmers.[13] 668 241

The cadre carries on the effort to destroy traditional mores. He publicizes the new marriage law, discourages or prevents arranged marriages, lectures on sanitation, and, sometimes with the help of radio, films, and mobile theatrical units, dramatizes the issues of the day, the need for the farmer to sacrifice, to send his sons to the army, to contribute labor to community projects, to inform on his neighbors, to buy bonds, and so forth. The cadre establishes "winter schools" in which the peasants are given intensive political indoctrination, practical training, and instruction in reading and writing. Hunan reported that 2,500,000 peasants were enrolled in these schools in the winter of 1955.[14] 208 873

The age-old drive of the vigorous peasant to in- 668 425

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[12] W. W. Rostow, The Prospects of Communist China, Cambridge, 1954, p. 84.

[13] Reported by New China News Agency, Changsha, Apr. 20, 1955; Survey of China Mainland Press (SCMP), 1036, Apr. 28, 1955.

[14] People's Daily, Jan. 30, 1955; SCMP 984, pp. 30-31.

crease his family's land holdings is checked by fear 668
lesthe be re-classified as a "rich peasant" and be 425
subject to higher taxes and other pressures. Yet what the Communists deplore as the peasant's "spontaneous capitalistic tendency" has not been crushed, and the landholdings of the more enterprising grow in size.[15]

The effort to force various forms of co-operative 668
work have not been completely successful. 474

> "... when a serious team-use of labor, tools, and farm animals was attempted, a variety of unsatisfactory results emerged; quarrels among the families interfered with efficient output; no one assumed responsibility for the upkeep of communal property; the claims of inefficient members violated the sense of equity of the more efficient..."[16]

Yet the villagers' way of life has been greatly 517
altered by the intervention of the government, through 668
the cadres, in all social, economic, and political ac-
tivities. The pressure to conform, at least outward- 369
ly, is formidable. Self-chosen leisure time activities are few, meetings occupy a great deal of time, and attendance at harangues by Party cadres, entertainment furnished by traveling theatrical groups (all with their ideological message) take up more of his

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[15] Rostow, op. cit., p. 152, cites the Peking People's Daily, Feb. 15, 1954.

[16] Rostow, op. cit., p. 84.

leisure. The slack winter season may now find him 369
in winter school or involved in a community work 517
project directed by the local cadre. 668

Settlement of accounts before the New Year holiday now means payment of taxes and the sale to the government of most of the balance of the farmer's grain, for which he receives coupons. The cadres carry this out at the village level.[17] The New Year festival itself is characterized by some traditional acitivites, modified to promote government aims, and by some new features. The peasant may buy New Year's pictures to decorate his house, but they will probably be romanticized portraits of Mao and other Communist heroes rather than the colorful deities of former days.[18] He may decorate his gate with paired mottoes, but the mottoes will no longer carry the old wishes for long life, happiness, and wealth, but exhortations to conform to Communist standards.[19] The government may allow some additional foods for the season, but gambling is forbidden, and social life is no longer restricted to family and friends. In Hunan, the peasants were urged to organize their own dramatic troupes to play the approved repertoire, and travelling troupes brought dramas to the villages. The cadres organized "cultural lectures" and mobile movie teams showed instructive films. The old exchange of visits with relatives in nearby towns now has its Communist counterpart: interchange of visits between urban and rural workers' groups to observe one another's progress in Communist reconstruction.[20]

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[17] SCMP 979, Feb. 2, 1955, p. 30.

[18] Enlightenment Daily, Jan. 23, 1955, p. 2.

[19] Cf. the collection of mottoes in Hua-nan t'ung-shu, [South China Almanac], Canton, 1953, p. 32.

[20] Enlightenment Daily, Jan. 23, 1955, p. 2.

The seasonal short pilgrimage, in company, to 668
some nearby shrine also has, in Hunan, its Commu- 309
nist counterpart: a mass pilgrimage from the city of 788
Changsha to Mao Tse-tung's native village, which is being built up as a national shrine.[21] Despite its frontal attack on the old familism, the Communist government last year provided special trains to take city dwellers back to their native villages for the holiday; a mass exodus was reported from Peking.[22]

Ch'ing-ming is no longer an approved festival, 527
presumably because of its function as a celebration 668
of kinship ties and family continuity. The next approved traditional holiday is the Dragon Boat festival in June. The boat races have been revived, and the poet Ch'ü Yüan, now a "People's hero martyred in protest against a corrupt feudal regime," is the focus of celebrations.[23] The moon festival in autumn is also celebrated with extra food allowances and "cultural" activities. The various anniversaries of the Chinese Communists and of the world Communist movement probably do not break into the agricultural working year, but may be occasions for special propaganda arranged by the local cadre. It will be seen that the pattern of living in the villages has been drastically altered; what remains of the old pattern is precisely what the government and the Party permits in the interest of morale or adapts in the interest of their rural program of change and indoctrination.

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[21] Ibid.

[22] Ibid.; also, SCMP 972, 1954, p. 21.

[23] SCMP 1075, June 23, 1955, p. 25.

E. Changes in Patterns of Living

In the towns and cities, as in the countryside, the greatest changes in living patterns have been brought about by the network of new associations by which the regime envelops and controls the individual. Workers in various traditional crafts, merchants, industrial workers, all are organized by the Party, and it is within these groups, under the guidance of the cadres, that the urban working population is most strenuously indoctrinated. In long and frequent meetings, the city dweller is under intense pressure to manifest "correct attitudes," to show himself free of all "feudal" and "bourgeois" taint, and to demonstrate his complete comitment to Communist goals. Through these and other channels he is under continual pressure to step up his efficiency and productivity. The meetings take such a toll of his energy at the end of the working day that they are openly referred to as "fatigue meetings." [24]

City and town dwellers are also organized into street and ward units, and through these they are given further directives on the management of their lives. The townsman, more than the peasant, is open to an around-the-clock propaganda barrage. From the first call to early morning calisthenics, the radio blares in every street until late at night. There is pressure to join sports groups, study groups -- all with their ideological purposes. The major Communist holidays are celebrated in the cities with great parades and with endless speeches. Privacy, the chance to be at ease with family or friends, is rare.

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[24] Rostow, op. cit., p. 160.

The New Year's holiday has retained some of its 668
old gaiety, although within the same restrictions im- 527
posed on the peasant. The cities receive special shipments of seasonal delicacies, and trips back to the family village may be possible for a small percentage of town dwellers.[25] Major sports events and theatrical performances are scheduled for this season, and visitors from rural areas come to the city in large numbers. There is special provisioning of the city shops at the time of the mid-Autumn and the Dragon Boat festivals.

The cities have been cleaned up and enlarged, 668
and building has apparently proceeded rapidly, al- 565
though improvements in housing probably mainly affect the industrial workers, the favored class in the drive for industrialization.[26] Yet the Rostow study indicates that there has been no real increase in wages for the urban worker.[27] His diet remains poor, his work hours long. But since the Party is anxious to recruit from urban workers, he does have opportunity to rise in life through Party work. Many industrial workers probably do feel some sense of identification with the most rapidly expanding sector of the Chinese economy. This identification and the opportunities offered by the Party are probably slowly changing the goals of the urban worker. He may be less interested than he once was in returning to a plot of land in the country, where economic opportunities are increasingly restricted. He knows, after attending one Party meeting, that the peasantry is no longer the favored class in the Chinese economy.

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25. Enlightenment Daily, Jan. 23, 1955, p. 2.
26. Rostow, op. cit., p. 160.
27. Ibid., pp. 160-61.

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The elite of the towns and cities are the functionaries of the government and Party. We know little of the pattern of their private lives. But, if the badge of the old Chinese bureaucratic elite was a leisurely and cultivated air, the badge of the new is a full briefcase and an air of purposeful, energetic activity. Their incomes permit their families a life somewhat easier than that granted the rest of the urban population, but they are constantly under discipline, watched by their colleagues, obliged to meet work quotas and to submit to continuous indoctrination and re-indoctrination. Party and government workers are urged to use the New Year holiday to plan their work for the year to come.

The bulk of the old middle class may have survived, but its activities have been increasingly restricted by government controls and the growth of government producing and marketing facilities. They are a tough and tenacious group, but their old comfortable life is already threatened and, as a class, they are scheduled for extinction.[28]

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The growing cities now appear to be replacing the country as the goal of the ambitious. It is likely that, as urbanization and industrialization proceed, the cities rather than the farm villages will determine, as the Communists plan, the mores, the patterns of living for society as a whole.

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[28] Rostow, op. cit., pp. 162-64.

II. BASIC ATTITUDES

One of the principal reasons for the stability 181
and long life of the old order in China was its social homogeneity. The imperial government fostered uniformity of attitudes and values, and Chinese statemen believed this to be a more binding, durable, and cheaper cement for the imperial order than governmental coercion. Old China was primarily a way of life, a system of values and attitudes, and on this premise the state was organized. A foreigner who wished to become "naturalized" had only to show that he accepted Chinese attitudes and values; this he did by adopting Chinese dress and speech and patterns of behavior.

This characteristic of the old order is one of 181
the reasons why we find no important regional varia- 668
tions in basic attitudes. The other reason is that the Communist government is as determined, in enforcing a uniformity of values and attitudes, and far more resourceful, than was the imperial government of the past.

There are, however, certain local variations in temperament and ethos which affect, to a minor degree, the basic attitudes and values. A few of these will be noted. For the variant attitudes and values of ethnic and religious minorities, see the chapters on Ethnic Groups and Religion.

There have been profound changes in basic atti- 181
tudes over the last century and particularly during the 668
last five years. Change has been brought about by 178

two factors. The first is the disintegration of the old social and political order resulting from its failure to adapt itself to the problems and pressures of the modern world. Consequently, people became critical of the older attitudes and, in increasing numbers, adopted newer "modern" attitudes and values which were considered better suited to a modern China. The second is the power of the Communist state which, in the last five years, has been used to inculcate a new and uniform set of values and attitudes. 181 668 178

These two factors are closely inter-related. Thus the Communists have been making a systematic use of individual and group-dissatisfaction with the old order to inspire and promote the acceptance of the new attitudes and values; the latter's appeal has been particularly strong with youth -- especially adolescents -- and with women who have been taught to regard the old social order as tyrannical and oppressive. The following will illustrate this last point: 181 668

> Co-operative agriculture has organization,
> and women are not left out.
> In the old society we were badly mistreated,
> but the new society teaches friendship
> and love.[1]

In addition to capitalizing on discontent, the Communists have been making a peculiar use of traditional attitudes and values. Certain values from the old order still have a strong emotional appeal for the Chinese people. And the Communists seek to make the new order more acceptable by associating some of its elements with selected elements from

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[1] Fu-nu San-tzu Ching [Three-character Classic for Women], Hsin-hua Publishing House, 1950, p 21. Three-character rhymed verses were widely used in traditional China for indoctrination of the young.

the traditional culture.
For example, they insist that as a guiding principle of personal behavior the idea of "struggle" (*tou-cheng*) must replace that of "harmony" (*ho*).[2] People are taught to struggle for self-perfection and to engage in class struggle, in the struggle for a new China, and in the struggle against deviation even when this involves attacking their friends. This is utterly contrary to the old ideal of harmony in personal relations, an ideal that meant in practice a comfortable adjustment to one's natural and human environments. Yet in urging all to struggle, the Communists insist that the ultimate goal of all struggle is the *Ta-t'ung Ching-yü* -- the traditional utopian ideal of a harmonious, frictionless social order.[3]

In discussing certain attitudes and values we should bear in mind that the power of the old and the appeal of the new vary not according to regions but according to social groups. It was among the population of modern cities like Shanghai that the old values were first challenged by the pressures of modern problems, but among the peasantry and rural gentry, despite many discontents and tensions, the old ways still prevailed.[4] Intellectuals and members of the new industrial and commercial groups were the first to discard traditional attitudes and adopt Western values; among other groups this process was slower. These variations affect Communist tactics to the extent that different kinds of persuasion are used with different groups. But the final goal is adoption of the attitudes and values decreed by the Communist leadership.

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2. Cf. Arthur F. Wright, "Struggle vs. Harmony: Symbols of Competing Values in Modern China," *World Politics*, Vol. VI (Oct. 1953) pp. 31-44.

3. Mao Tse-tung, *On People's Democratic Dictatorship* 3d. ed., Peking, Foreign Languages Press,

[see next page]

A. Good and Bad

In traditional China the prevailing belief was that man was inherently good and that socially harmful behavior occurred only when men lacked guidance or were placed in adverse circumstances. For example, if the ruler of the state or his officials or the father of the family failed to provide for the basic physical needs of individuals, their dependents were likely to rebel. Or if those in authority failed to provide instruction, particularly if they failed to set an example in conduct, then those subordinate to them would have no guideposts to the good and would fall into evil ways.

Bad conduct was not, as in the West, violation of the laws of God but deviation from the age-old norms of acceptable social behavior. Specifically, behavior was categorized as "bad" if it went against such prescribed norms as the following: (1) hsiao, filial submission to fathers and elders; (2) chung, loyal and submissive devotion to superiors; (3) hsin, good faith among friends and associates; (4) jen, benevolence or fellow-feeling which should inform all social relationships; (5) i, righteousness in one's dealings with others; (6) li [good form) accepted procedures in human relations; (7) lien, integrity; and (8) ch'ih, sense of shame.

[footnote No. 3 continued]
1950, pp. 16-17. For Mao, of course, the term means the ultimate world-wide Communist utopia.

4. For example, as late as 1941-43, one anthropologist found that in rural Yunan the traditional value of hsiao (filial submission) was still, as it had been for centuries, "the foundation stone... of social organization, ... the measuring stick of all behavior and of the worth of the individual.

The laws of imperial China provided heavy punishments for violations of these norms; the most heinous crimes were those against hsiao, filial submission. Yet the ideal in the application of law was not blindfold justice but punishment administered with due regard for "human feelings" [jen-ching] and for the specific circumstances sourrounding the crime. This attitude is illustrated in the old proverb: "There is one thing worse than a dishonest official and that is an honest official," which expresses disapproval of a rigorous enforcement of rules and regulations, of an enforcement that fails to take in account "human feelings."[5] The criteria for judging behavior as good or bad were therefore neither religious nor legalistic, but were the prevailing norms in the community, the customary practices sanctioned by tradition and ratified by a high degree of community consensus. 183 689 577

In traditional China goodness could be cultivated through practice, study, and contemplation. Confucianism held that the path to goodness was open to all, that those who attained a high order of goodness should be a moral elite, a group of exemplars for others. This moral elite was also, in Confucian theory, the group which should hold and exercise political power and enjoy the rewards of status and wealth. This notion sanctioned the long political dominance of the scholar-official. 577 829

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[5] Ruth Benzel and John Weakland, "An Anthropological Approach to Chinese Communism," Columbia University Research in Contemporary Cultures, New York, 1952, pp. 80-81. Hereafter cited as Bunzel-Weakland.

[6] Liu Shao-ch'i, "The Training of the Communist Party Member," first presented as a speech in 1939; cf. translation in Boyd Compton, Mao's China, Seattle, 1952, p. 146.

577 The Chinese Communists have laid out new standards of good and bad. In the words of their leading theoretician, their aim is"...to reform mankind into the completely selfless citizenry of a Communist society."[6] In setting the new standards the Communists have consciously and unconsciously selected concepts from traditional moral ideas; some have been discarded, others have been taken over with little adaptation; still others linger between the lines and in the implications of Communist utterances.

596 577 The old virtues associated with the traditional family have been discarded because the old family system has been dissolved, its functions taken over by the modern conjugal family on the one hand and by state and Party organizations on the other.[7] Familial virtues are castigated as "feudal" and as backward features of what the leadership calls "the squalid old society of China."[8]

829 The basic Marxist dogma that the individual is molded by his class position and, indirectly, by the "stage" of the society into which he is born has a good deal in common with the Confucian view of the prime importance of environment in the formation of character. Thus the Communist effort to create a new society, in both traditional Chinese and Marxist terms, will create a favorable environment for the development of individual goodness. But the "goodness" expected is differ-

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[7] J. M. H. Lindbeck, "Communist Policy and the Chinese Family," Far Eastern Survey, No.20 (July 25, 1951), pp. 137-41.

[8] Liu Shao-ch'i, quoted in David S. Nivison, Communist Ethics and Chinese Tradition, Stanford University, 1954, p. 15. Nivison's study will appear in a symposium, Thought and Officialdom in China, University of Chicago Press, early1956.

ent: "To sacrifice the individual for the sake of the Party, for the sake of the class, for national liberation, or the liberation of mankind, even to sacrifice one's own life without the slightest hesitation, with a feeling of happiness -- this is the highest expression of Communist morality. . .[9]" 829

This is the basic principle: utter subordination of the individual to the Party. But when we examine some of the personal qualities which the Communists want, we find them linked in many ways to Chinese tradition. The good Communist is "able to love others and hate others" (a phrase from the Analects of Confucius), that is, he never injures his comrades for his own benefit but vigorously fights the enemies of the revolution. Towards his comrades his attitude is one of "genuineness and sympathy." (Analects) He "does nothing to others that he would not have done to himself." (Analects) He "grieves before all the rest of the world grieves and is happy only after all the rest of the world is happy." (Buddhist ideal of the Bodhisattva-savior, adapted by an eleventh century Confucian thinker.) He "has no individual apprehensions or private desires to obscure and pervert his investigation of things and understanding of true principles, "(a restatement of the late Confucian 812 156 view of purity of mind as being necessary for true knowledge.[10]

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[9] Liu Shao-ch'i "On the Training of the Communist Party Member" in Compton, op. cit., p. 110. Nivison, op. cit., p. 18, points out that this prescription is close to the classic descriptions of the traditional virtue of chung -- absolute loyalty to superiors.

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To attain these and other "good" qualities, the Communist, like his Confucian ancestors, is to pattern his character after approved models and to subject himself to intensive self-cultivation. In traditional China, the models of character and behavior found in the classics and histories were to be studied and followed by individuals who manifested a particular virtue, filial piety for example, were required reading. Now the Communists set up Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin and Mao as personal models; everyone is capable of attaining the great qualities of these revolutionary geniuses if he tries.[11] Even selected heroes from China's "feudal past" are recommended as models.[12] Such models are presented in fiction, in textbooks, in newspapers, and young and old are urged to emulate these heroes. In addition, "model" workers, farmers, soldiers are feted and publicized, and their pictures and idealized biographies appear in all propaganda media.

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[10] These characterizations are all from the authoritative treatise by Liu Shao-ch'i "On the Training of the Communist Party Member," translated in Compton, op. cit., pp. 108-55. The traditional sources are identified in Nivison, op. cit., p. 19-20.

[11] Liu Shao-ch'i, op. cit., quoted in Nivison, p. 16.

[12] Ch'en Sang, "Tang-hsing Yü Ssu Sheng-huo" (Party Nature and Private Life) in Lun Tang Yü Ko-jen (On the Party and the Individual) by Ch'en Po-ta and others, Hong Kong reprint, 1948, p. 3, cited in Nivison, op. cit., p. 76, note 16.

Self-cultivation consists of being unremittingly conscious of one's faults and of Communist ideals, of being ever alert, in study and action, to the recrudescence of 'bad' attitudes which are the residue of one's pre-Communist education. Liu Shao-ch'i stresses the development of consciousness in the individual; through consciousness one is free from the determining forces of history and environment and becomes capable of working creatively for the aims of the new society. This emphasis on consciousness is connected with both traditional ethics and Soviet psychology. On the one hand, it has "an obvious affinity to the Neo-Confucian notion of cultivation as freeing the individual from the tyranny of blind habit and unconscious selfish motivations."[13] On the other, it reflects the recent development of Soviet psychology; from an earlier denunciation of consciousness as "smacking of bourgeois idealism" the Russians have come to the view that "consciousness is a central process in making man capable of forging his own destinies."[14] 156 812

The list of bad qualities denounced by Communists is long; liberalism, formalism, bureaucratism, opportunism, and a dozen others are being continually denounced. How does one rid oneself of these vices? The following formula, here used against the vice of individualism, is typical: 155

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[13] Cf. Nivison, op. cit., p. 15.

[14] Cf. Raymond Bauer, The New Man in Soviet Psychology, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1952, p. 164 and passim. The quotations are from Jerome Bruner's forword to this volume, xxii.

> "The methods transmitted by the ancients for raising oneself out of the vulgar state and entering sagehood, becoming a Buddha or a Taoist spirit, all required one to go through a long period of discipline. If we want to shed the earthly form of individualism and acquire a spiritual form of collectivism, we must cultivate and discipline ourselves over and over; ...we should continually ask ourselves this question: 'Am I or am I not still guilty of individualism?' If we have a thought, utter a sentence, walk a step or do a thing, we should then ask ourselves, 'Is this individualism or not?' And then we should listen for the response of others [the group] : this is -- or is not -- individualism."[15]

The last sentence quoted above introduces the notion of group criticism and group pressure, which is the universal Communist device for fostering approved behavior and eliminating the disapproved. Members of Party organizations, professions, government bureaus, and all other groups meet continually for criticism and self-criticism, and this whole process reaches the population through the publication of confessions and criticisms in the mass media. The study meetings, popularly called "struggle meetings," are characterized by an atmosphere of tension and fear. Confessions of deviation or defect are made by individuals and analyzed or "exposed" by the group; criticisms are leveled at individuals and promises of reform are exacted.[16] This appears to be a device of deadly effectiveness for making individuals conform to the new Communist standards for thought and behavior. 155

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[15] Lun Tang Yü Ko-jen [*On the Party and the Individual*] cited in Nivison, *op. cit.*, pp. 45-46, and note 66.

[16] Cf., Anon., "The 'Struggle Meeting' in Communist China", *Far Eastern Notes,* No. 1, April 21, 1952.

B. Time, Change, and Causation

In traditional China, time and change were regarded as cyclical. Out of their careful adjustment to the seasonal and recurrent rhythms of Nature, Chinese farmer-thinkers developed a notion of time and change which they applied to the course of individual lives, to changes in political life, to history as a whole. In the life of man, old age was seen not as the end of the line but as a return to childhood, not in the sense of "second childhood" but as having come full round from the freedom of childhood to the freedom of old age. In political thinking at all levels a notion of the cycle is present. Dynasties, like men and animals, were regarded as having a natural life, from birth, through growth, to maturity, senescence, and death; these phases differed in length but the cycle was never broken. Integration and disintegration followed one another as day followed night. The opening line of the most widely read Chinese classic novel states this prevailing belief: "When the empire has long been unified it will invariably be divided."[17] 829

The Communists seek to extirpate this age-old attitude and substitute for it the modern Western idea of straight-line progress. For them the future is not to be a return to the past but the attainment, through protracted struggle, of a Communist world utopia. Textbooks, Party handbooks, and all other media insist on this new and revolutionary idea of time and change. This dynamic straight-line change is typically and authoritatively expressed by Liu Shao-ch'i: 829

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[17] San-kuo Chih Yen-i, [The Romance of the Three Kingdoms], translated by Prewitt-Taylor.

> "It is in the course of the long struggle of men as social beings against nature, that men's physical forms. . . , their social relations, their forms of social organization as well as their brains, ideology, etc., are all continuously being changed and improved. . . ." [18]

The traditional Chinese view of causation was related to their views of time and change. Sequences of events were seen to have a certain regularity, not that of cause and effect. Night follows day, but day is not the cause of night.[19] Through education one learned how to identify situations and to know the sorts of things that might happen. One learned to place oneself advantageously in a sequence of situations. The Communists seek to replace this older view with the Marxist idea of causation. A student is to learn the Marxist laws of social development, that certain causes always bring certain effects, and that when one has mastered the laws of causation, one can actively participate in bringing about the desired and inevitable results.

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The Communist effort to replace the old attitudes toward time, change, and causation with new ones has tremendous implications. It seeks to destroy any tinge of fatalism, any inclination toward resignation, and to foster in the individual a restless search for the goals set by the Party.

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[18] Liu Shao-ch'i, "On the Training of the Communist Party Member." For this passage, cf. Current Background No. 159, Jan. 31, 1952, p. 18.

[19] Bunzel-Weakland, p. 31.

C. Work and Leisure

In traditional China, leisure was seen as a time for replenishment of bodily and psychic energy; leisure was necessary if one were not to suffer depletion of vital forces.[20] Abundant leisure was also important evidence of membership in the favored social class. In Communist China, work and vigorous activity are given a high value; hard work and ceaseless struggle are characteristic of all the "models" held up before the people in all the propaganda media. The ceaseless activity of the top leaders is meant to set a pattern for those who follow them. Leisure as contemplative bodily replenishment is devaluated, and active sports which develop competitive spirit are being promoted. Leisure as a mark of high status has disappeared. 461

D. Authority and the Individual

The father's relation to his sons was the model for the exercise of authority in traditional China. Ideally the father was to be firm and aloof, seeing to it rather impersonally that his children were well cared for and given proper instruction. The son was to submit unquestioningly to his father's will at all times. He had no independence of judgment or action until after his father's death. The son's loyalty and devotion were also to show themselves in providing for the father's comfort in old age, in arranging a proper funeral and burial, and in periodic offerings to his father's tablet in the ancestral hall of the family. 829

In the political sphere the emperor was the "father" of his people, and the key local magistrates of the imperial bureaucracy was often referred to as the "Fathers and Mothers of the People " To reciprocate the

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20. Ibid., pp. 37-40.

care and concern of those in authority, the people were 829 to provide material support through taxes and labor; they were to serve their masters loyally and submissively; they were to obey the rules which custom (personalized as the wise rulers of the past) and the laws laid down for them. And in those laws the heaviest punishments were decreed for those who showed unfilial behavior in the family, or, in its political counterpart, rebellion against the state.[21]

These were the patterns of authority to which the 593 individual was subject. His personality was formed within the family; his status in society was determined 156 by his family's status. To understand the individual of traditional China, we must see him within this setting; to understand the changes being wrought by the Communists, we must take into account some of the tensions and dissatisfactions which the family system--particularly in its period of decay -- set up in the individual.

The role of the individual was determined by his position in the family, and he was taught to fill that particular role. For example, an older brother was held responsible for his younger brother, and was taught to be nice in play to those younger in years. The younger sons were expected to be less sober and responsible; their mothers often spoiled them. Throughout all the complex relations of the family, roles were assigned

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[21] The Classic of Filial Piety says, "Of the 3,000 crimes punishable by the five punishments, none is greater than unfiliality." (i.e., failure to submit to authority.) For a discussion, cf. Etienne Balazs, Le Traite Juridique du Souei-chou, Paris, 1954, p. 144.

and the individual's life and character were formed 593
by the role he played. Freedom of choice and freedom 156
to develop individuality were thus rigidly limited.[22]

The well-being of the family group was the individual's prime concern. He was committed to the work which would assure the family's prosperity; he was obliged to protect the family's reputation, for example, by paying off the gambling debts of a family member rather than have the family disgraced; to continue to live in a tense and unhappy household rather than to break away and thereby weaken the family's solidarity.

In exchange for his submission to authority and discipline in every phase of his personal life, the individual was given the basic necessities of life and the help of the family's influence in obtaining jobs, and in obtaining a bride, etc. Nepotism was sanctioned by the classics, and family members benefited when one of them rose to wealth or power.

The only social relationship which an individual could enjoy with less family interference was friendship, which was the most cherished thing in life. 572 Many a Chinese poet has dealt with this theme. Popular novels and dramas have treated it with vividness and force. Friendship has the overtones of the elder-brother, younger-brother relationship. As John Weakland has observed, this type of relationship between individuals, self-elected, with virtual equality between the participants, is a refuge from the father-dominated, rigid hierarchy of the family.[23]

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[22] Bunzel-Weakland, pp. 47-64.

[23] *Ibid.*, pp. 137-47.

The two patterns -- paternal domination and fraternal association -- are reflected in political life. 829 Established governmental authority is of the paternal type; everyone is subject to the will of the emperor-father. But dissident movements are organized on the basis of the brotherly friendship pattern; the romantic rebels of Chinese novels, the organization of bandit gangs, the leadership of rebel armies are all bound together by ties of friendship and blood brotherhood.

When the old social order began to break up under 178 the impact of modern forces, the family system was undermined and began slowly to disintegrate. Chinese 596 critics held that the old family stifled individuality, prevented the development of individual initiative vital to modern China, and that it was a breeding ground for authoritarianism, hindering the development of democratic citizenship. They also felt that a new kind of individual was needed, and that the family system prevented its birth.[24]

The Communists are developing a new image of the individual and a new relationship between the individual and authority; in doing this they are using certain 156 of the old family ideas and, capitalizing on dissatisfaction with the old family system, they are releasing the individual from his bonds and pushing him into a new system of human relations.

The Communists have paid particular attention to the groups which suffered most under the old family: women, particularly younger women, such as daughters-in-law, and adolescents. Bitter denunciations of the tyranny of the old family system by dramatizing its

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25. Cf. Theodore Chen, "New China, New Texts," Current History, No. 19, 1950, p. 325.

inequities, insistence on the individual's loyalty to the Party rather than to the family -- all these measures are being resorted to in order to create new individuals suited to the needs of a Communist society. In Communist literature this new type of individual, free of the family and its "feudal" relationships, is presented as having boundless opportunities for self-development. Stories of young "heroes" who have broken away -- sometimes denouncing their "reactionary" fathers -- and gone on to make striking contributions to state and society are glorified in almost every publication. 156

"Comradeship," the brother-friend type of relationship, is strongly emphasized in Party and other organizations. During the long years of their suppression, the Communist leadership was bound together by "comradeship," which is continually romanticized and extolled in textbooks and other writings. This pattern of human relationships is built on an age-old Chinese ideal and is most attractive to those who suffered most under the old family system. It is used to encourage co-operation between individuals in a common task. In the textbooks it is fostered by moral tales -- a pail of water is too heavy for Little Brother and too heavy for Big Brother, but it is easily carried by the two; a lone tree is easily shaken by the wind, but many[25] trees standing together can withstand a heavy wind.

The brotherhood-friendship pattern among top Communist leadership has subtly shifted, and Mao and the Party have begun to exercise paternal authority over subordinates and the people as a whole. Mao has taken 829

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25. Cf. Theodore Chen, "New China, New Texts," Current History, No. 19, 1950, p. 325.

on many of the attributes of the supreme patriarchal emperors of old; his paternal guidance is praised in these lines from an officially published song:

> The great leader is like a father.
> Mao Tse-tung educates us....[26]

Another praises his paternal care for his people:

> In his loving care for the people
> He surpasses that of their own
> fathers and mothers.[27]

And, in a children's song, his paternal care and affection are invoked while he is likened to the pole star -- one of the old symbols of the emperor's supremacy:

> The northern pole star in the sky-
> In China, Mao Tse-tung --
> Saving Mankind,
> Loving little children.
> He'll destroy Chiang's dirty rats.[28]

As Mao takes on more and more attributes of the father, the Party and the state take over both the functions and the emotional focus once supplied by the family. A labor heroine is described as "a good daughter of the Party."[29] A song says, 829

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[26] From a song in Chieh-fang Ko-sheng [Liberation songs] , No. 2, 1949, p. 9.

[27] From a song in K'ang-mei Yüan-ch'ao Hsiao-t'iao Chi [A Collection of Resist-America-Aid-Korea Songs] , Wu-han t'ung-su ch'u-pan-she, Wuhan, 1951, p. 60.

[28] From a song in Nung-ts'un Ko-yao Hsüan-chi [A Song Collection of Rural Themes] , Hsin-hua ch'u-pan-she, 1950, p. 24

Our great fatherland-
We should pay it the same filial reverence,
As we would show to our mothers.[30]

These quotations suggest the reorientation of loyalties away from the family, but note that the terms and images used are those of the family system itself -- a typical example of the Communist use of the old order to destroy the old order. The functions of the traditional extended family are divided among the Party, the state, and the new type conjugal family. The individual, not the family, now chooses his mate -- often with "advice from Party comrades", and the state, not the family, sanctions the match.[31] The child is taught to rely on himself rather than on his relatives, and state nurseries take over, for many parents, the function of child care.[32] In illness one looks to state and Party health agencies, but responsibility for the care of the aged devolves upon the children of the conjugal family. 596

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[29] Cf. Jen-min Hua-pao [People's Pictorial], Vol. 2, No. 2, 1951.

[30] In Ch'ang-chiang Ko-sheng [Yangtze Songs], No. 7, Hsin-hua ch'u-pan-she, Wuhan Branch, Wuhan, 1950, p. 15.

[31] Cf. Lindbeck, op. cit., pp. 140-41.

[32] The poem "Wen Pao-pao" ["Ask Baby"] appeared in a textbook for the lower primary grades in 1950. It has the baby asking various members of the family to carry him. But each member is busy at a separate task, hoeing grain, tending a machine, writing speeches, etc., and baby ends by saying, "Everybody has something to do. I'd rather walk alone by holding onto a wall." Translated in Weakland-Bunzel, Appendix B.

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The family's function as an administrative unit for mutual surveillance and responsibility is now eliminated, and each citizen is responsible to the state. Family connections are no longer a means of getting jobs; these are assigned to individuals by state and Party organizations; in this way the Communists undermine what is left of the old family and strike at the age-old eivl of nepotism. 596

Yet, with the shattering of the old family and the assumption of its functions by the state, the individual is still urged by the leadership to work in a disciplined and co-operative way for the larger social group. The following prescription for individual behavior recalls the formulas for the activity of good members of the traditional family: 156

> Citizens of the People's Republic are expected to engage in labor and productive activities and to place the common good above personal benefit. They must learn to be helpful and co-operative. They must work hard and submit willingly to the discipline of group life. They must always be ready to learn and to accept criticism for the purpose of improvement.[34]

It would appear, then, that the Communist government tries to adapt both patterns of individual-group relationship to its purposes On the one hand it encourages the equal co-operation pattern associated with the old image of brotherhood and friendship. On the other it increasingly subjects each individual to a type

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33. Cf. Survey of China Mainland Press, No. 973 Jan. 21, 1955, pp. 31-32; "...when parents are 'counter-revolutionaries', the child should treat them as enemies."

34. Cf. Theodore Chen, op. cit., p. 324, and Weakland-Bunzel, pp. 153-54.

of authority that is reminiscent of the old all-powerful father of the family. For certain types of work, for example, team projects carried on by Party cadres, the former may be encouraged as the efficient pattern But for the masses of the population submission to absolute paternalistic authority and the subordination of the individual to the group is the ordained pattern. 156

E. Face

In traditional China "face" meant one's moral reputation (lien) and one's accumulated moral and material prestige in the eyes of the community (mien-tzu).[35] One's lien, or moral reputation, was solidified by adherence to the ethnical norms of society in all human dealings. One's mien-tzu could be increased by making important contacts, by acts of conspicuous generosity; but this could be done only within the role which society assigned to the individual. To "get above oneself" in a play for prestige was actually "to lose face" [tiu mien-tzu] . The widespread use of go-betweens in business, marriages, and political negotiations was a device for insuring that, in the event of failure, neither principal would "lose face." Consideration for the "face" of others was highly regarded, and, in actual behavior, care for one's own and others' "face," particularly of one's family's, was conducive to the surface harmony of Chinese social relations. 554

Modern Chinese critics have argued that this harmony was too dearly bought, that individual

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35. Cf. Hsien-chin Hu, "The Chinese Concepts of Face," American Anthropologist, Vol. 46 (1944), pp 45-64. The word lien is more current in North China than in the Yangtze Valley and the south. In the lower Yangtze Vailley, according to Miss Hu (p. 46, note 5), mien-k'ung is used for lien.

concern for "face," intensified by community pressure, stifled individual initiative and made creative people into timid conformists who sacrificed all for the preservation of superficial prestige in the community. This, they held, worked against China's successful adjustment to the modern world.

The Communists have built on this sort of criticism and dissatisfaction and, in seeking to release individual energies for the purposes of the Communist state, have made a frontal attack on the notion of "face." Mao sarcastically describes the attitude they seek to destroy: "Failing to start an argument in principle with a person, even when you know he is in the wrong, letting things slide for the sake of peace and cordiality, all because he is an old friend, a fellow villager, a fellow student, a close friend, someone beloved, an old colleague, or an old subordinate. Or failing to make any clear decision, speaking about [the error] in allusions in order to preserve harmony and unity. . . ." 36

The Communists single out for public recognition individuals who have ruthlessly battered their way toward one of the Communist goals with utter disregard for "face," their own or others'. They praise children who have denounced their father, which, in older China would have been condemned as utter destruction of the family's "face." Communist writings indicate that the older attitudes have been hard to overcome. Liu Shao-ch'i is fulminating against them when he says: "Any idea of trying to avoid inner-Party struggle, or of refraining from criticizing others' mistakes so that they will not criticize one's own errors, is utterly wrong." 37 Obviously the universal "struggle meetings"

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36. Mao Tse-tung, "In Opposition to Liberalism," written in 1937, translation in Compton, op. cit., pp. 184-85.

37. Liu Shao-ch'i, "On Inner-Party Struggle," Current Background, No. 105, Aug. 5, 1951, p. 5.

for personal criticism and self-criticism in the presence of the group are destructive of the old feeling for "face." Indeed the leadership may regard them as one of the principal devices for the complete elimination of this traditional attitude.

Annex "A," Subparagraph li, Sociological Background

INTELLECTUAL AND ARTISTIC EXPRESSION

Intellectual and artistic expression is interpreted in this chapter to mean the communication of experience and ideas through the media of creative and academic writing, painting, the plastic arts, dancing, and music. 532 538

The bulk of the creative and academic writing of the Central-South Region does not differ from that produced in China as a whole. The Chinese written language is the vehicle for official business and cultivated expression in all parts of China. In the past, cities like Changsha, Hankow, Nanchang, and Canton in Central-South China closely followed the cultural interests of Shanghai and Peking, and innovations derived from leaders in Shanghai and Peking, upon receiving support from people in these Central-South cities, appear to have been accepted nationally. The identification of the bulk of the creative and academic writings of the Central-South Region with that of the Chinese nation is particularly true today when the nation is ruled by an authoritarian government and when all cultural innovations emanate from Peking.

The Chinese, especially the Chinese Communists, often speak of literature and the arts as one. In the Communists' policy statements, what pertains to literature also pertains to the other arts. Therefore, as far as the theory and policy of the arts are concerned, no separate treatment is necessary.

In less sophisticated folk literature and folk art, however, the Central-South exhibits some unique regional characteristics. But even in this respect, the Central-South Region is by no means an integrated 532 538 184 whole: Honan is more closely related to the North 532 China tradition, and is oriented toward Hopei rather 538 than toward the provinces in the south; Hupeh, Hunan, 184 and Kiangsi are oriented toward the provinces east of them rather than toward their northern and southern neighbors; Kwangtung and Kwangsi have South China characteristics not shared by other provinces in the region. Furthermore, Kwangsi and the western border of Hunan have been settled by minority groups as well as the Han Chinese. These minority groups have forms of intellectual and artistic expression unlike those of the Han Chinese.

I. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF LITERARY ACTIVITIES IN COMMUNIST CHINA

The reform of literature and art (wen-i cheng-feng) at Yenan in 1942 [1] made the practice of literature and art in the Liberated Areas overt political activities; the application of the same line to the entire country in 1949 subjugated all writers and artists in the nation to the service of the state. Control and regimentation of thought in literature and art became more systematic as the Communists consolidated their power, the victor being the arbiter of artistic "truth." In general, the control over writers, artists, and their work takes three forms, as was true in the Liberated Areas after the 1942 reform: (1) the organization of writers and artists under government auspices; (2) the identification of the duties of writers and artists with the implementation of government policy; and (3) the intentional and unceasing use of literary and art criticism to keep writers and artists in line. Now, however, the scope is national. 814

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[1] Mao Tse-tung's speeches at the Party School in Yenan in February and at the Yenan Literary and Art Circles' meeting in May 1942 established the

(see next page)

Circles

In July 1949, before the establishment of the Central People's Government, writers and artists from various parts of China were "invited" to Peking where the All-China Federation of Literary and Art Circles was organized to co-ordinate the activities of a number of the nation-wide organizations in 814

[Footnote No. 1 continued]
"line" of literature and art which had been endorsed by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and which has since been upheld as the creed of writers and artists in Communist China. The general tenor of the speeches was that literary and art workers at Yenan, being undeniably "revolutionaries by choice," should stop the hitherto blind imitation of alien and imported prototypes and the singing of abstract, contentless tunes which had nothing to do with the revolution and which could not possibly be understood by the peasant-worker-soldier masses. In their place, fresh and lively revolutionary themes in the Chinese style would be appreciated by the masses. Although in principle Mao believed that the Chinese literature and art should benefit from masterpieces of other cultures, especially those produced in the Soviet Union, in no instance would he allow the separation of Chinese literature and art from the immediate revolutionary tasks; and on this basis, he puts the popularization of literature and art ahead of sophistication. See Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Peking: Jen-min ch'u-pan-she, 1953, Vo. 3, pp. 833-900.

specific cultural fields such as literature, art, music, 814 and the cinema; it was to follow the line laid down by Mao Tse-tung in 1942. Theoretically the federation is not a government body, but it sent delegates to the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference in September 1949, as did Communist-sponsored political factions and mass organizations. The chairman and vice-chairman of the federation were given posts in the Communist government.

At the organizational meeting in July, Chou En-lai told the gathered writers and artists that they were 814 538 the representatives of 70,000 literary and art workers in China, of which 30,000 were in the People's Liberation Army, another 30,000 were scattered in the old Liberated Areas, and the remaining 10,000 were in areas recently liberated from the Kuomintang. From Chou's statement it becomes obvious that he identified as writers and artists Party propaganda personnel and those workers engaged in raising the standard of literacy.[2] It is doubtful that the majority of these 70,000 so-called writers and artists had achieved high competence in intellectual and artistic expression. Two years later, the Communists' leading woman author, Ting Ling, was still complaining that as editor she had difficulty in finding passable manuscripts for her magazine.[3]

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[2] Chou En-lai, "Political Report at the Conference of the All-China Literary and Art Workers," (July 6, 1949), People's Literature (Jen-min Wen-hsueh), Peking, I, 3, Jan. 1, 1950, p. 17.

[3] Ting Miao, A General Analysis of Chinese Communist Literature and Art, Hong Kong, Ya-chou Ch'u-pan-she, 1954, pp. 149-50.

It is certain that the organization of these writers and artists put the politically dubious under the guidance and supervision of the politically reliable; and the organized state rendered the writers and artists collectively responsible and accountable for their part in the Communist cause. Furthermore, dominated as it was by veteran Communists, the organization embracing all China's well-known writers and artists served as a good Communist-style democratic front.

B. The Task of the Writers

The literary subdivision of the federation was the All-China Association of Literary Workers, which, like the federation's other subdivisions, has its own professional magazine, People's Literature. In the first issue, published in October 1949, the six-fold task of the magazine was stated in part as follows:

1. to participate in the People's Liberation War and in the construction of the "New Democratic nation" through literary forms that are treasured by the people, with ideological content reflecting the growth of the new nation and praising the contribution of the masses in revolutionary struggles and productive activities;
2. To rid literature of imperialist influence, and to reform traditional literature; to accept what is good in foreign literary and artistic endeavor;
3. to guide the masses in factories, villages, and in the ranks in their literary study, and to help increase their "literary strength";
4. to develop literatures of the ethnic minorities;
5. to study revolutionary theory, and to organize groups for the study and discussion of the new literary productions and the formulation of a "scientific" theory of literary criticism;
6. to promote interflow of literature and art

among nations; to develop patriotism and internationalism; and to participate in the struggle for peace led by the USSR.[4]

Before the writers of the association had time to demonstrate their ability to implement these policies by fulfilling pledges to turn out so many pieces of work in a stipulated period of time, the conflict in Korea began.

The war was utilized by the Party as a schooling ground for class education and was depicted as a panorama of international class struggle. On this pretext, writers were sent to the front to learn about "reality" in order to delineate the struggle of the "hero of the day" and to draw the "moral of his time." They were expected to make the most of their experience, not only by reporting immediate events but also by recording their impressions in notes which would later serve for material in more lengthy literary works. With the exception of Pa Chin's Living Among the Heroes, Wei Wei's Who Are the Most Lovable People?, Lu Chu-kuo's Shang-kan Mountain, Yang Su's Three Thousand-Li Territory, and a few others which are readable and maintain certain literary standards, other writings based upon the author's experience in Korea do not show maturity in even the handling of the Chinese language. However, the Chinese Communists claimed that these second-rate writings adequately express the Chinese Volunteers' patriotism and Communist internationalism.

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[4] People's Literature, I, 1, October 25, 1949, p. 13. The content of this declaration reads very much like the constitution of the Union of the Soviet Writers in the USSR.

In the Korean endeavor the Communists departed from one of their most boasted practices. Throughout the war against Japan and the "war of liberation" against the Kuomintang, Chinese soldiers were encouraged to write, and writings from the ranks were hailed and widely publicized. But professional writers were sent to Korea, probably to stimulate a more skillful literary dramatization of the Communist cause.

However, the Korean front was not the only place where writers were to learn about "reality" and to dramatize the "cause of the people." While the war was going on, Ai Wu, Ts'ao Yü, the noted playwright, and other writers were sent to factories; Ho Ching-tzu, author of the celebrated The White-haired Girl, was sent to study life in the villages; Ting Hsi-lin, Liu Ch'ing, Li Tzu-hua, Mu Yen, and a host of other veteran motion picture producers and directors were sent to Shanghai to participate in the Three-Anti and Five-Anti campaigns.[5]

But these writers were not to record life as they observed it. Before they left for their "life schools," they had to undergo some "training." One can imagine the situation: writers of the calibre of Pa Chin and Ts'ao Yü learning from the speeches of Lu Ting-i and Ch;en Po-ta, the two propaganda chiefs of the regime, "how to describe people, how to abstract living reality and exercise care in collecting material, how to portray and praise, and above all, how to avoid making mistakes." It would appear that the Communists were so eager to prove the righteousness of their actions that they arranged "history" in the way they wished it to seem. 814 538

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[5] See the chapter on Subversive Potentialities in this handbook for the content and impact of the Three-Anti and Five-Anti campaigns.

Judging from the extent to which the land reform turned the rural social and political order upside-down, the Three-Anti and Five-Anti campaigns destroyed the bourgeois stronghold in the national economy, and the way in which the war in Korea affected the national life, one might expect that those writers who had been given the opportunity to witness these momentous events would accomplish literary feats of equal magnitude. On the contrary, one finds, with only rare exceptions, "formula" stories which have all of the correct political ingredients demanded of them but which lack originality and any attempt at characterization. One story of land reform reads much like another, the only differences being the names given the heroes and some few idiosyncracies of the writers in the use of colloquial expressions and political jargon. The necessary adherence to the prescribed political formula has blighted creativeness.

C. Literary Criticism

What has contributed most to this fear of originality in literature is the influence of officially organized and directed literary criticism, which uses Communist literary theories to coerce and browbeat the writers. The disparity in the respect given critical and creative forces has stunted the young Communist literature and precluded a normal growth.

Outstanding instances of the enervating effect of criticism are the reviews of the play, "The Song of 814 538 536

of the Red Flags," and the story, "Old Worker Ku 814
Fu-shan." The play, concerning shock-teams in a 538
productive drive, was initially praised by the Com- 536
munists themselves; later, it was criticized because "it did not give a strong portrayal of the trade union and the Party." According to the critics, the author should have used the play to strengthen the prestige of the trade union among the worker-audiences as well as to emphasize the "heroic" qualities of the leading protagonist, a Communist cadre. The portrayal of the Party cadre P'eng Kang in the story was deemed incorrect, "for the Party's leadership is invariably collective, but in the play P'eng seems to be quite alone." The play was thus rated "of low educational value." The author of the story "Old Worker Kü Fu-shan" was reprimanded because he "not only distorts the image of a model Party member but also completely ignores the function of Party training and leadership."

The classic example of Communist literary and 814
artistic criticism involves the 1951 Shanghai-produced 546
film, Wu Hsün Chuan," based on the life of a famous advocate of free education who lived in Shantung Province. Wu Hsün was born into a poor family and was thus deprived of formal education. In order to help children to attend school, he dedicated himself to hard work and frugal living; and by shrewd investment of his savings, he succeeded in accumulating funds for the education of the poor. Wu Hsün's contribution to Chinese education was never questioned until the Communist critics attacked the film. Wu's effort for the kind of education prevalent at his time, according to the Communist critics, only strengthened the feudal order and arrested the forces of progress; rather

than serving as an "accomplice" of the Manchu ruling order, the critics said, Wu should have joined the revolutionary forces, i. e., the Taiping revolutionaries. Furthermore, they said, Wu Hsün's means of accumulating wealth was indicative of his subservience to the rich and of his exploitation of the poor.[6]

The evolution of criticism of the film "Wu Hsün Chuan" is illustrative of the nature of the Communist literary and artistic criticism. Adverse opinions toward this film were not initiated by literary and art circles, but by the Central Committee of the Communist Party. In fact, the film was till then very enthusiastically received, even by many eminent Communists. On May 20, 1951, the Peking People's Daily, an organ of the Central Committee of the Party, published an editorial alluding to this state of affairs. "Some comrades say that they have already mastered Marxism, but when confronted with concrete issues, they completely lose their critical sense." The "Party Life" column of the same issue ordered all Communists to join in criticism of "Wu Hsün Chuan." On June 4, a directive of the Ministry of Education of the People's Government published in the People's Daily, instructed all the educational personnel in the nation to carry out discussions of the film. On August 4, the final and definitive verdict on the film was delivered by Chou Yang, the Vice-minister of Cultural Affairs of the Communist Government. He labeled the film as unrealistic art and a product of anti-historical and anti-popular ideology.[7] Party organs in all parts of China where "Wu Hsün Chuan" had been shown used the film as a target for ideological propaganda. The ideology of the film was also discussed at the third session of the first National

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[6] Most representative voice of this kind is Ai Ch'ing's article "Oppose the Slave Ideology of Wu Hsün" in People's Literature, VI, 2, June 1, 1951, pp. 9-10.

[7] Current Background, Hong Kong American Consulate General, no. 113, Sept. 1, 1951.

Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, which met from October 23 to November 1, 1951. Members of the All-China Federation of the Literary and Art Circles began to echo the view of the Central Committee of the Party and confessed that, while they had made definite improvements in the past two years, nevertheless they always fell behind the development of Chinese society. This confession led the writers to "plunge" into study in an effort to "remold their ideology and to sharpen their critical sense." 814 546

This conflict between critical and creative forces also manifests itself in the bulk of the incongruous writings of the literary critics in Communist China. The critic has ready an abundance of clichés, jargon, and theories of socialist realism, but they are clearly ill-digested and are used with little discrimination or literary skill. Quotations from Marx, Lenin, Stalin, Gorky, Zhadanov are frequent but are not integrated into the theme of the text. Even Communist critics have noted that many quotations from orthodox Marxist texts are either irrelevant or superfluous.[8] This excessive verbalism at the expense of content makes literary criticism irreconcilable with the alleged theory of its essentially didactic function. Much criticism is lukewarm and stereotyped, written by writers who are called upon by the Communists to undertake the task of attacking their fellow writers. In this case, what is criticized is invariably the "petty bourgeois standpoint." The exception to the rule is Mao Tse-tung himself, who, from his position 814 538 of absolute authority, can write criticism which is non-imitative, forceful, and pointed, even by the standards of the free world. Top Communists, like Liu Shao-ch'i, for example, who seem to be more confident in translating Marxism into practice, do not quote from orthodox texts as often or use as many clichés as the lesser Communists do.

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[8] Shen Chu-chung, "The Popularization of Theoretical Criticism of Literature and Art," People's Literature, No. 9, July 1, 1950, pp. 27-28.

Since 1949, Chinese Communist literature appears to have concentrated on a number of well-defined themes. It has been most concerned with the individual under the Communist system and the problems confronting him. These have included the social confusion of the New Democratic period, the doubts of the intellectuals, the "criminal activities of the bourgeois merchants, and the lackeys of the imperialists," the rise of the industrial hero, the struggle against the "enemy of the People," and the appearance of human types based on the newly created Communist "tradition." Even the "return to history" is oriented for the solution of certain present-day problems.[9] Patriotism, aestheticism, and naturalism are all good literary themes, provided they are

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[9] Writers are told to find evidence in history of the excellent qualities of the Chinese people, and to appreciate and to learn the beautiful styles in Chinese literary heritage. For instance, the poet Li Po (A. D. 701-762) who was an incorrigible individualist, can now be safely described as a "great patriot," for "Li Po could not have written such beautiful verses about the magnificent rivers and mountains of his fatherland had he not been very patriotic." His many lyric poems which sang praises of the bright moon are not interpreted to mean his longing for a "cleaner" world, and therefore indicate

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imbued with the spirit of "socialist realism," which is belief in the inevitability of the development of socialism.

Since 1949, China's best writers have not produced any first-rate work. If there happen to be interesting writings that suit the taste of the reader, they do not fit into the theoretical scheme of the Party. Hsiao Yen-mu's short story "Between Us, Husband and Wife," for instance, was criticized as "employing the intellectual's viewpoint and taste to

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[Footnote No. 9. continued]
his personal integrity; his mild protests against the conditions of his time are now interpreted as signs of his progressive spirit. Wang Yao, Li Po, Shanghai, Jen-min ch'u-pan-she, 1955.

Ch'ü Yuan, the poet-statesman of the Kingdom of Ch'u in the Chan-kuo period [481-221 B.C.], is lauded for his "patriotism and sympathy for the common people." Kuo Mo-jo, "A Brief Account on Ch'ü Yuan," People's Literature, No. 44, June 1953.

Emperors like Han Kao-tsu and T'ang T'ai-tsung who increased the national territory and the prestige of the Chinese people, are now praised as heroic. This salvaging of historical characters and literature for Communist posterity could be a sign of a felt need. There are reports that since the Party came to the cities it has been neglecting to supply enough reading material for the people of the Old Liberated Areas, and the people have gone back to the old novels. In order that these people may not be "poisoned" by the "feudalistic ideas" in the old novels, the reinterpretation of the characters in the old novels according to dialectical materialism seems far more necessary than the writing of novels of comparable stature.

distort the image of the working masses and to vulgarize things political." 814
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Some writers are unable to find publishers for their work, not because the work is counterrevolutionary but because its theme is considered untimely. In 1952, Miao Yen-hsiu was advised not to publish his Miao-chia Feng-kuang, a long poem about freedom of love and marriage in Miao communities, because the Communists did not think a celebration of the equality of the sexes useful to the Communist revolution at that time.

Romantic novels of love and sophisticated novels of human relationships are not published. When love does come into the scene, it is shown as subsidiary to other, more "worthy" and "unselfish" problems (i.e., problems social and political).

Although the writer may desire to let human relationships play a decisive part in the development of his material, there is a tendency to utilize abstract characters rather than vivid personalities. Most of the writers who choose to deal with the exposure of corruption and the excesses and tyranny of established institutions are more adept at portraying "negative" personalities than creating "positive" personalities in keeping with the Communists' view of the "heroes" of the new regime. This is true, despite the fact that the Communist leaders have repeatedly told the writers "to give the most important position in the plot to the affirmative man," and that "in no case should evil be vividly presented, lest virtue remain an abstraction," for it is now the writers' task to describe the bright possibilities of life under Communist leadership.

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The recent development of literature and art in China seems to parallel that in Soviet Russia. In China, the emphasis to praise industrial and agricultural heroes follows the pattern of Soviet literature. The influence of the war in Korea upon literature in China is comparable to the influence of World War II upon Russian literature. Now that we hear about the "thaw" in Russian literature,[10] can we anticipate a similar development in China? Hu Feng's attempt[11] in early 1955 to liberate literature from the shackle of politics, although it ended in failure and personal disgrace, indicates, nevertheless, conscious recognition by a group of writers of the freedom necessary for the creation of works of art.[12] Only general discussion of minor ways to improve literature has been undertaken by leading authors like Mao Tun and Ai Ch'ing, and all discussions are prefaced by fervent dedications to the Marxist-Leninist world outlook. While the parallel we draw of the development of literature in the two countries may aid in the understanding of certain similarities, the parallel is not complete. If we compare the contents of the first six issues of People's Literature (October 1949 to April 1950) with the six issues published in the first six months of 1955, we find a noticeable change: the percentage of creative writing by Chinese has increased, and the percentage of works translated from the Russian has decreased. Among the translated works, the percentage from Soviet Russia is smaller than it was, and there is now a sampling of literature from non-Communist sources, including, surprisingly enough, the tales of Hans Christian Andersen.

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[10] Walter Z. Laqueur, "Russia in Flux, I. The 'Thaw' and After," Encounter, London, Oct. 1955, p.35.

[11] Hu Feng is a well-known Communist writer, protégé of Communists' "literary saint" Lu Hsün.

[12] Laqueur, op. cit., p. 35.

II. THE GENRES OF LITERATURE

A. Translations from Russian Literature

Translations from Russian literature are included in this section because of the influence they have had on Chinese intellectuals.

According to the survey made in 1937 in twenty-two Chinese universities and eight high schools, foreign literature, particularly Russian, English, and American, had an important place in the intellectual life of contemporary youth in China. Gorky was mentioned oftener than any other foreign author. Other favored Russian authors included Tolstoy and Turgenev.[13] This popularity of Russian literature seems remarkable in view of the fact that between 1927 and 1949 there were no Russian schools in China and almost no Russian was taught. Of course, many works of Russian literature were translated into Chinese.

The success of Russian literature in China stems from the appreciation of the problems confronting Russian and Chinese society: the struggle for sexual equality, the struggle between the doctrine of "non-resistance" and a revolutionary attitude toward life. Sympathy with the Russian revolution also has played a part.[14]

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13. Olga Lang, Chinese Family and Society, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1946, pp. 276, 363-364.

14. Lang, ibid., p. 276. O. Briere, Les tendances dominantes de la litterature Chinoise contemporaine, Bul. Univ. Aurore, Ser. III, Vol. 9, No. 35, July 1948, p. 251.

Translations of post-1917 Russian writings such as Krymov's Tanker Derbent (1939), Ostrovsky's How Steel Was Tempered (1937), Simonov's Days and Nights, a novel of Stalingrad, Scholokhov's And Quiet Flows the Don, and Virgin Soil Upturned, a novel about collective farming, and Fadeyev's the Young Guard (1945) were read by secondary school and college students. These novels encouraged young intellectuals with a yearning for a 'positive' life of action no less heroic, revolutionary, and romantic than that experienced by the heroes about which they read. These novels had an obvious influence on the radical movement among the students who defied the Kuomintang regime.

Today, Bassov, hero of Krymov's Tanker Derbent, and Korchagin, hero of Ostrovsky's How Steel Was Tempered, are more familiar to the students than many of the characters in novels written by Chinese Communists, most probably because the Chinese novels are poor imitations of Russian originals. Mayakovsky's poem "Lenin" is acclaimed by the Chinese Communists as a model of socialist realism, and Michael Prishvin's nature poetry is popular. Chinese translations of Ehrenburg's Storm and Nikolayava's Harvest are best-sellers.[15]

Since the establishment of the Central People's Government, delegations of Russian authors have visited Peking and other important cities of China. Russian is now taught in Chinese schools as the foreign language. Under the Communist regime, the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association, which has branches throughout China, has contributed much in the promotion of popular appreciation of Russian culture. 538

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[15] "'Liberating' the Creative Impulse in China," The Times Literary Supplement, August 5, 1955, xlii. For the Chinese Communists' own estimation of the influence of Soviet literature on Chinese writing, see Pa Jen, Look at the Soviet People through Soviet Literature, Peking, Chung-kuo ch'ing-nien ch'u-pan-she, 1955.

B. Academic Writings

Academic writing under direction of the Chinese Communists seems to be concentrated upon the history of peasant rebellion during the last one hundred years, anthropological studies of the ethnic minorities in China, commentaries, political and philosophical, on texts by Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, Mao Tse-tung, and Liu Shao-ch'i, and archeology and prehistoric Chinese society. 814

In the field of modern Chinese history, the Chinese Historical Society[16] is most comprehensive in its program of research. It has sponsored the compilation of a series of documents on modern Chinese history. To date, the published volumes of the series include *Nien Chün*, concerning the peasant rebellions in Kiangsu, Anhwei, Honan, and Shantung in the latter half of the nineteenth century; *T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo*, the Taiping Rebellion in the middle of the nineteenth century; and the *Hui* Revolt, the revolt of the *Hui* people in the Northwest and in the Province of Yunnan in the Southwest in the nineteenth century. This series will include twelve collections of source materials. They will include works on the Opium War (1839-1842), the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895), the Hundred-Day Reform (1898), and the May Fourth Movement (1919).

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[16] The society is now called the Institute of Chinese History, a division of the Academy of Sciences at Peking.

The published volumes contain a wealth of source materials. In addition to assembling records kept by previous governments, the works bring together the memoirs of individuals concerned and documents which have lain undisturbed in county archives. However, one cannot find in these volumes an interpretation of or commentaries on the material gathered. In the prefaces to these published volumes it is stated that:

> "Counterrevolutionary forces always try their best to distort fact. Because they often suppress and destroy revolutionary literature the latter is seldom preserved for posterity. Now research in past revolutionary events can only proceed from the records kept by the counterrevolutionaries. Therefore those who are going to use the material here assembled must be reminded that they should approach the matter with a viewpoint opposite to that advocated by the authors of the material."

So far no major historical treatises based on this material have been written. The first volume of Fan Wen-lan's Modern History of China (Harbin, Tung-pei Shu-tien, 1948) is the only available text on modern Chinese history; Fan's book was published before the Communists had achieved national power. Other historians such as Ku Chieh-kang, who at the beginning of the Communist rule in China expressed his gratitude to the Chinese Communist regime for enabling him to continue his research, have so far produced

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nothing.[17] Historians in China now prefer to annotate published works rather than write their own view of history, probably for fear that the whims of some Communist critics may someday put them in peril. As a result of the lack of new historical texts, history books written before 1949 are now being reprinted.

Of the academic people who have transferred their allegiance to the Communist regime, the anthropologists seem to be faring better than others. Fei Hsiao-t'ung, author of Peasant Life in China (London, 1939) and China's Gentry (Chicago, 1953), published his Revamping the Universities (Shanghai, Shanghai ch'u-pan kung-ssu, 1950), in which he anticipated the change of college curricula under the Communist government. Fei has since led several government delegations to visit the ethnic minorities in the South and Southwest and has made some first-hand studies of these peoples. In the field of anthropology much basic study is possible without running afoul of the Communist line. Despite the omnipresent praise for Communist policies, the articles written by the anthropoligists do indicate that new facts are being discovered; and the fact that these discoveries are financed by the government and are used in the administration of the minority peoples may suggest the favored position held by anthropologists in China today. On the other hand, anthropologist~~s~~ so busily employed by the government are prevented from doing the work they might do in a free society.

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[17] The re-writing of history textbooks with a dialectic materialist viewpoint for primary and secondary school students is not considered in this section. See the chapter on Education in this handbook.

In the field of philosophy, especially political philosophy, Mao Tse-tung's book are accepted as of unquestioned authority. His *Selected Works* has gone through several editions since 1949, each new edition being more beautifully and elegantly printed than the one before. But Mao has not written any new books since 1949. Political theorists who wrote on socialism before 1949 now limit their writings to short articles published in such journals as *The New Reconstruction* (*Hsin Chien-she*), explaining Communist terms and government policies. Fung Yu-lan, the philosopher, has only published one article, "Mao Tse-tung's *On Practice* and Chinese Philosophy," since he made his confession. His article is an attempt to establish some continuity in Chinese philosophy in the past centuries, especially as it is concerned with the problem of knowledge and action, and to place the various revolutions in the same context. The article attempts to make Mao Tse-tung's ideology seem respectable, but it adds nothing to the development of philosophy. This state of affairs is necessarily the case since "truth" was declared in Marxian writings before 1949, and there is no room for new ideas except in commentaries on "orthodox views." Cadres and students must study Party and government documents in the light of Marxian texts. By attacking "wrong" views, "correct" dialectic materialist views are vindicated. The recent mass attack on Hu Shih's "bourgeois" philosophy illustrates this point.[18]

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[18] *Criticism on Hu Shih's Ideology* (3 vols.), Peking, San-lien Shu-tien, 1955.

C. Fiction

The greater part of the Central-South Region came under Communist control after other sections of China had been conquered. This region was one of the last to face problems of industrial recovery, agricultural revival, the land reform, and the liquidation of anti-Communist forces. Since Communist literature is intended to describe the solution of these problems, stories and novels which dealt with these aspects had already been produced in Manchuria, North China, and East China. As a result, all the writings in this region seem stereotyped and lacking in originality. 538

Take, for instance, the short story "Ah Ts'ai," which describes the suffering and liberation of a woman in an emigrant community in Kwangtung. The plot closely follows that of other "formula" stories concerning other regions of China, although in "Ah Ts'ai" some use is made of local customs. Among the literature on the war of resistance against Japan, stories of the "heroic" deeds of the 8th Route Army in North China overshadow the accounts of anti-Japanese activities in Central-South China.

Publishing houses in the Central-South Region, notably the South-China People's Publishing House in Canton and the Central-South People's Publishing House in Hankow, are merely branches of the government's publishing enterprise which has its headquarters in Peking, whence policy is established on the kinds of literature to be published and distributed. The centralization of publishing assures the widespread popularity of novels which have received government approval. 214

People in Central-South China, like people in North China, also read Yüan Ching and K'ung Chüeh's best-seller Hsin Erh-nü Ying-hsung Chuan (The Biograpy of a New Hero and Heroine), a 200,000-word account of the repulse of the Japanese invaders in North China, written in the style of the old-fashioned novels,[19] and Ting Ling's The Sun Shines on the Sang-chien [Sang-kan] River, a novel about the struggle of the people in North China during the 1946-48 land reform, which was awarded the Stalin prize. Liu Pai-yü's Light's Ahead may be classified as a novel of Central-South China because it describes the crossing of the Yangtze River by General Liu Po-ch'eng's army during the "liberation war" against the Kuomintang. 538

Recently the Communists have encouraged stories based on the Red Army and the Communist infiltration of Kiangsi before the Long March. So far no major work in this field has appeared.

D. Literature of Minority Nationalities

The so-called literature of minority nationalities in Communist China, the development of which was mentioned in the first issue of the People's Literature 538 563 in October 1949 as one of the six tasks set for the Chinese people, has achieved little. Although the heroes and the heroines depicted may be members of minority peoples, the books are written in Chinese by Han Chinese or by people of minority nationalities who have mastered the Chinese language. 538 563

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[19] The first edition of 10,000 copies was sold out in twenty days, 80 per cent being sold in North China. Although pleased with its success, the Communists lamented the fact that the Chinese people are still too fond of the traditional "feudalistic" novels, that a novel of new ideas and new people could be successful only when dressed in traditional forms.

So far, the effort to foster literature of minority nationalities has taken three forms: (1) tracing and recording minority customs; (2) interpreting social systems in minority groups from the dialectic materialistic viewpoint; and (3) the exchange of minority literature and Han Chinese literatures. Until the minority nationalities have their own written languages, this exchange amounts to the Sinicization of the minority nationalities through Chinese literature in ways which are not intended to seem "imperialistic" to the minority peoples. On the other hand, the cultural heritage of the Chinese people may be enriched by acquaintance with the literature of minority cultures.

Although the past is often interpreted by the Chinese Communists as a struggle between groups or suppression of one group by another, the literature of minority nationalities which is to be developed is not to be allowed to suggest animosities against the Chinese.

Steps have been taken by the Chinese Communists to create written languages for the Yao and Chuang peoples in the Central-South Region as well as for other ethnic groups in Southwest China. Whether these peoples, who have hitherto depended mainly on oral 212 563

transmission of their tradition, may begin to use a 212
written language is not certain; but there is no doubt 563
that the opportunity for propaganda and regimentation of thought increases with literacy.

E. Poetry

Although Mao Tse-tung himself composes poems 538
in the classical style, the "new poetry," which is written in pai-hua (the vernacular), is in vogue in the Central-South Region today.

Wen I-to, Kuo Mo-jo, and Hsü Chih-mo, who wrote pai-hua, still are talked of. The publication of Wen's collected poems, Still Water, was an important literary event in 1929. Hsü experimented with new forms, including those found in Western poetry. He was less concerned with the theory and art of versification than Wen was. Wen's book, The Forms and Rules of Poetry (1926), which lists musical, artistic, and architectural skills as the necessary elements of good poetry, is a unique contribution to pai-hua poetry.

Kuo Mo-jo's poetry has energy and imagination, but no discipline and restraint; and has been likened to a torrent of water rushing from a broken dam. In the 1920's, when Kuo was the leader of the Creative Society, he advocated "art for art's sake." He was the first to introduce untranslated Western words and phrases into pai-hua poetry to enhance the beauty of of the metrical patterns of the stanzas. Although Kuo is not productive nowadays, and his poems are no longer popular, his present prestige as a "literary personage" is based on his past achievement; and his present political position as a cultural leader in the Communist regime in turn encourages the sale of his poems. He is the only one of the three still living. Being now wholly dedicated to the Communist cause, although not a Party member, he is comparable to Simonov of Russia, for Kuo, like Simonov, spends a good deal of his time heading Chinese cultural delegations to other countries and entertaining foreign cultural delegations to China. 538

Ai Ch'ing and T'ien Chien are established as Communist poets. Ai writes prose poems and T'ien writes extremely short verses. The average Chinese reader is apt to appreciate Ai more than T'ien, especially when Ai writes of everyday things familiar to the reader and T'ien draws his inspiration from a vision of the new world which is less comprehensible to the average reader.

Ma Fan-t'o and Li Chi are often spoken of together. Ma's poems are modeled upon popular rhymes. Li Chi's poems are modeled after Sheng-tien-yu, a folk-song pattern popular in Shansi and Suiyuan during the war against Japan.

All the poets mentioned above are known nationally. Their styles are imitated by lesser known poets.

F. Popular Ryhmes and Folk Songs

Popular ryhmes and folk songs of Honan resemble more nearly the free forms characteristic of North China; in the other provinces of the Central-South Region, rhymes and folk songs have four-line stanzas, 538 533 each line containing seven syllables which are, in fact, seven characters in written form. Kwangtung Province has more folk songs and popular rhymes than do other provinces in the region. Folk songs in Kwangtung can be divided into three groups according to the dialects in which they are sung: Cantonese, Fukienese, and Hakka. 538 533

The Chinese Communists have always been active in fostering folk songs and popular rhymes which welcome or accept the new political order. The best example is "Tung-fang Hung" ("All Red the East"), a folk song originating in Shensi and now well-known in Central-South China, which likens Mao Tse-tung to the sun rising in the east. Some of the newer folk songs fostered by the Communists praise construction and eulogize the "new people" under the present regime.

Some of the older folk songs are now being rearranged so that the old forms accomodate the new ideology. The most notable example is Yüan Chang-ching's re-arrangement of the song "The Water of the Chang River." In Central-South China nothing of comparable quality is known to have been composed.

G. Drama

Stage plays in China can be roughly divided into four kinds: (1) folk plays native to small dialectal districts; (2) ching-hsi or p'i-huang (Peking opera) which is appreciated in all parts of China proper, but particularly in North China and in the big cities of other regions; (3) the new opera, a genre created by the Chinese Communists; and (4) the modern play. 536

These, together with motion pictures, are now utilized by the Communists to disseminate ideological and political messages. 536

1. The folk plays Parallel to the many dialectal differences in the Central-South Region, the folk plays are both numerous and various. The following are the most representative.

"Honan pang-tzu" is one of the many variations of the North China pang-tzu. The musical rhythms [534] of these plays are marked by the beat of a foot-long wooden stick, which is North China is called pang-tzu, an indication that traditionally Honan is more closely related to North China than to the southern provinces.

"Yüeh-chü" (Kwangtung hsi, not Ch'ao-chou hsi). The musical arrangement of Yüeh-chü indicates that in its development it has appropriated musical elements of folk plays from East and Central China. Compared with Ch'ao-chou hsi, Yüeh-chü is decidedly richer in content and more integrated in form, having a larger professional group and a leisure class dedicated to its appreciation. The difference reflects the different economic situations of the two groups of people supporting these two types of folk plays. The Cantonese-speaking Kwang-fu people, who are Yüeh-chü-goers, tend to occupy the richer land as descendants of the first Han Chinese to settle in Kwangtung. The Fukienese-speaking Ch'ao-chou people, who are Ch'ao-chou hsi supporters, came to Kwangtung later, and have settled on less fertile lands. The K'e-chia people (Hakka), who are the last group of Han Chinese immigrants into Kwangtung, and who subsist on barren lands, do not have their own forms of folk play. Instead, the K'e-chia people have a richer collection of popular rhymes and folk songs. 536

Other folk plays in the Central-South Region include hsi (Tsui-tzu), Ch'u-chü, Han-chü, and Hsiang-chü. Much of the sung music of these folk plays, as well as that of pang-tzu, has been incorinto ching-hsi; and because ching-hsi is popular in all parts of China, few Chinese find the music outlandish in folk plays of Honan, Hupeh, and Honan.

2. Ching-hsi A composite of many regional plays, Ching-hsi is popular in all parts of China. The best actors and actresses of ching-hsi, however, have been those associated with the Peking theatres. The musical accompaniment is carried by the hu-ch'in, [534] a stringed instrument, assisted by other strings and by wood-winds. Percussion is used to accentuate rhythms of body movements and to dramatize heightened moments.

At its present state, ching-hsi is a highly polished form of art. It no longer depends for audience appeal on plotting but rather on a display of skill by the actors. It emphasizes costuming rather than scenery. The verses sung serve to express the feelings of the chief characters. Actors may play the female roles and actresses may play the male roles. The music pattern is not very flexible, but permits the well-known actors or actresses to vary the style at will. The spoken dialogue and the spoken patter, consisting of clichés in colloquial language, help the movement of the play, make the literary language of the sung verses more intelligible to the audience, and aid in the variation of the rhythm. However, most of the spectators know the plays, have memorized verses, and can sing some of them. They come to the theatre to watch and enjoy the art of a stylized) performance.

In comparison with the folk plays, the ching-hsi is a much more integrated art. Therefore, it is more difficult to bring innovations to the ching-hsi without damaging its accepted form; in contrast, the folk plays may easily incorporate new elements. This fact accounts for the Communists' effort to revamp the folk plays and to bring them up to the same level of popular and artistic recognition as the ching-hsi. However, in the Communists' effort to reinterpret history, the ching-hsi is at present rendering unique service. The Communists have not only revised many of the old scripts to conform to their ideology, but have also encouraged new scripts to be written. In this attempt, well-known actors like Mei Lan-fang and Ch'eng Yen-ch'iu are asked to lend a helping hand.

Playwrights in Communist China are now told to study ching-hsi, because this form can be used to dramatize personalities. In the Communists' effort to glorify the image of the "new heroes," this art is considered extremely important.

3. The new opera The new opera in China is modeled after the operatic forms of the West but the content conveys revolutionary themes. The first experiment in this form was The White-haired Girl (1944), a collective creation of the writers and artists of the Lu Hsün Institute of Literature and Art. In the arias sung by the heroine, the musical pattern of the Hopei pang-tzu is borrowed to convey her changing moods. This is considered a very successful adaptation by the Communists. But the melodies of the

other sung parts, which appear to be of yang-ko origin, are close to folk songs and lack dramatic effect. The White-haired Girl has been characterized as "drama-plus-song," a term which indicates that the operatic form is not well enough developed to enable the music to carry the theme.

This inadequacy was remedied in the second major opera commissioned by the Communists. The opera Liu Hu-lan gives the heroine Liu Hu-lan opportunities to "delineate her heroic personality" in longer and more frequent arias. The musical pattern of the Shansi pang-tzu is used in the arias, and the whole opera has a Shansi color.

The composers were alarmed when they discovered that the melodies which describe the corrupt life of the landlord in the opera The White-haired Girl were hummed by the audience rather than the arias of the heroine and the chorus of the 8th Route Army. They resolved not to give the "negative" personality strong musicalization. As a result, the opera Liu Hu-lan incorporates queer and disjointed melodies for the villainous roles, and the villains are shallow caricatures. Thus, for ideological reasons, the Communists now limit "true music" to the expression of "lofty passions" for the "right cause."

The new operas are intended for national consumption irrespective of regional differences, although local airs are incorporated into the scores according to the locality of the stories. Both The White-haired Girl and Liu Hu-lan are based on incidents which occurred in North China, although they have been transformed grossly by "dramatic" exaggerations. They are performed by opera troupes all over China, and their influence is therefore national. Other well-known operas include the Long March, in which

Mao Tse-tung is impersonated for the first time. 536

4. *Modern play* (*hua-chü*) The modern play, like the motion picture, has no regional character. 536 Any acceptable play will be staged in all parts of 545 China, and *kuo-yü* (the National Language) is used rather than the various dialects. Ch'en Ch'i-t'ung's *Thousands of Rivers and Mountains* proves that the Communists' Long March in the thirties is always "correct" material for dramatization. *The Song of the Red Flags,* concerned with production drives in a textile factory in North China, was a collective creation of three playwrights, written after they had agreed on the ideological significance of this type of play and had sketched out the plot under the "guidance" of Chou Yang, the Vice-minister of Cultural Affairs. *The Song of the Red Flags* was performed in Peking, Shanghai, Nanking, Chungking, Lan-chou and other big cities. In Shanghai alone, it had 159 performances, and some 125,000 people attended it.[20] If we take into account the fact that theater-going is now an organized social activity of the various mass organizations such as labor unions, the Women's Federation, the New Democratic Youth Corps, the Young Pioneers, and the study circles, the length of the run and the size of the audience do not accurately reflect the enthusiasm of the people but rather the effectiveness of the Communist organization for mass participation in the field of recreation.

5. *Motion pictures* Shanghai and Mukden are 54 now the centers of China's motion picture industry. *The White-haired Girl,* based on the same version as the opera, won the first prize among the thirty-eight entries at the Communist International Motion-Picture

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20. *Jen-min Hua-pao* [*People's Pictorial*], Peking, July 1950.

Festival in Czechoslovakia in 1951. The Concentration Camp at Shang-yao, which was made in 1951, describes the life of the "patriotic people" in the Kuomintang concentration camp and, according to the Communist reviewers, successfully "demonstrates the collective heroism" of the Communists under duress. When the rural production drive was about to begin in 1954, the movie Good Harvest was timed to be shown to the peasants during the festivities of the lunar New Year, in order to emphasize the importance of increasing the output of the land. The People on the Grassland is a movie about the Mongols in Inner Mongolia. Sound tracks in the Mongol and Uigur languages have been made so that this picture may be circulated among the ethnic minorities. 546

It should be mentioned that the Communists have elevated the social position of actors and actresses from that of "artist." Actors and actresses have their own organizations in the capital, and are invited to take part in the deliberation of new policies pertaining to their profession "under the leadership of the Party." 546 554

III. ARTISTIC EXPRESSION

A. Painting and the Plastic Arts

Painting and plastic arts are largely utilitarian in China today. The utilitarian spirit puts them either in the realm of propaganda, or craftsmanship. As propaganda, they become extremely derivative and stereotyped; as craftsmanship, they utilize local characteristics and traditional skills, although they sometimes appear to be unrestrainedly florid and pretentious. The entries for the Kwangtung Art Workers' 532

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Exhibition held in August 1954 at Canton may be taken as representative of artistic productions of the Central-South Region. The entries fell into the following broad categories: twenty Chinese brush paintings, twelve woodcuts, five oil paintings, five pencil sketches, four water colors, four pieces of sculpture, four ceramic figures, three wood-carvings, two door-pictures, two cartoons, one chalk drawing, and one poster. Among these items, the ceramic figures and wood-carvings represent the best-known craftsmanship of Kwangtung and are little influenced by Communist ideology.[21] Other art forms used Communist policies or slogans as themes for depiction. Woodcuts, sculptures, and water colors seem to have been more easily adapted to the new themes than oil paintings and the traditional Chinese brush paintings. The oil paintings lack imagination in composition; at their best, they are only photographic depictions of political activities. Traditional brush-painting technique is at its best in landscape paintings and in depicting rural life and is ill-adapted to the illustration of modern people and their activities.

No prominent artists in oil or water color have emerged under the Communist regime.

Under the general principle, "Accept the heritage of the world," artists like Rembrandt and Leonardo da Vinci are commemorated and reproductions like that of the Mona Lisa are used in literary and art journals.

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21. Ch'ao-chou is the center of the wood-carving craft and Shih-wan of the ceramic craft. The porcelain of Ching-te-cheng, Kiangsi, has been exhibited in Peking, Shanghai, and abroad.

B. Woodcuts

The woodcut, a traditional art in China, is used to adorn story books. Lu Hsün was the first to renew popular interest in this art. Woodcuts became popular in Yenan during the war against Japan because their creation does not require elaborate equipment. Many people remember the lively woodcuts of the Liberated Areas, which showed the influence of Western woodcuts. Woodcuts are popular in Communist China; there is a tendency to incorporate the traditional Chinese woodcut style in the illustration of Communist themes, and there are elaborate woodcuts in multiple colors, the technique of which antedates the Yenan period. In recent woodcuts, rural life is more effectively presented than blast furnaces or anti-U.S. activities.

C. New Year's Pictures (Nien-hua)

In those Chinese households which have not been influenced by the West, a new picture is hung or pasted on the wall on every New Year's Eve to assure a prosperous and peaceful year ahead. The pictures are called nien-hua. New Year's pictures are exploited by the Communists as a means to secure people's consent and support for their regime. The traditional theme of superstitious propitiation to gods has been transmogrified to praise of Mao Tse-tung for bringing happiness and prosperity to the people, to the celebration of the Long March of the Red Army, the distribution of the land certificates after the land reform, the woman train-conductor, or the "great meeting of Stalin and Mao Tse-tung."[22]

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[22] People's Pictorial, February 1951.

The Communists have boasted of a tremendous sale of the "new" nien-hua in the last few years. The production and printing of the nienhua are now done entirely by Communist publishing houses, and the Chinese people have no way of buying their traditional nien-hua. The aesthetic value of the nien-hua is practically nil, but it utilizes so well the traditional customs, beliefs, and sayings of the people that its messages are immediately understandable and are apt to be accepted.

D. Comic strips (Lien-huan t'u-hua)

The Chinese comic strip is neither literature nor art, but it borrows a little from both to enable the barely literate to entertain themselves with stories. The Communists, knowing the popularity of comic strips among children, women, and the uneducated, have contrived to make them instruments to teach "patriotism," sanitation, and health. They regard earlier comic strips as "feudalistic" and superstitious, and have replaced them with those which are "new, healthy, and educational." The new comic strips, created by artists recruited and guided by the Communists, are seen at street corners and in factories, villages, armies, and schools.

The Communists claim that the sale of comic strips is increasing daily. The Lien-ho Bookstore in Shanghai, which handles the new comic strips, reports the sale of more than 600,000 volumes in January 1951, and more than one million volumes in the following April. The comic strip periodical Lien-huan Hua-pao is reported to have a circulation of 400,000 copies.

The most representative and most publicized new comic strip is The Letter with a Chicken Feather, which uses 243 pictures to "give the Chinese children a patriotic education." The story concerns a young boy who, after receiving a Communist education, successfully fulfilled the "heroic" task of delivering an important message to anti-Japanese guerrilla forces It is claimed that more than 58,000 copies of The Letter with a Chicken Feather have been sold. (It was traditional practice to include a chicken feather with an urgent message to signify the letter's importance and the need for safekeeping.) 532

E. Dance

China proper does not have any distinctive forms of dancing, although yang-ko is sometimes considered native to China. Yang-ko is a combination of singing and dancing derived from the song pattern of peasants who sing in groups antiphonically when working in the rice-fields. The dance steps revolve around a basic pattern, that is, two steps forward and one step back, which resembles the movement of the peasants as they work in the fields. In village festivals yang-ko is sometimes performed, but it became truly popular only after the reform of literature and art in 1942, when the Communists used the dance to propagate new ideas in Shensi and in North China. It was brought to different parts of China in time to greet the advancing People's Liberation Army. The opera The White-haired Girl was based on the singing and dancing forms of the yang-ko; and at the first stage of land reform this opera was utilized by the Communist 535 cadres in many different parts of China to stir up class struggles in villages. The vogue of yang-ko in the Central-South Region now seems to be over. The sophisticated cadres seem to prefer the new operas to yang-ko, and the Western forms of social dancing to yang-ko steps. 535

The Chinese Communists have always fostered any art form that would assist their revolution. In 1950, Hsien Hsing-hai's Production Canta (Sheng-ch'an ta-ho-ch'ang) was transformed into an operatic spectacle. The new song-and-dance version is divided into four scenes, celebrating the time of spring cultivation, seeding, harvest, and prosperity, to portray the rural working people's enthusiasm for production and their prosperity as a result of the Communist "liberation."[23] 535 545

The Central Dance Corps at Peking, sponsored by the government, recently gave a "Lion Dance," which is an adaptation of a traditional festival dance performed in North China during the lunar New Year season.[24] Another dace, "Tea and Butterflies," has also been widely publicized; it concerns tea-gathering maidens in Western Fukien.[25] The purpose of these dances is to "beautify the working spirit" and to set a pattern to be developed by dance corps elsewhere in China. 535

The Cultural Corps (Wen-kung T'uan) of Central Institute of Nationalities at Peking has been visiting the minority communities in Southwest China, and has adapted some of the dances of the minority peoples for performance in Peking, in other Chinese cities, and abroad. Among those performed are a flute dance, a courtship dance, and a wedding dance of the Miao people, "Happy Sun," a tap dance, "Good Harvest," a traditional dance performed by Tibetans in Southwest China around the family cooking stove, "Please Stay, You Guests from Afar" of the *Yi* people, and the "Peacock Dance" of the *Tai* (Thai) people.[26] 535

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[23] People's Pictorial, August 1950.

[24] Ibid., March 1954.

[25] Ibid., April 1954.

The Central Experimental Opera Institute at Peking has also given instruction in ballet, and there are many aspiring ballerinas. Interest in ballet is unprecedented in China and is clearly the result of the popularity of ballet in Russia.[27] 535 177

The activities associated with dance are organized and directed by the government. There is the All-China Association of Dancers, which is a subdivision of the All-China Federation of Literary and Art Workers,[28] with its headquarters in Peking. Tai Ai-lien, a well-known professional dancer, heads the association. She has dedicated herself to the incorporation of folk life, especially that of the minority peoples into her dances. Her training, however, is Western. 535 658

F. *Music*

Appreciation of Western classical music has 533 been revived in accordance with the principle of "accepting the culture of the world." A municipal symphony orchestra in Peking performs Beethoven as well as Tschaikowsky and is intended to set an example for musical activities elsewhere in the nation. The quality of the symphony's performance is unknown. No major composer has emerged under the Communist regime.

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[26] *Ibid.*, July 1954.

[27] *Ibid.*, July 1954.

[28] The All-China Federation of Literary and Art Circles was changed to the All-China Federation of Literary and Art Workers in September 1953.

Most of the musicians seem to be absorbed in collecting and re-arranging folk music, in composing scores for the new operas, or in turning out at short notice musical accompaniment for propaganda films.

EDUCATION

I. BACKGROUND

In order to understand the changes brought about by the Communists in the educational system of China, it is necessary to review the background of educational development under the Nationalist regime. 642 871

Chapter II, Article 11, of the Nationalist Constitution promulgated in 1946 states that the "people have freedom of speech, [freedom for the] pursuit of knowledge, and [freedom of] publication." Article 21 of the same chapter further spells out the principle of education by stating that the "people have the right as well as the duty to receive basic education." Interpretations of these broad principles are found in Chapter XIII, which specifies, among other things, that the purpose of education includes the development of the spirit of nationalism, and that both public and private educational institutions are subject to government supervision according to law.[1]

Nationalist official singled out two of the most controversial points for further elaboration. 871 656

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[1] Chung-kuo Chiao-yü Nien-chien 1948. [Educational Yearbook of China 1948], Shanghai, Commercial Press, 1948, pp. 23-24.

One is the so-called "spirit of nationalism" which the Ministry of Education at Nanking defined as the spirit based on San-min Chu-i, the Three Principles of the People expounded by Dr. Sun Yat-sen (See the chapter on Political Dynamics in the HRAF handbook on China as a whole.) Thus a mild social reform was adopted as the central theme of the Nationalist philosophy for education. The other controversial point is the extent of government supervision over educational institutions. Official explanations stressed the supervisory function of the government in the system of education and denied that this implied any authoritarian control.[2] 871 656

Under the Nationalist government, efforts were exerted to promote adult education and combat illiteracy. Outstanding records were made by such people as James Yen (an internationally known promoter of mass education) who organized drives to eradicate illiteracy, and Huang Yen-p'ei, now a member of the Communist central government, who did a great deal for the development of vocational education in China. Since most of these features of Nationalist education must have been covered in the HRAF handbook on China as a whole, it is enough to say here that had it not been for a decade of war, general education in China would have been far more developed than it was 871

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2. Ibid., p. 24. For other influential theories on education expounded during World War II in China see Chan-shih Chiao-yü Lun-chi [Discussions on Wartime Education], Shanghai, Sheng-huo chiao-yü she, 1938.

CHART 1. SYSTEM OF EDUCATION UNDER THE NATIONALIST GOVERNMENT*


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*Chung-hua Min-kuo Nien-chien, 1953 [The Yearbook of the Republic of China], Taipei, Chung-hua nien-chien she, 1953, p. 491.

1 [No explanation for these letters has been provided --Analyst]

(Chart 1 faces p. 259.)

in 1949 on the eve of the Communist seizure of power.

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The application of the broad principles of education under the Nationalist government resulted in a system of regular and specialized schooling as pictured in the following chart.

872 As shown in Chart 1, the primary school consists of six grades divided into two levels. For students at rural schools, the first four years of primary school education may constitute an integral unit by itself and may be sufficiently useful if the students have to take up farming or other professions upon the completion of this unit. This feature was later attacked by the Communists as a mark of discrimination against the peasants and workers. But it is to be remembered that at one time the Nationalist Ministry of Education did attempt to revise the primary school system by making it a five-year, one-level system.

874 Another feature of the Nationalist system of education attacked by the Communists was its failure to establish vocational schools with college standing, thus forcing vocational school graduates to terminate their education at the high school level. While most of the vocational school graduates did not continue their formal education, the system under the Nationalist did not preclude this possibility. The doors of the colleges were open to such graduates as were qualified for enrollment. The only restrictive factor was that most of the vocational school graduates because of their specialization had to take additional courses in order to fulfill general requirements before they could pass the entrance examination to the regular college.

871 By 1946, the Nationalist Ministry of Education announced, 54.52 per cent of the nation's population above the age of six either

had attended or were attending schools.[3] In 1947, there were 207 institutes of higher learning throughout the country. But this number was unsatisfactory to the Government; the Ministry of Education announced that the Central Government devoted only 4.3 per cent[4] of its 1946 budget to education, which is not quite one-third of the amount designated for this purpose by the Constitution. 871 873

In the Central-South Region, 48 schools for advanced education were in operation in 1947. Of these, seventeen were technical schools and five were teacher's colleges. The latest available figures on education in Central-South China cited in Table I will offer comparison with developments under the Communist regime, to be discussed. 871

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[3] *The Education Yearbook of China, 1948*, pp. 1,397-1,483.

[4] *Chung-hua Nien-chien, 1948* [*The China Yearbook, 1948*], Nanking, Chung-hua nien-chien she, 1946, p. 1,623.

Table I. Education in Central-South China (1945-46)*

(Figures in parentheses are 1946 statistics)

Province	Primary Schools		Middle Schools#		Institutions of Adult Education	
	Schools	Students	Schools	Students	Schools	Students
Kiangsi	19,446	1,210,219	265	74,541	(2,221)	(102,068)
Hupeh	13,855	949,977	132	47,712	(909)	(17,314)
Hunan	32,089	2,167,961	294	119,597	(1,256)	(3,749)
Honan	19,915	2,000,736	387	110,794	(406)	(8,233)
Kwangtung	22,927	1,958,772	510	142,250	(2,053)	(26,501)
Kwangsi	16,699	1,133,582	227	61,433	(14,286)	(886)

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* The Education Yearbook of China, 1948, pp. 1,397-1,483. The institutions for adult education include libraries, museums, night schools, etc. It is obvious that not all the people participating in such activities are counted in the figures for "students" of adult education institutions.

# Secondary schools.

II. MAJOR CHANGES BROUGHT ABOUT BY THE COMMUNISTS

A. Basic Policy

Mao Tse-tung stated in On New Democracy 871
that, "A specific culture is the ideological
reflection of the political and economic activities 642
of a specific society."[5] In molding a culture for the "new China," Mao believed that education would be successful if it contained "scientific substance, oriented toward the masses, and adapted to suit China's nationalism."[6] This principle of education was incorporated into the Common Program of 1949 which constituted the basis of the Communist Constitution promulgated in 1954. Article 41 of the Common Program states that the purpose of education is "to elevate the level of the people's culture, to prepare personnel for national reconstruction, to eradicate the thoughts of feudalism, compradorism,[7] and Fascism, and to develop the spirit of service to the people." To apply this basic policy to education, Article 47 of the same

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[5] Mao Tse-tung, Mao Tse-tung Hsüan-chi [Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung], Vol II, Peking, Jen-min ch'u-pan-she, p. 666.

[6] Hsia Feng, Hsiao-hsüeh Chiao-shih Shou-ts'e [Handbook for Primary School Teachers], Shanghai, Wen-hua ch'u-pan-she, 1953, p. 8.

[7] Comprador - a native agent employed by a foreign establishment (commercial houses, etc.) in China, to have charge of its native employees.

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document further specifies that "education must be systematically popularized; secondary and advanced education must be strengthened; technical education must be emphasized; spare-time education for laborers and cadres must be stressed; and revolutionary political education must be given to both young and old intellectuals."[8]

These pronouncements became the guiding light for the Communists in their effort to revamp the educational system of China until the promulgation of the Constitution in 1954. In reality, the new Constitution has nothing to add to or subtract from the principles already in practice. Article 94 of the Constitution says that "Citizens of the People's Republic of China have the right to education. To guarantee enjoyment of this right, the state establishes and gradually extends the various types of educational institutions. The state pays special attention to the physical and mental development of young people." The next article in the Constitution "safeguards the freedom of citizens to engage in scientific research, literary and artistic creation and other cultural activity." These are innocuous statements of commonly accepted principles. Reiteration of these principles in the Constitution, however, provides

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8. Jen-min Shou-ts'e, 1950 [People's Handbook, 1950], Shanghai, Ta-kung pao, 1950, Section B, p. 9.

the Communists once more with the opportunity 871
to clarify their educational aims which are 642
"to develop a socialist China."

Attention must be given to the gradual shift 871
of emphasis from 1949 to the present in the Communist basic policy for education. At the beginning of the Communist regime, the central theme was to bring to reality a "New Democracy" in education. By this the Communists meant that petit bourgeois and national capitalist classes would still be tolerated on a level with the proletariat. Soon afterwards the Communists made it amply clear that a constant effort was to be made to root out every trace of thought and action in education that did not conform to strict proletarian socialism, Russian style. There have been numerous articles auguing whether there is any difference between the principles of the New Democracy and the socialist principles of education.[9] Apparently the final word on this question was pronounced by an article in People's Education, an official organ of the Ministry of Education since May 1, 1951, which said: "The present stage is no longer the same as the New Democracy stage. We have to not only establish a socialist system of thought for the educators and students (which was the central mission under the New Democracy principle),

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[9] See articles on this subject in Jen-min Chiao-yü [People's Education], Peking, June 1953, April 1954, and June 1954 issues.

but to put into practice the principle of 'eliminating step by step the exploitation system and establishing a socialist society' as stipulated in the new Constitution."[10] 871

In short, the Communist basic policy of education has been to remove gradually all influences other than those stemming from socialism. In practice, the Communists have attempted to train all levels of personnel required for a complete socialist remolding of China.

B. Changes in Curricula

Curricular "reform" was among the first actions undertaken by the Communists in the field of education. Even before their consolidation of power (at a time when a thorough renovation of the educational system was administratively impossible) the Communist instituted changes in the curricula wherever their troops had seized control. As early as September 1949, Communist authorities announced the "Temporary Regulations of Curricular Reform in the Departments of the Colleges of Arts and of Law in the Institutions of Higher Learning in North China." The principal features of this "reform" were (1) the substitution of Marxism and Leninism for the Three People's Principles, 876

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[10] People's Education, October 1954, p. 13.

(2) abolishment of the course on traditional law and, before new laws were promulgated, the addition of studies on socialist theories of jurisprudence. This action was aimed at institutions of higher learning; reform of curricula for lower level schools was not much publicized.

The same subject was the central theme for the All-China Higher Education Conference of June 1-9, 1950. By that time the movement to reform curricula had reached its second stage. Out of this conference emerged "Decisions Concerning the Enforcement of Curricula-reform in the Institutions of Higher Learning." The main point of this directive was that, "Institutions of higher learning must ... abolish the politically reactionary courses, install revolutionary political courses of New Democracy.... The curriculum of all departments must practice the principles of proper specialization ..., must install and strengthen necessary and important courses and omit those overlapping and unimportant courses and materials, in accordance with the principle of intensification and simplification.[11]

Following this conference, major changes in college curricula were carried out. Similar measures were also adopted for secondary and primary schools by modifying the courses and altering the subject-content. In January 1951, the Communist Ministry of Education moved to check on the results of curricular "reform" by holding a "Conference on Inspection of Teaching Plans for the Academic Year 1950 of All Institutions of Higher Learning." Again, similar actions were taken for schools on the lower level. After September 1951, official efforts were mainly devoted to "thought reform" and the inspection of course material and teaching methods to insure that the reform measures were truly carried out in the Communist spirit. These efforts have not lessened in the past five years.

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[11] Hsin-hua Yüeh-pao [New China Monthly], Vol. II, No. 5, September 1950, p. 1,134.

Besides changing the materials for courses on political and economic theory, the curricular "reform" also has the mission of dovetailing the schools on different levels and seeing that their doors are open to Party and other professional cadres who have not had the opportunity of a formal education.

One important development closely related to curricular "reform" is the thorough re-examination of all textual materials. The central authorities responsible for education, through their subordinate agencies on provincial and municipal levels, supervised the revision of all textbooks, particularly those in the field of the social sciences, before releasing them to the schools. That the revised books are politically slanted is obvious, but their technical quality can not be judged without a detailed comparative study of many such books against the original versions and against similar books accepted as standard works in non-Communist countries.[12] 876

C. Changes in Organization

Before 1949, as the Communist Army assumed 871 control of a city or a town, a military delegate was assigned to each school to supervise its administration. 656 The changes the Communists brought to the schools at that time were imposed unsystematically and arbitrarily. Even after the establishment of the Peking regime, the measures designed to revise the educational system and school organization remained haphazard. Following the outbreak of the Korean war in 1950, the main activity of the Communist Ministry of Education, as far as reorganization of the schools was concerned, appeared to be the seizure of private schools and other schools sponsored by religious groups and foreign missions.[13] The first systematic reorganization was occasioned by the issuance of a Government Administration Council directive, "Decisions Concerning the Reform of the Educational System," on October 1, 1951. The People's Daily of Peking, central organ of the Communist Party, and People's Education both expounded the theory behind the organizational reform:[14] (1) the reorganization will ascertain the position of vocational schools, special training programs for cadres, and adult educational classes in the regular school system; in other words those cadres, soldiers, peasants, and workers who have had no opportunity for formal education may attend special training schools and achieve the same training as regular school graduates; (2) changing the six-year and two-level primary school system into a five-year and one-level system will enable children of poor peasants to receive a much more complete basic education; (3) the new system will place emphasis on technical education to serve the purpose of the "socialist reconstruction of China"; and (4) the kindergarten will have its definite place in the reorganized system.

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[12] Wu-nien-lai Ti Kung-fei Chiao-yü [Communist Education in the Last Five Years], Sixth Section, Central Committee, Nationalist Party, 1955, Vol. II, pp. 14-15. A total of 6,360 schools were said to have been seized by the Communist.

[13] For more information on revision and publication of textbooks in Communist China, see the chapters on "Public Information and Propaganda," and "Artistic and Intellectual Expressions." Also see Chu Po-ch'i, Chung-kung Ti Hsüeh-hsiao Chiao-yü [Formal Education in Communist China], Hong Kong, Ya-chou ch'u-pan-she, 1954, pp. 218-27.

Thus the reorganization was launched as the central task for education in China for 1952. By September 1952, it was reported, the major reorganization of schools was completed.[15] However, the Communist Vice-Minister of Education, Liu Shih reported in January 1954 that "systematic reorganization of the

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[14] People's Education, October 1951, pp. 5-6; Hsia Feng, op. cit., pp. 2-3.

[15] Kao Chien-hsing, Chung-kung Ti Nu-i Chiao-yü [Slave Education of the Chinese Communists], Hong Kong, Tzu-yu ch'u-pan-she, 1953, p. 36; Walter Crosby Eells, Communism in Education, Washington, D. C., American Council of Education, 1954, p. 201.

Chart 2. System of Education under the Chinese Communist Regime*

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656


AGE SCALE
Research Institutes
Universities and Specialized Colleges
Specialized Institutes
5
4
3
2
1
19
18
17
16
15
14
13
12
11
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
6
5
4
3
2
1
6
5
4
3
2
1
Senior Middle Schools
Secondary Specialized Schools
Junior Middle Schools
Primary Schools
(Senior)
(Junior)
Kindergartens
Proletarian Accelerated Middle Schools (3-4 yrs.)
Proletarian Accelerated Primary Schools (2-3 yrs.)
Spare-time Senior Middle Schools (3-4 yrs.)
Spare-time Junior Middle Schools (3-4 yrs.)
Spare-time Primary Schools

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*Communist Education in the Past Five Years, pp. 8-9; Chi Tung-wei, Education for the Proletariat in Communist China, Hong Kong, Union Research Institute, 1954, p. 16. The Chinese term for "middle school" implies "secondary school."

(Chart 2 faces p. 271.)

schools was not completed until late 1953."[16] Liu, 871
in reporting on the completion of the reorganization, 656
possibly had in mind the decision of the Government Administration Council in November 1953 to "restore the old primary school system of six-years and two-levels." According to Premier Chou En-lai, this last action was necessary because of "inadequate preparation" for the new five-year, one-level system.[17]

The main changes brought about in the reorganization were the regrouping of departments in large universities and specialisation in the colleges. The purpose was to achieve a balanced distribution of educational facilities as prescribed in the program of national economic reconstruction.[18] The system of education after reorganization can best be shown in the chart which follows.

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[16] People's Education, January 1954, p. 24.

[17] Ibid., p. 8.

[18] For a detailed description of the reorganization, see People's Education, Jan. 1954, p. 65; Communist Education in the Past Five Years, Vol. II, pp. 14-15; Chung Shih, Higher Education in Communist China, Hong Kong, Union Research Institute, 1953, pp. 41-47.

Chart 3. Communist Government Control of Education[*]


State Council
Physical Education Commission
Ministry of Public Health
Ministry of Education
Ministry of Higher Education
Ministry of Culture
Provincial (or Municipal) People's Council
Physical Education Commission
Department of Public Health
Department of Education
Department of Culture
County People's Council
Municipal People's Council
Public Health Bureau
Cultural & Educational Bureau
Physical Education Committee
Public Health Bureau
Educational Bureau
Cultural Bureau
Hsiang (or Minority National Hsiang, or Chen) People's Council
Ch'ü People's Council
Commission on Cultural and Educational Work
Public Health Section
Cultural & Educational Section

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[*] Communist Education in the Past Five Years, pp. 12-13. The term "Physical Education" used here can also be translated as "Physical Culture and Sports."

(Chart 3 faces p. 272.)

Following the reorganization of the school system, government control over the system was further defined by the promulgation of the 1954 Constitution. As shown in Chart 3, the formal chain of control is not much different from that of the Nationalist system. The following new features, of course, are to be noted: The two ministries of education function differently in that the Ministry of Higher Education is in charge of the education of higher and secondary levels of technical and administrative personnel to be used in the national reconstruction program, while the Ministry of education is responsible for the administration of teacher's training schools, regular middle (secondary) and primary schools, and adult education schools.[19] Prior to the promulgation of the Constitution, education was under the jurisdiction of a Cultural and Educational Administration of the Government Administration Council. Now, under the State Council, culture and education are separated. The Ministry of Culture continues to supervise all "cultural activities" other than education, such as the press, publications, art, drama, and so forth. That physical education is worthy of an independent commission under the State Council indicates the important position it occupies in the Communist program of youth training.

One significant development in the control of education by the Communist government is the role played by the Party. Although the official chain of control as shown in Chart 3 seems to have no place

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[19] *Communist Education in the Past Five Years*, Vol. I, p. 11.

for the Communist Party, Party branches on all 871
levels are actually the authorities for interpretation
of official policy and have the final decision on how 656
a school should be run. Evidence shows that some schools report every important question to the local Party secretary before taking any action.[20] Close-range Party supervision, together with the assignment of well trained veteran cadres to key positions on the administrative staff of the school, serve to maintain the Communists' control over the educational system.

III. MAJOR MOVEMENTS LAUNCHED BY COMMUNIST IN EDUCATION

A. "Thought Reform"

To effect an ideological revolution among the 876
educators and students is an essential step in the Communist plan to "Sovietize" completely the educational system in China. Since 1949, every major measure adopted by the Peking regime in the cultural and educational fields involves, either implicitly or explicitly, an effort to remold the thought of the people concerned. However, an organized drive to change the way of thinking of the educators and students did not start until Premier Chou En-lai delivered his speech on September 29, 1951. He urged the educators to abandon their attitude of "study for study's sake" or "art for art's sake"

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[20] People's Education, December 1954, p. 30.

and to step down from their professorial pedestals to serve the masses. He exhorted the students to forget about personal profit and to identify their ambitions with the national interest. 876

This movement spread rapidly. Criticism and self-criticism were encouraged. "Petit bourgeois sentimentalism," "capitalistic romanticism," "feudalistic individualism," and a host of other "undesirable" attitudes were subject to relentless attack. During subsequent months the Communist press was crowded with signed confessions of past ideological errors. This is the mainstay of the Communist program to revamp education, but it is admittedly a most trying task, which requires a long-range plan and sustained effort for its achievement.

Although practically every college professor in China has published his self-criticism (some of them have done so several times) and every student has been through at least one "thought struggle," the movement continues unabated. The Ministry of Education in announcing the tasks for 1954 again pointed out the need for continued vigilance against the "remnant of feudalistic thought."[21] The State Council in directing secondary schools to improve their courses stressed the importance of strengthening socialist thought.[22] The latest revival of this issue occurred when the philosophy and works of Hu Shih, Yü P'ing-po, and Hu Feng became the subject of a purge.[23] (See chapter on Artistic and Intellectual Expression in this handbook.) 876

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[21] People's Education, March 1954, p. 22.

[22] Ibid., July 1954, p. 16.

B. Labor-education Movement

The labor-education movement is designed to inculcate a respect for labor in the minds of intellectuals and youth, and is not to be confused with "Reform-through-labor" discussed in the chapter on Forced Labor.

Beginning with the kindergarten, the Communists teach students to respect the "fruits of labor," to care for school property, and to aid their parents by doing chores at home. Grade school children are taught manual work, partly as physical exercise and partly as a means to cultivate respect for labor. Older students are urged to prepare themselves for work on the farm or in the factory. Such a preparation, the Communists say, is the "most glorious" assignment which can be offered "new China's" youth. Students in advanced schools are reminded of their duty to accept government assignments regardless of the working conditions involved. The main purpose of the labor-education movement is to prepare students for work upon the completion of any level of education.

"Study is the only task worth undertaking, and all other professions are beneath it" is a traditional Chinese expression which upholds the high social

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23. People's Education, May 1955, p. 5.

status of the educated. This has become a target of Communist attack, and the fight to change the minds of the people is still surging.[24] 876

C. Physical Education Movement

Although a specific commission has been established to promote physical education (see Chart 3), the State Council and the two ministries of education have been seriously concerned with the health of students. This concern originates from Mao Tse-tung's instructions to promote "good health, good study, and good work." As early as April 1951, Tung Ch'un-ts'ai, Vice-Minister of Education, called the attention of the nation's educators to the importance of guarding the health of students. Tung's declaration was affirmed by other officials in responsible positions during subsequent years, but apparently the situation was not much improved. The students remained in financial straits while the pressure of intensified courses was increased. The Ministry of Higher Education, the Ministry of Health, and the Commission on Physical Education issued in July 1954 a joint directive reiterating an earlier announcement by the Government Administration Council on "Decisions on Improving the Health of Students in Schools at All Levels."[25] However, it is obvious that 871 744 stress on physical exercise can not take the place of an adequate diet. 871 744

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[24] See Communist official directives on "labor-education," ibid., June 1954, p. 7; May 1954, p. 7.

[25] People's Education, August 1954, p. 65.

Other movements launched simultaneously with the above-mentioned drives have been revived from time to time. They are indicative of the ills plaguing the educational system under the Communists in China. Language reform, important to primary education and in efforts to combat illiteracy, is associated with "thoughtreform." The program to establish winter schools, summer schools, and other special training classes for peasants, workers, and soldiers is actually a part of school reorganization. Some of the most important characteristics of these movements will be discussed. 871

IV. THE VARIOUS LEVELS OF SCHOOLS

The Communist policy for education and the movements in education are nation-wide, and are subject to only minor regional variations. However, a survey of the schools in Central-South China may reveal the extent to which the Communist policy has been carried out and the response of the people in this region.

A. Kindergartens and Primary Schools

The development of kindergartens in the Central-South China Region followed the basic policies laid down by the Communists. Although complete information on the present situation in this region is not available, the development on Kwangtung Province may serve as an indication. The operation of 872 kindergartens in Kwangtung had hitherto been unsystematic. The Communist claimed that their policy to standardize the kindergartens resulted in the establishment in Kwangtung Province of 54 such schools, with a total enrollment of 7,373 children by the end of September 1954.[26] However, this claim did not tally with a survey conducted at the end of 1954, which reported that in the city of Canton 117 kindergartens with a total enrollment of 20,710 children were in operation.[27] The survey also revealed that the kindergarten situation in Canton in 1954 was about four times better than that in 1949. Although claiming success, the Communists in Central-South China released no statistics on the total number of kindergartens and their enrollment in this region as a whole.

The development of primary schools received prompter attention than did the development of the kindergarten system. The Communist policy has been to strengthen the "complete" primary schools in cities and important villages and to encourage the villagers in outlying districts to establish their own primary schools under local government supervision.[28] To consolidate Party control over these numerous primary schools scattered over wide areas, the Government Administration Council in Peking ordered the assignment of experienced political cadres to supervise the educational agencies in county governments. In addition, primary school principals and other administrators were indoctrinated. In Central-South China, the first such indoctrination course was scheduled in September 1951 and was to last eight months.[29] During this period the schoolmasters were expected to learn Marxian theories and Peking's policies of education. Between October and November 1951 in the city of Wuhan, over 5,000 primary school teachers received political training.[30] Similar programs of indoctrination for primary school teachers were in progress in other areas in Central-South China at about the same time.

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[26] Survey of China Mainland Press, No. 932, Hong Kong, American Consulate-General, November 20-22, 1954, p. 12.

[27] Hua-ch'iao Jih-pao [China Daily News], New York, June 21, 1955, p. 6.

The number of primary schools in this region showed no immediate increase after the Communists' seizure of power. In fact, the change of administration and the reorganization of schools brought about the consolidation of many schools; thus for a short period the total number of schools in this region was reduced. Subsequent expansion, according to a Communist report,[31] brought the number of schools in the province of Kwangtung to 19,653, with a total enrollment of 3,130,000 students, by September 1954. The municipality of Canton in the same year claimed[32] that the number of primary school students had doubled since 1949.

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[28] Jen-min Shou-ts'e, 1955 [People's Handbook, 1955], Tientsin, Ta-kung pao, 1955, pp. 575-76.

[29] People's Education, December 1951, p. 12.

[30] Slave Education of the Chinese Communists, p. 66.

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The trained political cadres who were sent to rural areas to establish primary schools reported a shortage of supplies and a lack of financial support. At the same time, the Central-South China press printed a number of accounts of "the glorious success" of these Party-assigned schoolmasters who struggled hard to win the support of the villagers.[33]

The emphasis in primary school education in Central-South China followed the national pattern to imbue the students with respect for labor and love for one's own country with a socialist slant. Thus in a history course, the students were told that Confucius was not concerned with the "proletariat" and that he offered advice to kings in order to perpetuate the feudalistic system.[34] A language teacher in Changsha was criticized by the local Party cadre for expressing petit bourgeois "sentimentalism" when he said he was sorry to see his students graduate.[35] For a while some primary schools in Central-South China employed the method of group discussion to teach political subjects, but this was discouraged by higher authorities,[36] because, it was said, primary school pupils were not sufficiently mature to benefit from open discussions. Primary schools at T'ang-yin in Honan Province and Changsha in Hunan Province were cited as model schools where students were taught to enjoy manual work, to help their parents at home, and to prepare for farm work upon graduation.[37] Some of these primary schools insisted that the parents agree it was as noble and desirable to have their children upon graduation participate in productive labor as to send them to the schools of higher education. 872

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[31] Survey of China Mainland Press, No. 932, p. 12.

[32] China Daily News, New York, June 21, 1955, p. 6.

[33] One of these vivid accounts tells how a new young schoolmaster won over the opposition of a "reactionary" village head in Honan Province. See People's Education , July 1952, p. 37.

[34] Ibid., January 1952, p. 52.

B. Secondary Schools

In 1950, the secondary schools in Central-South China were submitted to the initial stages of consolidation and reorganization in accordance with the Communist policy for education. Incomplete 873 statistics from a Communist source indicate that in that year there were 148 middle (secondary) schools in Hupeh, 177 in Hunan, and 190 in Kwangsi Provinces.[38] Establishment of additional middle schools brought the total number of registered students (including those of the secondary normal schools and "proletarian accelerated" middle schools) in Mainland China to 3, 628, 264 by September 1954.[39] This figure was claimed to have doubled that of 1948. In Central-South China, Kwangtung Province alone reported having 470 secondary schools in 1954, with a total enrollment of 249,000 students.[40] The fact that there were actually fewer middle schools in Kwangtung in 1954 than in 1945 (see Table 1) can be accounted for by the elimination of many "old" schools supported by foreign religious groups and by overseas Chinese. However, if Communist statistics can be accepted as reliable, the total enrollment of middle school students in Kwangtung Province showed an increase of approximately 100, 000 over the past ten years.

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[35] Ibid., May 1952, p. 54.

[36] Ibid., January 1952, p. 50.

[37] Wo-men Shih Tsen-yang Chin-hsing Lao-tung Chiao-yü Ti [How We Carry Out Labor-Education], Shanghai, Hsin chih-shih ch'u-pan-she, 1955, pp. 15-21, 51-61, 62-66.

The aim of secondary education, according to the Government Administration Council which reiterated the point on June 5, 1954, is to cultivate

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38. Cheng-fu Kung-tso Pao-kao Hui-pien 1950 [Compendium of Government Reports 1950], Peking, Jen-min Ch'u pan-she, 1951, pp. 870, 899, 962.

39. People's Education, October 1954, p. 34.

40. Survey of China Mainland Press, No. 932, p. 12.

nationalism but not at the expense of "internationalism," to teach the students to love their country, respect labor, and realize their duties and responsibilities to their country.[41] To carry out this official line, a system of rotating indoctrination was inaugurated for the secondary school principals and other administrators, with the commissioners of education of each provincial government responsible for the supervision of indoctrination. Fear of deviation was expressed by those in charge of the junior secondary school at Hsing-tzu hsien, Kiangsi Province, in 1954, when the school administration reported that it had to refer every matter of policy to the local Party cadre for interpretation before action could be taken.[42]

Some important changes were made in the curriculum for secondary schools. To the natural science courses was added a subject called Elementary Darwinianism. To the social science courses was added a study of the Common Program, later replaced by a study of the new Constitution of 1954. During the past five years there have been times when a scheduled course has been suspended at the last minute because the official textbook for the course was not ready.[43] Many textbooks were

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[41] Chou En-lai "Directive on Improvement and Expansion of Secondary Education," People's Handbook 1955, pp. 571-73.

[42] People's Education, December 1954, p. 30.

[43] Ibid., August 1954, pp. 63-64.

revised several times to measure up to the official 873
Party line as interpreted by Peking.

Because of the geographic proximity of the Central-South China Region to such foreign territories as Hong Kong and Macao, the Kwangtung provincial authorities have paid special attention to schools established to accommodate overseas Chinese students. The latest action was the construction of four secondary schools and three primary schools for overseas Chinese in Canton, with a total enrollment capacity of 1,000 students.[44]

C. Institutions of Higher Learning

In principle, the control of institutions of higher learning is centralized under the Ministry of Higher Education, except for the teacher's training program which falls under the Ministry of Education (see Chart 3). In practice, the Government Administration Council has instructed the various central government ministries in charge of different industries to "supervise and co-ordinate" the programs for advanced technical schools. These central government ministries in turn can appoint local government personnel to take charge of the schools in order to maintain close supervision. In this connection, local governments, mainly provincial, were given the responsibility of providing the schools with political guidance.[45] With this system of control, the political conversion of the universities and colleges has been carried out with very little delay. The administrative reorganization of these institutions, however, ran into more difficulties because each of the well established universities was an academic entity with a definite personality of its own. Some of the experiences on the universities in transition were presented by Fei Hsiao-t'ung, noted sociologist and senior professor at the Tsing Hua University, in his book, Revamping the Universities.[46]

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[44] China Daily News, New York, May 28, 1955, p. 6.

Among the more acute difficulties experienced during the conversion and reorganization of universities were:[47] (1) the "thought reform" of college

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45. "Decisions Concerning the Revision of Relations of Leadership for Institutions of Higher Learning," announced by the Government Administration Council on October 6, 1953. People's Handbook 1955, pp. 558-59.

46. Ta-hsüeh Ti Kai-tsao [Revamping the Universities], Shanghai, Shang-hai ch'u-pan kung-ssu, 1950.

47. Accounts of thought reform for college professors are presented (possibly with some exaggeration) in such works as Ts'ui Shu-ch'in, Ta-lu Hsüeh-jen Ti Pei-chü [Tradedy of Scholars on the Mainland], Taipei, Chung-yang wen-wu kung-ying she, 1953; and Kung-fei Ti Nu-i Wen-hua Yü Chiao-yü, [The Slave Culture and Education of the Chinese Communists], Taipei, Sixth Section, Central Reform Committee, Nationalist Party, 1952.

Table II. Institutions of Higher Learning in Central-South China */

NAME	LOCATION	NUMBER OF DEPARTMENTS	NUMBER OF SPECIAL COURSES	SPECIALIZATION
873 University of Wuhan	Wuchang	9	1	General
Chung-shan University	Canton	8	none	General
874 Hua-chung Engineering College	Wuchang	3	3	Engineering
Hua-nan Engineering College	Canton	6	4	Engineering
Chung-nan Mining College	Changsha	3	2	Mining
Chung-nan Civil Engineering College	Changsha	1	1	Civil engineering
Hydraulic Engineering College, Wuhan University	Wuchang	1	1	Hydraulic Eng.
Wuhan Inland Waterway Transportation College	Wuchang	2	None	Inland navigation, shipbuilding
Hua-chung Agricultural College	Wuchang	8	none	Agriculture
Hua-nan Agricultural College	Canton	8	none	Agriculture
Honan Agricultural College	Kaifeng	2	none	Agriculture
Hunan Agricultural College	Changsha	2	none	Agr., forestry
Kiangsi Agricultural College	Nanchang	2	none	Agr., forestry
Kwangsi Agricultural College	Kweilin	2	none	Agr., forestry
Chung-nan Financial and Economic College	Wuchang	6	none	Finance, economics
Chung-nan College of Political Science and Law	Wuchang	none	1	Pol. Science, Law
Chung-nan T'ung-chi Medical College	Hankow	2	none	Medicine, public health
Hunan Medical College	Changsha	1	none	Medicine
Hupeh Medical College	Wuchang	1	none	Medicine
Kwangsi Medical College	Kweilin	1	none	Medicine
Hua-nan Medical College	Canton	1	none	Medicine
Kuang-hua Medical College	Nanchang	1	none	Medicine
Honan Medical College	Kaifeng	1	none	Medicine
Hua-chung Teachers' College	Wuchang	9	10	General
Hua-nan Teachers' College	Canton	9	9	General
Honan Teachers' College (no.1)	Kaifeng	6	6	General
Honan Teachers' College (no.2)	Hsin-hsiang	4	4	General
Hunan Teachers' College	Changsha	6	6	General
Kiangsi Teachers' College	Nanchang	3	7	General
Kwangsi Teachers' College	Kweilin	3	4	General
Hupeh Special School for Teachers	Wuchang	none	9	General
Honan Special School for Teachers	Kaifeng	none	6	General
Chung-nan College of Physical Education	Nanchang	2	none	Physical education
Chung-nan Special School of Music	Wuchang	none	3	Music
Chung-nan Special School of Arts	Wuchang	none	3	Arts

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* Jen-min Shou-ts'e /People's Handbook, 1956/, Tientsin, Ta-kung pao, 1956, pp. 567-70.

(Table II faces p. 286.)

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professors, who were subject to public criticism by their students, and (2) the transfer of certain departments from one university to another, which disrupted the administration of both institutions. In Central-South China, most universities and colleges went through a similar experience. One widely publicized action taken by the municipal authorities of Canton in the "thought reform" movement was the organization in December 1951 of a "self-reform forum" for college professors. Over 90 professors were said to have participated in the conference in order to "clean their thought of any bureaucratic and feudalistic influences" and to learn Marxism.[48]

In 1950, there were 34 schools of higher learning in operation in Central-South China.[49] This was 14 less than the number of colleges and universities in 1947. In 1954, after the reorganization, 35 universities and colleges were in operation.[50] Among them were 19 advanced technical schools, 9 teachers' colleges, 5 colleges specializing in the social sciences, physical education, or the arts, and only two "comprehensive" universities, one located at Wuhan, the other at Canton. More than half of these schools simultaneously conducted two- and three-year special courses. (See Table II). The establishment of the short-term special course is in accordance with the over-all government policy of preparing sufficient technical personnel to meet the needs of the national reconstruction program.

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[48] The Slave Culture and Education of Chinese Communists, p. 66.

[49] Compendium of Government Reports, 1950, p. 749.

[50] People's Handbook 1955, pp. 567-70. See Table II.

There were problems created by the "planned distribution" of college graduates to places where they would be needed. Throughout their years in college the students were told that "to think of salary is mercenary and to dodge government assignment is political desertion."[51] From the beginning of 1950 to the end of 1952, the Central People's Government had assigned 74,000 graduates of institutions of higher learning to various parts of China, and another 34,000 were to be assigned during 1953. It is not known how many students from the Central-South China Region have been thus assigned during the past five years. However, the South China Daily of Canton as recently as May 1955 reported the February shipment of 362 Kwangtung "educated youths" to Sinkiang.[52] While the report did not specify whether all the assignees were college graduates or not, it is presumed that high school and vocational school graduates were also included. Obviously the practice of assigning students to work where they are needed still continues in Central-South China.

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51. Kao-teng Hsüeh-hsiao Pi-yeh-sheng Ti Kuang-yung Jen-wu [The Glorious Mission of College Graduates], Shanghai, Hua-tung jen-min ch'u-pan-she, 1953, pp. 12-13.

52. Quoted in Union Research Service (a China Mainland press digest bulletin), No. 4, Hong Kong, Union Research Institute, September 27, 1955, p. 2.

D. The Teachers' Training Program

As shown in Chart 2, colleges and secondary schools for teacher training have equal standing with general schools on the same levels. In their curricula, the teachers' training schools stress certain aspects which are not emphasized in general educational institutions. The urgent need for trained teachers for schools on different levels was first announced in October 1950 by Ma Hsü-lun, then Minister of Education. Ma told the first All-China Conference on Primary Education and Teacher's Training that, before 1957, according to the planned expansion of schools, China would need 1,000,000 new teachers. Of these, 200,000 would be for "spare-time" schools for peasants and workers, 130,000 for regular middle schools, 10,000 for colleges, and the remainder for kindergartens.[53] Measures adopted to expedite the training of teachers included the condensation of courses and the setting up of special short-term courses for training primary school teachers. Many primary school teachers who had left the profession were induced to return. To improve their qualifications, these teachers were encouraged to use their spare time to take refresher courses in evening and Sunday classes especially organized for them. In 1953, there were 1,280 such refresher courses throughout China. For teachers in outlying districts correspondence courses were designed in addition to reference materials brought to them by mobile libraries. The Communists claim that 407 counties in China were serviced by mobile libraries in 1953. In the same year, the teachers in 220 counties formed correspondence clubs among themselves, and exchanged teaching experiences, thus helping one another to improve teaching techniques.[54] In September 1953, secondary school teachers in Wuhan organized seven associations, each devoted to the discussion of one subject taught in school.[55] More associations of a similar nature were to be established.

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[53] *The Slave Culture and Education of Chinese Communists,* p. 23.

Another measure adopted was the hiring of some high school graduates after a period of apprenticeship, to serve as teachers in the same schools. This experiment was tried out at the First Girls' Middle School in Wuhan in 1952 and was reported to be successful.[56]

These stop-gap measures, however, were not enough to meet the shortage of teachers pointed out by Ma Hsü-lun in 1950. In 1954, Tung Ch'un-ts'ai, Vice-Minister of Education, still mentioned the possible shortage of 100,000 secondary school teachers in the next five years.[57] Nine months later, a report from the Ministry of Education stated that, according to plan, the expansion of secondary schools in 1954 would need about 28,000 additional teachers.

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[54] People's Education, January 1953, p. 23.
[55] Ibid., September 1953, p. 36.
[56] Ibid., November 1953, p. 29.
[57] Ibid., January 1954, pp. 17-18.

Yet all the teachers' colleges in China would graduate only 9, 600 students in 1954. The report estimated that only about 7, 600 new teachers would be available because a number of the graduates would be "asked" to remain on the staff of the teachers' colleges which had to be expanded at the same time. Thus the Communist Ministry of Education predicted a continued shortage of teachers for a number of years to come. 825

Political training for future teachers is stressed in all the teachers' colleges. The curricula designed by the Ministry of Education specify that 33.8 per cent of the total credit hours for a teacher in training must be devoted to the "history of Communist revolution," Marxian and Leninist theories, psychology, the theory of education, the study of teaching methods, and physical education.[58]

E. Schools for Peasants, Workers, Cadres, and the Illiterate

To give political and technical training to peasants, workers, and other "cadres" is one of the basic principles of the Communists' theory of education. A broad program for this purpose was outlined at the All-China Conference on Education for Peasants and Workers by Ch'ien Chün-jui, Vice-Minister of Education, on September 30, 1950.[59] He quoted 873

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[58] Ibid., September 1954, pp. 9-10.

[59] People's Education, May 1951, pp. 12-16.

Mao Tse-tung as saying that, because the peasants and workers constituted over 80 per cent of China's population, they were the main force upon which would depend the transition of Chinese society from "New Democracy" to Socialism. Ch'ien stressed the following points: (1) The most immediate task was to combat illiteracy. (2) The cadres among the peasants and workers must be the first to be educated so that they would provide proper leadership for the masses. (3) This type of education must be fitted to local conditions which might vary from place to place.

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No line of demarcation can be clearly drawn between the educatinal institutions for peasants and workers and those for Party and government cadres. Altogether these schools form a part of the regular school system. As Ch'eng Fang-wu, former president of the College of the War of Resistance at Yenan, reported in July 1952,[60] the development of this type of education under the Communists could traced back to Mao Tse-tung's Peasant Movement Institute in Hunan in the early days of the Chinese Communist movement. Later, when the Communists established a stronghold in southern Kiangsi Province, cadre schools were established to train political and military personnel. These institutions were succeeded by the College of the War of Resistance and by the Northern Shensi Institute in Yenan in the 1930's and early 1940's.

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[60] Ibid., July 1952, p. 6.

As the Communist Army occupied North China after World War II, the North China University and the North China People's Revolutionary University were established for cadre training. After 1949, the Chinese People's University emerged in Peking, with 30 per cent of its curriculum devoted to political education and 70 per cent to the specific fields in which the cadre students were specializing. 873

In 1950, a Communist survey asserted that about 765,000 workers and over 25,000,000 peasants were enrolled in night schools, "winter schools," and other classes during their spare-time.[61] In the same year in Central-South China 26,400 people in Wuhan and over 4,000 in Pao-feng hsien in Honan Province participated in similar educational activities. In Shan hsien, Honan Province, 32 reading classes for women were in operation in 1954 as a part of the illiteracy-elimination program.[62] Similar classes were formed for soldiers. The much 876 publicized "accelerated course" invented by Ch'i Chien-hua, a cultural cadre attached to the army, to teach the Chinese written language, was first tried and pronounced successful. In the Central-South China Region, several "cultural cadres" assigned to army units followed a system which would enable them to write Chinese characters at a speed never attained before.[63]

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[61] People's Education, January 1953, p. 16.

[62] Compendium of Government Reports, 1950, p. 829.

[63] People's Education, May 1952, p. 4; July 1952, pp. 9-13. These methods of learning the Chinese language are discussed in the chapter on Language. Also see photograph on the inside of the cover of People's Education, Dec. 1951, depicting a reading class for the militia.

In the proletarian (peasants and workers) accelerated secondary schools (see Chart 2), a formal curriculum is pursued. The courses taught are similar to those in regular secondary schools except that emphasis is placed on technical subjects while anything without direct bearing on farm or factory work is simplified in order to shorten the time of study. In the classes irregularly conducted during the spare-time of the peasants and workers, political study consists of lectures and discussions, using as topics whatever happens to coincide with the most recent official Party propaganda line. For political cadres, regardless of their own professions, study of Marxian and other Communist theories are required. The Central Committee of the Communist Party periodically issues directives listing the works of Marx, Lenin, and Mao Tse-tung to be studied. Chiefs of local Party branches are charged with the responsibility of supervising these studies at weekly meetings.[64]

Classes to teach beginners to read the Chinese language are held separately, but once the students have graduated from these classes they are given the opportunity to advance to higher levels of learning. An attempt is made to raise the academic level of cadres among peasant and workers to that of graduates of regular schools. In a directive issued by the Communist Party on December 24, 1953,[65] it was stated that those who pursued spare-time study at least six hours a week for forty weeks a year, covering the essential courses prescribed for the primary school level by educational authorities, were entitled to enroll in a junior secondary school. Three years of similar spare-time study covering junior secondary school courses would enable students to enroll in senior secondary school. In this way, any person pursuing studies in his spare-time can eventually complete his education by attending night colleges.

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[64] A sample list of materials to be studied is found in People's Handbook 1955, issued for 1953-54, pp. 535-36.

Another development in education for peasants and workers is the Communist claim that the percentage of students with a peasant- or worker-family background has risen sharply in the total enrollment figures. By 1955, these figures were 21.94 per cent for institutions of higher learning, 60 per cent for middle schools, and 76 per cent for primary schools.[66] In Central-South China, a survey of four secondary schools in Hupeh Province in October 1951 showed, according to the Communists, that 45 per cent of the students enrolled that year were from peasant and worker families.[67] Although the Communists claimed that these figures indicated an improvement of education among the proletariat, they also admitted that the schools had not been paying sufficient attention to the children of the proletariat, who felt that they were discriminated against,, and that the cost of education often hindered the furtherance of their education. 873

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[65] People's Handbook 1955, p. 538.

[66] Communist Education in the Past Five Years, p. 3.

[67] People's Education, May 1952, pp. 26-27.

Official concern was expressed by the Communists over the lack of preparation on the part of some of the cadres enrolled in higher level cadre schools.[68] To remedy this situation, educational authorities are now trying to strengthen the spare-time classes by giving refresher courses to those students who are deficient.

F. Education for Minority Nationalities

With the slogan, "All the ethnic groups in China are brothers in a big family," the Communists have been encouraging the establishment of a program to provide educational opportunities for minority nationals. Regular schools are encouraged to enroll minority nationals, and special schools have been established for minority groups. Communist statistics asserted that in 1951 there were 9,103 special primary schools (with 943,285 students) and 117 secondary schools (with 45,628 students) throughout China. These figures, it was claimed, 871 563 increased in 1952 to 10,668 (1,474,244 students) for primary schools, and 182 (90,000 students) for secondary schools.[69] At the end of 1953, the Communists claimed that over 4,000,000 minority nationals were attending schools,[70] and this would mean that one out of every eight minority nationals was attending school.

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[68] People's Education, August 1953, pp. 31-32.

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In Central-South China, some 16,170 schools in 1953 accepted the enrollment of minority nationals the total number of students from minority groups reached 103,300. During 1950-52, over 1,300 teachers were trained to teach in schools for minority nationals. In the Miao area in western Hunan Province, the number of primary schools for minority nationals increased from 47 in 1950 to 1,690 in 1952. The number of such schools in the minority national areas in Kwangsi was claimed to have been doubled during the same period.[71]

As a matter of policy, the appropriate language of each minority group is to be used in schools where the use of the Chinese language would tend to make teaching more difficult. (For the language policy of the Communists, see the chapter on Language.) With the exception of such higher level schools as the Central-South Minority National

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[69] Ibid., March 1954, pp. 40-42.
[70] Ibid., October 1954, p. 35.
[71] People's Education, March 1954, p. 40.

College and the Kwangsi Minority National College, most of the primary schools included in Communist statistics are presumably poorly equipped and operated on an irregular schedule. 871 563

V. SOME OBSERVATIONS

A. The Character of the Communist Education

Two significant characteristics of the Communist educational system are the degree of specialization found in the school system and the centralization of control over the content of the subjects taught in the schools. The measures so far adopted by the Communists in reorganizing the schools, with emphasis on the development of technical institutions, are measures of expediency in view of the urgency of economic reconstruction as outlired in the first Five-year Plan. The centralization of control begins with the indoctrination of the teachers and rigid supervision of the publication of textbooks. Every teacher is told what to say and how to say it. To be sure the Communists have yet to achieve complete uniformity in education, but all possible efforts are made to guard against deviation. 871

B. Ideological Orientation and Its Effect on the People's Attitudes

The ideological orientation of the Communist educational system can be readily seen from the basic policies and the major movements instituted in Chinese education during the past five years. Through "education" the Communists expect to teach 876 191 the Chinese people to hate "American imperialism" and to respect the Soviet Union as "the leader in the revolutionary bloc of nations." The social sciences taught in schools are oriented on the basis of Russian socialism "because China must learn from the Russian revolutionary experiences." In technical courses Russian technique is singled out as "advanced experience". Hostility toward all non-Communist traditions and ideals is stressed throughout the country. Any person, Chinese or foreign, who is not sympathetic toward Communism is assumed to be either an actual or a potential enemy, and is to be treated as such.

There is a lack of subtlety in the Chinese Communists' attempt to reconcile their theory of patriotism with their pro-Russian propaganda line. When they directed the teachers to abandon the use of English except in foreign language classes, they defended this by saying that Russia would be taught in certain schools in order to expedite the process of translating certain Russian works into Chinese, but that even this practice would be terminated as soon as the goal was attained.[72] But they failed to specify the time when such practices would cease. Since learning a foreign language is no easy matter, such a substitution of Russian for English has been a controversial point and may remain an unresolved issue of the Communist ideological orientation in education.

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72. People's Education, February 1952, p. 7.

C. Noted Inadequacies

Lack of teachers, as has been noted, will continue to hamper the development of education and the improvement of the standards of the schools. Lack of educational equipment can only be partially solved by improvisations, and until sufficient classrooms have been built, classes cannot be properly conducted. Lack of financial support for students will make it necessary for them to become preoccupied with their own livelihood when they are studying. Above all, the lack of well-trained educational administrators will be the greatest obstacle to the Communist's efforts to achieve educational progress. It accounts for the cases involving mistreatment of students.[73] Furthermore, the multiple system of control often prevents schools administrators from doing a good job. This has caused the Yangtze Daily, the Communists' official newspaper in Central-South China, to comment that, "a schoolmaster is like a daughter-in-law with too many parents-in-law to serve, and she cannot please them all."[74]

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[73] Fang Shu, Yüan Yü [The Great Injustice], Hong Kong, Union Research Institute, 1952, in which a detailed account of the I-ch'ang Normal School is given.

[74] Quoted in The Slave Culture and Education of the Chinese Communists, pp. 25-30.

Despite Communist efforts to run the schools according to a centralized plan, the lack of a clear-cut policy leads to the "piracy of teachers and students." Government agencies in need of technical personnel often call away teachers or students from certain schools without notifying the school authorities. Although there is no recent information on this practice, the situation was serious enough in 1951 for the Government Administration Council in Peking ot issue an order banning such practices.[75] The Central-South China press has reported unreasonable demands made upon the time of teachers and students by the government decree that they take part in extracurricular activities. Each time the government decides to publicize a mass movement, teachers and students are required to help propagandize it. According to one report, 46 secondary schools in Kwangsi Province were asked to take part in a number of propaganda campaigns during the second half of 1950; each campaign lasted on an average of a month, during which time no classes were held.[76] Such a condition was so widespread that the Government Administration Council felt that it warranted the issuance of another decree to correct the tendency.[77]

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[75] People's Education, August 1951, p. 8.

[76] Report by a Kwangsi Communist paper, quoted in the Salve Culture and Education of the Chinese Communists, p. 28.

[77] People's Education, September 1951, pp. 57-58.

Until adequate officially-approved textbooks become available, the Communists have to resort to the translating of Russian works in order to meet temporary needs. Since such translated works have not yet been integrated, it is doubtful that they may help improve the educational system of Communist China.

The government's effort to place college graduates wherever they are needed is undoubtedly required by the Communist plan for economic reconstruction. But even if the graduates are thoroughly indoctrinated in Communism, there is still no reassurance that dissatisfaction will not brew among those who have been denied the choice of jobs.

In summary, it should be noted that although the Communists have launched a thorough reorganization of the Chinese educational system, their work is far from accomplished. The attitudes of so many people involved in the system of education cannot be quickly changed; hence the renewed effort on the part of the government to root out "bourgeois" and anti-Communist thought among teachers and students. The expediency of "accelerated schooling" apparently has had a detrimental effort upon the qualifications of the graduates. According to one report, of the 8,193 candidates who took the entrance examinations for high schools in the eight counties around Shao-yang in Hunan in the summer of 1952, some 98 per cent failed at least in one subject and about 13 per cent failed in as many as five subjects.[78] Although there is no informaton available on how the college graduates fared, it seems reasonable to assume that they could not have done any better.

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[78] Chu Po-ch'i, *op. cit.*, p. 256.

RELIGION

I. INTRODUCTION

Religious organization and activity in China has always been strictly limited by what the state felt to be desirable. Public and private morality were not based on religion but on a combination of philosophic principles (Confucianism) and secular mores. (On this principle, Confucianism is treated in the chapters on Social Values and Patterns of Living). Governmental authority judged whether a certain religion was conducive to morality and the welfare of the state and then allowed the religion and its adherents a carefully defined range and sphere of activity. Anything beyond that range was regarded as subversive of public welfare and morality, and the religion was curbed or suppressed. As a consequence China has not had, until very recently, any "churches," that is well-organized, centrally disciplined organizations of believers capable of decisively influencing public morality or state policy. 771

With the slow collapse of the traditional order the effectiveness of government control of religion diminished. The Western powers, as they gained more and more rights and concessions from a weakening China, demanded and got "rights" of religious and missionary activity which no strong Chinese government would ever have granted. But the rise of nationalist sentiment brought with it hatred of foreigners and of their religions -- hatred that exploded repeatedly in anti-foreign, anti-Christian riots.[1] 771

Meanwhile another trend was visible. Religious groups and a number of outstanding political leaders began to feel that China could not become truly modern and Western unless it was reformed from the moral base upward; religion accounted for the power and success of Western nations. Would not a religion --- a religionized Confucianism, a revitalized Buddhism, or even Christianity bring about that basic transformation that China clearly needed?

This view was rejected by two overlapping groups which had decisive power in state and society after 1925. The first were the intellectual leaders, increasingly committed to some form of materialistic philosophy -- a philosophy which held all religion to be parasitic, corrosive and "non-progressive."[2] The second group was the Kuomintang elite, many of whom derived their anti-religious views from the intellectual leadership. For others in the Kuomintang elite the older Confucian view of religions, reinforced by nationalist feeling, reasserted itself; consciously or unconsciously they reverted to the view that no strong self-respecting government should

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1. Tatsuro and Sumiko Yamamoto, "The Anti-Christian Movement in China," Far Eastern Quarterly, Feb. 1953, pp. 133-47.

2. O. Brière, "Les courants philosophiques en Chine depuis 50 ans," Bulletin de l'Université de l'Aurore, No. 40, 1947, pp. 561-654.

tolerate independent religious bodies that challenged 771
government control of all aspects of public and private life.

Religions in the twentieth century were caught in this crossfire of negative sentiment and attack. To modernize and to become militant was to provoke state suppression, and the effort of religious leaders to stem the rising tide of intellectual materialism failed.[3] In the countryside the old folk religions -- varieties of Buddhism and Taoism -- continued to wither away. Christianity made some advances, but it was always tainted by its foreignness, by the fact that its missionaries came with the backing of the Western powers which held China in thrall.

Communist policy towards religion is in many 798
ways the culmination of the trends we have described. It reflects the triumph of materialist philosophy and the imposition of materialism as *the* intellectual orthodoxy: It is highly nationalistic and anti-foreign and thus insists that all religious organizations cease receiving support from abroad and assert their distinctive Chinese character. It carries forward, through the most effective apparatus of control and coercion that China has seen, the confiscation of church property and the secularization of the clergy. The Communist Constitution provides that "Citizens of the People's Republic of China have freedom of religious belief."[4] This means, in practice, that

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[3] O. Brière, *op. cit.*, *passim.*

[4] Article 88, Ch. III.

people of various religious persuasions are allowed 798 a limited and shrinking area of belief and action by an authoritarian government, which reserves the fundamental right to control all education, communication, and public and private morality. On the grounds of anti-superstition, anti-imperialism, and anti-feudalism, the government and Party move steadily, with only occasional tactical retreats, towards the liquidation of religion in China.

Both pre-Communist trends and Communist policies should be kept in mind as we consider religion in the Central-South Region.

II. BUDDHISM

This oldest of imported religions shows, in its 779 recent development, some of the trends just noted. 798 Despite the efforts of the noted abbot T'ai-hsü (1889-1946), Buddhism never competed successfully for the allegiance of the intellectuals. The effort to transform it into a modern religion, by updating both its theology and its social program, failed, although for a time it seemed to show signs of an increasing vitality. Under warlord and nationalist governments its personnel and establishments suffered severe attrition. Its establishments were taxed, its temples were converted to secular use by warlords, Kuomintang officials, and the local gentry. Much Buddhist property was confiscated, and tenants on Buddhist land refused to pay their rent. Monks and nuns were driven from their temples in cities where up to 80

per cent of Buddhist establishments were secularized.[5] 779
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The Japanese attempt to use Buddhism as an ideology to bind together their puppet regimes in China and Southeast Asia probably generated widespread anti-Buddhism sentiment throughout Free and Occupied China.

The older clergy of monks and nuns was accused 779 of being corrupt and parasitic by modern Buddhists, but efforts at sweeping fundamental reform failed; the motivation for becoming a member of such a clergy remained largely negative.[6] Thus gradual

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5. Cf. Wing-tsit Chan, *Religious Trends in Modern China*, New York, 1953, pp. 55-56. This summary is from Ta-hsing, "Fifteen Years of Religious Catastrophes in Retrospect," *Hai-ch'ao-yin* [*The Sound of the Sea Tide*], a magazine, Vol. XVI, No. 1, Jan. 1935.

6. Chan, *Religious Trends*, pp. 81-82, citing Reichelt, *Truth and Tradition in Chinese Buddhism*, pp. 231-34, lists reasons given by Chinese nuns for entering holy orders. Unhappy marriages account for a great number, and 60 to 70 per cent made the choice because no other solution presented itself. Other reasons for entering holy orders include: genuine and deep faith; presented to the church by parents because of devotion, sickness, lack of support, or an astrologer's advice; sense of helplessness after husband's death; poverty, family troubles or other disappointments; influence of sisters, *et al*, who had become nuns; and servants seeking escape from the cruelty of their mistresses.

extinction of the Buddhist order seemed only a matter of time. But as late as 1930, the Buddhist clergy in the Central-South Region were numerous.[7]

Province	Buddhist Clergy	Temples, Monasteries, and Nunneries
Honan	2,960	1,350
Hupeh	76,040	17,260
Hunan	62,400	3,540
Kiangsi	2,640	1,150
Kwangtung	19,120	12,900
Kwangsi	460	290

It is not possible to trace the decline from 1936 onward, but the pressures of war and invasion added to those noted above probably contributed to a sharp reduction of both clergy and establishments in this area. Communist measures have probably eliminated most of what remained. Buddhist establishments in China as a whole appear to have declined in number from 268,494 in 1930[8] to about 130,000 in 1947[9] to "less than 100" in 1954.[10] Estimates on the

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[7] Shen-pao Nien-chien [Shen-pao Yearbook] 1933, p. T2.

[8] Ibid.; basis of figures is data collected by the China Buddhist Association.

[9] Communist Atrocities and Persecutions of Buddhism on the China Mainland, [a four-page pamphlet], Buddhist Association of China, Taiwan, 1954, hereinafter cited as Atrocities.

[10] Ibid.

Estimates on the 779
total number[11] of clergy vary, but in 1931 they 793
appear to have numbered 500,000 - 600,000. Refugees reported that four out of every seven clerics had been forced to return to lay life.[12] By 1954 it was estimated that there were only 2,500 clergy remaining in the whole of China, "of which half are Chinese Communist Party agents."[13] Even allowing for exaggeration, it would appear that the Buddhist clergy as a group has been nearly eliminated and that its dwindling influence in society has reached the vanishing point.

While the traditional clergy was in decline, 779
Buddhist laymen assisted by a few monks attempted 794
the reinvigoration of the Chinese Buddhist community. Modern-minded Buddhists felt that a lesson could be learned from Protestantism in the West: than an entrenched clergy could not be the instrument of sweeping reform. Hence their efforts were concentrated on building lay organizations of various kinds: social welfare organizations such as the Red Swastika Society (modeled on the Red Cross), YMBA and YWBA patterned on the YMCA and YWCA, Buddhist schools and seminaries to train a modern clergy, and research centers for the re-evaluation of the Buddhist heritage. They attempted to reach out and join hands with Buddhists in other Asiatic countries, and good-will tours and conferences were

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[11] Chan, op. cit., pp. 80-81.

[12] Chan, op. cit., pp. 90-91.

[13] Atrocities.

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organized. Buddhist writing and publishing were encouraged.[14]

The Chinese Buddhist Association, founded in 1914 to oppose the effort to make Confucianism a state religion, continued as the main organization of Chinese Buddhists. It claimed 4,620,000 members in 1947, but its organization was loose and weak; it included heterogeneous components: Buddhist philosophers, simple believers, reformist clergy and many of the old clergy, nationalists, internationalists, and Japan-oriented pan-Asians. The great abbot T'ai-hsü, master monk-politician, tried to weld these elements into a strong, effective, and enduring organization which could formulate an attractive long range program and defend Buddhism against attack. But he ultimately failed, and the Buddhists of China had not the means to defend themselves against Kuomintang pressure; when the Communist came, the Buddhists had a stronger adversary and neither the means nor the spirit to resist. Some residue of the modern Buddhist movement may be found in the Central-South Region, and the statistics of 1930 may suggest where the movement is strongest. The following is a breakdown, by provinces, of the number of Buddhist believers then claimed by the China Buddhist Association. The second column gives the number of modern type Buddhist organizations such as schools, translation and publication societies, missionary societies, etc.[15]

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[14] Chan, op. cit., pp. 1-62, points out that 537 Buddhist works and 58 Buddhist periodicals were published in the years 1920-35 in all parts of China. Most of the periodicals were short-lived.

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Province	Lay Adherents	Modern Organizations
Honan	4, 070	3
Hupeh	286, 900	17
Hunan	64, 100	15
Kiangsi	26, 700	10
Kwangtung	154, 550	28
Kwangsi	2, 730	17

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Such Buddhist schools and institutes as had survived have been taken over by the Communists. Buddhist periodicals have been stopped, publishing houses closed. Two Communist-sponsored Buddhist magazines have appeared, one in Peking, one in Shanghai;they are devoted to reconciling Buddhism and Marxism.[16] A new Chinese Buddhist Association was formed in Peking in November 1952, with several leading Buddhist scholars among its leaders. Unlike the earlier Buddhist Association, which was organized by Buddhists to reform and defend their faith, the new body is sponsored, organized, and manipulated by the state and Party. In May 1951, a Party central committeeman outlined the chief tasks for Chinese Buddhists: (1) participation in land reform, (2) opposition to counterrevolutionaries, (3) participation in the Resist-America-Aid-Korea Movement, and (4) recognition of the duty to construct a new religion in the new society.[17] The new association, like all others in Communist China, will be primarily used for the indoctrination and control of its members.

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[15] Shen-pao Nien-chien [The Shen-pao Yearbook] 1933, p. T2.

[16] Atrocities. According to this report the circulation of Communist-sponsored Buddhist magazines is very limited.

In the principal cities a few temples are maintained; a biased account says that the number of Peking temples in religious use has fallen from 1,300 to 3, that in Nanking the number has decreased from 400 to 1.[18] There are occasional reports of Buddhist ceremonies, such as the celebration of the Buddha's birth day.[19] We have no detailed reports from the Central-South Region, but it is reasonable to assume that Buddhism is being steadily and systematically eliminated from the life of the area. Buddhist belief is a handicap to youth who must adopt Marxist orthodoxy in order to succeed in life. The old may cling to their beliefs, but their influence on their children is now slight. The cadres in the countryside are attacking "superstition," and their ridicule of old Buddhist-linked observances is

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[17] Richard L. Walker, China Under Communism, pp. 188-9.

[18] Atrocities

[19] New China News Agency, Peking, May 29, 1955; Survey of China Mainland Press, No. 1058, p. 48.

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probably further undermining the faith. The clergy, never up to their task of serving a modern type religious community, has been largely secularized. There is little in Buddhist doctrine to steel the believer to resist authority or the trend of the times. The willingness of some Buddhist leaders to openly embrace Communist doctrine has probably undermined what little will to resist there may have been.[20]

III. TAOISM

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Some of the tendencies noted in the modern history of Chinese Buddhism are also to be found in Taoism. But the differences are many, and they spring from fundamental differences between the two religions.

It is convenient for our purpose to consider two levels of Taoism. One is Taoism as an organize

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[20] The outstanding example is Chü-tsan -- a modern-minded reformist monk with an excellent background in philosophy, religion, and social work -- the latter particularly in Hunan. He was one of two Buddhist delegates (out of 585) to the People's Political Consultative Conference. Chan, *op. cit.*, p. 92, records Chü-tsan's willingness as of 1948 to support a Communist regime. Cf. also, Chü-tsan's article, "A Buddhist Monk's Life," in *China Reconstructs*, Jan.-Feb. 1954, pp. 42-44.

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religion; the other is Taoism as a folk religion at the village level.[21] The Taoist religion developed as a reaction to the challenge of the imported faith of Buddhism. It borrowed extensively from its alien rival; its scriptures, its clerical hierarchy and organization, its rituals, its heavens and hells were often scarcely disguised copies of those of Buddhism. Its decline over the last five-hundred years has been slow but steady; in recent years its decline has accelerated. Some aspects of this decline should be noted. Intellectual vitality has long since disappeared, and there was little on which to base a modern revival of the religion. The priesthood, divided between northern and southern sects, was largely locally recruited; there was no central control exercised by the hereditary "Heavenly Teachers" (T'ien-shih) of the two sects, and the monks gained the reputation of being idle and corrupt. If their way of life was hardly inspiring, their practical function no longer involved spiritual leadership but only astrological and magical performances for those of the population who might still believe in them.[22] The last "Heavenly Master" of the Southern School was driven from his headquarters in Kiangsi by the Communists in 1927; in 1949 he was again a refugee in Macao and had "decided that it was time for him to buy some books to read."[23] The last abbot of the headquarters of the Northern School, the Po-yun-kuan at Peking, was burned alive by his fellow monks in 1947 when his corruption became too flagrant; the Nationalist government then confiscated the lands which had long supported the Po-yun-kuan.

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[21] The residue of philosophic Taoism is dealt with in the chapter on Basic Attitudes.

[22] Chan, op. cit., pp. 146-52.

Religious Taoism has not had the inspiration or the leadership to develop modern doctrines and programs as Buddhism and Islam have done. There was an abortive effort at a national Taoist association in the years 1912-1915,[24] but this was not accompanied by any rallying of believers, nor was it followed by the development of any social, educational, or medical program. Taoist temples have been steadily secularized, and it is doubtful if the Communists will leave this process incomplete. The Communists themselves recognize that "Religious Taoism" is dead. In 1949, when bidding for the support of religious groups, they invited representatives of Buddhism, Protestantism, and Islam to the People's Political Consultative Conference but no representative of Taoism.[25]

Folk Taoism in the present study includes all of the local cults and practices that have, for millenia, been characteristic of the villages of China. Organized Taoism in many respects simply magnified

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[23] *Ibid.*, p. 152.

[24] *Shina mondai jiten* [*Encyclopedia of China Problems*], Tokyo, 1942, pp. 416-17.

[25] Chan, *op. cit.*, p. 146.

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and encompassed a wide variety of folk cults, giving this amalgam some of the trappings of an organized "religion." Folk Taoism, like organized Taoism, has been in a long slow decline. The gods of its pantheon have been increasingly neglected; the shrines and temples in the towns and villages have fallen into neglect. The arrival of modern school teachers, the appearance, even occasional, of effective modern doctors have steadily undermined belief in the efficacy of magic, alchemy, and charms. The City God, tutelary deity of an urban center, is no longer enshrined and worshipped; in many villages the god of grain no longer has his altar.[26] One sample survey showed that in the early 1930's, 58 per cent of the folk shrines were no longer being used for their original purpose;[27] the decline in the last twenty-five years has been accelerated.

In the case of folk Taoism, the Communists have moved to bring to an end a complex of ancient practices that had long been dying out. Their method has been a campaign against superstition, a campaign carried out with all of the many devices of propaganda and pressure which are described elsewhere in this handbook. It may be sufficient here to point out a few typical methods of attack on folk religion. In a rhymed indoctrination text for women we find exhortations to stay away from local witch doctors and, when ill, to consult a physician. And women are warned not to believe in prayer to the images of some divinity, "for these are only of mud and lacquer."[28] At all levels of education and in the annual cycles of "campaigns," such as the Patriotic Hygiene Movement, and the Resist-America-Aid-Korea Movement, reference is made to the false and debilitating character of the old beliefs, which are held to be "feudal," "unscientific," "reactionary," etc. It is doubtful that the remnants of folk religion -- in recent years the resort only of the aged and the ignorant -- will long survive the campaigns being waged against them. 779

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[26] Cf. Chan, op. cit., p. 145.

[27] C. S. Braden, Modern Tendencies in World Religions, New York, 1933, p. 113, as cited in Chan, op. cit., p. 145.

Another Taoist-linked institution is the secret society, which has played a major role in modern Chinese politics. Most secret societies draw their rituals, liturgies, and patron deities from religious and folk Taoism, but their purpose is not in most cases primarily religious; rather, as is noted in the chapter on customs and characteristic ways of life, they provide various kinds of insurance in times of chaos, and their tightly knit memberships in recent times have often influenced both local and national politics. The Communists have been conducting an all-out drive for the liquidation of secret societies. At the end of a major drive in 1953, P'eng Chen reported that "four million duped members had withdrawn from these reactionary sects and societies and that the battle was essentially won."[29] That 575

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[28] Fu-nü San-Tzu Ching [Three-Character Classic For Women], Shanghai, Hsin-hua, 1950, passim.

[29] NCNA dispatch of Sept. 18, 1953, quoted in Walker, China Under Communism, p. 189.

P'eng Chen's claims of victory were premature is suggested by a recent report of the breaking up of five secret society organizations in the vicinity of Kalgan. The report credited the societies with elaborate clandestine organizations, hidden headquarters, an elaborate hierarchy of leadership, and the ability to infiltrate Communist organizations.[30] (The societies' power of resistance are dealt with in the chapter on Subversive Potentialities.)

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Secret societies have been particularly numerous in North China, but those which have had some following in parts of the Central-South Region might be mentioned here:

1. Hung-chiang hui, the Society of Redspears, an offshoot of Pai-lien chiao, the White Lotus Society. Once powerful in the north, since 1924 it has been active in Hupeh, Hunan, and Kiangsi.[31]

2. Tsai-li hui, Principle Abiding Society. Its strength was in the north, mainly in the cities, but it also had followers in Honan. Social composition: mostly artisans and laborers, some farmers and merchants, a few intellectuals.[32]

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[30] NCNA, June 16, 1955. SCMP, 1078, June 28, 1955, pp. 27-28.

[31] Chan, op. cit., pp. 258-9; Encyclopedia of Chinese Problems, p. 480.

[32] Chan, op. cit., pp. 156-57.

3. *San-tien*, *San-ho*, *T'ien-ti* or *T'ien-li*, the Triad Society. It originated in Fukien and spread to Kwangtung and Kwangsi. Strong among overseas Chinese.[33] Known in the United States as *Chih-kung Tong*. 575

4. *Ko-lao-hui*, the Society of the Elders, also an offshoot of the White Lotus Society, is somewhat more religious than the others; the "most extensive, well organized, and influential of China's secret societies."[34] Centers of strength were Central, North, and West China.

IV. MOHAMMEDANISM

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This religion was introduced into China by immigrants arriving overland from the west and northwest and by sea to Canton; they have since spread until there are some in every province, although the highest concentration is in the northwest and southwest. Since their ancestors were immigrants, the Mohammedans have been treated by Chinese governments as *both* an ethnic minority and a religious group. (Hence, cf. the chapter on Ethnic Minorities.). Adherents have tended to live in separate communities, their mores and customs governed by religious law rather than by the laws and customs of China. Not only did Islam prescribe

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[33] Chan, *op. cit.*, pp. 259-60.

[34] *Ibid.*, pp. 160-61.

for the believer a different way of life from that of 779
the Chinese, it also had international connections
and a tradition of militancy. These aspects of
Mohammedanism made their communities in China
the object of government distrust, and governments
in modern times have alternated between policies of
suppression and of appeasement.

The Chinese Mohammedan is set apart from 779
other Chinese by such special customs and obser- 563
vances as these: many greetings are exchanged in
Arabic or Persian; believers wear white head- 463
dresses resembling turbans; they abstain from alcohol and pork; marriage and funeral rites are unlike those of the Chinese, e.g. they do not use coffins in burial. Traditionally, they seldom engage in farming but rather in certain occupations which in some areas they virtually monopolize: keeping inns and organizing caravans, butchering, leather working, metal work, or managing shops which deal in curios and jewelry. Because of oppression and a strong sense of religious community, they tend to live in special districts or streets. They have been more inclined towards athletics and military careers than the Chinese.[35]

The Moslem sector of a city or the Moslem 621
village community centers on its mosque presided 793
over by its Imam, usually elected from among 779

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[35] Chan, op. cit., p. 6; Encyclopedia of China Problems, pp. 421-22.

senior leaders; the Imam and the elders invite an 621
Ahung who preaches, settles disputes, interprets 793
Islamic law, and presides at ceremonies.[36] The 779
Ahung was usually versed in Arabic, although until very recently few had any direct contact with major centers of Islam in the Near East.

In the Central-South Region, Mohammedan 779
communities are found in all provinces. But the major centers, now recognized by the Communists as "Autonomous Areas," lie in the northwest and in Central Asia. The following table[37] of believers and religious establishments (probably mosques) give some indication of their distribution throughout the region, as of 1938. However the source of these figures gives the total number of Moslems in China as more than 48,000,000, a figure that some scholars think is far too high.[38]

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[36] Chan, op. cit., p. 189; Encyclopedia of China Problems, pp. 421-22.

[37] Chung-kuo Nien Chien [Chinese Yearbook], 1948, pp. 126-27.

[38] Cf. the admirable summary of the statistical argument in Chan, op. cit., pp. 187-88. Chan, p. 188, note 12, cites the leading Chinese Mohammadan scholar Pai Shou-i's estimate of between 30 and 40 million Moslems in China. The picture publication Chinese Moslems, Peking, the Foreign Languages Press, 1955, gives the figure 10 million.

Province	Mosques	Adherents
Honan	2,703	3,094,800
Hupeh	1,134	1,587,080
Hunan	932	1,302,900
Kiangsi	205	286,590
Kwangtung	201	558,450
Kwangsi	429	280,180

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Islam in modern times has manifested some of the tendencies which Buddhism showed under the impact of various modernizing forces. One of these was the tendency for lay leaders to rise in influence over the Ahung. Another was the foundation of a Chinese Islamic Association in 1912 to represent the interests of all Chinese Moslems, to work for social reform, and to foster closer relations between Moslems and non-Moslems. It claimed 3,000 branches by 1923. Its successors participated in the resistance against Japan, sponsored students abroad and the importation of modern scholars of the Koran from other countries, and developed young men's associations and medical services.[39] The total effect of this activity was to foster a trend to liberality and modernity. It served also to identify the Chinese Moslems with the national aspirations of other Chinese.

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As the Chinese Moslems came out of isolation and into contact with the rest of Islam and with modern culture generally, there was a considerable difference of view as to the perpetuation of Islam in China. Visits to Mecca in the 1780's had impressed some Chinese Moslems with how far, in their long isolation, they had diverged from orthodox practices. This experience led to the foundation of the New Sect, which stressed return to pure and orthodox Islamic practices. They were resisted by the Old Sect, which favored holding to the customary ways developed in China through the centuries. A new New Sect (Tsan-hsin chiao) was founded by Ma Fu-ch'u (1794-1874), and this sect, emphasizing religious ethics, the spirit rather than the letter of scripture, and modernism in dress, has recently been strong along the coast of China and has spread to modern cultural centers.[40] 779 795

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[39] Cf. Chan, op. cit., pp. 190-91.

Chinese Mohammedans in the course of the modernist movement, accepted the Chinese translation of the Koran, hitherto only in the sacred language of Arabic, and opened schools which taught general as well as religious subjects. And they began, like modernists of other faiths to emphasize the compatability between the Koran and modern science.[41] They published modern periodicals, of which there were nine in 1947; circulation, however, was small. In 1936 the first Chinese Moslem to be so honored received a degree from El Azhar University, the great center of Islamic learning in Cairo. By 1950 the Chinese Islamic Association 779 797 had set up or co-ordinated two-hundred primary schools and twenty high schools; the Islamic Theological College at the Chungking mosque was opened in 1945. All of these institutions, however, were handicapped by the poverty of the Chinese Moslem community and by suspicion of Chinese learning born of religious conservatism.[42] 779 797

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[40] Chan, op. cit., pp. 192-94.
[41] Chan, op. cit., p. 198.

What have been Chinese Communist policies towards the problem of Chinese Islam, a problem that involves some areas where they are a major segment of the population and other areas -- such as the Central-South Region -- where they represent a cohesive, slowly modernizing religious community? (The policies adopted towards major centers of Moslem population, are dealt with in the chapter on Ethnic Minorities.) Communist religious policies toward Mohammedanism have something in common with Communist policies toward other religions. The standard pattern of organization has been established by the Peking government: an All-China Islamic Association which, it should be emphasized, differs from former organizations in being an instrument of control over Chinese Mohammedans operated by a hierarchy ideologically acceptable to the Communists. A Peking propaganda booklet issued in 1955 states that, "The work of education is really tackled seriously now, and the number of primary 779 668 and secondary school pupils is now double the figure before liberation."[43] This may sound like "progress," but what it undoubtedly means is that the children of Chinese Moslems are increasingly being given the prescribed Communist education.

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[42] Chan, op. cit., pp. 198-205.

The cadre is the basic instrument for the Communization of Chinese Islam. Offering the education and prestige inducements of Party work has apparently successfully recruited cadres from among young Chinese Moslems. "In the government organs there have been many Moslem cadres. Some of them have taken up the leadership jobs. In the areas where the Moslems have been comparatively concentrated, the government has paid attention to foster the basic-level Moslem cadres."[44]

The policy of Communization is well reflected in a speech by Ma Sung-t'ing, Vice Chairman of the Chinese Moslem Cultural Association, on the occasion of the "Second Enlarged Conference" in June 1955. This conference, he said,

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[43] Chinese Moslems. A NCNA dispatch dated June 9, 1955, states that Moslem students in Shanghai have increased from 290 in 1949 to 3,000. Government subsidies (and control) might account for this. SCMP, 1068, June 14, 1955, p. 35.

[44] SCMP, 1068, June 14, 1955, p. 35.

> "...will study how to help the government to carry out the ideological education in patriotism, national unity, and Socialist transformation among the Moslems, so as to further strengthen and consolidate national unity and continue to develop and raise the Moslem political, economic, and cultural levels in jointly carrying out the construction of the fatherland."[45]

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The Chinese Communists' policy toward the Moslems has been affected by two factors which do not influence their policies towards other religions: (1) the Russian pattern of handling integrated minority groups through various types of "culturally autonomous" organizations; (2) Chinese ambitions in Islamic areas of Asia, which foster tactical tolerance towards the Islamic minority in China. Thus the glamorized picture publication Chinese Moslems has texts in English, Chinese, Arabic, and Indonesian, and its introduction ends with the greeting "Salaam to all peace-loving Moslems."[46] There are reports of special food arrangements for Mohammedan communities, especially in Ramadan. Selections from the works

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[45] NCNA dispatch, SCMP, 1067, June 11-13, 1955, p. 24.

[46] Chinese Moslems.

of Mao Tse-tung have been translated into Arabic 779
for the indoctrination of the Ahungs who do not know 668
Chinese; one suspects that these translations will also find their way overseas to Indonesia and other countries where Arabic is a sacred lingua-franca. Mosques in "show" cities have been renovated and serve to demonstrate to visitors the "reality" of Communist China's promise of religious freedom.

We have little information on the fate of Islamic establishments and clergy and adherents in the Central-South Region. Without the relative safety in numbers offered by the large communities in the Southwest and Northwest, and without the need -- save perhaps in Canton -- to make a good impression on visitors, the process of Communization, secularization, and integration are probably advancing rapidly in Central-South China. The Chinese Moslems have shown more cohesive and more steadfast resistance to government pressures than any other religious group; their resistance to assimiliation in Russia has been, in some areas, striking. The great question is whether the Moslem cadre, backed by the full force and apparatus of the Communist government, with appeals to nationalism and anti-imperialism in his sausive arsenal, will have more success than the policies of previous governments. Our guess is that he will.

V. CATHOLICISM

The older of the two Christian faiths in China 779
has had 350 years of missionary and organizational 797

experience. It is, in China as elsewhere, resourceful, flexible, and highly disciplined. In modern China, Catholicism has repeatedly come under nationalistic attack because of its foreign support and its allegiance to Rome. The church has countered these attacks in a variety of ways: it has encouraged the Sinicization of Church symbols, e.g., the Virgin is portrayed as a Chinese woman in Chinese dress; it has given its foreign missionaries a more thorough grounding in Chinese language and culture, so that the best of them, wearing Chinese scholars' gowns as habits and speaking excellent Chinese, can make their way successfully in any stratum of Chinese society. The most striking response to nationalistic attacks has been the increasing use of Chinese priests throughout the hierarchy. This is part of worldwide policies in an age of rising nationalism. The following figures indicate the dimensions of the change since 1900:[47]

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Catholicism in China

	Chinese Catholics	Foreign Priests	Native Priests
1900	700,000	1,375	471
1948	3,275,000	3,015	2,676

This process of replacing foreign clergy with Chinese clergy has made greatest progress in the older Catholic areas, particularly in North China. There are 144 dioceses or apostolic prefectures, and 29 of these, in the major cultural and commercial centers, are administered by Chinese prelates.[48] The elevation of a Chinese priest to the College of Cardinals in 1946 was a striking symbol of the Church's intention to advance the process of Sinicization.

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[47] Jean Monsterleet, S. J., Les Martyrs de Chine parlent: L'Empire du Mao Tse-toung contre l'Eglise du Christ, Paris, 1953, p. 32; hereinafter cited as Monsterleet.

Catholic cultural and educational activities have played an important role in the advance of the Church. Schools, colleges, and universities have, on the one hand, made it possible for the youth of Chinese Catholic families to have a complete modern education under Church auspices and control; on the other, the colleges and universities have given the clergy a chance to win over non-Catholic youth enrolled as students. Catholic scientific and cultural research, such as that carried on at the famous ZiKawei Observatory near Shanghai, make it clear that the Church and modern science are not in direct opposition to one another.

The situation in 1945-46 was encouraging to Chinese and foreign Catholics. The clergy was being rapidly Sinicized, charitable work was going forward, Catholic educational institutions were full. Native and foreign clergy had gained approval for their work in the war of resistance against Japan. At the same time there were developments which, especially in the light of later events, promised

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48. Ibid.

trouble to the Church. The exchange of envoys 779
between the Vatican and the Nationalist government 797
took place in 1946; Bishop Paul Yü-pin was widely believed to have strong influence with Generalissimo Chiang; these and other signs of identification of the Catholic Church with the Nationalist Government boded ill for the Church when the government declined in power. As the Communist power in- 798
creased, the persecution of the Church, begun in Communist areas in 1937, was a grim warning of what might be in store for Chinese Catholicism as a whole.[49] Catholic Action, the association of enthusiastic laymen for the advancement of the Faith, had been growing in all parts of the country from 1928 onward; there were two-hundred groups and thirty youth groups as early as 1930.[50] In 1948 the Papal Nuncio ordered the formation of the Legion of Mary, a more militant, zealous, and disciplined organization of Catholic laymen, which in many areas absorbed the Catholic Action groups. The new organization was set up by an American priest, and it had the Chinese name of Sheng-mu chün (Army, or Legion, of Mary). Many experienced Catholic missionaries were doubtful if any strong Chinese government would tolerate this type of militant organization. The group has proved of major propaganda value to the Communists and an object

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49. Cf. Raymonde de Jaegher and I. Corbally Kuhn, Tempete sur la Chine, Paris, 1953.

50. Monsterleet, p. 148.

of their most ruthless measures of oppression.[51] 798

Communist policies and propaganda have made the most of all the vulnerabilities of the Chinese Catholic Church. Its foreign "imperialist" and Kuomintang connections were played up, and nationalistic feelings against it were aroused. Its role as property owner -- "foreign capitalist-imperialist oppression" -- was dramatized during the land reform period, and local ignorance and hatred turned against it.[52] Old and long-discredited accusations were made against Catholic charitable organizations: the Sacred Heart Home for Children in Nanking was labeled a "little Buchenwald" and the sisters were accused of torturing, neglecting, and selling Chinese children.[53] The war in Korea provided the occasion for an increasing number of accusations of espionage against Catholic clergy.

Communist government measures have been many, but the main steps resemble those taken

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51. Cf. Hsü, Hsin Chung-kuo ti tsung-chiao ko-hsin yün-tung, [The Movement for Religious Reformation in New China], Shanghai, 1951, pp. 9-13.

52. Cf. the dramatic eyewitness account of F. Legrand, Le Communisme arrive au village Chinois, Peking, 1947. This observation was made before the nation-wide land reform campaign.

53. Cf. Walker, China Under Communism, p. 190. Such accusations recall the stories circulated by the gentry which touched off the Tientsin massacre of Chinese Catholics and foreigners in 1870.

against other religious groups. The 1950 campaign for "triple independence" or "triple autonomy" involved freedom from foreign administration, financing, and evangelistic policy control. This was given emotional significance by the warfare in Korea, with the Communists' well-managed propaganda campaigns against imperialism and espionage.[54]

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In 1951 the campaign against the Church was accelerated. All Catholic schools and universities and many hospitals and churches were confiscated. Priests were "tried" and imprisoned, and the Papal Nuncio was expelled from China.[55]

The next step in the campaign against Catholicism resembled the policy followed in Russia and in the East European satellites. This was the foundation by the Communists of a "national church" whose guiding spirits were a small minority of disaffected clergy and laymen. This group was constituted as the "Committee of the Reform Church." It was not subject to episcopal or pontifical directives. The group was to decide what was to be taught, who could say mass or give the sacraments; and it advocated "progressive," i.e. orthodox Communist teaching. Under its sponsorship certain "model parishes" were set up with "progressive" priests in charge. Apparently this organization has had only limited success. Monsterleet estimates that only 2 per cent of the native clergy went over to the

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[54] Monsterleet, pp. 25-29.

[55] Ibid., p. 28.

"reform church" in 1953. More than 20 per cent 798
openly proclaimed their faith and/or died as martyrs.[56]

Since October 1952, there has been less persecution of Catholics, although between January 1951 and November 1953 the number of missionaries[57] was reduced through expulsion from 3,222 to 364. In December 1955 it was reported by British subjects leaving Shanghai that regular Catholic services were being held and were well attended.[58]

The Central-South Region has fewer and less 797
important centers of Catholicism than North China.[59]
The distribution of these centers in this region in
1946 was as follows:

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[56] Monsterleet, p. 29. It should be emphasized that these figures are given by a Catholic author.

[57] Mission Bulletin, April 1952, p. 323, and January 1954, p. 56; cited in Walker, op. cit., p. 189.

[58] New York Times, Dec. 18, 1955.

[59] Monsterleet, pp. 16-17.

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Province	Metropolitan Bishopric	Suffragan Bishopric
Honan	Kaifeng	Chengchow Loyang Nanyang Chumatien Sinyangchow
Hupeh	Hankow	Lachowkow Wuchang Hanyang Kichow
Hunan	Changsha	Changte Hengyang Yuanling
Kiangsi	Nanchang	Nancheng Kian Kanchow Yukieng
Kwangtung	Canton	Kongmoon Kaying Chiuchow Swatow Pakhoi
Kwangsi	Nanning	Wuchow Anlung

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We are fortunate in having reports on Kwangsi Province which give full details of the tactics of the Communists at the local level.[60] In Nanning, a provincial capital of 180,000, there was a Catholic community of four-hundred. The bishop was a foreigner, and the community had a seminary with five Chinese priest-professorsand twenty students, a convent with forty nuns or novices, a Catholic school with one hundred students, and a much-frequented dispensary. The Communists turned against this small community all their battery of weapons. In September 1950, the papers began talking of the "reform" of the "Protestant patriots" who had broken with imperialism. Pressure on the Catholics mounted to follow this example. Towards the end of the year "registration" of mission property and investigations were carried out. At the New Year, two cadres whose mission was to promote the "reform" movement urged leading Catholics to join the movement in order to show their patriotism. Threats accompanied the persuasion. The Catholics, warned that the "reform" movement was against the laws of the Church, stood firm.

Early in 1951, the Protestants of Nanning signed a manifesto of "reform," and pressure increased for the Catholics to do the same. The Chinese pastor of a district near Nanning, who had refused to head a "reformed" church of Nanning, was accused of being an agent of the imperialists and sentenced to ten years' hard-labor. Certain Catholic intellectuals sought to make a patriotic statement without associating themselves with the "reform" movement. When told that they must show their patriotism by joining the movement and denouncing the Pope as the leading imperialist, they refused. Then, characteristically, the Communists attacked vulnerable Catholic individuals, particularly a certain Mr. Ma who had worked with Americans in UNRRA. He might have succumbed to Communist persuasion if the local bishop, Monsignor Albany, had not warned him that excommunication would follow; instead he escaped from the city. In the next several months, the local Catholics defied public accusations. Arrests, torture, and execution of Chinese clergy added to the tension. In September 1952, the bishop was subjected to public trial and sentenced to expulsion from China. In spite of Communist attack, the Catholics of Nanning lost very few members to the "reform movement," and it seemed as if they had won a temporary victory.[61] Yet the Communist apparatus of education and propaganda continued its relentless work, and the Communist ideology seemed to appeal to young people. Father Greene, who witnessed the persecution in Kwangsi, sounds a sombre note of warning in his book, Calvary in China.[62] He is speaking of the cadres:

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[60] Monsterleet, pp. 86-95; Robert W. Greene, Calvary in China, New York, 1953, passim.

> "It was impossible for me, as I watched these well-trained youths perform their

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[61] Summarized from Monsterleet, pp. 86-95.

[62] Greene, op. cit., pp. 76-77.

> inhuman tasks, to minimize the seriousness of their convictions and the thoroughness of their methods. These convictions were deeply impressed on their minds.... The new ideas and strange throughts are unconditionally accepted by the young, and accepted with a fanaticism which fears neither suffering, hardship nor death. I saw shy youths changed into courageous apostles; I saw the ambitious and selfish give up their goals and possessions; I saw some of my Christian youths break the bonds of family and friendship for this Cause." 798

The basic question is whether the harassed and persecuted Church can find the means to give its own youth these qualities. If it can not, its future throughout China is dark indeed.

VI. PROTESTANTISM

In many respects the Protestant missionaries and their converts set the pattern for the modernizing movements which took place in Buddhism and Islam. Protestant religious work in the twentieth century came to be accompanied by widespread, diverse, and large-scale social service, medical, and educational activities. The Protestant missionaries helped to awaken the social conscience of the Chinese, and the missions were major centers for the dissemination of general knowledge about the West. Sun Yat-sen was a devout Christian, and Christian thought left its mark on much of his work. As 797

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pioneers in medical education, in many fields of technical education, in women's education, and in many other spheres, the Protestants made striking contributions to the dissolution of the traditional order in China. But it was beyond their powers to replace that order with a Christian democratic society. Adn they failed also to forge an effective instrument to work for that end: a disciplined, independent, vigorous body of Chinese Protestants.

Protestant missions began in the ports of the China coast that were gradually opened up after China's successive defeats by the Western powers. The rights of residence, travel, and property ownership for both Catholic and Protestant churches were exacted in the successive treaties which China was forced to sign. This background of, as it were, forced-entry into China has handicapped Christianity in China in two important respects: as the tide of nationalistic sentiment rose, anti-Christian movements invariably accompanied anti-foreign and nationalistic manifestations. Secondly, the decades of foreign protection and foreign support prevented the Christian churches -- the Protestant perhaps more than the Catholic from developing their own means of self-support and their own mechanisms of survival in times of political upheaval.

Protestantism has suffered from its own sectarianism. A rational division of Christian effort was usually impossible when Baptists, Methodists, Episcopalians and innumerable small sects were at odds with one another and brought diverse and conflicting interpretations of Christianity to the Chinese.[63] Naturally the antagonism between Catholic and Protestant mission workers -- their tendency to depreciate one another when dealing with the Chinese -- further weakened the whole effort. Martin Yang describes the antagonisms that developed in the Shantung countryside between Catholic and Protestant Chinese; this added to the tension that already existed between the mass of the villagers and the converts to both forms of Christianity.[64] Yang, himself a Christian, has this to say of the motivations of conversion in the village he studied: "The first converts were members of the Ch'en and Yang families and included a Ch'en scholar and his second brother. They were all ambitious men, and their primary purpose in conversion was to get positions as country preachers, and then to establish a church-subsidized village school, to use foreign influence through the church

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[63] There were 66 different Protestant missionary societies in China in 1906. By 1919 there were 130 different societies, groups, and other missionary organizations. Cf. Pr. Damboriena, "Les Missions Protestantes en Chine" Bulletin de l'Université l'Aurore, Ser. III, Vol. 8, No. 1, Shanghai, 1947, p. 18; hereinafter cited as Damboriena.

[64] Martin Yang, A Chinese Village, New York 1945, pp. 158-164.

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to deal with their opponents, and to sell food to the missionaries."[65] Chinese governments, imperial and nationalist, found the Christians troublesome, and, in the twenties and thirties, there were serious efforts to curb them.

One of the effects of government sanctions, combined with the relatively poor results after ninety years of effort, was to reduce the enthusiasm for China missions among Christians abroad. This was reflected in the decreased flow of funds, notably from the United States. From nearly $6,000,000 in 1928, Protestant contributions fell to a little over $3,500,000 in 1933 and did not greatly exceed $4,000,000 in 1935 and 1936.[66] This handicapped nearly all fields of missionary endeavor.

Another arena in which the Protestants tried for influence was the great polemical struggle of the 1920's and 1930's over the nature and future of Chinese civilization. In this prolonged and important controversy, the Protestants found themselves handicapped by the divisions among themselves, notably that between modernists and fundamentalists, and also by the rising tide of nationalism. In the end the Protestants shared with idealistic Chinese and Western philosophers the failure to stem the rising tide of materialism.

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65. Ibid., p. 159.
66. Damboriena, p. 83.

The Sino-Japanese War and the war in the Pacific disrupted missionary efforts in north and central China, and in the years 1945-49 Protestant churches were gradually rehabilitating their establishments throughout the country. But there were serious difficulties in these years. American support, which had long been the principal source of funds for Chinese Protestantism, became increasingly suspect as Communist and left wing propaganda harped on "American imperialism" and as Chiang's government, which also received American support, became increasingly discredited. Protestants, because of their overwhelming emphasis on the social gospel (serving God through service to society) and their less formidable unity and discipline, suffered less in Communist-occupied areas than did the Catholics. 797

The timetable of Communist moves against Protestants and their organizations follows approximately that for the Catholics noted above. The "national church," the "three autonomies," the confiscation of church property, church schools, and hospitals were accompanied by a steady expulsion of the missionaries. The following figures show the decrease in Protestant missionary personnel between 1935 and 1949 and the almost total elimination of missionaries since that time.[67] In 1935, there were 5,816 Protestant missionaries in China; in 1949, about 3,000; in April 1952, only 100. 798

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[67] The first figure is from the *Handbook of the Christian Movement,* reproduced in Damboriena, p. 82. The other figures are from Walker, *op. cit.*, p. 19.

It is not possible to document the proportion of Chinese Protestants who have made their peace with the Communist regime, but "modernism," the social gospel, sectarianism, and the lack of such punitive sanctions as excommunication all tend to make the Protestants less resistant to Communist force and persuasion than the Catholics. A leading Chinese Protestant layman -- under what degree of pressure we do not know -- found a number of ways to come to terms with Communism: (1) as far back as the founding of Judaism, men's highest hope has been the establishment of a solidly united, ideal society; the Communists promise such a society; (2) sectarianism has created dissension, but the Chinese have a genius for compromise; therefore, there is an opportunity to promote (under the Communist government) "a grand union of the churches"; (3) Christianity is a religion of world revolution, but it has been fettered and frustrated by feudal and reactionary institutions. The age of Marxism-Leninism, therefore, is favorable to the realization of "Christian ideals."[68] Chinese Protestants are under a barrage of such statements, which can go so far as to assert that Jesus was a "patriotic anti-imperialist" in defending his country against the Romans.[69] How successfully Chinese Protestants as a whole are resisting this type of persuasion and the manifold pressures and blandishments of the Communist regime is unknown. Again, as in the case of the Catholics, loss of Protestant youth to the Communist "religion" would mean that the future of China is dark indeed. 797 668

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[68] Ts'ai Yung-ch'un, "Progressive Road for Christianity in the New China," Hsin Kuan-ch'a [New Observation], Vol. I, No. 8, Oct. 10, 1950; Current Background, 40, Dec. 15, 1950, p. 3.

The Central-South Region has fewer centers of Protestantism than some other, more accessible, parts of China. The following tabulation gives the percentage of the Central-South population which, in 1938, was Protestant. The second column gives the total number of Protestants in 1924:[70] 797

Province	1938	1924
Honan	3.7%	12,418
Hupeh	4.3	14,725
Hunan	3.2	11,018
Kiangsi	2.2	7,827
Kwangtung	18.2	61,262
Kwangsi	1.4	4,722

It will be noted that except for Kwangtung, whose capital Canton is the oldest port of entry for

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[69] Hsu, op. cit., p. 41.

[70] Ku T'ing-ch'ang's percentage figures published in the Collectanea Commissionis Synodalis, Vol. XI, 1938, pp. 272, 281. Tables reproduced in Damboriena pp. 90-91. The 1924 figures are from The China Yearbook, 1924, p. 629.

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Western commerce, the Protestant minorities in these provinces are inconsiderable. Further, a very high proportion of Protestant missions was concentrated in provincial capitals and major cities.[71] Most of the missionaries from the inland stations have now been expelled, and the capacity of the native pastorate to hold its tiny churches together against an all-powerful state is problematical.

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[71] See, for example, discussion of the distribution of mission publication operations by provinces in Damboriena, pp. 90-91.

HEALTH AND SANITATION

I. BACKGROUND

Organized public health as part of the responsibilities of government in China may be traced back as far as 1902, when the Peiyang Sanitary Department was established. Because of plagues in 1911 and 1917, organizations for the prevention of epidemics also came into being. In 1927, under the Nationalist Government, a Ministry of Health, later reorganized into the National Health Administration, sought to solve problems of public health. Among the six departments of the National Health Administration was the Department of Health Organization and Services, which promoted local health work, local sanitary projects, and local training of health personnel; another was the Department of Epidemic Prevention, which was charged with the prevention and control of epidemic and endemic diseases, anti-epidemic services, and the manufacture of biological products.[1] 744

However, peaceful development of health work was greatly disrupted by the long and destructive war of resistance against Japan (1937-45) and the internal conflicts which followed. Much of the 744 708 government effort in that period was devoted to the Army Medical Service, which was affiliated with the Ministry of Military Affairs from the beginning of 1938.[2] 744 708

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[1] China Handbook 1937-1945, compiled by China Ministry of Information, New York, McMillan, 1949, p. 490.

In May 1946, after World War II, the Nationalist Government officially returned to Nanking. Amid the manifold attempts at rehabilitation and reconstruction, the restoration and reorganizationof health work was begun. Some statistics for Central-South China are available for the years 1946-47, but it is clear that little could have been accomplished within so short a time. In 1947 there were in the six provinces of Central-South China 90 government health organizations with 2,768 hospital beds and 8,434 personnel, including 1,501 doctors. There were 2,809 additional public health agencies on the county level in these provinces.[3] As to preventive medical care, 3,630,250 people in Central-South China received vaccination against smallpox in 1946, some 4,315,642 received inoculations against cholera, and 1,739,520 received vaccine to combat both cholera and typhoid.[4] (For the purpose of comparison, it should be noted that the population of Central-South China in 1948 was reported to be 130,540,797. For details on the 744 changes in population and administrative geography, see chapters on Population and Geography.) These statistics are incomplete and cannot provide a satisfactory picture of health conditions before 1949 in the six Central-South provinces; however, they offer a background for an understanding of the efforts of the Nationalist Government in the field of public health. 744

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[2] The China Year Book, 1938-39, Shanghai, Commercial Press, 1939, p. 652.

[3] Chung-hua Min-kuo T'ung-chi Nien-chien [Statistical Yearbook of China], Nanking, Bureau of Statistics, 1948, pp. 341-42.

[4] Ibid., p. 346.

II. COMMUNIST OFFICIAL REPORTS

The initial task in health and sanitation work for the Communists in Central-South China, as in all the other regions, was first to restore the original public health agencies and, once they resumed operation, to reorganize and mold them to Communist needs and principles. Adhering to the directives of the Central People's Government in Peking, the regional government of Central-South China put chief emphasis upon epidemic prevention in its public health program.

On reporting to the Second Plenary Session of the Central-South China Military and Political Committee in September 1950, the chairman of Cultural and Educational Affairs of the region made it clear that these six provinces were plagued by a
number of contagious diseases, the three most serious [164]
being malaria, schistosomiasis, and leprosy. He outlined the urgent need to establish centers for the manufacture of biologicals, to organize epidemic-prevention corps and agencies, to restore the inspection stations, and to act for the prevention of serious diseases. Many health organizations were

not yet restored to operation at the time of the report; 744 the figures given for the then functioning county public health agencies were: 71 in Hunan, 77 for Kiangsi, 67 for Kwangsi, 75 for Kwangtung, 27 for Hupeh, and none for Honan.[5]

Honan Province reported in 1950 the outbreak [164] in many counties of epidemics of measles, smallpox, scarlet fever, and diphtheria. To combat this situation, mobile medical corps were organized under the provincial government and epidemic-prevention teams were sent by the Central Government in Peking as well as by the Central-South regional administration. About 40,000 victims of epidemics were reported and more than 30,000 were treated during the epidemics in Honan.[6] In individual reports of the six provinces and the two municipalities of the region submitted in 1950, all mentioned the large number of vaccinations against smallpox and inoculations against cholera, typhoid, and malaria.

When the Fourth Plenary Session of the Central-South Military and Political Committee convened in November 1951, marked achievements were reported in public health and epidemic-prevention. In reviewing the work of the preceding year it was stated that

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[5] *Cheng-fu Kung-tso Pao-kao Hui-pien* [*A Compendium of Government Work Reports*], Peking Jen-min ch'u-pan-she, 1951, p. 758-59.

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 833.

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28,000,000 people in Central-South China had been given vaccinations, and 45,000,000 more were to be vaccinated by the end of 1951. The report claimed that smallpox cases in a year showed a decrease of 53 per cent. A total of 100,000 children in various areas in the Central-South Region were inoculated against tuberculosis with B.C.G. vaccine. Throughout the region, according to the same report, public health centers were established in 428 counties, and 170 centers were set up on the ch'ü (subdivision of a county or a municipality) level. Public health personnel in Central-South China were reported to include 4,000 medical workers, 1,700 medical assistants, 8,000 nurses and midwives, and 2,000 people engaged in miscellaneous tasks connected with public health.[7]

In reporting on the three-year achievement in health work in Central-South China in 1952, the chairman of the Department of Health announced that 88 per cent of the population (142,000,000) were vaccinated against smallpox, and in such large cities as Wuhan, Canton, Kaifeng, Changsha, and Hengyang, smallpox had been entirely eliminated. (The population of Central-South China in 1953 was 176,334,987, according to Communist statistics.) In the restoring and establishing of health centers and hospitals, the

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[7] Current Background, Hong Kong, American Consulate General, No. 157, Feb. 8, 1952, p. 3.

goal of one unit for every county was fulfilled. (There 744
were 517 counties in Central-South China, according to the 1955 People's Handbook.) On a lower level, among the 4,386 ch'ü in Central-South China, 670 health centers and 136 clinics were opened. Since 1949, according to the report, 134 additional hospitals had been opened in the cities and the number of trained workers had tripled. Approximately 6,605 doctors were reported.[8]

III. THE HEALTH OF WOMEN AND CHILDREN

One of the most significant early documents of 744
the Chinese Communist regime was the Common 562
Program. The health of women and children was 858
given special attention in Article 48, which specified
that attention should be paid to the protection of the 844
health of mothers, infants, and children.[9] The Constitution, adopted on September 20, 1954, provides for the physical and mental development of the young people and the rights of women.[10] In speeches and reports on health matters in Communist China, the promotion of the well-being of women and children

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[8] Chang-chiang Jih-pao [Yangtze Daily], Sept. 30, 1952, p. 3.

[9] The Important Documents of the First Plenary Session of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1949, p. 8.

[10] Constitution of the People's Republic of China, Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1954, Article 94, 96, pp. 98-99.

has almost always been given prominence. The 744
training of midwives, the re-education of "old-style"
midwives, the establishment of maternity stations 562
and health centers for women and children, and the 858
prevention of various children's diseases have been
particularly publicized in public health work in the 844
Central-South Region as well as in the country as
a whole.

In mid-1952, in the six provinces of Central-South China, it was reported that 30,500 midwives were trained, and 50,000 - 60,000 additional midwives were scheduled to finish training by the end of the year. Other types of health cadres were trained to work for the betterment of the health of women and children. The same report expressed the hope that in a year or two there would be two midwives in every hsiang (village) in the region.[11]

When the vice-chairman of the Kwangtung People's Government made his four-year progress report in 1954, he claimed that 4,717 medical, nursing, and maternity workers and 19,000 midwives in the rural areas had been trained during that period in Kwangtung. As proof of the betterment of health [165] of women and children in Kwangtung, he cited the results of an investigation in Yungyun (Weng-yüan) which showed a decrease in the infant mortality rate from 30 per cent to 2 per cent after the introduction of modern obstetrics in 1951.[12] (see p. 352) of modern obstetrics in 1951.[12] 005

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[11] Yangtze Daily, Sept. 30, 1952, p. 3.

IV. MINORITY NATIONALITIES

Many groups of minority nationalities are found in Central-South China and Southwest China. The Chinese Communists, largely for propaganda purposes, are eager to show their goodwill to minority groups. Cultural advancement programs among these peoples are often publicized by the press and in government publications. By offering education and medical care to these groups, the Chinese Communist government may be able to exercise a strong control over areas in which minority nationalities predominate.[13] 744 563

In August 1951, the Ministry of Health called the National Conference on Health of the Minority Nationalities. It was reported that the minority groups [164] in both the Central-South and Southwest regions suffered from malaria, cerebrospinal meningitis, diptheria, scarlet fever, typhoid, and recurrent fever. These contagious diseases took a heavy toll of lives and caused a serious loss of manpower. Puerperal and children's diseases also caused a high mortality rate among women and children. In the Central-South Region, the Ministry of Health, following the decisions adopted by the National Conference, made plans to fight malaria and puerperal and children's diseases. Because many minority peoples live in widely scattered areas, it was decided to organize mobile medical teams.[14]

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[12] Survey of China Mainland Press, Hong Kong, American Consulate General, No. 932, Nov. 20-22, 1954, Supplement, p. XIII.

[13] Kung-fei K'ung-chih-hsia-ti Kuei-chou [Kweichow Under the Control of the Communists], The Sixth Section of the Central Committee of the Nationalist Party, 1955, p. 15.

In October 1952, according to a Communist report, there were in the minority nationalities areas in the Central-South Region 54 county health centers, 104 ch'ü health centers, and three special hospitals for minority nationalities. In the province of Kwangsi, where most of the minority groups are concentrated, the provincial government claimed to have appropriated JMP$7,225,000,000 for the advancement of health work from 1949 to 1952. Health centers of these counties were reported either restored to operation or established. According to the same report, 225 minority nationalities health cadres, 300 vaccination workers, and a number of midwives were trained to care for the minority groups.[15]

In a description of Kwangsi in 1955, in the Hong Kong Ta-kung Pao, a Communist daily, it said that in the minority areas of that province hospitals, sanitoriums, women and children's health centers, and plague- and malaria-prevention stations have been established. and mobile medical teams were organized to visit isolated districts, administer inoculations,

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14. Current Background, American Consulate-General, Hong Kong, No. 152, Jan. 15, 1952, pp. 5-7.

15. Yangtze Daily, Dec. 7, 1952, p. 3.

and give aid to the sick. Smallpox and malaria, which in the past were rampant, have now been almost entirely eliminated. In Lungling, a multi-nationality autonomous ch'ü (Southwest Kwangsi), poor health "no longer exists, especially during the harvest season."[16]

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V. THE PATRIOTIC HEALTH MOVEMENT

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In order to integrate health work with the mass propaganda drive against the so-called "bacteriological warfare" of the United States, the Chinese Communists launched the Patriotic Health Drive in 1952. It was animated by the fighting in Korea and became a part of the Resist-America-Aid-Korea Movement. It proved so economical to the government and so successful that it was established as an annual health drive. The purpose of the movement is, in short, to solicit and obtain free labor (in the name of patriotism) for the cleaning of the cities and rural areas and for the general improvement of environmental hygiene.

Three months after the launching of the Patriotic Health Drive in the central southern provinces in the early part of 1952, the regional government was reported to have mobilized 4,000,000 students, 150,000 teachers, and 160,000 medical and health workers. The accomplishments to the middle of July 1952 were itemized as follows:

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[16] Survey of China Mainland Press, No. 1089, July 15, 1955, p. 36.

Refuse removed		2,181,837 tons
Ditches dredged	some	5,500 miles
Ditches rebuilt	some	570 miles
Wells dug		5,479
Wells improved		108,622
Public comfort stations constructed		39,365
Public comfort stations improved		65,114
Flies exterminated	some	23,800,000,000

The report added that, as a result of the movement, epidemics were prevented, the health of the people was protected, the production of the nation maintained, and the masses received valuable health education.[17] These general remarks will be found in many Communist reports; they are impressive and yet are not concrete and so cannot be checked. Achievement records of a similar nature can be found for every province and most of the large cities in the Central-South Region. They are widely publicized in the Communist press. For example, in Wuhan municipality, the inhabitants were organized into large and small teams for the drive. The formation of 1,700 large teams, consisting of 100 families each, and 7,800 small teams, consisting of 20 families each, was reported. In early July 1952, one small team proudly reported killing 430,000 flies.[18]

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[17] Yangtze Daily, July 29, 1952, p. 3.
[18] Ibid.

By September 1952, authorities in Kwangtung Province reported that the movement was carried into its second phase of "consolidation and regularization." A cleaning system was set up and the inhabitants were organized. Each street designated at least one day a month as "People's Health Day."[19] 744

At the First Session of the First National People's Congress, Li Teh-ch'üan, Minister of Health, strongly urged the continuation of the Patriotic Health Drive as one of the chief tasks for the Communist national health program. She proposed to make it an annual drive, because it seemed the most effective way to prevent disease and improve the health of the people.[20]

VI. FLOOD IN CENTRAL CHINA

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The year 1954 brought extraordinary flood conditions to the China Mainland. (See chapter on Public Welfare.) The areas most severely stricken were the provinces of Hunan, Hupeh, and Kiangsi in the Central-South Region, which provided another test case for the integration of public health work with a mass movement. Health and sanitation workers were not only needed to administer to the victims of the flood, but, even more importantly, to care for the huge labor forces fighting the flood. A health center for flood prevention was formed in Hupeh Province, under the Wuhan municipal government. Four teams were sent to

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19. Nan-fang Jih-pao [South China Daily], March 19, 1953, p. 3.

20. Survey of China Mainland Press, No. 922, Nov. 5, 1954, pp. 42-43.

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exercise control over food and drinking water, to supervise the preparation of food for flood workers, and to improve the environmental hygiene for both the flood workers and victims. A special epidemic prevention corps of 170 went among the laborers working on the dikes to disseminate health propaganda and to distribute disinfecting equipment. The Communist report also mentioned that doctors with native medical training and clerks in herb shops were mobilized to assist.[21]

One report from the Mainland, indicating the seriousness of the flood, revealed that as late as March 1955 a group of medical workers was dispatched to the flooded areas in Hupeh by the Ministry of Health in Peking. This group consisted of 48 doctors, 48 nurses, and 41 pharmacists from the distant province of Heilungkiang (Amur Province) in Manchuria; they were divided into two main teams and six small teams.[22]

In Hunan and Kiangsi provinces, similar drives and similar accomplishments were reported. Some 2,000 medical workers of both Chinese and Western medical training were mobilized to work in the flooded areas in the vicinity of Tung-t'ing Lake in Hunan Province.[23] In Kiangsi, a total of 1,245 medical

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21. Kuang-ming Jih-pao [Enlightenment Daily], Peking, Sept. 10, 1954, p. 3.
22. Ibid., March 20, 1955, p. 2.
23. Ibid., Oct. 22, 1954, p. 2.

workers were organized into 114 mobile teams; 744 22 per cent were doctors with Chinese medical training. Some 270,000 people received treatment, 731 according to the same report, and 79 per cent of these treatments were administered without charge.[24] However, no attempt has been made to show what groups constituted the 21 per cent who had to pay for medical treatment during the disaster.

VII. CONCLUSION

In Central-South China, infanticide still exists 847 in certain areas. It is a serious matter and helps to suggest the complexity of the social problems and the uneven progress achieved in the different regions and communities in Communist China. In four counties of southeastern Kwangtung Province, 1,882 cases of infanticide were reported in 1950-51.[25] According to the record of two orphanages in Chan- [736] chiang (Kwangchowan), 14,193 female foundlings were taken in during the period 1935-1951.[26] The Communists blamed the situation on existing social patterns of inequality between the sexes, superstition, the decadent feudal system, and "feudalistic ideas" on marriage.

Although *schistosoma japonicum* is most serious 164 in East China, the Central-South Region is also effected by this peculiar disease, particularly in the area along the Yangtze River in Hupeh Province. The Communists have attempted to fight *schistosomiasis*, but a cure has not yet been found.

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24. *Ibid.*
25. *Yangtze Daily*, Aug. 6, 1952, p. 3.
26. *South China Daily*, Aug. 28, 1952, p. 3.

The health of a nation depends on many factors. 005 Preventive medical care or even a lower infant mortality rate does not necessarily mean the betterment of general health. Malnutrition or an insufficient diet may offset whatever has been accomplished by vaccinations and inoculations. Since little information is revealed in Communist publications on the diet and nutrition of the Chinese people, it is essential to point out that while reports on health and sanitation improvements in the different regions need not necessarily be discounted, other factors must be taken into consideration in the evaluation of the general health of the Chinese people. (For a discussion of famines and man-made shortage of food, see chapters on Agriculture and Public Welfare.)

One difficult problem which the Bureau of Public 514 Health of the Canton Municipal government had to 387 meet in early 1950 concerned the disposal of human ordure. It was the custom in Canton, as in many other places in China, to transport feces to the rural areas to be used as fertilizer. A proposal to construct an organic fertilizer plant in the suburbs of Canton was adopted to meet this problem. The proposal explained that such a plant would utilize human ordure and garbage from the city for the manufacture of organic fertilizer and would also bring in profits to assist municipal expenditure and to help promote public health. A petition was sent to the regional authorities in Wuhan, and the Canton Municipal government thereupon received an appropriation of JMP$17,000,000,000 (nearly US$800,000) from the Central-South Committee of Financial and Economic Affairs. Construction was begun in August 1950.

After this sum had been spent, Deputy Mayor Chu 514
Kuang added a floating capital of JMP$5,000,000,000.
By April 1951, all the money was gone and the scheme 387
had to be given up, but it was not until March 1953
that the case was brought to a conclusion and Chu
Kuang removed from office. In the report on the case 387
of the organic fertilizer plant in Canton, made by the
Canton Municipal Government in March 1953, it was 661
said: "During the process of the erection of the
organic fertilizer plant, the leadership abandoned its
duties of supervision and inspection and placed blind
confidence...in the technicians whose bourgeois
viewpoints had not been properly reformed, and who
proceeded with the task on the basis of their own
bourgeois viewpoints and thoughts. For example,
before the factory for disposal of ordure had been
erected, palatial residences and western type
hostels had been built, with American-type modern
conveniences, for the enjoyment of a few [officials],
while little attention was paid to the lodgings and
amenities of the majority of the workers. The
construction schedule was not adhered to, and a
number of tasks were commenced simultaneously.
As a result, when the buildings were completed the
machinery equipment could not be installed. And
when the machinery equipment was finally installed,
it could not be operated. In the civil construction
tasks alone, many jobs had to be done over again....
There was great confusion in personnel and financial
management. The employees of the plant, with
the exception of a few appointed through the Party
organization, had all been brought in because they
enjoyed one of the five-fellowship relationships and

were not subject to investigation politically or technically."[27] (The "five-fellowship" relationships refer to: fellow natives of the same home district; fellow students at the same school; fellow workers in the same organ; fellow members of the same clan; and fellow members of the same national group.) 387 661

The Canton incident shows that incompetence and corruption, as well as other evils, still exist among the Chinese Communists. In the same year (1953) the mayor of Wuhan was removed from office by members of the municipal government for involvement in intrigues. Although one of the principles was the deputy director of the Municipal Bureau of Health -- a veteran female Party member -- the case itself had nothing to do with public health. Like the organic-fertilizer plant scandal in Canton, the Wuhan scandal lasted for some two years. Finally the mayor was removed and four of the principals involved in the case were sentenced to imprisonment.[28] These incidents may serve as examples of corruption and incompetence existing in practically all branches of the Chinese Communist government. 661

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27. *Current Background*, *op. cit.*, No. 250, July 10, 1953, (*The Case of the Canton Organic Fertilizer Plant*).

28. *Ibid.*, No. 256, Aug. 5, 1953, (*The Wuhan Case* (1950-1952)).

PUBLIC WELFARE

I. INTRODUCTION

Under the Nationalist Government during the war years (1937-1945), the first and foremost agency in the work of public welfare was the National Relief Commission. It was the pivot upon which China's machinery of relief and rehabilitation depended. Through its various efforts from 1938 to 1944, 30,152,131 war and famine refugees were benefited.[1] In addition to immediate war and disaster relief, it operated clinics, occupational relief works, and organizations for the training and care of children. A number of private and semi-private welfare and relief agencies were also active, and most of these were founded to meet the needs of wartime conditions.[2] For women and children, there was the National Association for Refugee Children; also, the National Child Welfare Association of China, and the Women's Advisory Council. For servicemen, there were the Friends of the Wounded Society and the YMCA Emergency Service to Soldiers. And for general war work there were the China Wartime Relief Association and the National Chinese Women's Association for War Relief. Foreign agencies such as the United China Relief and the American Red Cross in China, and British and Canadian contributions distributed through different mediums, also helped to aid China in her distress. 746 747

The Ministry of Social Affairs as a department 746

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[1] China Handbook 1937-1945, compiled by Chinese Ministry of Information, New York, Macmillan, 1947, pp. 521-37.

[2] Ibid.

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under the Executive Yuan of the Nationalist Government was established in November 1940. Throughout the 1940's, during the war years in Chungking as well as in the postwar years in Nanking, this ministry led and guided the development of public welfare and helped to co-ordinate the work of the relief and welfare organizations. The following chart will give some idea of the state of public welfare in 1947 in Central-South China.[3]

RELIEF AND WELFARE ORGANZATIONS IN CENTRAL-SOUTH JUNE 1947

[See following page for chart.]

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3. Chung-hua Min-kuo T'ung-chi Nien-chien [Statistical Yearbook of China], Nanking, Bureau of Statistics, 1948, pp. 365-72.

Province	Relief Organizations	Farmers' Welfare Societies	Child Welfare Units	Social Service Offices	Employment Agencies	
					Independent	Auxiliary
Kiangsi	411	29	285	75	20	16
Hupeh	17	171	35	7	1	
Hunan	169	25	153	121	20	19
Honan	157	12	142	44	17	17
Kwangtung	231	5	135	153	58	57
Kwangsi	133	52	47	9	2	1
Total	1118	294	797	409	118	110

On November 9, 1943, China became a member of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA). The Chinese National Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (CNRRA), as a department of the Nationalist Government on the ministerial level was established in January 1945, as was the Chinese office of UNRRA. In co-operation the two administrations planned and worked on the gigantic problems of relief and the rehabilitation of postwar China.[4]

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[4] China Handbook, 1937-1945, pp. 538-41.

Despite the great contribution to Chinese welfare resulting from the efforts of peaceful projects of this sort, the Chinese National Relief and Rehabilitation Administration was suspended when the Chinese Communists became the victors on the Mainland of China, although such efforts, had they continued, might well have been perverted and subverted by the Communists. 746

II. CALAMITIES SINCE 1949

Since the establishment of the Communist regime in China, many natural disasters have occurred. Droughts, floods, locust invasions, frost, windstorms, and hail-storms have caused famines which began in the rural districts and spread throughout the nation. An anti-Communist source has given the following estimate of the number of people adversely affected since 1949 by national calamities, climaxed by the great flood of 1954. 731

1949	60,000,000
1950	38,000,000
1951	28,000,000
1952	33,000,000
1953	47,000,000
1954	180,000,000

No region has escaped entirely from these disasters. If there are differences between them, it is only a matter of degree.

As if these natural calamities were not disastrous enough, the people on the China Mainland suffered further abuse from man-made adversities, such as the Land Reform Movement, the Three-Anti and Five-Anti campaigns, the war in Korea, and the government's "planned purchase" of agricultural products. The number of people who have been affected by the Communist quest for power is estimated to have been about 90,000,000[5] during the first four years of the Communist regime.

Throughout the Central-South Region in the past five years, natural calamities have been extensive. One estimate reveals that in 1952 alone the number of people stricken by the spring and summer famines in the six provinces of the Central-South Region were as follows:[6]

Hupeh	6,300,000
Hunan	4,000,000
Kwangtung	8,000,000
Kwangsi	2,250,000
Kiangsi	3,000,000
Honan	9,000,000

Later in the same year, the six provinces again suffered from floods and insects. In 1954, the Mainland of China was once more subjected to floods, which even the Communists themselves termed "without parallel in history."[7] The most devastated area was in the middle of the Yangtze River Valley, particularly Hupeh, Hunan, and Kiangsi. 731

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[5] Kung-fei Ti Chiu-chi Kung-tso [Relief Work Under the Chinese Communists], 6th Section of the Central Committee of the Nationalist Party, Taipei, 1955, pp. 5-6. It should be noted that source references originating in Taipei are almost invariably sponsored by the Chinese Nationalist Party. As well as being anti-Communist in intent, they may sometimes serve as a media for pro-Nationalist propaganda.

[6] P'ien-ti Tsai-huang Ai Ta-lu [Widespread Calamities on the Continent], Taipei, 6th Section, Central Committee of Kuomintang , 1952, pp. 26-27.

The Land Reform Movement in Central-South China was begun in 1950 and all but completed in 1952. In 1953 a re-investigation was ordered. As a result, 23,000 more landowners were purged. Of this number, about 5,000 were put to death, and the remaining 18,000 either went to jail or to "Reform-through-labor" camps. A large number of landowners were victims of land reform in the Central-South during 1950-53.[8] 423

III. COMMUNIST RELIEF AND WELFARE ORGANIZATIONS

After the Hwai River flood of 1949, the Central Relief Committee was formed (February 1950) under the Government Administration Council as a temporary but integral part of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Later, similar committees were set up in the provinces and municipalities. Their existence, on the whole, has been in name only, according to an anti-Communist report, and it is 746 asserted that they have accomplished little relief work.[9]

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[7] Survey of China Mainland Press, Hong Kong, American Consulate General, No. 962, Jan. 6, 1955, pp. 18-20.

[8] Ch'ih K'ung-pu-hsia Ti Hu-pei [Hupeh Under Red Terror], 6th Section of the Central Committee of the Nationalist Party, Taipei, 1954, pp. 16-20.

During the convention of the All-China People's Relief Conference in April 1950, the People's Relief Administration of China was organized as the successor of the China Liberated Areas Relief Administration. This was not a government department but a "People's" organization. Soong Ching-ling (Madame Sun Yat-sen) was elected chairman. It was this organization which took over all U. S. charities after the outbreak of the war in Korea. It was reported four years later that twenty-three large cities throughout China had branch offices of the People's Relief Administration. In the Central-South Region, branch offices have been established in the cities of Chengchow and Kaifeng in Honan Province, in Wuhan in Hupeh Province, in Canton in Kwangtung Province, and in Changsha in Hunan Province. A special provincial branch office was also set up for Kwangtung in addition to the branch in Canton.[10] There have been meetings and conferences, but the only actual relief work reported to date has been the collection in 1950 of 6, 800, 000 outfits of winter clothing for the flood refugees in northern Anhwei.[11]

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[9] Relief Work Under the Chinese Communists, pp. 5-6, published in Taipei, lists all of the welfare organizations described in this study. Reference to the same organizations are to be found in Jen-min Shou-ts'e [People's Handbook] , 1955, a Communist source.

[10] Jen-min Shou-ts'e 1955 [People's Handbook 1955] , Tientsin, 1955, pp. 396-397.

[11] Relief Work Under the Chinese Communists, pp. 6-8.

Due to the danger of growing unemployment, the Labor Employment Committee was established in July 1952 under the Government Administration Council. Regional Labor Employment Committees were established by August of the same year. Later, similar committees were formed on lower administration levels in the provinces, counties, and municipalities.[12] 746

The Red Cross Society of China has had a history of fifty years. In August 1950 the Communists assumed control and reorganized it under the leadership of the Ministry of Health. It has done more medical work than relief work, especially in construction projects where large numbers of laborers congregated. In Central-South China, the Communists have undertaken such major construction projects as the harnessing of the Hwai River, conservation work along the Yellow River in Honan Province. and the water works on Tungting Lake, in addition to numerous minor projects. To these projects the Red Cross sent medical and epidemic-prevention corps to guard the health of the battalions of laborers.[13] Among the minority nationalities, especially in Kwangtung and Kwangsi provinces and on Hainan Island, the Communist Red Cross Society sent medical service teams.[14] (See study on Health and Sanitation.) 746 747

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[11] Relief Work Under the Chinese Communists, pp. 6-8.

[12] Ibid., p. 8.

[13] Ibid., p. 10.

[14] Ibid., p. .8.

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In June 1938, during the war of resistance against Japan, the China Defense League was founded in Hong Kong by Soong Ching-ling. It acted as a channel for international aid chiefly to bring medicine and relief to Communist bases. In 1941, its headquarters was moved to Chungking. After the establishment of the Chinese Communist regime, this organization changed its name to the China Welfare Institute (August 1950). Its center of activity has been in Shanghai.[15] Beginning in January 1952, the China Welfare Institute has published an international, propaganda-disseminating, bi-monthly magazine, China Reconstructs, in the English language. [204]

The Chinese People's National Committee for the Protection of Children was formed on November 26, 1951 at Peking in response to the call issued at the Berlin conference of the International Federation of Democratic Women. The head of the Chinese organization is also Soong Ching-ling. The principles of this committee, which include the promotion of child welfare, were defined as "anti-imperialism" and "the promotion of world peace."[16]

A group of professors in Shanghai founded the China Tuberculosis Prevention Association in 1948. The Communist regime brought this organization under their control and moved it to Peking. In

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15. Ibid., pp. 8-9.

16. People's Handbook, 1955, p. 396.

August 1953, a conference of the workers was called and certain tasks and policies of the association were outlined. More than 100 tuberculosis-prevention units throughout the country are said to be affiliated with this organization.[17] 746 747

IV. RELIEF AND RELIEF POLICIES

During the convention of the National People's Congress in Peking in September 1954, Hsieh Chüeh-tsai, Minister of Internal Affairs of the Chinese Communist regime, made a report on the state of relief and welfare on the China Mainland. After alluding to the expanse and severity of natural calamities from 1949 to 1954, he reiterated the stand and policies of the Chinese Communist Government in conducting relief work. The first effort was to mobilize the broad masses to work in the prevention of drought, frost, harmful insects, and floods. Secondly, when disaster struck, the people were expected to adopt measures to "help themselves through production," "to economize during the famine period," and "to offer mutual aid." Only when absolutely necessary would the government proffer outright relief.[18] 746

In discussing public welfare and relief in Communist China, it is necessary to recognize how the Communist interprets certain common terms. The word relief, although generally taken to mean "money or necessaries given to people who are in need,"[19] to the Communists carries no implication of unconditional succor. Their basic relief policy, including emergency relief, is "self-help-through-production," and their basic relief method is the substitution of work for relief. From this the Chinese Communists have not deviated. As a matter of fact, most of their projects for water conservation, road building, and the laying of railroad lines have drawn upon famine refugees who thus are expected to pay by labor for government efforts to prevent starvation.[20]

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[17] Ibid., pp. 397-98.

[18] Ibid., pp. 211-12.

About the middle of 1950 the Chinese Communist government at Peking issued several documents concerning relief work. In the cities the problem of increasing unemployment was pressing, and in rural areas famine was serious. Among the five large cities in which the problem of unemployment was most serious, two were in the Central-South Region, namely Wuhan and Canton.[21] The central provinces of Hupeh and Hunan and the southern provinces of Kwangtung and Kwangsi were among those most severely stricken by famines. The municipalities of Wuhan and Canton were directed to form relief committees and unemployment relief bureaus. A set of provisions for the relief of the unemployed was promulgated by the People's Government in Peking.[22] (See chapter on Labor.) The unemployed were ordered to register. Following a central government directive, they were given work rather than direct relief under the policy of "self-help-through-production," re-direction of workers into fields offering greater opportunity for employment, and return to rural areas to assist in agricultural production. Outright relief was the least significant clause in the scheme.[23] Generally speaking, the same principles were applied to rural relief programs in combating natural calamities. Under the slogan of "famine-relief-through economy," the people were advised to economize, "to substitute unprocessed food for processed foods," to use ersatz foods, and to adulterate grain, presumably with leaves and bark.[24]

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[19] Fairchild, H. P., Dictionary of Sociology and Related Sciences, Ames, Iowa, Littlefield, Adams, 1955, p. 255.

[20] Relief Work Under the Chinese Communists, pp. 9-12.

[21] Kan-pu Hsüeh-hsi Tzu-liao Ti Shih-erh-chi [Cadres' Study Materials No. 12.] Communist Party, Central Committee, South China Bureau, Canton, 1950, pp. 40-51. [22] Ibid, p. 51.

When a progress report on the municipality of Wuhan was made in September 1952, it was announced that 59, 328 unemployed persons had registered. By the end of August 1952, the report continued, 34, 146 persons had obtained work. During the same period, only 771 persons received long-term direct relief, and 4, 560 received temporary relief. The total amount of direct relief distributed by the municipal government amounted to JMP$5, 956, 140, 833 (about US$270, 000), constituting 22. 9 per cent of total relief funds alloted for the three-year period.[25]

In order to substitute work for relief, many construction projects -- water conservation, road building, sewage systems, the excavating and transporting of rocks and gravel -- were undertaken in the Wuhan area. To prepare the unemployed

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23. Ibid., pp. 52-60.
24. Ibid., p. 50.
25. Ch'ang-chiang Jih-pao [Yangtze Daily] , Wuhan, Sept. 29, 1952, p. 2.

for new work in the period 1950-52, some 21 training centers were established and 6,196 young people were trained, although only 3,634 of this number found employment. In the three-year period, 21,149 persons obtained work through government recommendation, and of this number 80 per cent were put to work in textile factories.[26] 746

On the problem of labor and employment, the chief of the Bureau of Labor of Kwangtung Province reported in September 1952 that in two years' time 53,724 persons, including unemployed intellectuals and returned overseas Chinese, were benefited by relief measures and by government assistance in obtaining work. It was claimed that the provincial government spent JMP$2,760,000,000 (about US$123,633) for relief and distributed over 4,000,000 pounds of grain. At the time of the report, the Kwangtung provincial government hoped to solve the problem of unemployment in forty-seven urban areas (with a population of over 10,000,000) by advising the jobless to seek work in the rural districts.[27]

In 1954, the China Mainland was stricken by flood.[28] The areas most affected were the northern provinces of the Central-South Region, Hupeh Hunan, and Kiangsi, along the Yangtze River and around Lake Tungting In Wuhan alone, 100,000 people were mobilized to fight the flood.[29] From July 8 to September 24, 1954, it was said, 1,616 731 students of Wuhan University worked to win "victory from the flood."[30] The same report listed the work of these students accomplished; they dug 9,352 carloads and 100 boatloads of dirt, removed 151,838 "shoulder poles" of dirt, loaded and unloaded 5,437 carloads and 491 boatloads of dirt, and transported 2,009 carloads of dirt and 730 carloads of rocks. "Triumph over the flood" was achieved by human efforts. In fighting the flood of 1954,[31] 12,000,000 refugees were used as common laborers. 731

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[26] Ibid.

[27] Nan-fang Jih-pao [South China Daily], Canton, Sept. 22, 1952, p. 3.

[28] Jen-min Jih-pao [People's Daily], Peking, Jan. 6, 1955, p. 1.

[29] Kuang-ming Jih-pao [Enlightenment Daily], Peking, July 19, 1954.

An editorial in the People's Daily on December 19, 1954 not only summed up the flood and relief situation, but also made certain criticisms. In some famine-stricken areas in Hupeh, sufficient attention was not paid to the organization of production to combat the famine. Some cadres did not have a clear idea of state relief and loans, and in these areas they grew slack or even gave up leadership. In the co-operation necessary among those engaged in fighting the flood and in flood prevention, some groups failed to respond with "full understanding and whole-hearted support."[32]

V. CHILD WELFARE

Following the international practice of dedicating one day in the year to children, April 4 was promulgated as China's Children's Day by the Nationalist Government in 1931. But the Chinese Communist 527 858 regime changed this date to June 1st, in accordance with a decision made by the International Democratic Women's Federation in 1949 at Moscow.[33] 527 858 Children's Day as it is celebrated in the United States and in Great Britain was branded as capitalistic, i. e., not designed for the well-being of the children of the laboring classes. Around June 1st every year, all the propaganda media are mobilized for the promotion of child welfare, praise of the happy state of children in Communist China and in the Communist bloc of nations, and derogatory references to the "plight" of children in free nations. And it is also around this time in most large cities on the China Mainland that health examinations for children are conducted. 744 858 In the period 1950-52, according to one report, more than 1,000,000 children throughout China received health examinations.[34]

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[30] Ibid., Oct. 20, 1954, p. 2.

[31] Relief Work Under the Chinese Communists, p. 10.

[32] People's Daily, Dec. 19, 1954, p. 1.

On the morning of June 1, 1952, more than 2,000 young representatives of various schools, including representatives from the Soviet Union, Korea, India, Japan, gathered in Wuhan to celebrate Children's Day. 527 858 Words of greeting were delivered by municipal officials, labor models, and a "fighting heroine," as well as by the Red Dean of Canterbury, Hewlett Johnson, who at this time was touring Communist China. In the afternoon, more than 10,000 children participated in a celebration held in Chung-shan Park.[35]

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[33] Hung Hsin-t'ao, *Chi-nien Chieh-jih Shih-shih Tzu-liao* [*History of the Memorial Days*], Shanghai, 1953, Vol. I, pp. 180-83.

[34] *Hsin-hua Jih-pao* [*New China Daily*], Chungking, May 30, 1953, p. 3.

[35] *Yangtze Daily*, June 2, 1952, p. 1.

In Canton, in addition to similar celebrations, 368
the Municipal "Children's Palace" was formally opened on June 1, 1952. As a "cultural center" for 858
the children, the "palace" was reported to have a capacity of 1, 500, and three departments -- political education, artistic education, and a department of science -- as well as a children's library.[36]

A three-year progress report on child welfare 868
was made by the Central-South Democratic Women's
Federation in 1952. Incomplete statistics showed 747
that 70 creches to care for 2, 000 children had been established in the urban districts, and that temporary organizations in the rural areas helped to care for 30, 000 children during the busy farm seasons. In the municipality of Wuhan before the Communist "liberation" in May 1949, the report stated, there had been only one crêche caring for 35 children, but in mid-1952 the number of creches had increased to 28, caring for 1, 000 children. The report claimed such achievements as a lower death rate for both infants and mothers and better health provisions for women and children. (See chapter on Health and Sanitation.) However, it also pointed out that in the many phases of child welfare, there was much need for improvement, especially in raising the standard of education for welfare workers.[37]

The first conference of the workers in women's 747
and children's welfare was convened October 3-12, 858

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[36] South China Daily, June 1, 1952, p. 1. 562

[37] Yangtze Daily, June 1, 1952, p. 3.

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1951, under the aegis of the All-China Democratic Women's Federation. With national production as the prime concern the conference decided the objective of welfare work should be to serve the masses of working women and their children. Its principal tasks were to promote better health and better health conditions for women and children, and to solve the problems which arose in the rearing and education of the children of working people. At the conference it was reported that 15, 700 child welfare organizations, including crêches, kindergartens, and relief institutions, had been established on the China Mainland. Another report claimed that in two years ending November 1951, some 4, 340 persons were trained to care for children and 3, 743 were trained as health workers to care for women and children. In the same period, 7, 295, 095 persons were reported to have attended the 128 exhibits arranged by propaganda agencies to promote good health among women and children.[38]

By the end of 1952, there were 34, 000 public health agencies for women and children in China as a whole, with additional mobile corps for the same purpose organized under all the provincial governments. In mining and construction works, in other enterprises, in organizations and schools, 2, 738 crêches were in existence in 1952; in cities, 4, 346 street crêches were set up, and in the rural areas 148, 200 crêches were organized to care for some 850, 000 children of agricultural families.[39]

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[38] New China Daily, May 30, 1953, p. 3.
[39] Ibid., April 18, 1953, p. 4.

Warefare in Korea began in 1950. Both the Suppression of Counterrevolutionaries Movement and the Resist-America-Aid-Korea Movement were in progress early in 1951. To justify the taking over of all foreign-subsidized cultural and philanthropic organizations, propaganda of the most glaring kind was printed in the newspapers.[40] In Central-South China, the focus of such propaganda was the Immaculate Conception Orphanage in Canton. This orphanage, established 18 years before, was supported by the Catholic churches of Canada and supervised by five nuns. One of its objectives was to counteract the practice of female infanticide in that area; all of the children in the orphanage were female and most had been abandoned by their parents. The Communist papers asserted that 94 per cent of the orphans had died as a result of neglect or the inhuman ways of the nuns. It was claimed that 2, 251 infants were received by the orphanage from the time of the "liberation" in October 1949 to 1952, and the number of deaths in the same period was 2, 116. When the Communists assumed control of the orphanage, according to the same report, they found 33 girls ranging from 5 to 18 years of age and 60 babies of less than a year, of which 40 were sick.[41] The five nuns were arrested and the orphanage was turned over to the People's Relief Administration of China. In the province of Kwangtung, the Communists assumed control of 27 foundling homes and orphanages and claimed to have delivered 983 children from the "cruelty of the imperialists."[42]

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[40] People's Daily, April 18, 1951, p. 5

[41] South China Daily, Feb. 27, pp. 1, 3.

[42] Ibid., May 31, 1952, p. 3.

One American-supported orphanage in Wuchang was accused of killing 16,000 Chinese children in the twenty-three years of its existence. The total number of relief organizations in China receiving foreign subsidy (largely from the United States) which were taken over by the Communists in 1951 was 246, with a total of 18,000 inmates. Of the organizations, 159 were designated as child welfare organizations.[43] 736

VI. AID TO FAMILIES OF "MARTYRS" AND SERVICEMEN

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In Communist China, aid to the families of "martyrs" and servicemen has been given serious attention. Concern for the welfare of armed forces' members and families was specified in Article 25 of the Common Program, one of the earliest documents adopted by the Peking regime. It states: "Dependents of those who have given their lives for the revolution and of members of the revolutionary forces who are in need shall receive preferential treatment from the state and from society. The People's Government shall make appropriate arrangements for disabled or retired servicemen who have participated in revolutionary war, providing them with the means of livelihood or occupation."[44] However, the nation-wide campaign did not begin until late 1950, which indicates that the activity was probably the result of the warfare in Korea.[45] On December 11, 1950, the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Peking regime promulgated five sets of regulations relating to compensation for dependents of servicemen. These were provisional regulations governing preferential treatment of families of revolutionary "martyrs" →

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[43] Yangtze Daily, Sept. 28, 1952, p. 4.

[44] The Important Documents of the First Plenary Session of Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1949, p. 10.

[45] Relief Work Under the Chinese Communists, p. 18.

and servicemen; preferential treatment of, and compassionate payments to, disabled servicemen; citations and compassionate payments for revolutionary workers injured or killed, and citations and compassionate payments for members of the People's Militia and laborers in military service injured or killed.[46] The preferential treatment of families of "martyrs" and servicemen included land and farming implements, government scholarships for their children, lower prices, discounts, etc. Only in cases of extreme hardship were direct payments given. 729 746

At the time of the lunar new year in 1951, which fell on February 6 in that year, the Communists promoted a campaign to honor the families of the Chinese People's Volunteers and the People's Liberation Army. Since then, the lunar new year, usually called the Spring Festival, and Chinese Communist Army Day, August 1, have been made the occasions for honoring the families of servicemen. 527

As part of the program to aid the dependents of "martyrs" and servicemen, those in the city able to work have been taught various handicrafts to assure their livelihood; in the rural areas, for those unable to work, a system of substitute-tilling has been adopted whereby land owned by such dependents is cultivated for them. 729 746

The Central South Military and Political Committee in its annual report of 1951-52 announced oustanding achievements in the program to aid the families of "martyrs" and servicemen. The committee claimed to have distributed JMP$60, 000, 000, 000 (approximately US$2, 700, 000) either as relief or in the form of loans. The people, said the report, were also encouraged to offer preferential treatment to the dependents of "martyrs" and servicemen. In 38 counties in Honan, a fixed system of substitute-tilling was carried out. In the I-yang county of Kiangsi, an area which had formed a part of the old base of the Chinese Soviet, 833 substitute-tilling groups were organized, and the land of 1, 834 families of "martyrs" was cultivated. In the cities, it was claimed, the local governments on various levels helped many members of such families to take part in production and to secure employment. In 15 large and medium cities of Central-South China (Chengchow, Kaifeng, and Chou-chia-k'ou in Honan, Wuhan, Sha-shih, I-ch'ang and Huang-shih in Hupeh, Changsha and Heng-yang in Hunan, Nanchang in Kiangsi, Canton in Kwangtung, and Nanning, Liu-chou, Kweilin and Wuchou in Kwangsi), 29 small factories were set up for the employment of a large number of dependents of "martyrs" and servicemen. In these cities and also some counties in Central-South China, 29, 697 dependents obtained employment through the recommendation of their local governments. Special schools and scholarships were set up for their children. In the three municipalities of Wuhan, Canton, and Nanchang, according to the same report, 21, 217 children received free education and 10, 322 children of "martyrs" and servicemen received free medical care.[47]

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[46] Hsin-hua Yüeh-pao [New China Monthly], Peking, Vol. III, No. 3, Jan. 1951, pp. 516-21.

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[47] Enlightenment Daily, July 29, 1952, p. 2.

According to a broadcast in January 1955 by the Minister of Internal Affairs of the Peking regime, incomplete statistics from 13 provinces showed more than 60 per cent of the families of "martyrs" and servicemen had become participants in mutual-aid groups and co-operatives, and many were elected officials of these organizations. Others were elected as delegates to the People's Congress or to village cadres.[48] The People's Daily (Jan. 25, 1955) reported that 382 rehabilitated veterans were elected "labor heroes" in July 1954. The same paper (Jan. 24, 1955) also reported that there was a 20 per cent increase in the number of families of servicemen joining mutual-aid groups and co-operatives in 1954 over the number in 1953. In Central-South China, statistics from 1,638 villages in 22 counties in Hupeh Province showed that of 24,039 servicemen's families, 15,099, or over 63 per cent, were participating in mutual-aid groups and co-operative organizations. 729 746

VII. CONCLUSION

In almost all documents concerning public welfare and relief in Communist China the emphasis is on production and labor power rather than human life. In regard to famine relief in the rural areas as well as unemployment relief in the cities, the people are asked to save themselves by "self-help-through-production." Even in concern for the welfare of women and children, the chief purpose is labor power. Whereas the humanitarian element prevails in public wel- —> 746 fare in the free world, it is generally lacking in a Communist state In the charter of the People's Relief Administration, Article 2 explains its function in the following sentence: "This Administration is an organization of the people under the leadership of the Central People's Government to unite and guide. . . relief and welfare workers to help the Government in the organization of the masses for the promoting of production and economy, labor and mutual-aid, so that the relief and welfare works for the masses of the people shall be enhanced."[49] The key words here are production, economy, labor, and mutual-aid. There is no allusion to the alleviation of suffering or the promotion of the well-being of the people.

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[48] New China Monthly, No. 2, Feb. 1955, p. 19.

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When one understands the Communist attitude toward public welfare, it helps one to grasp the overwhelming plight of those within the Soviet orbit who become the victims of calamities. Perhaps no written passage could illuminate the situation so vividly and succinctly as a parable recounted in one of the ancient Chinese classics.

> "In passing by the side of Mount Thai, Confucius came upon a woman who was wailing bitterly by a grave. . . . 'Your wailing,' said he, 'is altogether like that of one who has suffered sorrow upon sorrow.' She replied, 'It is so. Formerly, my husband's father was killed here by a tiger. My husband was also killed. . . . and now my son has died in the same way.' The Master said, 'Why do you not leave. . . [this] place?' The answer was, 'There is no oppressive government

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[49] Ho-pei Jih-pao [Hopei Daily], Paoting, May 5, 1950, p.1.

> here.' The Master then said (to ...[his] disciples), 'Rembmer this, my little children. Oppressive government is more terrible than tigers.'"[50]

Have man-made disasters in Communist China become fiercer than nature's floods and droughts? This may be the reason why so many Chinese prisoners of war in Korea did not choose to return to the China Mainland.

On April 4, 1950, in Taipei, the capital of Formosa, an organization called the Free China Relief Association was formed. Its purpose is to aid Chinese refugees from the Mainland and some of the suffering masses still under Communist rule. In the past five years, the association has aided more than 967,000 refugees and helped 51,846 people to escape to Formosa. During the flood of 1954, this organization sent thirty-five airplanes to the China Mainland and dropped about 100,000 pounds of rice and 7,500,000 handbills. The Free China Relief Association was also responsible for the rehabilitation of 14,500 Chinese prisoners of war from Korea, who chose Free China rather than return to the Communist fold. This group arrived in Formosa on January 23, 1954. The FCRA has established connections with the United Nations and the United States and has extended aid to Chinese refugees in many places, including Hong Kong, Japan, and Korea.[51]

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[50] Legge, James, tr., The Liki (The Book of Rites), Oxford at the Clarendon Press, 1885, Vol. 27 in The Sacred Books of the East, ed. by F. Max Muller, pp. 190-91.

[51] Chiu-chi T'e-k'an [Special Relief Bulletin] , published by Free Chinese Relief Association, Taipei, Sept. 1, 1955.

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At the United Nations Security Council meeting on November 28, 1950, the American delegate, Warren Austin, spoke of the relief supplies sent to China from the United States, of American efforts to feed and to clothe thousands upon thousands of Chinese people in the post-war years, and of the friendship expressed by the American people for China. Friendship between America and China has a long history. Because this is true, and a truth remembered by millions of Chinese, the Peking regime and the Communists have done all in their power to slander the United States.

During a period of two years (1945-47), China received several hundred millions of dollars' worth of American aid through the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration and the Chinese National Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. Although these programs were disrupted by civil strife between the Nationalists and the Communists and brought to an abrupt end by the Communist domination of the Mainland, many people benefited, After the outbreak of warfare in Korea, the Chinese Communist Government made the decision to assume control of all American-subsidized educational, relief, and religious organizations. According to the Communist report, American assets in these three categories amounted to US$41, 900, 000. Of this sum, 47 per cent was for relief and welfare work, which operated 200 orphanages, 20 leper asylums, 10 schools for the mute and deaf, and 30 schools for the blind.[52]

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52. Enlightenment Daily, Dec. 30, 1950, p. 1.

It is apparent that without American aid much welfare work will be suspended. It is unlikely that those who have received the benefit of these subsidized institutions will readily forget such gestures of American friendship. 000

ATTITUDES AND REACTIONS

The attitudes of an individual, although conditioned by the environment in which he lives and influenced by the persons with whom he comes in contact, are subject to changes that are well-nigh unpredictable; even under a set of given circumstances, his attitudes may not remain the same; he may simultaneously adopt diametrically opposed attitudes without being aware of the inconsistency. This fact, coupled with China's multitudinous regions and groups of people of varying characteristics, makes the task of gauging the attitudes of the Chinese people an exceedingly risky one at best. The Chinese, in general, are traditionally less outspoken than Americans. However, since attitudes manifest themselves in reactions and some of the reactions of the Chinese people are observable even in the official Communist announcements, a few very general and broad conclusions may be drawn. In this discussion, attention is focused on the attitudes of the various groups of Chinese toward their country, the Communist government, and the ambitions and aspirations of the individual.

In sociological studies, occupational stratification is one recognized criterion for analyzing any society. In adopting this approach for our discussion, we do not propose to overlook the significance of grouping the people according to other equally valid criteria, such as age, sex, and income. Older people, for example, are generally more conservative, less willing to adapt to change, and less likely to show enthusiasm for the Communist program. The rich, who have more to lose, are generally more dissatisfied with the Communist regime than their poorer countrymen. These patterns of attitudes tend to cut across the occupational stratification. In view of the technical limitations imposed on this discussion, professional stratification will be used, with allowance for the exceptions within each category.

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A. Farmers

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The rich absentee-landowners of China, whose social status ranks with that of government bureaucrats and whose interests are identified with that of rich merchants, are all but non-existent in Mainland China today. The Chinese farmer class consists of chiefly the poor peasants and "middle farmers" holding small lots of land. These people have had little opportunity to identify themselves with the state or its destiny. In fact, their mode of living tends to confine their interest to their own villages or to the limited area defined by the dialect they speak. A Cantonese farmer may feel as alien in Peking as in a foreign land. The farmers are only affected by the pressure of government taxation and legislation. Only in those areas overrun by invaders is the spirit of nationalism apt to arise. This was found to be true in Honan, Hupeh, and Hunan provinces, and in parts of Kwangtung, Kiangsi, and Kwangsi during World War II.

The Communists have made persistent efforts to "educate and propagandize" the farmers. The farmers in Hunan Province, for example, derive a large measure of pride and satisfaction from the knowledge that one of their fellow Hunanese, Mao Tse-tung, has become the leader of the nation. However, the fact that the farmers as a class have learned

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a few political terms as a result of Communist propaganda does not mean that they have developed a strong national feeling. Some of the farmers may regard the Communist effort to "educate" them as unwelcome interference. The younger farmers show a more favorable response to Communist propaganda.

The idea that he is to be given land in a manner to which he is totally unaccustomed probably has generated apprehension in even the poorest peasant who believed he wanted to be a landowner. To be sure, the gain through the process of land reform must have given the poor peasant some satisfaction. However, there is evidence that grain taxes remain heavy and Communist efforts to collectivize the marketing of farm produce have met a great amount of resistance. The poor farmer in China today is less happy than he was in the days immediately after the Communist land reform. The possibility still exists that changes in government policy toward the farmer may regain for the regime some of the farmer's enthusiasm. Available reports show that neither the government nor the farmer is satisfied with the amount of relief and welfare work done thus far, nor with the manner in which this work is done. Where disaster strikes, farmers still die helplessly, as such was the case recently reported in Kwangtung.[1] Although starvation is by no means unprecedented in China, failure to prevent starvation alienates support from the present regime. On the other hand, some improvement in his life may induce the farmer to feel favorably disposed toward the government.

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The Chinese farmer's picture of a foreign culture is derived from contact with foreign mission-

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[1] Ya-chou Tien-hsün [Asia Foundation Bulletin], San Francisco, Oct. 21, 1955, p. 6.

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aries. At one time foreign churches were established in all parts of Central-South China except a few of the remote districts along the Kiangsi-Kwangtung border and in western Kwangsi. Government efforts to foster xenophobia, supported by the effort of the ultranationalistic segment of the Chinese elite, dated from the nineteenth century. Some farmers in this region, particularly those in Hunan and Honan, are likely to remember, for instance, the stories about the Boxer's Rebellion, which terrorized many foreigners. With relish, the Communists are re-telling such stories as specimens of "anti-imperialistic" expressions of the Chinese people. A very small number of farmers who have been less influenced by anti-foreign propaganda and who have received benefits from foreign missionaries may be disturbed by the deliberate mistreatment of missionaries on the Mainland. Other farmers who regard the missionaries as an undesirable group may chuckle at the thought of the "foreign devils' downfall." But the majority of farmers have had little or no contact with foreigners; they are not particularly concerned with the latter's fate in Communist China.

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The Chinese farmer has always hoped to safeguard his family by acquiring land, provide a better education for his children, and maintain the respect of fellow villagers. Now that the farmer can no longer obtain as much land as he hopes, his interest turns to finding ways in which his children, through education, can advance on the social ladder. The fact that many young people from peasant families have been absorbed in the government "cadre" system may induce the Chinese farmers to look more kindly upon the present regime.

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Of course, there are exceptions among the farming population -- the members of secret societies, for example, are traditionally opposed to government control. Farmers active in these groups may have an altogether different set of attitudes toward the nation, foreigners, and the individual's role in society. Mass uprisings in which secret societies played an important part indicate that sometimes these groups have distinctively anti-foreign or anti-government characteristics. Others may uphold a standard of loyalty to the individual above traditional loyalty to the family or to the state.

B. Urban Workers

The group feeling of organized workers was aroused as early as the 1920's in industrial centers like Chengchow, Hankow, and Canton, where organized labor was involved in many political movements The worker realized that he was "in the group" and somewhat later came to the conclusion that he had to work "for the group" in those movements launched against foreign influence and private capital. Having been involved in these movements, the worker undoubtedly formed a more definite idea of the nation and its sumbols than that of the average farmer.

The Communist policy to raise the status of the worker must have given the worker a feeling of importance as he learned of the Communists' economic reconstruction plan. He is likely to feel a sense of achievement when a steel plant is erected or when a bridge is built, although he may not really believe that the workers, as the Communists say, are the masters of the new China. Other promised benefits, including job security and welfare provisions, also

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add to the popularity of the Communist regime among the workers, in spite of the fact that such "benefits" remain largely promises.

On the liability side of the Communist policy toward the worker are the lack of wage increases, a harsher work sechedule and loss of leisure time, and a visionary welfare program for the worker which the Communists themselves admit cannot be realized until the worker has worked still harder to produce still more. Thus the worker's attitude toward the government and its policy must depend on how much he believes in a glorious "tomorrow" and how well he can put up with the physical hardship of "today." The recent let-up in "labor emulation" drives and the sudden flurry of official warnings against driving the worker too hard appear to indicate that the laboring class is showing signs of possible exhaustion. In addition, the worker's attitude may also be greatly influenced by the rise of a new managerial class which is being fostered by the Communists and which, for whatever reasons, receives better treatment than do those who work on the production line.

C. Students and Intellectuals

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Of all the groups of people in China, the intellectuals are probably the most varied in their attitudes. They do not constitute a "class," hence their attitudes do not show any distinctive "group" characteristics. There are those whose strong convictions make them active leaders of social and political movements in defiance of authoritarian rule; there are others whose education and experience make them flexible under pressure. Hence no dependable conclusion on the attitudes of the Chinese intellectuals as a group has been arrived at.

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Though the attitudes of Chinese intellectuals differ, the great majority of them are exceedingly patriotic. It is therefore conceivable that to some of them at least the Communist emphasis on loyalty to the state rather than the traditional loyalty to the family must have a great appeal. There is reason to believe that most of them who accepted Communism in 1949 did so because they saw in the Communist program some hope of restoring China to a position of dignity among nations. After five years of Communist rule, some of the intellectuals are probably elated by the truculence with which Red China has been conducting its foreign affairs, and by the feeling that China, at long last, has been unified and become a nation of importance. But on the negative side there are the restrictions on intellectual freedom imposed by the Communists. Furthermore, the Communist policy of gradually substituting the freshly trained and well-indoctrinated intellectuals for those who have had a "liberal" or "conservative" background must have created a sense of insecurity among many.

Traditionally, Chinese intellectuals aspired to high positions in government where they might attain wealth, social esteem, and influence. For those intellectuals still harboring such personal ambitions, it must be heartening to see people with no seniority in either the Party hierarchy or the government bureaucracy among the ranks of the nation's leaders in all fields. For others, who have modified their personal ambitions and who sincerely wish to make their training useful to the country, something they have not been able to do for many years in the past, Peking's policy of finding a place for intellectuals in the national reconstruction program is a welcome move.

565 184 517 The Communists have counted on the enthusiastic support of students. From among the students the Communists recruit their loyal cadres. Exposure to regimentation may lessen the student enthusiasm for the Communist regime. Although anti-Communist sources in Hong Kong have reported a sharp decrease in the number of overseas Chinese students returning to the Mainland, the fact that some continue to return to China indicates the strong appeal of Communist ideology to literate Chinese youth. The Communists, however, may be expecting too much of their program of indoctrination; the young may give loyal support to a totalitarian regime, but it is unlikely that they can entirely suppress a simultaneous impulse toward individualism.

D. Businessmen and Industrialists

441 184 Few industrialists are left in Communist China today, but small-business men and manufacturers, who have made up the larger part of China's urban population continue to exist, although in reduced number. The merchant has always occupied an inferior position in traditional Chinese social strata, while industry is something relatively new and its position in Chinese society has yet to be clearly defined. In general, merchants and manufacturers, who had operated under government restrictions even in pre-Communist days, are cool-headed realists. They are not easily swayed by high-sound phrases. There have been few occasions when symbols of state could evoke intimate sentiment among the merchants and small manufacturers, except, perhaps, at a time when foreign goods flooded the Chinese market and caused dislocation of the Chinese economy.

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Under the Peking regime, business men and industrialists as a group fare badly (possibly not much better than rich landowners), and the general mood in industrial and commercial circles is most probably unfavorable toward the government. The Communists have made it clear that small-business men and manufacturers are only tolerated in the transitional stage of the New Democracy; and that there will be no room for private enterprise in the socialist construction, which is the ultimate goal of the Communist regime. Meanwhile, these people have to carry a large share of the tax burden and face the stiff competition of state enterprises. There is evidence that the business men and manufacturers, accustomed as they are to government interference, are finding the controls imposed by the Communist government much too strict, making it increasingly difficult to manipulate or elude restrictive measures.

If profit has been the most common motive among business men and manufacturers, under the present circumstances they have been forced to abandon or at least restrain their ambitions. Some of those who were allowed to do so have made a second choice -- that of changing their careers. The more adaptable have escaped the wave of purges by co-operating with the Communist regime. In this connection the Communists have appointed a number of erstwhile influential financiers and industrialists to serve in the government; it may be merely a conciliatory gesture of the Communists to win the support of small business, but it does provide the manufacturers some slight hope.

An aditional factor to provoke dislike for the regime among merchants and manufacturers is the control on foreign trade. Merchants in Kwangtung cannot acquire cheap imported consumer goods to which they had had access under the former regime. The control on smuggling meets disfavor among Kwangtung merchants who live along the international border. 441 184

E. Women

The customary position of women in China is subordinate to that of men. This tradition was so deep-rooted that it took superhuman courage for the first women to claim their "rights"; and the pain of "emancipation" continues under the Communists. 562 184

To the "emancipated!" belongs the responsibility; this is at least theoretically true, and the Chinese women who have exchanged one form of drudgery for another are generally expected to have a degree of political consciousness similar to that of men of equal education and comparable environment. In many cases women prove to be even more "patriotic" than men as a result of the unprecedented government effort to show women that they, too, can achieve enviable social recognition by a show of "patriotism."

How much improvement in the status of the women has been brought about by the Communists? Women are encouraged to participate in political activities; more tangibly and closer to their daily life, they are given child care, adult education, and other welfare benefits if they join the working froce. If the increase in the number of women workers in factories can be taken as an indication of the women's own free choice, then women in Communist China may indeed feel favorably disposed toward the

Communist regime. But upon closer observation this may not be the case; many women who undertook factory-work after 1949 may have done so as a financial necessity rather than as a result of free choice. 562 184

The much-publicized marriage law in Communist China embodies nothing new, but its vigorous and arbitrary enforcement is unprecedented. Even this Communist law has engendered mixed feelings among the women; acceptance will mean the destruction of some of the most stubborn traditions in China. (See discussion of the marriage law in the chapter on The Family.)

Some women hold high posts in government, and "labor heroines" are found in all industries. Housewives of well-to-do families in larger cities may live in leisure, but those of families of modest means may have to work outside the home and do not resent it as long as their work is not heavy ~~or~~ or manual in character. This means that the Communists have to continue their indoctrination of women to respect and enjoy labor. The age-group differential assets itself in the reactions of women to the new regime; older women who had learned to live in peace with the extended family system are likely to dread the Communist effort to reduce the extended family to the conjugal family; younger women are more apt to feel favorably disposed toward the Peking regime.

F. National Minorities

The minority groups in China have never felt any great loyalty toward the larger political entity 563 184 of China. Occasionally they have been made aware that a distant government claimed control over them; but most of the time they ignored the existence of the national government and were only annoyed by the local government's interference.

It is a Communist policy to cultivate a feeling of kinship between these groups and the Han-Chinese. The government's approaches, so far, have been mild and friendly. The effort to help the minority groups develop their own languages may serve to decrease the tension between the minorities and the Han-Chinese. The offer of more opportunities for the education and advancement of minorities will contribute to the growht of a "greater China." In Central-South China, where the minority groups have had no self-sufficient culture to challenge the superiority of the Han-Chinese, conflict between the Communists and the minorities is not likely to result. The key to the Communists' success or failure will depend upon their ability to fulfill the promises they have made to the minorities. The Communists claim credit for economic improvement in the minority areas but we have no certain proof that permanent changes have been made.

Even if we assume that the Communists have done all they promised to do, there is still a possibility of dissatisfaction among minority groups. Although most of the Chuang people (in Kwangsi Province) and the Miao people (in Hunan Province) have been assimilated by neighboring Han-Chinese, some may regard recent changes as an intrusion and resent the dictates of government "cadres."

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F. Other Groups

In addition to the groups discussed, there are other groups which, although minor in numerical strength, are of importance because their attitudes do have some bearing on the tensions in Chinese society.

It is evident that all Communist Party members and all government bureaucrats do not necessarily have the same attitudes, in spite of the fact that they are regimented by a well-controlled machine. High-ranking Communist officials exhibit intense feelings of patriotism and dedication to the "cause." They work to strengthen the machine which brought them to power, thereby making certain that they will not be deposed. Granted that the behind-the-scene struggle for personal power in a Soviet system is most difficult to discern, there have been a few signs of antagonism among the leaders. A purge as violent as that which took place in Russia in the 1930's at present cannot be predicted for China. Overshadowed by the unique personal prestige and cohesive power of Mao Tse-tung, the high-ranking Communist leaders have yet to offer evidence of power-seeking at the risk of disrupting Party harmony and hegemony. This, of course, does not preclude the development discord among Party leaders.

The personnel in lower Party echelons are subject to tremendous pressures from all sides. Even the most devoted Party workers are expected to prove their loyalty to Communism. The fact that the Party relies on close surveillance and an atmosphere of fear in order to keep members in line indicates the existence of dissatisfaction and dissidence within the Party ranks. In Kwangtung

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Province, there are more new members in local Party and Government bureaus. There are possibly more "opportunists" among the new members who joined the Party because they saw a chance for personal advancement. These people are undoubtedly more susceptible to discontent than those who joined the Party before it came to power. On the other hand, the old Party cadres may be provoked to discontent by the rise of new cadres to positions equal to or higher than their own. Generally speaking, cadres assigned to rural areas are less enthusiastic about the regime than those in urban areas who live in more comfortable circumstances and have more frequent opportunities for promotion.

Former Nationalist officials had their darkest days during the Three-Anti and Five-Anti campaigns, when almost all lived under the imminent threat of violence and death. After these intensive campaigns had subsided, a few former Kuomintang personnel remained among the Communist government bureaucrats. There is no doubt that these former Kuomintang personnel are reminded of the necessity of proving their thorough conversion to Communism. A sense of insecurity affects this group more virulently than it does "securely situated" segments of the Chinese population.

G. Conclusion

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The Communist system of multiple control, which penetrates all aspects of life, and the Communist effort to maintain a strong tie with Russia are two major causes of dissatisfaction among the

Chinese people. Regimentation, when carried to the extreme, provokes the resistance of the people. Subservience to the Soviet destroys the spirit of nationalism which Communists have been trying to cultivate in China. There is evidence that Peking is attempting to reduce the possibility of friction between the Russians and the Chinese without damaging the ideological kinship and the diplomatic relationship between China and the Soviet Union. The activities of the wide-spread Sino-Russian Friendship Association, and the continual propaganda on Russian aid to Communist China, indicate a sustained effort to create a favorable attitude toward Soviet Russia.

The general patterns of attitudes we have discussed can serve only as indications of the prevailing social mood among various groups. Sociologists agree that it is difficult to predict group response. This, it appears, must apply to a study of a people so various in temperament as the Chinese.

CONSTITUTION

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The Constitution of the People's Republic of China, adopted in September, 1954, is designed to serve the country as a whole. No attempt has been made to explore its provisions on a regional basis. However, a study of certain interesting phases of the Constitution is included in this handbook as Appendix A, and readers are urged to consult it.

1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF14 Central China AF14

STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT

I. MILITARY CONQUEST

669 The present government of the Communist regime in Central-South China is a continuation of the Chung-yüan, or Central China Provisional Government, which was established by the Communists in December 1948. The Communists look upon this region, which consists of the six provinces of Honan, Hupeh, Hunan, Kiangsi, Kwangtung, and Kwangsi, as the birthplace of Chinese Communism, for within its borders, Mao Tse-tung, Li Hsien-nien, and Fang Fang, among others, began their revolutionary activities.

Although Communist revolutionary leaders failed to keep these provinces as strongholds before World War II, two years after the war, Teng Hsiao-p'ing and Liu Po-ch'eng emerged from hiding and became active in an area extending from the Yellow River in the north to the Yangtze Valley in the south, and west from the Han River to the Tientsin-- P'u-k'ou (Pukow) railroad in the east.

At the end of 1948, when the battle of Huai Hai was in progress, the Communist Field Army, under Ch'en-I, was joined by the Communist Second Field Army, under Liu Po-ch'eng, which had been fighting in the vicinity of Ta-pieh Shan Range in North China, and the Communist Fourth Field Army, under Lin Piao, which had been active in northeast China (Manchuria). One and a half years after the fall of Canton and Hainan Island, the conquest of Central-South China was complete.

669 724 As the army of Lin Piao entered the battle from the northeast along the Peking-Canton railroad, the jurisdiction of the Chung-yüan Provisional Government

was extended to give the Communists control over other provincial governments. The Military and Political Committee, which had jurisdiction over the six provinces of Central-South China, was established in February 1950. These provinces, with the exception of a part of Honan and Hupeh, came under the domination of the Communists after the crossing of the Yangtze River in 1949. The Communist conquest of the southern provinces was successful because of the factors described in a report made by Teng Tzu-hui, vice-chairman of the Military and Political Committee, in February 1950:

> "For the purpose of annihilation of the enemy army and liberation of the people, we depended mainly upon the heroic efforts of the People's Liberation Army. The logistic support, or Aid-to-the-War-Front Drive, also fulfilled a mission of great importance. This was a complicated and heavy responsibility. During the months of March and April of last year, we had to give supplies to the Second Field Army of 400, 000 men who passed through Honan and Hupeh to cross the Yangtze Valley. In May and June of the same year, we had to supply the Fourth Field Army of 1, 000, 000 men who marched through the provinces. In the months of September and October we were called upon for the third time to supply the 600, 000 men of the Second Field Army for an expedition to the Southwest Region, and it also became necessary to send reinforcements for these armies which fought side by side in the south and west of China. Our rallying cry was 'All for the support of the war-front; all for the battlefield; all for the victory!'"[1]

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[1] Teng Tzu-hui, "Ch'ien Chung-yüan Lin-shih Cheng-fu Chin I-nien-lai Ti Shih-cheng Pao-kao" [Report on the Administration of the Former Chung-yuan Provisional Government during the Past Year,"], *Tu-pao Shou-ts'e* [*Newspaper Reading Handbook*] , Hankow, Ch'ang-chiang jih-pao she, 1950, p. 263.

The main task of the Aid-to-the-War-Front Drive was to assure the supply of food and other necessities and to carry wounded troops to areas of safety. In districts where revolutionary governments were already in existence, supply stations were readily formed at important points. In areas where there was no revolutionary government, the armies depended on the detachment of civilian workers who followed the armies and also on the temporarily formed peace-preservation corps for collection of food and forage, and for transportation arrangements. The following is an incomplete list of the amounts of supplies to the Communist field armies in this region.

Supplies for Communist Field Armies (Nov. 1949)*

Supplies#	Amount Supplied
Food..........	480, 241, 293 catties (528, 265, 422 lbs.)
Firewood	322, 788, 208 catties (355, 067, 0[illegible]9 lbs.)
Grass for horses....	118, 193, 268 catties (130, 012, 595 lbs.)
Other fodder..	75, 469, 000 catties (83, 015, 900 lbs.)

*/ Teng Tzu-hui, "Ch'ien Chung-yüan Lin-shih Cheng-fu Chin-i-nien-lai Ti Shih-cheng Pao-kao" [Report on the Administration of the Former Chung-yüan Provisional Government during the Past Year"] , Tu-pao Shou-ts'e [Newspaper Reading Handbook] , Hankow, Ch'ang chiang jih-pao she, 1950, p. 625.

#/ Supplies from the provinces of Kwangtung and Kwangsi are not included.

In addition, the Chung-yuan Provisional Government organized laborers, who gave the equivalent of 30, 329, 080 work-days to aid the Communist field armies on the march. The workers repaired 2, 188 kilometers

(1, 367. 5 miles) of railroad lines, 145 bridges, 12, 516 kilometers (7, 822. 5 miles) of highways, and 1, 293 highway bridges, according to the Communist report.[2] 669 724

Teng Tzu-hui explained the difficulty of the task. "Except for Honan and part of Hupeh which belonged to the old liberation area, the other four provinces, excluding Hainan Island, were liberated within six months, so the responsibility of taking-over was a heavy one."[3]

The Communists first seized power in the urban districts, which contained the largest number of persons sympathetic to Communism, and then extended their influence to the rural districts. A great number of cadres of the Communist Party including 10, 000 from North China, 8, 000 from Northeast China, and 5, 000 from Central China, were drafted and sent to this region to assist. Underground workers were also employed in Hunan, Kwangtung, and Kwangsi. In each province a "revolutionary university" was established to train educated men and women for the service of the Party. Approximately 200 to 300 men and women were enlisted in each country, and altogether a total of 200, 000 inhabitants of Central-South China were trained for Party work. All existing governmental institutions were kept as they were, but employed personnel had to undergo the process of re-education in Communist doctrine. The old personnel under the pao-chia system (an organization established on the local level for the promotion of public safety) was left intact in order to avoid disturbances and to maintain a system of village defense. Shortly thereafter, the Communists organized peasants' associations, trade unions, and women's federations, thus encompassing all groups.[4] 669 727

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[2] Ibid., p. 625.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid., p. 626.

II. POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC STABILITY

On March 10, 1950, Lin Piao, chairman of the Military and Political Committee of the Central-South Region, made another report to the administration of the Central People's Government "In the Central-South Area a fundamental change is going on. The center of activity has now been shifted from the military to the economic aspect and to the preparatory work for land reform. This change has arisen out of the speedy victory of the Liberation War."[5]

Lin announced that within six months the Kuomintang's regular army of 600,000 men and a militia of 500,000 men had been totally destroyed. Following this "historic conquest," he continued, the "orderly assumption of control" of the cities and the extension of the Communist regime to the rural areas had begun. Trade and industry were beginning to revive. The masses of workers had been duly assigned to factories and other productive enterprises. Meanwhile, a movement for the suppression of local despots and for rent reduction had been established. Within the four provinces of Honan, Hupeh, Kiangsi, and Hunan, 230,000 "bandits" were captured and 150,000 scattered enemy soldiers were brought together and reorganized to serve in the Communist military forces.[6] Lin concluded: "Governments in the rural areas also went through a process of transformation. This is the beginning of favorable conditions for us."

The following tasks were ordered for the Central-South region: (1) elimination of the enemy and the strengthening

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[5] Lin Pao, "Chung-nan-ch'ü I-chiu-wu-ling-nien Ti Kung-tso Jen-wu," [The 1950 Mission for Central-South China"] , Ibid., p. 608.

[6] Ibid., p. 609.

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of the forces for national defense; (2) production and reconstruction; (3) preparations for land reform; (4) financial reform and reinforcement of the economy; (5) establishment of representative bodies for the consolidation of the people's political power; and (6) establishment of cultural and educational programs and the training of cadre members.

The people of the Central-South Region and the cadres which had been recruited were ordered to mobilize as if for war in order to speed reconstruction. Under the first point given above, emphasis was placed upon the strengthening of the army to increase its efficiency. Under the second point, emphasis was placed on the rehabilitation of light industries, although this program necessitated reforms in currency, communications, and commerce.[7] No less important were the projects involving agriculture and irrigation.

The initial economic policies in the Central-South China Region seemed moderate if we judge from the measured ordered. Labor-management were to be conducted through collective bargaining and arbitration; business-accounting methods were to be used and waste was eliminated. Finally, technical experts were to be employed, with the aim of mass production of goods of high quality at low cost.

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In the field of agriculture, during the period of transition before the Land Reform Movement began, "landlords" and rich peasants were to be allowed to continue to collect rents from their tenants, although the rents were to be reduced by 25 per cent. "Landlords" were to grant loans to their tenants. "Landlords" would not be allowed to divide their property or sell

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[7] Ibid., pp. 609-11.

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any part of it, and they would be subject to fine or imprisonment if they killed their cattle or destroyed horses. When transfer of land took place, all crops harvested were to go to those who had sown the seeds. These proposals seem moderate, and very probably they were meant to be so when they were initiated by Lin Piao, who knew that there was certain to be considerable resistance to the policy of land confiscation. However, the transition period before land reform was to be short. Lin Piao proposed that land reform in the provinces of Hunan, Kiangsi, and Kwangtung should be completed in 1951. Several other temporary measures instituted during the transition period are worth mentioning. Industrial and commercial enterprises belonging to "landlords" were in no way to be curtailed. After the estates of the "landlords" had been confiscated, they were to be given exactly the same amount of land as that given the poor peasants. And, rather surprisingly, unnecessary violence was not to be used against the "landlords" if they resisted the confiscation of property.[8]

III. ABOLITION OF THE MILITARY AND AND POLITICAL COMMITTEE

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In the year 1952, a resolution changing the status and the name of the regional Military and Political Committee was passed by the Peking Government. The military governor of the region had assumed too much authority in the administration of government affairs. After the Committee had been abolished, the provincial govern-

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8. Ibid., pp. 611-13.

ments came under the direct control of the Central People's Government. There is no doubt that the elimination of the regional government as such simplified the hierarchy of administration and that it is a measure in agreement with the tradition of China as a unitary state. From that time, the provincial governments were directly under the control of the Central People's Government, but the chairmen of the provinces were allowed to continue in office until the promulgation of the Constitution. The names of the chairmen were as follows: 631

Province	Chairmen	Term
Honan.	Wu Chih-p'u	1949-55
Hupeh.	Li Hsien-hien	1949-54
Hunan.	Wang Shou-tao	1949-52
Kiangsi.	Shao Shih-p'ing	1949-55
Kwangtung. .	Yeh Chien-ying	1949-54
Kwangsi. . . .	Chang Yüan-i	1949-54

Because of the differences in geographical position, the varying economic conditions which prevail, and the differing characteristics of the people in the various provinces, an examination of the work of the provincial governments should be useful for an understanding of the political situation.

Chairman Wu Chih-p'u reported[9] that the peasant movement sponsored by the Communists 668

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[9] Wu Chih-p'u, "Ho-nan-sheng Jen-min Cheng-fu I-nien-lai Shih-cheng Kung-tso Pao-kao," ["Report on the Administration of the Honan People's Government during the Past Year"], *Cheng-fu Kung-tso Pao-kao Hui-pien*, 1950 [*Compendium of Government Reports, 1950*], Peking, Jen-min ch'u-pan-she, 1951, p. 828.

involved 21, 900, 000 members, or 73 per cent of 668
the total population of 30, 000, 000. Among the workers in twleve cities and the laborers employed 467
at the Hsin Yü coal mines, 71, 711, or 47 per cent, of a total of 152, 613 men, were members of the trade union.[10]

In ten *hsiang* in Chia county, 223 landlord families and 283 rich peasant families, 9 per cent of the population of 5, 863 families, owned more than 1, 900 *mou* (about 316 acres) of land before the "Liberation" -- 49 per cent of the land in the ten *hsiang*. Although the anti-despot movement and the rent-reduction movement had reduced their holdings, the average acreage owned by "landlords" and "rich peasants" remained nearly twice as much as that owned by the peasants and hired farmers. After reform, the average amount of land owned by the "landlord" became 1. 46 *mou* (about 1/6 of an acre), that of the poor peasants was raised to 1. 5 *mou*, that of the rich peasants to 1. 9 *mou*, and that of the middle peasants was increased from 2 *mou* to 2. 7 *mou*.[11] These figures suggest how sweeping the land reform movement was. Land reform was of first importance to the Communist regime because its inauguration gained the support of the peasants who formed the majority of the population. 423 [565]

Hupeh Province, in the Yangtze Valley, has a greater concentration of industry than the neighboring Honan Province. As in other provinces, land reform became a major part of the Communist program in Hupeh. Li Hsien-nien, chairman of Hupeh, reported that the movement for rent re- 427

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[10] *Ibid.*, p. 828.

[11] *Ibid.*, p. 828.

duction was successfully concluded about October 427
1950, and that approximately 206, 500, 000 catties
(227, 150, 000 lbs.) of rice had been refunded to
poor tenant farmers. Peasants' associations, 575
with a total membership of 4, 141, 466, were organ-
ized in 15, 175 hsiang throughout the province. 668
One-fourth of the members were women. As a
result of the organization of the peasants' associations, the power of government passed into the hands of Communist officials in 5, 190 hsiang, although in the remaining 9, 985 hsiang the change was only a partial one.[12]

Since the Chinese Communists well knew that popular support was necessary for a strong government, they had the wisdom to establish the Peasants' Association, which in a certain way worked as an informal representatives' conference before the regime was able to establish a formal one in each hsiang or county.

Wang Shou-tao, chairman of Hunan Province, 575
mentioned in his report of June 1950[13] that there
were 14, 830 hsiang in the province, and that 423
Peasants' Associations had been formed in 19, 564
hsiang, with a total membership of 5, 730, 000. Chin Ming, chairman of the Land Reform Committee of Hunan, reported in October 1950 that, because there were 28, 000, 000 people in the two municipalities and 77 counties of Hunan, it would be necessary to limit land reform to 33 counties with a total population of 17, 000, 000. He expected that within a year or two the work of land

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[12] Li Hsien-nien, "Hu-pei-sheng Jen-min Cheng-fu I-nien-lai Shih-cheng Pao-kao Yü Chin-hou Jen-wu ["Report on Last Year's Administration and Future Tasks of the Hupeh People;s Government']. Ibid., p. 862.

[13] [following page] .

reform could be completed.

reform could be completed. 000

Hunan Province, rich in agricultural products, is also rich in mining and industry. Twenty-one industries and mines owned by the provincial government and 281 privately owned factories and mines were "rehabilitated" after a period of inoperation during the southward march of the Communist army.[15] In Hunan, Tungting Lake was utilized to prevent floods and to aid in irrigation. 471

Kiangsi Province lies along the southern bank of the Yangtze River, east of Hupeh. Ch'en Cheng-jen, secretary of the Kiangsi branch of the Communist Party, reported in August 1950 that, in 83.6 per cent of the hsiang in Kiangsi, 113,860 peasants' associations were formed,[16] and that the membership had reached 1,300,000. 575

There are 99 counties and three municipal- 000

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13. Wang Shou-tao, "Hu-nan-sheng Jen-min Cheng-fu Kung-tso Pao-kao" ["Report on the Administration of the Hunan People's Government] , Ibid., p. 891.

14. Chin Ming, "Wei Cheng-chü Sheng-li Shih-hsien Ching-tung Ming-ch'un T'u-ti Kai-ko Erh Fen-tou" ["Struggle for the Successful Realization of Land Reform during this Winter and Next Spring"] , Ibid., p. 907.

15. Wang Shou-tao, "Hu-nan-sheng Jen-min Cheng-fu I-nien-lai Kung-tso Tung-chieh Yü Chin-hou Kung-tso Jen-wu" ["Summary of the Last Year's Administration and of Future Tasks for the Hunan People's Government] , Ibid., p. 896.

16. Ch'en Cheng-jen, "Kuan-yü Chiang-hsi-sheng T'u-ti Kai-ko Wen-t'i Ti Pao-kao" [Re-on Land Reform in Kiangsi Province] , Ibid., p. 853.

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There are 99 counties and three municipalities, with a total population of 27,460,000, in Kwangtung Province. The vice-chairman, Fang Fang, reported that, of this number, 19,210,000 were peasants. A table released by Chen Han-sen, a research fellow of sociology and economics at the Academia Sinica, was quoted by Fang Fang,[17] as follows: 30 per cent of the arable land in Kwangtung Province was designated as a source of family revenue for the ancestor-temple; 23 per cent of the arable land was owned by 110,000 landlord families ; 13 per cent was owned by 220,000 rich farmer families; 13 per cent was owned by 1,090,000 families of the middle peasantry; and 19 per cent was owned by poor and hired peasants in 4,040,000 families. These figures, Fang Fang maintained, showed the inequality of land distribution; 53 per cent of the arable land was owned by the landlord families, who constituted only 2 per cent of the total number of families in the province. Fang Fang said: "The People's Government must take a cautious attitude because this area was late in being liberated and because its geographical position is too remote to be influenced by the older liberated areas. Furthermore, the proximity of this province to Hong Kong and Macao makes it more accessible to bandits and spies who are always trying to stir up disturbances.[18] The people of Kwangtung are not so submissive as those in other provinces, in spite of the fact that much propaganda work had been done by the Communist regime to induce them to accept land reform.

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[17] Fang Fang, "Kuan-yu Kuang-tung T'u-ti Kai-ko Wen-t'i Ti Pao-kao" ["Report on Land Reform in Kwangtung Province"] , Ibid., p. 938.

[18] Ibid., pp. 941-42.

Kwangsi Province, like Kwangtung, lies near the Pearl River. It was for many years under the separate rule of Li Tsung-jen and Pai Ch'ung-hsi, both of whom were strongly opposed to Communism. Long before the Communists came into power, Li and Pai warned the people of Kwangsi against the threat of Communism, and as a result the Communists found it most difficult to win the support of the people. Li Ch'u-li, a member of the Kwangsi Provincial Government, mentioned in a report in October 1950 that the membership in the peasants' associations was only 1,340,000, the second smallest membership in the Central-South China Region.[19] 668 575

IV. THE REPRESENTATIVES' CONFERENCE

The Representatives' Conference was utilized by the Communists in the period 1950-53 as a preparation for the People's Congress, which had not yet been established. Chairman Wu Chih-p'u gave a report on the representatives' conferences held in the counties, municipalities, and Peasants' Associations of Honan, listing the number of conferences held and the membership involved. 646

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[19] Li Ch'u-li "San-nien-nei Shih-hsien Kuang-hsi-sheng Ti T'u-ti Kai-ko Shih Kuang-hsi-sheng Jen-min Ti Kuang-yung Jen-wu" ["To Complete Land Reform in Kwangsi within Three Years is the Proud Task of the Kwangsi People"], Ibid., p. 967.

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Representatives'Conferences */

Location	No. of Members	No. of Conferences
Counties	31,472	141
Ten Municipalities	5,430	44
County Peasants' Associations	213,750	1,130
Hsiang Peasants' Associations	466,587	9,254
Total	717,239	10,569

*/ Wu Chih-p'u, "Ho-nan-sheng Jen-min Cheng-fu I-nien-lai Shih-cheng Kung-tso Pao-kao" ["Report on the Administration of Honan People's Government during the Past Year"], *Cheng-fu Kung-tso Pao-kao Hui-pien, 1950,* [*Compendium of Government Reports, 1950*], Peking Jen-min ch'u-pan-she, 1951, pp. 835-36.

The Chinese Communists believe that required participation in conferences gives the people an understanding of the operation of the Communist form of "democratic" government.

The Wang Shou-tao, chairman of Hunan, also gave an account of the practice of holding the Representatives' Conferences in Hunan Province. In 9,564 *hsiang* out of a total of 14,830 peasants' associations were formed with a total membership

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of 4,600,000. The peasants' associations were expected to send delegates to the Representatives' Conferences held at the county and municipality levels. Wang mentioned that in 67 counties and municipalities at least one representatives' conference was held, and in some cases as many as four conferences were held in the period from June to October 1950. These conferences, Wang claimed, influenced the work of the county governments. In the hsiang, the peasants' association was used as a substitute for the representatives' conference, and members were permitted to elect the officials of the hsiang executive branch.

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This eagerness to bring the people together for conferences was shown by Wang Shou-tao[20] and also by Cheng Shao-wen, Minister of Civil Affairs, who reported to the Military and Political Committee of Central-South China on democratic reconstruction work in November 1952. They seemed to believe that there was a correlation between the number of conferences and the political progress made by the Communist regime in that particular area. Cheng Shao-wen gave the following figures concerning the representatives' conferences held in each county and all provinces from 1950 to July 1952.

Province	Average No. of Conferences
Honan	7.99
Hunan	5.85
Hupeh	6.68
Kiangsi	7.54
Kwangsi	5.00
Kwangtung	4.95

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[20] W ng Shou-tao, op. cit., p. 898.

In each province, a Provincial Represen tives' Conference was held at least twice, and the Representatives' Conference for the municipality of Wuchang-Hankow was held five times; the conference for Canton was convened seven times; conferences in forty smaller cities in this region were held eight times; and in the municipality of Nanchang, a conference was held fourteen times. The publication of these figures was offered not only in compliment to the zealous conference workers, but also served as an implied rebuke to those who refused to show the required degree of enthusiasm. 646

In the preparatory stage. representatives to the conferences were elected from a number of professional groups, including the peasants' associations, the trade unions, the chambers of commerce and industry, and the cultural and educational associations. Cheng's report clearly shows that in this period many mistakes were committed, but these were seized upon and re-examined so that future mistakes might be avoided when the People's Congress, at all levels, should next be convened. Many illegal practices were discovered. Sometimes a candidate was chosen without the formality of election; in other cases representatives were appointed by the Party; in other cases substitutes were chosen for those representatives already elected. Cheng also reported that in some instances landlords and counter revolutionaries were elected to the representatives' conferences. 646 666

On the other hand, Cheng's report includes examples of cases in which members of the Representatives' Conference in Hsi-shui County had the courage to accuse members of the Communist 661

661 Party cadres of corruption, extravagance with government funds, bureaucracy, violations of laws, and "independent" action counter to government policy. Among those accused were members of the Communist county branch, the head of the county, the chief of the commercial and artisan division, the chief of the cultural and educational division, a secretary of a district branch of the Chinese Communist Party, and a principal of a high school.[21]

V. THE NEW CONSTITUTION

671 666 An electoral law for the People's Congress on all levels was promulgated on March 1, 1953. Then followed the registration of voters, the choice of candidates, the institution of election campaigns, the elections, and the counting of ballots.

646 666 The meeting of the National People's Congress, which was scheduled for September 1954, was preceded by the election of deputies to the provincial, municipal, county, and hsiang People' congresses of a province, a county, and a municipality divided into districts shall be elected by the People's Congress on the next lower level.

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[21] Cheng Shao-wen, "Chung-nan-ch'u Ti-erh-tz'u Min-cheng Hui-i Shang- Kuan-yu Min-chu Chien-cheng Kung-tso Ti Pao-kao" ["Report on the Democratic Reconstruction Delivered before the Second Central-South China Civil Administration Conference"] , Ch'ang-chiang Jih-pao [Yangtze Daily] , Hankow, November 13, 1952, p. 3.

After convening of the People's Congress at 646 all levels, the provincial governments were busy [659] with census-taking, the registration of voters, elections, meetings of the hsiang congress and congress of the municipality, and the election of the delegates to be sent to the congress on the next higher level. On September 15, 1954, the [642] National People's Congress met for the first time, and on September 20, 1954, the new Constitution was passed. The principles of organization for provincial governments and local governments were formulated. A statute for the organization of the local People's Congress on all levels and the local People's Council was published, followed by the election of new chairmen and of the members of the provincial government.

A. The Provincial Government

In the post-Constitution period, the provincial 635 governments have been placed on a new basis. Each province has the status of an administrative district under the supervision of the Central People's Government, according to Chinese political tradition. However, there is a point of departure from the traditional system, in that some members of the provincial government are elected locally (see below) and a Provincial People's Congress has a share in the deliverative functions. The term "legislative" which is applied to the National Congress in Peking, does not appear in the section of the Constitution formulating the principles of organization for the provincial government. As a result, the Provincial People's Congress is limited to the function of a deliberative body. Thus each province, according to Article 53 of the Constitution of the People's Republic of China, becomes an administrative district modified to such an extent that its chief duties concern only the passing of budgets, the enforcing of laws, and the safeguarding of the "rights" of the citizens. Although the provincial government is an elected body and a Provincial People's Congress sits next to it, it does not resemble an American state, with its reserved powers, nor does it resemble a British borough, which operates under a special grant of powers. 635

The province under the Chinese Communist Constitution is only one of a number of administrative districts, which are comprised of provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities, all directly responsible to and under the authority of the Central People's Government. Even the county and the hsiang are considered administrative districts, although they are not directly under the authority of the Central People's Government. 631

The provincial executive body consists of a governor, a number of deputy-governors, and 25-55 members of the Provincial People's Council. Although the governor, the deputy-governors, and the members of the Provincial Council are elected by the Provincial People's Congress, the commissioners, who head the twelve provincial departments -- Civil Affairs, Public Security, Finance, Grain, and the like -- are appointed by the Central People's Government, according to Article 9 of the Organizational Law of the State Council. 635

The Provincial People's Congress has the following powers, according to the Chinese Communist Constitution: 635 646

1. To insure observance and execution of the resolutions of the National People's Congress.

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2. To adopt and promulgate resolutions within the limits of their functions and power.
3. To plan economic construction, cultural construction, public works, pension work, and relief work.
4. To consider and approve budgets and financial statements.
5. To elect members to the Provincial People's Council.
6. To elect presidents of the Provincial People's Courts.
7. To elect deputies to the National People's Congress.
8. To hear and examine the work reports of the Provincial People's Council, and the Provincial People's Court.
9. To revise or annul inappropriate decisions and orders of the Provincial People's Council.
10. To revise or annul inappropriate decisions of the People's congresses of the next lower level and the inappropriate decisions and orders of the People's Councils of the next lower level.
11. To protect public property, maintain public order, and safeguard civil rights.
12. To ensure the equal rights of minority nationals.
13. To recall the members of the Provincial People's Councils and the president of the court, elected by them.

The members of the Provincial People's Congress are elected by the congresses in the counties, municipalities, etc., rather than directly by the people of the province.

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The number of members elected is governed by two principles concerning the population of the province and the number of counties which lie within the territory of each province. These two principles are stipulated by the Electoral Law of the People's Congress: .

"A province with a population not exceeding 20,000,000 shall elect from 100 to 400 deputies; with a population exceeding 20,000,000, from 400 to 500 deputies. In a province where the population and the number of counties is exceedingly small, the number of deputies may be less than 100 but not less than 50; where the population and the number of counties are exceptionally large, the number of deputies may exceed 500 but must not exceed 600....

"A county with a population not exceeding 200,000 shall elect one to three deputies; a county with a population exceeding 200,000 and not more than 600,000 shall elect two to four deputies; a county with a population exceeding 600,000 shall elect three to five deputies. From the municipalities, towns, and important industrial and mining districts within the province, one deputy shall be elected for every 20,000 population."

These principles give the six provinces of the Central-South Region the following quotas of delegates to the National People's Congress:

Delegates to the National People's Congress

Province	No. of Delegates	Population	No. of Counties	No. of Provincial Municipalities	No. of Hsiang
Honan	535	44, 214, 594	86	12	6, 411
Hupeh	361	27, 789, 693	71	5	15, 175
Hunan	505	33, 226, 954	77	2	14, 830
Kiangsi	408	16, 772, 865	82	9	9, 994
Kwangsi	560	34, 770, 059	99	9	9, 576
Kwangtung	417	19, 560, 822	99	6	lacking

When the local People's congresses were convened, they first elected the delegates to be sent to the People's Congress on the next higher level. Only after the National People's Congress ratified the constitution and the laws of organization of the People's Council and the People's Congress on all levels did the members of the provincial congresses and the county congresses know what their duties were to be, the number of persons to be assigned to local government, and the number of persons they were entitled to elect.

1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF 14 C-S China

The results of the election of provincial executive officers were announced after September 1954:

Honan Province:

Governor: Wu Chih-p'u.
Deputy-Governors: Chao Wen-fu, Hsing Chao t'ang, Shih Fang-sheng, Chi Yu-fu, Chia Hsin-chai, Ch'i Wen-chien.
President of Provincial People's High Court: Wang Kuang-li.

Hupeh Province:

Governor: Liu Tzu-hou.
Deputy-Governors: Chang T'i-hsüeh, Hsiung Chin-huai, Liu Chi-sun, Li-Ming-hao, Ch'en I-hsin, Nieh Kuo-ch'ing.
President of Provincial People's High Court: Chien I-min.

Hunan Province:

Governor: Ch'eng Ch'ien.
Deputy-Governors: Chou Hsiao-chou, T'ang Sheng-chih, T'an Yu-pao, Ch'eng Hsing-ling, Hsü Ch-i-wen, Hsia Ju-ai, Chang Meng-hsu.
President of Provincial People's High Court: Ts'ao Po-wen.

Kiangsi Province:

Governor: Shao Shih-p'ing.
Deputy-Governors: Fang Chih-ch'un, Jao Ssu-ch'eng, Wang Cho-ch'ao, Huang Hsien, Ch Chieh-yung, Ouyang Wu.
President of Provincial People's High Court: Ch K'ai-ch'üan.

Kwangtung Province.

Governor: T'ao Chu.

Deputy-Governors: Ku Ta-ts'un, Feng Po-chü, Ho Hsi-ming, Wen Min-sheng, Ch'en Ju-t'ang, Ch'iu Che, Yin Lin-p'ing

President of Provincial People's High Court: Chou Nan.

Kwangsi Province:

Governor: Wei Kuo-ch'ing.

Deputy-Governors: Ho Chung-shih, Li Jen-jen, Ch'en Tsai-li Mo Nai-ch'ün, Hsiao I-chou, T'an Ying-chi, Lu Shao-wu, Ch'en T'zu-sheng.

President of Provincial People's High Court: Hou Mu-han.

Each provincial governor, upon his election, summons the Provincial Congress and reports on the work accomplished by the previous administration as well as upon the work to be done under his administration. Then a budget for the coming fiscal year is presented to the Congress and a financial statement for the year past is approved. The Congress is expected to approve the governor's proposals. Besides convening to give routine assent, the Provincial Congress sends statements of support to the Central People's Government on special occasions, as part of the general procedure of the Provincial Congress.

B. Local Government

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The administrative districts below the provincial level include the municipality, the county, and the hsiang or chen. Urban populations live

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in municipalities and counties; the hsiang is a unit of rural or semi-rural population. Between the provincial level and the county level is the Administrative District Commissioner, whose duty as agent of the regime calls for inspection of the county governments within his assigned district. The office of the administrative district commissioner has been established on the basis of Article 42 of the principles for the organization of the local People's Congress and People's Council. Commissioners are appointed by the provincial government.

SUBDIVISIONS OF THE SIX PROVINCES

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The following list gives the names of the municipalities, administrative districts, and counties of the six provinces of Central-South China as of 1955:

Honan Province. Capital, Chengchou.

1. Twelve municipalities (cities): Chengchow, Kaifeng, Hsin-hsiang, Loyang, Anyang, Shang-ch'iu, Chou-k'ou, Lo-ho, Nan-yang, Hsin-yang, Hsu-ch'ang, Chu-ma-tien.
2. Eight Administrative Districts.
   a) Chengchow (District Administrative office at Ying-yang), comprising 13 counties: Ying-yang, Chung-mu, Kaifeng, Ch'en-liu, Lan-k'ao, Tung-ming, Ch'i, T'ung-hsü, Wei-shih, Hsin-cheng, Mi, Teng-feng, Kung. (Note: The word hsien is appended when speaking of counties which bear a monosyllabic name. E.g., Ch'i-hsien.)

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22. Jen-min Shou-ts'e [People's Handbook, 1955 Tientsin, Ta-kung pao, 1955 pp. 245-48.

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b) Hsin-hsiang (District Administrative office at Hsin-hsiang), comprising 15 counties: Hsin-hsiang, Po-ai, Hsiu-wu, Hui, Chi, Yen-chin, Yüan-yang, Huo-chia, Wu-chih, Wen, Meng, Ch'in-yang, Chi-yüan, Ch'ang-yüan, Feng-ch'iu;
One industrial and mining district --
Chiao-tso Industrial and Mining District.

c) Anyang (District Administrative office at Anyang), comprising 9 counties: Anyang, T'ang-yin, Chun, Lin, P'u-yang, Ch'ing-feng, Nan-lo, Nei-huang, Hua.

d) Shang-ch'iu, (District Administrative office at Shang-ch'iu Municipality), comprising 14 counties: Shang-ch'iu, Yu-ch'eng, Hsia-i, Yung-ch'eng, Shih-ch'eng, Ning-ling, Sui, Min-ch'üan, Hsiang-ch'eng, Huai-yang, Lu-i, T'ai-k'ang, Tan-ch'eng, Shen-ch'iu.

e) Hsin-yang (District Administrative office at Hsin-yang Municipality), comprising 17 counties: Hsin-yang, Ch'üeh-shan, Hsu-p'ing, Shang-ts'ai, Ju-nan, P'ing-yü, Hsin-ts'ai, Cheng-yang, Lo-shan, Hsi, Huai-pin, Huang-ch'uan, Ku-shih, Shang-ch'eng, Kuang-shan, Hsin.

f) Hsü-ch'ang (District Administrative office at Hsu-ch'ang Municipality), comprising 15 counties: Hsü-ch'ang, Ch'ang-ko, Yen-ling, Lin-ying, Yen-ch'eng, Wu-yang, Hsiang-ch'eng, Yeh, Pao-feng, Lu shan, Chia, Yü, Fu-kou, Shang-shui, Hsi-hua.

g) Nan-yang (District Administrative office at Nan-yang Municipality), comprising 12 counties: Nan-yang, Fang-ch'eng, Pi-yang, T'ung-po, T'ang-po, Hsin-yeh, Teng, Hsi-ch'uan, Hsi-hsia, Nei-hsiang, Chen-p'ing, Nan-chao.

h) Loyang (District Administrative Office at Loyang Municipality), 15 counties: Loyang, Meng-chin, Yen-shih, I-ch'uan, I-yang, Sung, Luan-ch'uan, Lu-shih, Ling-pao, Shan, Min-ch'ih, Lo-ning, I-yang, Hsin-an, Lin-ju.

Hupeh Province. Capital, Wuhan Municipality.

1. Five municipalities (cities): Wuhan, I-ch'ang, Hsiang-fan, Sha-shih, Huang-shih

2. Six districts:

a) Hsiao-kan (District Administrative Office at Hsiao-kan) 16 counties: Hsiao-kan, Ying-shan, Ta-wu, Huang-p'o (Huang-p'i), Han-yang, Wuchang, Kan-ning, T'ung-shan, Ch'ung-yang, T'ung ch'eng, P'u-ch'i, Chia-yü, Han-ch'uan, Yun-meng, Ying-ch'eng, An-lu.
b) Huang-kang (District Administrative Office at Huang-kang) 14 counties: Huang-kang, Hsin-chou, Pao-an, Ma-ch'eng, Sheng-li, Lo-t'ien, Ying-shan, Hsi-shui, Ch'i-ch'un, Huang-mei, Kuang-chi, Yang-hsin, Ta-yeh, O-ch'eng.
c) Ching-chou (District Administrative Office at Chiang-ling), 13 counties: Chiang-ling, Ching-men, Chung-hsiang, Ching-shan, T'ien-men, Chien-chiang, Mien-yang, Hung-hu, Chien-li, Shih-chou, Kung-an, Sung-tzu, Ching-chiang.
d) I-ch'ang (District Administrative Office at I-ch'ang), 9 counties: I-ch'ang, Yuan-an, Tang-yang, I-tu, Chih-chiang, Wu-feng, Ch'ang-yang, Tzu-kuei, Hsing-shan.
e) En-shih (District Administrative Office at En-shih), 8 counties: En-shih, Chien-shih,

Pa-tung, Ho-feng, Hsuan-en, Lai-feng, Hsien-feng, Li-ch'uan.

f) Hsiang-yang (District Administrative Office at Hsiang-yang), 15 counties: Hsiang-yang, Tsao-yang, Sui, Hung-shan, I-ch'eng, Nan-chang, Pao-k'ang, Fang, Chu-shan, Chu-ch'i, Yun-hsi, Yun, Chun, Ku-ch'eng, Kuang-hua.

Hunan Province. Capital, Changsha.

1. Nine municipalities (cities): Changsha, Heng-yang, Hsiang-t'an, Shao-yang, Ch'ang-te, I-yang, Chu-chou, Chin-shih, Hung-chiang.
2. Six districts and one autonomous district:
   a) Hsiang-t'an (District Administrative Office at Hsiang-t'an Municipality) 12 counties: Hsiang-t'an, Ning-hsiang, Wang-ch'eng, Changsha, Hsiang-yin, Yueh-yang, Lin-hsiang, P'ing-chiang, Liu-yang, Li-ling, Yu, Ch'a-ling.
   b) Ch'ang-te (District Administrative Office at Ch'ang-tse Municipality), 14 counties: Ch'ang-te, Lin-li, Li, An-hsiang, Hua-yung, Nan, Yuan-chiang, I-yang, Han-shou, T'ao-chiang. An-hua, T'ao-yüan, Tz'u-li, Shih-men.
   c) Shao-yang (District Administrative Office at Shao-yang Municipality), 12 counties: Shao-yang, Hsin-shao, Lien-yüan, Shuang-feng, Hsiang-hsiang, Shao-tung, Hsin-ning, Ch'eng-pu, Wu-kang, Tung-k'ou, Lung-hui, Hsin-hua.
   d) Ch'ien-yang (District Administrative Office at Ch'ien-yang), 11 counties: Ch'ien-yang, Huai-hua, Chen-ch'i, Yüan-ling, Hsu-p'ü, Sui-ning, Ching, Hui-t'ung, Chih-chiang, Huang, Ma-yang; one minority nationality autonomous hsien (T'ung-tao T'ung Nationality Autonomous Hsien).

e) Heng-yang (District Administrative Office at Heng-yang), 12 counties: Heng-yang, Heng-nan, Heng-shan, Ch'ang-ning, Ling-ling, Yung-ming, Ch'i-yang, Ch'i-tung, Ning-yuan, Tung-an, Tao, Chiang-hua.

f) Ch'in-hsien (District Administrative Office at Ch'in-hsien), 14 counties : Ch'in, Lan-shan, I-chang, Yung-hsing, Kuei-tung, Kuei-yang, An-jen, Chia-huo, Lin-wu, Ju-ch'eng, Tz'u-hsing, Hsin-t'ien, Ling, Lei-yang.

g) Hsiang-hsi Miao Nationality Autonomous District (District People's Government at Chi-shou Hsien), 10 counties: Chi-shou, Hua-yüan, Yung-shun, Pao-ching, Lung-shan, Sang-chih, Ta-yung, Ku-chang, Lu-ch'i, Feng-huang.

Kiangsi Province. Capital: Nanchang.

1. Six municipalities (cities): Nanchang, Ching-te-chen, Kan-chou, Shang-jao, Chiu-chiang, Chi-an.

2. One special district directly under the jurisdiction of the provincial government - the Lu-shan Special District.

3. Five districts and one field administrative district.

   a) Nanchang (District Administrative Office at Nanchang Municipality), 17 counties: Nanchang, Chin-hsien, Feng-ch'eng, Ch'ing-chiang, Hsin-yü, Shang-kao, Fen-i, I-ch'un, P'ing-hsiang, Wan-tsai, T'ung-ku, I-feng, Kao-an, Feng-hsin, Ching-an, An-i, Hsin-chien.

b) Chiu-chiang (District Administrative Office at Chiu-chiang Municipality), 10 counties: Chiu-chiang, Hu-k'ou, P'eng-tse, Tu-ch'ang, Hsing-tzu, Yung-hsiu, Hsiu-shui, Wu-ning, Te-an, Jui-ch'ang.
c) Shang-jao (District Administrative Office at Shang-jao Municipality), 16 counties: Shang-yao, Yu-shan, Kuang-feng, Ch'ien-shan, Heng-feng, I-yang, Kuei-ch'i, Tung-hsiang, Yu-chiang, Wan-nien, Po-yang, Lo-p'ing, Fu-liang, Wu-yuan, Te-hsing, Yu-kan.
d) Fu-chou (District Administrative Office at Lin-ch'uan), 9 counties: Lin-ch'uan, Chin-ch'i, Tzu-ch'i, Nan-ch'eng, Li-ch'uan, Nan-feng, Lo-an, I-huang, Ch'ung-jen.
e) Chi-an (District Administrative Office at Chi-an Municipality), 12 counties: Chi-an, Hsia-chiang, Hsin-kan, Yung-feng, Chi-shui, T'ai-ho, Wan-an, Hsü-ch'uan, Ning-kang, Yung-hsin, Lien-hua, An-fu.
f) Kan-nan (Southern Kiangsi) (Field Administrative District) (District Administrative Office at Kan-chou), one municipality (Kan-chou Municipality), 18 counties: Kan, Hsing-kuo, Yü-tu, Ning-tu, Shih-ch'eng, Jui-chin, Hui-ch'ang, Hsün-wu, An-yüan, Ting-nan, Lung-nan, Ch'ien-nan, Hsin-feng, Nan-k'ang, Ta-yü, Ch'ung-i, Shang-yu, Kuang-ch'ang.

Kwangtung Province.[23] Capital, Kuang-chou(Canton)

1. Nine municipalities (cities): Kuang-chou, Shan-t'ou (Swatow), Chan-chiang (Kwangchowan), Fo-shan, Ch'ao-chou, Hai-k'ou (Hoihow), Chiang-men, Shao-kuan, Shih-ch'i, Pei-hai.
2. Five districts and one autonomous district:
   a) Yüeh-chung (Central Kuangtung) (District

[23] [See following page.]

Administrative Office at Chiang-men), 25 counties: Hsin-hui, Ho-shan-Kao-ming, Kao-yao, Hsing-hsing, Yün-fu, Lo-ting, Yu-nan, Te-ch'ing, Feng-ch'uan, K'ai-chien, Huai-chi, Kuang-ning, Ssu-hui, San-shui, Nan-hai, Shun-te, Fan-yü, Chung-shan, Chu-hai, Pao-an, Tung-wan, Tseng-ch'eng, Lung-men, Po-lo.

b) Yüeh-pei (Northern Kwangtung) (District Administrative Office at Shao-kuan Municipality), 18 counties: Ch'ü-chiang, Lo-ch'ang, Jen-hua, Nan-hsiung, Shih-hsing, Weng-yüan, Ho-p'ing, Lien-p'ing, Hsin-feng, Fo-kang, Ts-ung-hua, Hua, Ch'ing-yüan, Ying-te, Yang-shan, Ju-yüan, Lien, Lien-shan; one minority nationality autonomous subdistrict (Lien-nan Yao Nationality Autonomous Subdistrict.)

c) Yüeh-tung (Eastern Kwangtung) (District Administrative Office at Ch'ao-chou Munici-

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[continued from previous page]

23. At the Tenth Plenary Session of the State Council on May 31, 1955, in Peking, it was decided that the five *hsien* of Ch'in, Ho-p'u, Lin-shan, Fang-ch'eng, and P'u-pei, and the municipality of Pei-hai of Kwangsi Province be incorporated into Kwangtung Province. Presumably these areas were placed under the jurisdiction of the Yueh-hsi (western Kwangtung) District, but the Peking announcement failed to specify. It is to be noted that all these areas are on the coast and include some valuable seaports. The latest move in political redemarcation could conceivably have significant bearing on the streamlining of Red China's southern coastal defense. However, a comparison of maps shows that the revised Kwangtung-Kwangsi boundary closely resembles that of the 1930's.

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pality), 21 counties: Chao-an, Jao-p'ing, Nan-ao, Ch'eng-hai, Chieh-yang, Ch'ao-yang, P'u-ning, Hui-lai Lu-feng, Hai-feng, Hui-yang, Wu-hua, Tzu-chin, Ho-yuan, Lung-ch'uan, Hsing-ning, P'ing-yuan, Chiao-ling, Mei, Ta-p'u, Feng-shun.

d) Yüeh-hsi (Western Kwangtung) (District Administrative Office at Chan-chiang), 15 counties: Hsü-ch'i, Wu-ch'uan, Lien-chiang, Hua, Mou-ming, Hsin-i, Yang-ch'un, En-p'ing, T'ai-shan, Yang-chiang, Tien-pai, Hai-k'ang, Hsü-wen, Lei-tung.

e) Hainan (District Administrative Office at Haik'ou), 11 counties: Ch'iung-shan, Wen-ch'ang, Ting-an, Ch'iung-tung, Lo-hui, Wan-ning, Ch'ang-kan, Tan, Lin-kao, Ch'eng-mai, Tun-ch'ang.

f) Hainan Li and Miao Nationalities Autonomous District (District Administrative Office at Ch'ung-ch'ang in Pao-t'ing Hsien), 7 counties: Lo-tung, Tung-fang, Pai-sha, Chiung-chung, Pao-t'ing, Ling-shui, Yai.

Kwangsi Province. Capital, Nan-ning Municipality.

1. Four municipalities (cities): Nanning, Liu-chou, Kweilin, Wu-chou.
2. The Kuei-hsi (Western Kwangsi) T'ung Nationality Autonomous District) (Autonomous District People's Government at Nanning), 3 subdistricts:

a) Yung-ning (Subdistrict Administrative Office at Nanning), 15 counties: Yung-ning (Subdistrict Administrative Office at Nanning), 15 counties: Yung-ning, Pin-yang, Heng, Fu-sui, Ch'ung-tso, Ning-ming, Lung-chin, Ta-hsin, Chen-tu, Lung-an, Wu-ming, Shang-lin, Ma-shan, Tu-an, Shang-ssu.

b) Po-se (Subdistrict Administrative Office at Po-se), 11 counties: Po-se, T'ien-lin, Ling-lo, Feng-shan, Tung-lan, P'ing-kuo, T'ien-tung, T'ien-yang, Te-pao, Ching-hsi, Lu-pien; one autonomous area (the Lung-lin Nationalities Joint Autonomous Area). 635 631

c) I-shan (Subdistrict Administrative Office at Ch'ing-yüan in I-shan Hsien), 12 counties: I-shan, Ho-ch'ih, Nan-tan, T-ien-o, Huan-chiang, Lo-ch'eng, Yung-an, Liu-ch'eng, Liu-chiang, Shih-lung, Lai-pin, Hsin-ch'eng; two autonomous areas (the Ta-miao-shan Miao Nationality Autonomous Area and the San-chiang-hsien T'ung Nationality Autonomous Area).

3. Three districts:

a. Kweilin (District Administrative Office at Kweilin), 8 counties: Lin-kuei, Hsing-an, Ch'üan, Kuan-yang, Yang-shuo, Lu-chai, Yung-fu, Tzu-yüan; one autonomous area (the Lung-sheng-hsien Nationalities Joint Autonomous Area).

b) P'ing-lo (District Administrative Office at P'ing-lo), 7 counties: P'ing-lo, Kung-ch'eng, Fu-chung, Ho-hsien, Chao-p'ing, Meng-shan, Li-p'u; one autonomous area (the Ta-yao-shan Yao Nationality Autonomous Area).

c) Yung-hsien (District Administrative Office at Yung-hsien), 11 counties: Yung-hsien, T'eng, Ts'ang-wu, Ts'en-ch'i, Pei-liu, Lu-ch'uan, Yü-lin, Kuei, Kuei-p'ing, P'ing-nan, Po-pai.

To study the operation of the local governments, 635 including the People's Council and the People's Congress, let us begin with the status of the officials involved. Many "labor heroes" and influential

personages in the agricultural co-operatives and 635
mutual-aid teams have been elected to public
office. In the province of Honan, a typesetter was
chosen from the trade union, and 41 presidents of
agricultural co-operatives were chosen to serve
in the People's Congress. Women members made [562]
up 28 per cent of the delegates to the People's
Congress. In Tu-an County in Kwangsi Province, 635
an area of minority nationalities, 37 members of
the Yao people, 17 members of the Chuang people, 563
and 13 members of the Han-Chinese were elected
to serve. Nineteen of those chosen were women
from the minority groups. In T'ai-shan, Kwangtung
Province, 39 were elected as members of the
People's Congress and 13 as members of the
hsiang People's Council.[24]

Elections in 98 per cent of the basic units of 631
the municipalities, counties, and hsiang were to 666
be completed by May 25, 1954. Because leaders
of the Party had urged the people to exercise
their right to vote, about 85-90 per cent of those
eligible to vote went to the polls. The Communist
propaganda agencies insist that in Shao-shan hsiang,
the birthplace of Mao Tse-tung, 100 per cent of
those eligible to vote did so.

It was reported that, in the province of Kiangsi, 631
preparations for the People's Congress begun in
June 1953 were completed by March 1954. In the
82 counties and 6 provincial districts and the special
district of Lu Shan (Kuling), 10,000 delegates attended sessions of the People's Congress. Those
winning the maximum number of votes were

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[24] People's Daily, May 21, 1954.

"Socialist leaders" -- members of the new Democratic Youth Corps and the agricultural co-operatives, and "labor heroes." They were considered well able to act as liaison officers between the people and the government. Delegates to the hsiang People's Congress from 35 hsiang offered a total of 3,400 proposals and/or criticisms solicited from the people they represented. Most of the proposals were concerned with problems of production, and the criticisms were, for the most part, directed against behavior of the local government leaders.[25] 631

1. The Municipal Government. The procedure of the municipal government of Wuhan (Wuchang-Hankow) is much the same in both the pre-Constitution and post-Constitution periods. Therefore, a summary of the Representatives' Conference which met from October 10 to 15, 1952, can be used as an illustration of present practices. 633

At the first meeting, Li Hsien-nien, mayor of the municipality, made a report on the work accomplished during the preceding ten months and on the tasks which lay ahead. It was followed by a report on the increase of production and the increase in economy, delivered by the deputy-mayor, Wang Jen-chung, who emphasized the need of preventing waste in commerce and industry. A third report was made by another deputy-mayor, Sung K'an-fu, on democratic reconstruction and judicial reform. The whole day of October 10 was occupied with plenary meetings. On October 11, the day was occupied with committee work. October 12 was a

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[25] Ibid., April 7, 1954.

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day of recess. On October 13 and October 14, plenary meetings were resumed, and the report on the accomplishments of the preceding ten months was passed, together with recommendations for the correction of certain errors and imperfections. The following six points for future construction were proposed by the mayor, Li Hsien-nien: development of a plan for increase in production and economy; continuation of the work of democratic reform -- a term which refers to relations between landlords and tenants and factory bosses and laborers; furthering of the exchange of goods between localities; enforcement of financial discipline; cultural work, with emphasis on character development by workmen and peasants, and on technical education for all; and judicial reform.

Members of the Representatives' Conference agreed to support the policies of the Central People's Government. On October 14, the chief of the Bureau of Finance reported on the revenues and expenditures for 1951, and announced the budget for 1952. Another member of the bureau gave a committee report on the financial statement. The reports on the budget and the financial statement received unanimous approval. On the afternoon of October 14, 414 members elected 44 members to the government of Wuchang-Hankow. Li Hsien-nien was elected mayor; Wang Jen-chung and Sung K'an-fu were elected deputy-mayors.

Of the 1,176 proposals submitted, most were not considered important; of the rest, 45 concerned matters of culture education and health; 25 concerned finance and economics; 25 dealt with city reconstruction; 20 concerned the field of law and politics. Among the proposals submitted, some asked that the municipal government construct more schools, sportsgrounds, and hospitals; others concerned repair of roads and houses, a new sewage system, additional street lamps, new parks, and better means of transportation.[26] 633

2. The County Government. On the work of the People's Congress and the People's Council at the county level, a report will be given on Nan Hai County, Kwangtung Province. About 400 delegates attended the session which convened November 6 to 9, 1954. Most of the members came from the 247 agricultural co-operatives working 107,000 mou (17,833 acres) of land. The amount of land under cultivation had increased by 12 per cent over that of the previous year. A resolution was passed to increase production in the autumn harvest. Support was promised by the delegates to the liberation of Taiwan and the speedy industrialization of China.[27] 634

3. The Hsiang Government. A report on the Shuang Miao hsiang, Hsiang-ch'eng County, Honan Province, will serve to explain the workings of government at the hsiang level. After the land reform of 1949, a Representatives' Conference was convened and members of the People's Council were elected. The conference passed resolutions to be carried out by the People's Council. The conference urged that the council do everything possible to speed rehabilitation of neglected farms and to increase agricultural production. In this hsiang, 95 per cent of the population joined agricultural co-operatives or mutual-aid teams. Production was increased by 50 per cent during the war against Japan. Floods had done a great amount of damage in the hsiang, and so the 632

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[26] Yangtze Daily, October 16, 1952.

[27] Wen-hui Pao [Wen-hui Daily], Hong Kong, November 10, 1954.

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Conference passed a resolution calling for the digging of a ditch to control flood damage. The entire population, men and women, completed a ditch 4 li (about 1.3 miles) long, 10 feet wide, and 12 feet deep. A report offered at the Conference concerned damage done the tobacco crops by insects, and definite measures to eradicate the pests were decided upon. The conference considered 70 proposals, some of them criticisms of Party cadres. Three members of the hsiang council were impeached and dismissed with the approval of the county government. A Representatives' Conference on the hsiang level is not only a political gathering but a means to improve general conditions within the hsiang.[28]

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[28] Yangtze Daily, November 13, 1952.

POLITICAL DYNAMICS

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It is the nature of the Communist regime to seek to place all political power in the hands of a single party -- the Communist Party of China. This is the basic factor in the pattern of political dynamics in Communist China and in the Central-South Region. Political dynamics is concerned with political power and political process. Since political power is monopolized by the Communist Party of China, and since the political process is patterned upon the controls exercised by the Party, political dynamics deals with the study of the Party itself, its political control, and the elections and politics of minor parties. The power structure is such that the decision-making process follows a course largely determined by the organizational and operational pattern of the Party. Through a well-established network of control over organizations of all types, political activities are regulated and guided by the Party. The Party rather than society as a whole generates the vitality that lies behind the political process. To control the course which society is to follow requires the adoption of a total approach to all problems and the mobilization of all available instruments of compulsion in society.

A campaign,[1] one of the means by which the Party

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[1] For a discussion of campaigns, see Richard L. Walker, China under Communism, the First Five Years, Yale University Press, 1955, pp. 77-100; W. W. Rostow, The Prospects for Communist China, Cambridge, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1955, pp. 72-98.

implements its political processes, calls for concerted action among interested groups at all Party levels, initiated by a signal which sets organized forces in motion. A campaign is also a device to test the efficacy of the members of all organizations and a means to eliminate those who are deemed undesirable. It may be either national or local in nature,[2] directed toward either the population as a whole or a segment of it. In the present context, a campaign should be regarded as a political device rather than a manifestation of political or social process.

The centralization of both government and Party is the second factor determining the pattern of political dynamics in the Central-South China region. Local agencies in this region are held under Party direction by four major means: (1) the maintenance of a unified and effective Party organization throughout the region; (2) the control of administrative and judicial organs, people's procuratorates, and public security organizations; (3) the control of mass organizations; and (4) the agitation of popular enthusiasm, the manipulation of popular will, and ultimately, the control of elections and of the composition of the people's congress.

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[2] Typical drives of a local nature are those conducted in farming communities: Spring Plowing Summer Collection, Resist Drought, Resist Flood, Autumn Harvest, and many others.

I. THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA AND ITS AFFILIATED ORGANS

A. Present Status of the Party in the Central-South Region[3]

Since the Communist seizure of power in the Central-South China region, many Party activities have come above ground and Party policy pronouncements affecting society as a whole receive widespread publicity. At the same time, increasing secrecy surrounds matters relative to Party politics, structure, and personnel.

On the basis of the limited information available, the following points are clear: first, while the regional Party organization has become very flexible, with the aim of performing a greatly expanded function, the tasks are still too numerous for the organization to handle; secondly, the Party maintains a concerted drive for increased total membership and adjusts its policies to increase membership. The effect of the purge of Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih[4] and the subsequent call for a general retreachment in Party membership is not yet known; thirdly, a thorough indoctrination and training program imposes upon members the duty of continuous rectification and remolding.

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[3] Information on Communist movements in this region prior to the assumption of power is found in Wang Shou-tao, Ch'ang-chiang Jih-pao [Yantze Daily] June 29, 1951, p. 2; Nieh Hung-chün, Ibid., July 15, 1951, p. 3. For World War II Communist activities, see Hsü Tsung-tse, Chung-Kuo Hung-Chün Ti Shih-nien, [Ten Years of the Chinese Red Army], Peking, Hsüan-wen Shu-tien, 1951; K'ang-jih Chan-cheng Shih-ch'i Ti Chung-kuo Jen-min Chieh-fang-chün, [The People's Liberation Army During the War of Resistance Against Japan], Peking Jen-min ch'u-pan-she, 1953.

B. Party Organization

Three principles governing party organization should be borne in mind: (1) Party organization is an integrated system, a system that symbolizes the extreme centralization of political power and the fullest demand for unity and discipline. (2) Party organization is pyramidal in structure and is erected on a territorial and functional basis. (3) Party organization is flexible. Any attempt to assume it to be a stereotyped organization would be misleading.

Prior to 1955, the organization of the Communist Party of China in the Central-South Region was divided into two parts: (a) the delegates of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China to the region and (b) the local party bodies extending from the provincial party layer down to the hsiang (group of villages) level. Since the abolition of the Central-

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[4] English text of official statement of the Communist Party of China on the Kang-Jao purge in New China News Agency, London Bulletin, No. 1278, April 7, 1955; that of Hu-Pan expulsion in Hua-ch'iao Jih-pao [China Daily News], July 19, 1955, p. 1.

South China Administrative Committee in 1954, the need for the Party Bureau has diminished. Although the abolition of the bureau organization has not yet been announced, Bureau representatives, with the exception of those from the Shanghai, Inner Mongolia, and Sinkiang bureaus, were not present at the National Conference of the Communist Party of China held in March 1955 and the 6th Plenary Session[5] (enlarged) of the 7th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in October 1955. Presumably, the bureau organization in the different regions no longer exists. However, since the Party bureau had long been active in regional politics, and since it can be established at the will of the Central Committee of the Party, some explanation of its operation seems necessary.

Delegates of the Central Committee. The Central-South China Bureau and the South China Sub-Bureau were the delegates of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. The Central-South China Bureau had direct jurisdiction over the provincial Party organizations in Hunan, Hupeh, Kiangsi, and Honan provinces; the South China Sub-Bureau held the Party leadership over organizations in Kwangtung and Kwangsi provinces. The local Party bodies are divided into tiers from provincial Party organizations to administrative district, county and city, *ch'ü* [district], and *hsiang.*

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[5] Communiques on the Conference and the Plenary Session are found in *New China News Agency Daily Bulletin* (London), No. 1278, April 7, 1955, p. 4; and *Ibid.*, No. 1413, October 18, 1955, pp. 6-7.

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The Central-South China Bureau and the South China Sub-Bureau exerted their authority through two channels, the Bureau Secretariat and the regional Party Conference. The Bureau Secretariat was, on its level, comparable to the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. Its standing departments were: organization, propaganda, rural work, urban work, social affairs, united front; its commission dealt with trade unions, youth, and women; it also had offices of policy planning, military affairs, and other functions. Apart from these standing departments and commissions under the Bureau Secretariat, a more or less independent committee known as the Control Committee was instituted in March 1955, replacing the Discipline Inspection Committee established in 1949.

The regional Party Conference was called immediately after the National Party Conference and that of the Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, and the Bureau had not hestiated to use it for the transmission of directives and for periodic controls. In the past few years, the Bureaus convened many enlarged cadre conferences and administrative district-secretariat joint sessions. Bureau departments might also call their own sessions, thereby placing the different Party secretariats directly under their respective jurisdictions.

C. Local Party Hierarchy [6]

1. Provincial Party Layer. There are six provincial Party organizations in the Central-South China region. Each is the highest layer of the Party hierarchy within a province. Its first obligation is to enforce the directives and decrees transmitted by the Central Party. As will be seen, the provincial and city/county layers have a mixed party-governmental function while the administrative district and ch'ü layers are concerned more with the Party.

2. Administrative District Party Layer. The Party unit at this layer generally corresponds with that of an administrative district under the jurisdiction of the provincial government. Its great importance derives from the following facts: (a) its major work is Party affairs; (b) owing to administrative requirements, its functionaries are allowed some initiative and independence. For example, it holds authority in the selection and placement of personnel -- Party as well as governmental -- within its jurisdiction.

3. County and City Party Layer. This layer of organization corresponds to the county and city governments. Like the provincial Party agencies, the county and city Party units have the dual tasks of carrying out Party work and of securing complete control over other administrative and mass organizations.

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[6] For local Party organizations, consult the Constitution of the Communist Party of China; English text in Liu Shao-ch'i, On the Party, Peking, 1951, pp. 185-90.

4. Ch'ü Layer. Party bodies are installed below a city or county irrespective of the ch'ü organization. Like the administrative district Party agencies, Ch'ü Party units are directly responsible for the management of party affairs and the implementation of Party policy.

5. Hsiang Layer. It is here that the Party and government fusion is most obvious and the Party control over other administrative and mass organizations most clearly revealed.

In addition to the territorial division of Party organization -- the central delegate to the region and the local Party hierarchy -- there is an organization known as the Party branch or Party cell, which acts as a link between the Party and the masses in all organizations. Party branches are organized in any factory, mine, village, enterprise, street, army, government office, or school, wherever there are three or more Party members. They can be grouped into general branches and Party committees or divided into sub-branches and Party groups, depending largely upon the number of members and the place of function.

D. Organization

In each of these constituent party units, quadripartite division of authority is maintained: the Party Congress, the Party Committee, Control Committee, and the Party Conference.

1. The Party Congress. The Party Congress of each unit is the highest organization of that unit. In theory, Party congresses at all local levels meet every two years; in fact, the National Party Congress has not convened since 1945, and local Party congresses as such have not been held. But theoretically, in order to carry out its announced function of supervising the Party Committee, the Party Congress hears and approves or disapproves the Committee's report, decides on questions pertaining to that area, and elects members of the Party Committee on its level and delegates to the Party congress at the immediately higher level, subject to the approval of the Party Committee at that higher level.

2. Party Committee. The executive body of the Party unit on each level is the Party Committee, whose power is concentrated. At the provincial level, power within the Party Committee is further centralized in a Standing Committee which has the same permanent and temporary functional departments and working commissions as the Party bureaus. The Party Committee convenes Party conferences between sessions of Party congresses and sets up various subordinate Party organizations, allocates Party personnel and finance, and directs the work of Party agents in non-Party organizations.

Although Party committees in the district and below have no standing committee, power within the committee is further centralized in the hands of secretaries. Certain basic departments and commissions form the backbone of the committee. The operational aspect of the Party Committee is uniform at all levels, in the sense that all committees adhere to democratic-centralism and other basic centralized devices characteristic of the Communist Party.

3. Control Committee. The National Party Conference of the Communist Party of China held in March 1955[7] established new Control Committees to replace the Discipline Inspection Committees established in November 1949. The change was made necessary because of the need for an intensified drive toward socialism and as a campaign against corruption and laxity in the Party. Members of the committees are elected by the Party congresses or conferences of the respective levels, subject to the approval of the Party committees of the next higher levels. Local control committees are also subject to the supervision and direction of the higher control committees. They may set up branch offices. Their relationship is centralized and permits no deviation.

4. Party Conference. The Party Conference in fact is an executive meeting. Convened by the Party Committee on a higher level, it is attended by representatives of Party committees on lower levels. Unlike the delegates to the Party congresses who are elected at large, representatives to the conferences are appointed by their own Party committees. The conference has the power to appoint or remove up to

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[7] English text in New China News Agency Daily Bulletin, No. 1277, April 6, 1955, p. 3.

one-fourth of the members of the Party committee convening the conference, and to reach decisions on Party work within its jurisdiction.

E. Party Expansion

Since the establishment of the Communist regime in this area, there have been three instances of major membership drives -- the resolution of June 1950, calling for membership expansion in the cities,[8] the 1953 expansion in the cities and counties,[9] and that of March 1955, aiming at the further increase of membership in the rural communities.[10] The purpose of these major drives is twofold: an effort after each major struggle to draw into the Party more loyal activists, and the continuing endeavor of the Party to broaden its organization to include all social groups, particularly the intellectuals, the managers, and the skilled workers.

During the first period of expansion in the city, the main targets were factories, business firms,

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[8] Speech of Mao Tse-tung at Third Session of the 7th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, People's Daily, June 6, 1950.

[9] Directives of the Central-South China Bureau of June 24, 1942 in Yangtze Daily, p. 1. For a study on this subject see: Fang Shu, Campaign of Party Expansion, Hong Kong Union Research Institute, 1953.

[10] Official report of conference, Hsin-hua Yüeh-pao [New China Monthly], No. 4, April 28, 1955, pp. 27-28.

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and government offices. In the factories, progress was not at first encouraging. Sometimes too little was accomplished; at other times, too much was accomplished carelessly. In the First Textile Factory of Wuchang,[11] for example, the Party branch was organized with an underground crew of five. In Changsha, Hunan,[12] the recruitment was also hampered by the weakness of underground Party organizations. Failure here was attributed to an overly cautious attitude and to limited participation.

In other instances the error was over-aggressiveness rather than over-caution. In Wuhan, for example,[13] membership drives were conducted simultaneously with the expansion of trade unions. As of January 1950, some 220 Party branches had been established, 43 per cent of which were organized in government offices and 25 per cent in factories. As of October 1950, some 1,249 new members had been recruited. This rapid expansion resulted in the admission of dangerous elements into the Party in consequence of failure to observe the rules and procedure of admission.

The second large-scale membership drive was ordered by a Central-South China Bureau decree on June 23, 1952, at the conclusion of the Land Reform and Democratic Construction movements and the Three-Anti and Five-Anti campaigns, which had removed the remnants of opposition to the Communist regime. The directive urged the shift in Party attention from the country to the city and the recruitment of "activists." In August 1952, it was reported that there were more than 11,000 activists in Hunan Province alone.[14] Within the agencies under the Central-South China Military and Political Committee, the activists numbered 4,613, of which 1,891 were members of the Youth Corps. With the increasing intensity of Party expansion in the cities and the consolidation of political power in the rural areas, the Party membership drive reached its climax in 1953. The total membership of the Party in 1954 reached 6.5 million in the nation as a whole,[15] an increase of 700,000 over that of July 1951 and more than two million over that of June 1950.

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[11] Yangtze Daily, Oct. 25, 1950, p. 3.
[12] Ibid., Dec. 7, 1950, p. 7.
[13] Ibid., Nov. 29, 1950, p. 3.

F. Party Overhauling.

Party overhauling generally involves four major activities:

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[14] Ibid., Aug. 7, 1952, p. 1; also a report from Kiangsi numbered activists at 17,000; cf., Yangtze Daily, Aug. 22, 1952, p. 3.

[15] Reported by Liu Shao-chi at the Fourth Session of Central Committee of the Communist Party, People's Daily, Feb. 18, 1954, p. 1. Previous Party membership and compositions in Shih-shih Shou-ts'e [Current Affairs Handbook], No. 16, Canton May 31, 1951, pp. 14-15.

(1) rectification,[16] a step which involves examination and the political education of Party members; (2) review and criticism of Party members' work; (3) arousal of mass interest in the criticism of Party members, and (4) increased study.

The examination of individual Party members centers upon the eight conditions set forth by the Party and upon the San Ch'a ("three checks" principle). The eight conditions required of a Party member have been set forth in the Party's Constitution. They included the realization on the part of each Party member of the ultimate goal of the Party, devotion to the cause and interest of the Party, and absolute obedience required of each Party member.[17]

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16. Prior to the assumption of power, there had been two rectification movements in Party history, in 1942-44 and in 1947-48. For a study of the 1942-44 rectification, see Boyd Compton, Mao's China: Party Reform Documents, 1942-44, Seattle, U. of Washington Press, 1952. The 1950 rectification movement was aimed at the promotion of the fighting spirit of the Party and the study of administrative and organizational material. It began in the Central-South Region in July 1950 and lasted until the fall of the same year. Reports of the movement in this region are found in Yangtze Daily, issues of September 5, 10, 12, 27, 1950.

17. For detailed discussion on the eight conditions, consult An Tzu-wen, "Strengthen the Work of Party Reform and Party Expansion on the Foundation of Victory in the Three-Anti and Five-Anti Campaigns," Current Background, No. 251, July 25, 1953, pp. 5-6.

The San Ch'a principle is employed by the Party as a means of eliminating undesirable members. San Ch'a can mean a check on work, work style, and ideology; it can also mean a check on ideology, viewpoint, and personal history. During the Land Reform Movement, work style, history, and class status constituted the three checks. This practice may not appear violent, but its psychological effect upon the individual is alarming.

Even the selection of Party members for further training can be used as a means to eliminate undesirables,[18] for it is a device to re-examine the qualifications of Party members; those who fail to pass the examination may be expelled. While rectification and overhauling are constant, the examination given four times a year increases the already high pressure upon Party members.

G. Indoctrination and Training

Another way of maintaining Party unity and discipline is by the constant indoctrination and training of each member.[19] This practice is aimed at the revitalization of individual adherence to Party doctrine. 665

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[18] Provincial Party Committee of Hupeh's report on land reform, Yangtze Daily, December 27, 1952, p. 1.

The Central-South China region maintains two schools, a cultural school to raise the general level of education, and an ideological school to tighten adherence to doctrine. 665 871

In the country as a whole, one half of the cadres (most of them Party members), have had less than a junior high school education, and some actually illiterate.[20] To remedy this, a cultural school system, administered by the Party and the government, was established in this region in 1951.[21] with the aim of raising the cadre standard to the junior high school level. The course called for two semesters of twenty weeks, with four two-hour evening classes per week. In January 1954 a revised plan was ordered by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, establishing a nation-wide system and bringing both individuals and the responsible secretaries

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[19] Pamphlets published by the 6th section of Kuomintang on Formosa relative to this subject are of interest: Fe-tang Hsün-lien Ti P'ou-shih [An Analytical Study of Indoctrination of the Communist Party of China], Taipei, 1952; Chung-kung Tang Ti tsu-chih yü K'ung-chih, [Organization and Control of the Communist Party of China], Taipei, 1951.

[20] Directive of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on the cultural supplementary school system and editorial in People's Daily, Jan. 22, 1954, p. 1.

[21] The Central-South China Bureau's directive in Yangtze Daily, May 14, 1951, p. 3.

below the county and *ch'ü* levels into the new plan.[22] 665
The plan called for cadre education equivalent to 871
grade school and/or that of junior high school. Also included in the program, and to be completed in three or four months, was a class for the illiterate. Evening schools for the average cadre took twenty weeks at six hours a week to complete. The secretaries and administrative personnel of the Party who were unable to take time off during the day for the supplementary classes would attend school in the evening.

The purpose of the ideological school is to 665
train Party members, candidates for membership, 874
and leaders of mass organizations. The first group of schools of this type was established in 1951 in such major cities of the Central-South Region as Wuhan in Hupeh, Canton in Kwangtung, and Nanchang in Kiangsi. By 1953, there were sixteen schools with an enrollment of 7,500. The well-publicized Wuhan Marxist Evening School will serve as an example.[23] The school, fully staffed by Party functionaries, reported an enrollment of 543. In addition to the ideological schools, a Party study system in the rural areas was further strengthened in 1955.[24]

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[22] *People's Daily,* January 22, 1954, p. 1.

[23] *Yangtze Daily,* Sept. 1, 1951, p. 3; reports on schools in other cities, *ibid.*, August 19, 1951, p. 3.

[24] Central-South China Bureau directive, *New China Monthly,* No. 4, April 1955, pp. 30-31.

H. Affiliated Party Organizations

The Party attempts to utilize the enthusiasm of youth through two organizations which, although not a part of the Party, are under its supervision. The New Democratic Youth Corps (NDYC) and its subordinate group, the Young Pioneers, for youths aged 9 to 15. The Young Pioneers are subordinates of the Youth Corps, looking to the latter for leadership and guidance.

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1. New Democratic Youth Corps

The Party controls the NDYC through the Central-South China Working Committee of the corps. The Constitution of the corps assures the Party of effective control.[25] It permits Party members to be in charge of corps organs above the county level, thus placing the direction of corps activities in the hands of the Party. The first function of the corps is to provide a reservoir of potential new Party members; for example, corps members constituted 56 per cent of the Party recruitment in Wuhan in 1951.[26] Its second task is to supply needed activists in all organizations, particularly in the factories and rural communities. Its final task is to engage

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[25] The Chinese text of the Constitution of the NDYC and Li Ch'ang's explanatory report in People's Daily, July 7, 1953, pp. 1, 3. English text in Current Background, No. 258, Sept. 10, 1953.

[26] Editorial, Yangtze Daily, Aug. 22, 1951, p. 1.

in the broadest possible range of activities in order to reach segments of society where Party organizations are lacking.

The organization of the corps follows that of the Party. Prior to 1955, a Central-South China Working Committee of the NDYC was established to serve as the representative of the Central Committee of the NDYC. Local corps organizations on provincial, municipal, and county levels are empowered to establish representative committees in the administrative districts and *ch'ü.*

With the exception of those working committees on administrative-district and *ch'ü* levels, the constituent corps organizations rest upon a dual authority. Each level has a congress and a committee elected by it. These committees are the executive organs of the corps and their component members are approved by the upper-level committee. The Central-South China Working Committee has repeatedly stressed centralized leadership within the corps and the strengthening of the position of the corps branches.[27]

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[27] For example, consult report of the committee, *ibid.*, August 8, 1952, p. 1.

The corps branch, like the Party branch, is an essential link with the population as a whole. It may be formed in any factory, mine, enterprise, farm station, village, government agency, company of the armed forces, school, or street where there are three or more corps members. A general corps branch and corps committee can be formed, depending upon the size of the branch. These basic-level agencies of the corps serve to mobilize youth and the masses and also may take over Party functions where Party agencies are inadequate.

The New Democratic Youth Corps has at least three million more members than does the Party itself.[28] However, it is not an organization with political power; it is rather the instrument through which the Party exercises control over youth and, more particularly, over youth organizations in the militia,[29] the army, and the schools.

2. The Young Pioneers.

Chapter 7 of the Constitution of the Corps governs the relationship between the corps and the pioneers.[30] Their regional influence is less apparent than that of the corps. Earlier, the pioneers concentrated upon the promotion of patriotic fervor among the youth between the ages of nine and fifteen; since 1953 emphasis has shifted to recruitment of members.[31] National membership now stands at 70 million, about 15 per cent of the youth in that age group.[32]

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[28] In the Central-South China area, Corps membership in August 1952 was 900,000, with 50,000 Corps branches established. Cf. summary of the Central-South China Corps Secretaries Meeting in Yangtze Daily, Aug. 8, 1952, p. 1; national figure in Feng Wen-pin's report, ibid., Aug. 8, 1952, p. 1.

[29] Corps members constitute 80 per cent of militia in some cases; Yangtze Daily, Nov. 8, 1951, p. 3.

[30] Chinese text of Regulations of the Young Pioneers, People's Daily, June 1, 1954, p. 2.

II. POLITICAL CONTROLS

The Party has consolidated its power by a network of controls not only over Party agencies but over all bureaucratic, military, public security, and mass organizations. The control is maintained by placing members of the Communist Party of China in key positions in all of these organizations, by reserving all policy-making decisions to the Party, and by agitation to arouse popular enthusiasm in favor of the Party.

A. PARTY CONTROLS OVER GOVERNMENT ORGANS

1. Party and Government Fusion

Control of government organs has been accompolshed primarily by the fusion of government and Party in authority, in functions, in personnel at all levels and in all spheres of political activity.

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[31] Official call for the establishment of the Young Pioneers in the Central-South China Area, Yangtze Daily, Dec. 13, 1952, p. 4.

[32] Kuang-ming Jih-pao [Enlightenment Daily], March 14, 1955, p. 1.

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The first means of control is the subjecting of all Party members in all government agencies to Party discipline. The directive of November 14, 1950, issued by the Central-South China Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, formalized the relationship by requiring all members to report the activities of the government agencies where they were employed.[33]

Another powerful means of control is the placement of Party members in key administrative positions. On the regional level, for example, the vice-chairman of the Central-South China Administrative Committee, Teng Tzu-hui was also second secretary of the Central South China Bureau, and concurrently the political commissioner to the Fourth Field Army of the People's Liberation Army. The several committee chairmen under the regional government were also Party secretaries, thus holding concurrent key positions in both hierarchies.[34]

The pattern of the provincial level is similar. Ch'eng Ch'ien, formerly a Nationalist general, was elected governor of Hunan in 1955, but his Communist

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33. Yangtze Daily, Nov. 14, 1950, p. 3.

34. For example, the Political and Legal Affairs Commission was headed by Li Hsüeh-feng; he was also head of the Organization Department of the Bureau and secretary of the Commission on Trade Unions of the Bureau; cf. Jen-min nien-chien [People's Yearbook], Shanghai, Ta-kung pao, 1950, p. A-41-44; Tu-pao Shou-ts'e [Newspaper Reading Handbook], Hankow, Ch'ang-chiang jih-pao-she, 1950, pp. 116-125.

deputy, Chou Hsiao-chou, the first secretary of Hunan Province, retained true power. In Hupeh, the governor, Liu Tzu-hou was a verteran Party member. In 1950 he was the head of the Department of Organization of the Hupeh Provincial Party Committee and was promoted to first secretary of the Party in 1954.

At lower levels, this fusion is even more frequent.

2. Cadre Utilization

A second method through which the Party exercises control over state organs is the appointment of faithful and capable cadres (Party members as well as non-Party members) to serve in the rank and file of judicial and administrative organizations.[35] Party secretaries in charge of Party personnel are appointed to head the personnel offices of the government organizations. For instance, Ch'ien Ying, then deputy of the Department of Organization of the Party's Central-South China Bureau, was appointed in 1952 as the director of the Department of Personnel under the Central-South China Military and Political Committee, and held, at the same time, the position of chairman of the People's Control Commission in the regional organization. The deputy in the department, Sun Hsi-ch'i, was also a division chief of the

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[35] For a discussion of the Party's role in the control of state organs, see Hsiung Hsi-yüan, People's Daily, Nov. 18, 1954, p. 3; for definition and the utilization of cadre, see Walter E. Gourlay, The Chinese Communist Cadre: Key to Political Control, Cambridge, M.I.T., 1942, ii.

Department of Organization of the Central-South China Bureau. 665

After the Constitution was promulgated, all government personnel offices of the central and provincial governments were disbanded. This may mean even firmer Party control of personnel policy.

3. The Department of Supervision and Other Instruments of Control.

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One of the most common and effective instruments of Party control over government is the Office of Supervision, formerly the People's Control Commission. It is found at all levels from the central government down to the county government. This system of control should be distinguished from the judicial agencies of control, namely, the people's procuratorates, and from the public security agencies.[36] Supervisory offices of all levels and in all organizations are strictly controlled by the Party. As a rule, heads of these offices are either Party secretaries or chiefs of public security agencies. Personnel working in these offices are usually activists, who, like the members of the Party, only carry out Party directives.

The offices of supervision check the execution of government policies directed against officials guilty of misdemeanors, disobedience, and corruption. Unlike the people's procuratorates, they check only

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[36] Discussions of judicial and public-security organs will be found in later studies.

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government employees.[37]

The highest supervisory agency in the Central-South Region before 1954 was the Central-South People's Control Commission established in March 1950. Similar offices were organized in the several provinces and in administrative districts in 1950 and 1951.[38]

Control branches have been established in state enterprises,[39] financial and economic offices, transportation agencies, notably railways,[40] and post offices. At the provincial level, such offices are formed within each department and bureau dealing with financial and economic matters. From two to four workers are employed in each branch.

The work of the supervisory offices in the region is co-ordinated with the major yearly drives. The tasks for the nation[41] in 1955 are the elimination of nation-wide waste, corruption, and degeneration within the government.

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37. T'an Cheng-wen's article in "Chien-ch'üan Jen min Chien-ch'a Chih-tu, Kung-ku Kuo-chia Fa-chih", ["Construct a Peoples' Protectorate and Reinforce State Judicial System"], New China Monthly, No. 2, Feb. 28, 1955, pp. 28-29.

38. Summary Reports of the Central-South China Peoples' Control Committee in Yangtze Daily, Sept., 20, 1950, p. 2; August 8, 1951, p. 5; Dec. 5, 1942, p. 1.

39. Directive governing establishment, People's Daily, Jan. 6, 1953, p. 1.

40. Directive governing the establishment, ibid., Jan. 6, 1953, p. 1.

41. Official report on the Conference Enlightenment Daily, June 13, 1955, p. 3.

People's supervision reporters[42] are sent out by the supervisory commission or selected within the organization itself. They are organized into small working groups to spy on the individual worker for evidences of misdemeanor, waste, corruption, bureaucracy, and other behavior not in the "best interest" of the State. Their techniques are varied. They may make direct accusations, establish a network of mass contact, spy on their own colleagues, tamper with the people's complaint boxes, or control the hearings of the "reception room." The complaint boxes are used to encourage accusations and complaints aginst officials and agencies. This arrangement is required in all government offices, and the head of the office is responsible for the examination of these letters, and appropriate replies. The reception room enables people to make accusations and complaints directly to the government. The reception room of the People's Control Commission under the Central-South China Military and Political Committee received 1,615 people and undertook 2,349 cases in a period of six months in 1952.[44] With the subsequent recession of large-scale drives, the number of complaints has doubtless declined.

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42. Directive of the Central-South China People's Control Commission, Yangtze Daily, Aug. 10, 1952, p. 3.

43. Directive of the Central-South China People's Control Commission, ibid., Aug. 26, 1953, p. 1.

44. Ibid., Aug. 10, 1952, p. 3.

B. PARTY CONTROL OVER MASS ORGANIZATIONS

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Communist policies toward mass organizations have been well calculated and effectively carried out. These policies encourage and regulate the activities and political utilization of mass organizations.

From the Party point of view, mass organizations are a political asset because each of these mass organizations represents a specific segment of the populace and is itself a social or economic force.

Immediately after the Communist seizure of power in this region, mass organizations sprang to life. Not until 1952, however, was their organization placed upon a permanent basis. There are as many mass organizations in this region as at the central level.[45] The most influential are here singled out to illustrate the pattern of Party control.

1. Trade Unions

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Trade unions are regarded as the transmission belt by which the Party and the workers are linked.[46] Their organization is patterned after that of the Party. A Central-South China Trade Union Working Committee is established as the delegate of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions.[47] Under the regional Working Committee, local trade union councils stretch from provinces, municipalities, and counties to towns (*hsiang* is not included, for farmers and handicraft workers are not considered eligible).

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[45] See Chao Kuo-chün, The Mass Organization in Communist China, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Institute of Technology, 1953.

The establishment of Party control over the trade unions in the Central-South China region did not prove easy. A gigantic and drastic campaign was required before control was comfortably secured. The "democratic reform" campaign, launched in the midst of land reform in the summer of 1951,[48] was directed at the trade unions and was aimed at the liquidation of old trade union leadership and the strengthening of the Communist hold over the urban populace.

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[46] Chinese text of the Constitution of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions in *People's Daily*, May 14, 1953, p. 2; English text in *Current Background*, No. 248, June 22, 1953.

[47] The Working Committee was formally established on October 4, 1952, *Hsin Wuhan Pao* [*New Wuhan Daily*], Oct. 5, 1952, p. 2; prior to that it was known as the Preparatory Committee of the Trade Unions.

[48] Provincial reports on the completion of the movement in Kwangtung, see *Yangtze Daily*, Nov. 28, 1951, p. 2; in Honan, *ibid.*, Nov. 27, 1951; in Canton, *Yangtze Daily*, Nov. 29, 1951, p. 3.

To facilitate the Party's political control over trade unions, there is a basic trade union branch or cell, similar to the Party branch, composed of the trade union members working in the same enterprise. If the branch is of sufficient size, this basic trade union committee will set up a workshop (department) committee. The trade union committee may be divided into trade union teams according to production units. The general methods employed by the Party for political control over other organizations are applicable here, of course. Trade union affairs are subject to the direction of the Party commission on trade unions; and Party members are placed in key positions within the unions.

However, the most effective method is the initiation of union policies in the Party rather than in the union.[49] This involves three steps: first, the Party branch within the union initiates major policies, including directives, working plans, and cadre policy. Secondly, the Party branch suggests to the presidium of the Trade Union Council policies in need of discussion. Party members elected to the presidium direct the trade union meeting and successfully pilot the Party proposal through the presidium. Third, after the resolution is adopted, Party and corps members must accept it unconditionally and serve as activists to make certain that it is carried out.

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[49] People's Daily, May 8, 1953, p. 2.

2. Federation of Democratic Women

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On October 27, 1951, Ch'ien Ying, then Chairman of the Federation of the Democratic Women of the Central-South China region, declared that the federation's membership had reached twenty-one million, or almost one-third of all the women of the region.[50] The federation's importance in this region, however, is not based merely on numerical supremacy. The position of women in society is such that they not only constitute an important part of the labor force, but their influence extends throughout the entire population. The Communists correctly regard the federation as a major political force and are most eager to see that women's organizations are formed.

At the village level, the federation is the most active part of the rural movement. The wide participation of women in the Peasants' Association should be particularly noted. The provincial Federation of Democratic Women of Hupeh alone mobilized 12 million women during the Land Reform Movement, almost 40 per cent of the total membership of the peasant's associations in the provinces.[51] The Federation plays a political role in all the farm drives and gives full support to the hsiang governments and party apparatus. Since the completion of land reform, women have begun to take an active part in the producers' co-operatives. In May 1954, the All-China Federation of Democratic Women held its first Rural Work Meeting and called upon all women on the farms of China to join the movement.[52] The activities of rural women are not limited to the land. In Kiangsi alone, for example, more than 50,000 women belong to the militia.[53]

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[50] Yangtze Daily, Oct. 28, 1951, p. 1.
[51] Ibid., Dec. 3, 1950, p. 4; July 13, 1951, p. 3.

In the cities, women are important to the urban inhabitants' committees and the worker's family committees, both Party devices for urban control. Apart from participation in all drives in the cities -- notably the "democratic reform" movement and Three-Anti and Five-Anti campaigns -- the Federation of Democratic Women also co-operates with the Department of Women Workers of the trade unions. The federation also urges all women, including housewives, to participate in social work.

Party control over women's federations follows the same pattern as that for other mass organizations. The Party as well as the New Democratic Youth Corps maintains a commission on women's affairs. The commission has the power of direction and policy-making. However, the work of the commission is subject to the supervision of other basic departments such as the departments of organization, propaganda, and rural work, and so forth. Party personnel are placed in key positions in the federations.

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[52] People's Handbook, 1955, pp. 386-87.
[53] Yangtze Daily, July 13, 1951, p. 3.

3. Other Mass Organizations

A number of mass organizations which have a strong influence on society are represented in this region. The All-China Federation of Democratic Youth[54] maintains branches in all key cities and counties in a province. The Central-South branch of the All-China Federation of Literature and Art Circles was established[55] in November 1951. The most elaborately organized group is the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association, established in 1949. By July 1952, it claimed a membership of 6,676,776, with 7,681 branches in the counties and towns of the region.[56] Party control over these mass organizations follows the usual pattern.

C. POLITICAL CONTROL IN THE RURAL AREAS

The rural movement is the foundation of Communist political power in Central-South China. Here lies the strength and the weakness of the region and of the Party; here the pattern of political dynamics is most revealing and Communist power encounters the greatest opposition.

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[54] Regulations governing ACFDY in People's Daily, June 17, 1953, p. 1.

[55] Yangtze Daily, Nov. 19, 1951, p. 1.

[56] Ibid., July 10, 1952, p. 1.

The establishment of Communist power in the rural areas can be divided into three stages: the initial construction period prior to the completion of land reform, when political power was centered in the peasants' associations and closely related to land reform in the rural areas; the consolidation period, a period of experiment for the producers' co-operative movements, marked by a gradual shift of political power from the Peasants' association to the hsiang government, controlled by the Party; the election- and the post-Constitution periods when the continuous suppression of oppositions in the rural areas (during the elections of 1953-54) strengthened the foundation of Communist political power, and when such political power has been firmly entrenched in the government and the Party (during the post-Constitution period). 668

1. Initial Construction: 1949-1952

Communist leaders have constantly emphasized the political significance of land reform.[57] They regard it as a political struggle, and its very essence is conceived to be the abolition of the "feudal" system of landownership, the creation of a political force under Party control, and the establishment of "democratic authority." Teng Tzu-hui declared that 668 423 the political aim of the movement is to be placed above any economic aim. 668 423

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[57] Liu Shao-Chi's report on land reform in Enlightenment Daily, June 30, 1950, p. 1; English text in The Agrarian Law of the Peoples' Republic of China, Peking, Foreign Language Press, 1950. Also Teng Tsu-hui's report, Yangtze Daily, Dec. 27 1950, p. 1.

Land reform is divided into three stages: preparation, execution, and re-examination. The preparatory stage is aimed at the liquidation of the existing holders of political power. The execution stage includes confiscation and redistribution of land in order to destroy the basis of the landlord class. During the re-examination stage, the foundation of new political power is laid.

During the land reform period, political power in the rural area[58] rested upon: (1) the Party, (2) the Peasants' Association, (3) the *hsiang* government, (4) the militia, and (5) other mass organizations, notably the women's federations and youth organizations. Of these, the Peasant's Association and the militia, organized as instruments of terror, were of particular importance. 668 575

The chief task of the Peasant's Association was to incite people to action and to provide a receptive group which could be controlled by a small number of Party members. Poor peasants, farm laborers, and middle-class peasants constituted one-third of the membership; but the peasant's associations were

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[58] For reference, consult *Kung-fei Ju-ho K'ung-chih Nung-ts'un Yü Ch'eng-shih [How the Communists Control Villages and Cities]*, Taipeh, 1954; also, *Nung-ts'un Kung-ch'an-tang-yüan K'o-pen [Textbook for Rural Party Workers]*, Canton, Hua-nan, 1951.

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organized only after the Party had established control over such earlier peasants' organizations as the Poor Peasants' Corps, Peasants' Mass Meeting, and Peasants' Representatives Conference. Further, although plenary meetings were held, the true power of the association lay with the executive committee, which was under Party control.

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The militia, an armed force at the disposal of the Party, is an organization of poor peasants, farm laborers, and young people. As of December 1950, the strength of the militia in the Central-South China region was placed at 1,480,000 men.[59] In Hupeh, a membership of 220,000 was reported in September 1950. Prior to May 1950, the militia structure was complex and unwieldy. It was reorganized in May 1950 and more thoroughly, in 1952.[60] According to a January 1952 directive of the Central-South China Military and Political Committee,[61] each village was to have a platoon, each *ch'ü* forms a company. Its size is in no sense comparable to its military counterpart. Operationally, area commands at all levels can employ the local militia. The People's council, with the approval of the military command

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59. *Yangtze Daily,* Dec. 15, 1950, p. 1; in Hupeh alone, a reported 220,000 men in Sept. 1950; *ibid.*, Sept. 23, 1950, p. 2.

60. *Ibid.*, March 31, 1951, p. 3; for the employment of militia prior to the Party's assumption of power, see *ibid.*, Aug. 24, 1953, p. 3.

61. *Ibid.*, Jan. 5, 1952, p. 1; for a study of militia, see Li Tang, *Militia of Communist China,* Hong Kong, Union Research Institute, 1954.

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of the area, can employ the militia for such duties as the transportation of food and the guarding of granaries.

The duties of the milita in peace time are to assist the public security organizations in matters concerning arrests and detention, co-operate with troops in campaigns against bandits, to guard bridges and transportation centers, and to take charge of food transportation and the maintenance of order at public meetings. In war time, the militia's duty is to co-operate with area commands in district defense.

2. Consolidation Period: 1952

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As land reform came to a close, Communist power was established but not yet unchallenged in the rural areas. First, many villages and hsiang were controlled by "reactionary" elements[62] who, in some instances, were said to have succeeded in bribing Party members. Such a phenomenon was often reported, and in 1954 ten per cent of the villages in the country as a whole still belonged in this "backward" category.[63] Secondly, the cadres were said to be generally apathetic. For this the Communists gave four reasons: (a) the low educational level of the cadres which made them incapable of successfully completing assigned tasks; (b) the "five-fears" reportedly existing among the cadre -- fear of injustice, fear of liquidation, fear of individual loss resulting from Party-re-education, fear of criticism from above, and fear of revenge;[64] (c) abuse of power by the newly-rich activists, whose status and income rose after the land reform; and (d) the temptations of city life.

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[62] See chapter on Subversive Potentialities.

[63] Yangtze Daily, Aug. 23, 1951, p. 2; of early report, in ibid., Sept. 1, 1950.

Together with reports of general apathy was the Wu-to (the "five-too-many") phenomenon.[65] Its name has reference to the practice of allowing a single individual to hold too many different jobs at one time, and it was one of the causes contributing to Party inefficiency in the rural areas. It was reported that a corps member in a village in Hupeh held five jobs and had to attend meetings thirteen times a week.[66] This phenomenon was nationwide and was so serious that the Communists issued directives to remedy it.

The first task in rural areas after the period of land reform was increase in production through the establishment of mutual-aid teams and the organization of agricultural producers' co-operatives. This task was assigned to the Party and the hsiang government.

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64. Ibid., Aug. 29, 1950, p. 5; Jan. 6, 1952.

65. The "five-too-many" pertained to tasks, meetings and conferences, memoranda and forms, organizations, and jobs. See People's Daily, June 26, 1953, p. 1.

66. Yangtze Daily, Oct. 17, 1951, p. 2.

The consolidation of the Party's political power in the rural areas involved the following steps:[67] re-examination of Party members and overhauling of Party branches; election of new officers in Party and government apparatus; and appointment of *hsiang* Party secretaries with enhanced functions. The *hsiang* Party secretary was placed in charge of the four seasonal production drives on the farms and the activities of the yough corps. The secretary in charge of organization supervised indoctrination and Party schooling and was concurrently responsible for the establishment of "democratic systems." The secretary in charge of propaganda handled matters concerning the agricultural producers" co-operative movement in addition to his propaganda jobs.

Administratively, the *hsiang* head (assistant-secretary of the Party) had charge of civil affairs, whereas the council member on production looked after the mutual-aid teams and co-operatives. The council member on educational and cultural matters was also in charge of the propaganda network.

The process of consolidation was speeded by the requirement that all policy information be first discussed by the Party organizations. Then, under the auspices of the *hsiang* government, a representatives' conference, which included delegates from all mass organizations, was convened to secure mass participation.

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[67] *Yangtze Daily*, Sept. 1, 1951.

3. The Election and the Post-Constitution Period

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Premier Chou En-lai's announcement of a nation-wide election in 1953 and the fact that the majority of the 280,000 *hsiang* had completed All-Circle People's Conferences indicated the degree of Communist confidence in their power.[68]

At the village and *hsiang* levels, the key task in the period prior to the election was the allocation of election districts.[69] In the Central-South China region, the original 4,100 *ch'ü* were increased to 5,300 *ch'ü* and the number of *hsiang* was increased to 10,000. Consequently, as explained by Teng Tzu-hui, the size of each *hsiang* was reduced to make for easier control. In the *hsiang* (which averaged 1,500 inhabitants) election districts were drawn up. From these districts representatives were elected to attend *hsiang* representatives' conferences, from which *hsiang* governments were organized.

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After the promulgation of the Constitution, Communist political power was further strengthened. The *hsiang* People's congress now holds the highest formal authority in the locality, but the true power remains with the *hsiang* People's council. Resistance remains strong in the rural areas, however, and in 1955, two strong countermeasures were passed by the Party.[70] Further expansion of agricultural

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[68] Chinese text of Chou's report on Government Works in Chou En-lai: *Cheng-chih Pao-kao 1953* [*Political Report of 1953*], Peking, Jen-min ch'u-pan-she, 1953, p. 16.

[69] Teng's report before the Fourth Conference of Central-South China Military and Political Committee in *Yangtze Daily*, Dec. 13, 1952, pp. 1-3.

[70] "*Wei-shen-ma Pi-hsü Chung-shih Nung-yeh*

(continued next page)

producers' co-operatives was temporarily checked, and the first Rural Basic-Level Organization Conference was held in April 1955 for the purposes of strengthening Party leadership over the agricultural producers' co-operative organization in order to begin gradual collectivization.

The following resolutions were adopted at the Conference:[71] (1) Party organization shall be based on territorial and production units, with emphasis on the development of more Party branches in the agricultural producers' co-operatives. (2) Collective work rather than individual achievement is to be stressed. (3) There is to be further expansion of Party indoctrination programs. (4) The county Party secretary's leadership and the Party's political role in the producers' co-operatives is to be strengthened.

The chief problems which the agricultural program of the Party faces are the need for cadre education, the lack of Party strength, and the peasant's sense of individuality and love for his own land.

D. POLITICAL CONTROL IN THE CITY

The establishment and consolidation of Communist

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70. (continued) Sheng-ch'an Ho-tso-she Ti Kung-ku Kung-tso?" ["Why Should Productive Co-operatives Be Strengthened?"], New China Monthly, March, 1955, pp. 133-134.

[71] Summary report on the Conference, New China Monthly, No. 4, April 1955, pp. 27-28.

power in the cities followed the same general course as in the rural areas. The Democratic Reform Movement, directed in particular at the urban population and the trade unions, and the violent Three-Anti and Five-Anti campaigns, directed at the Party itself, the government administration, and industrial and business circles of society, in effect, performed functions similar to those in the land reform in rural areas.

Communist power in the city is retained through the maintenance of a set of control organizations, extending from workers' trade unions to the students' federation.[72]

The Urban Inhabitants' Committee, composed of one-hundred to six-hundred families, is organized with the stated aim of contributing to the welfare of the residents. The basic unit is a family residing in or sharing a house with others. Under the committee are sub-committees representing fifteen to forty families. Minority nationality groups and workers' residential areas are organized in similar units. It is reported that more than 70 per cent of the cities in China are under the control of these organizations.

The Urban Street Office is a representative of the city government and acts as a liason between the

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[72] Regulation of committees, *People's Daily*, Dec. 31, 1954, p. 1-2; English text in *Current Background,* No. 310, Jan. 17, 1955.

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government and the street for the maintenance of public order. Its jurisdiction parallels that established for the Public Security Sub-Station, thus enforcing a double-check on residents. The Public Security Sub-Station is responsible, in the main, for the maintenance of public order and the suppression of counterrevolutionaries.

The Mediation Committee[73] is a "mass" organization established both in the city and in the village. Its function is to mediate disputes and to propagandize government statutes, and, provisionally, to exercise "judicial" power in the village or street for misdemeanors not covered by the Peoples' tribunal. Although the committee acts as a third part in a dispute, it represents the government's view and emphasizes the technique of self-criticism. 668 698

Communist control in the city is much more rigid and forceful than in the village. With the spread of Communist domination over many organizations, factories, and other professional organizations, Communist domination is strengthened. Although public security sub-stations play a leading role in enforcing government decrees, the importance of other organizations, notably the procuratorates and the peoples' courts, should not be minimized. 668

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[73] People's Daily, March 23, 1954, p. 1.

III. ELECTIONS AND POLITICS OF MINOR PARTIES

A. Elections

The nation-wide election which produced the peoples' congresses at all levels was held in the Central-South China region between 1953 and July-August 1954.

1. Election Mechanism

The Electoral Law of the People's Republic of China was promulgated on March 1, 1953.[74] Article 3 stipulates that deputies to people's congresses of a province, county, or municipality divided into districts shall be elected by a like people's congress of the next lower level. Deputies to the people's congress of a hsiang, town, municipal district, or municipality divided into districts shall be elected directly by the electors. To administer these elections, the electoral law provides for the establishment of election committees at all levels down to the hsiang. Members of the committees are appointed by the People's government of the next higher level. The eight functions assigned to the committee at the hsiang level were reinforced by the directive issued in April 1953 by the Central Election Committee.[75] The chairman of the committee is appointed from the higher level. The Committee defines electoral districts; each district should have at least 200 people, in order to supply two or three representatives. A voter-qualification examination board is established; only those who pass the examination may receive the electoral certificate. Committees at the hsiang level directly control the selection of candidates through negotiations between the Party representatives and representatives of mass organizations within the election committee.

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[74] The Electoral Law of the People's Republic of China for the All-China People's Congresses and Local People's Congresses of all Levels, Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1953.

[75] For the eight functions of the committee, see Article 39, ibid.; for the directive, see People's Daily, April 6, 1953, p. 1.

Although the election to the peoples' congresses above the county level must be conducted by secret ballot, the election of deputies to the peoples' congresses of a hsiang, town, municipal district, and the election of hsiang or a town deputy to a county peoples' congress may be conducted by eithe secret ballot or a show of hands (Article 55).

2. Selection and Nomination of Candidates

Article 47 of the Electoral Law regulates the nomination of candidates. Members of the Communist Party of China, the various democratic parties, the various Peoples' organizations, and electors or representatives who are not affiliated with the above-mentioned parties or organizations may be nominated as candidates for election as deputies, either jointly through negotiation among the groups or separately by each party, according to electoral districts and electoral units. In all cases, however, joint nomination is the rule and the caucus method is adopted. Negotiations on the nomination of candidates at the provincial or municipal level are made through the consultative conference of the level 666 in question. At the county level or below, where such conferences do not exist, negotiations are carried out by the election committee. There is little doubt that the Communist Party of China commands the selection of candidates in the negotiations. At the hsiang level, a preliminary list of the candidates is given to the electors' discussion group for approval and returned to the election committee. The final list is then published five days before the election.

3. Election Campaign and Fund

The practice of joint nomination of candidates usually eliminates the need for election campaigning. A candidate from other parties and organizations so selected must first meet the approval of the local Party organization; if he is approved, his election is assured. Any campaigning must take place only at the Party meetings and discussion group meetings, where an individual may be questioned and his qualifications discussed. With respect to election expenses, Article 8 of the electoral law permits a disbursement from the national treasury. Since campaigning is rare, the collection of a campaign fund is not provided for. Article 62 singles out bribery as an offense. Other unlawful practices include violence, intimidation, and fraud, offenses subject to fine or imprisonment.

B. Politics of Minor Parties 665

After 1950, minor parties gradually established

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in the key cities of the Central-South Region.[75] The offices of the notable minor parties established in this region are the Revolutionary Committee of Kuomintang, the China Association for the Promotion of Democracy, the Democratic League, Chinese Peasants Workers' Democratic Party, and Chih Kung Tang.

The Revolutionary Committee of Kuomintang, composed of former Kuomintang officials, forms the largest group participating in government. The next largest is the Democratic League. As a party made up of the petty bourgeoisie and intelligentsia, it serves as a symbol of coalition. The China Association for the Promotion of Democracy is a party of the national bourgeoisie, including industrialists and capitalists. Its services are needed in the nation's economic programs. Minor parties having some political importance are drafted for other activities. Of special importance is the Chih Kung Tang which, as an overseas Chinese political association, has been a major medium through which the Communists seek support from abroad.

The status of minor parties in this region is determined ultimately by their status in the central government -- a status which changed after the promulgation of the Constitution. While the

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75. For example, both the Democratic League and the China Association for the Promotion of Democracy Wuhan branches were organized in September 1950; Yangtze Daily, Sept. 2, 1950, p. 4; ibid., Sept. 16, 1950, p. 4. History of various parties appears in People's Handbook, 1955, pp. 371-80; also A Guide to New China 1953, Peking, Foreign Languages Press, pp. 47-61.

Constitution still calls for the continued functioning of the Peoples' Democratic United Front led by the Communist Party of China, the democratic groups of the United Front are rapidly losing their identity.

In the first place, the local consultative committees of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, which are the organizational forms of the United Front, are no longer politically important. In 1951 their duties included[76] assisting local governments, reflecting opinion, examining decrees submitted by the government, and participating in government-sponsored drives. Article 18 of the Constitution has reduced their role to that of advisory agencies.[77]

In the second place, minor parties' participation in the government is no longer effective. It is true that minor parties may still participate in government affairs, either through the nomination of candidates to the People's congresses or through the local consultative committees of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference; however, as the foregoing sections have indicated, the peoples' congresses and people's councils fail to provide for true popular participation. Equally significant is the reduction in the establishment of consultative

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76. Decrees governing local consultative committees and the additional functions of the Standing Committee of County People's Conference, see Yangtze Daily, Sept. 8, 1951, p. 4.

77. English text of the Constitution of C.P.P.C.C. in Current Background, No. 309, D c. 25, 1954.

committees below provincial level. Prior to the promulgation of the Constitution in September 1954, the establishment of these committees in administrative districts, cities, and counties was encouraged. The new Constitution only allows for the establishment of these committees in provinces and in municipalities directly under the central authority. 665

In the third place, with the consolidation of Communist political power at all levels, the position of minor parties is further endangered. For instance, the liquidation of capitalists in the transition stage will certainly reduce the political position of the China Association for the Promotion of Democracy. Eventually, minor parties will no longer exist as a political force in the ordinary sense because they will have no political influence.

1. Control and Infiltration of Minor Parties

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The most effective way of eliminating minor parties and their activities is to exercise strict control over them, either through direct subjugation or infiltration. The guiding principles to be observed by all minor parties participating in the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference indicates the degree to which these minor parties have subordinated themselves to the Communist Party of China. Minor parties "must assist the state organs and set the social forces in motion...to maintain close contact with the masses...to continue to consolidate and develop the alliance between China and the USSR... and to study Marxist-Leninist theories on a voluntary basis, study state policy, elevate political levels, practice criticism and self-criticism, and strive for ideological remolding." 665 668

Infiltration is the long-term method of eliminating the minor parties. As early as 1951, Chang Chih-i, head of the United Front department of the Central-South China Military and Political Committee, made this policy amply clear in an article calling for the assistance of the Communist Party of China in the expansion of minor parties.[78] He laid down four conditions under which the expansion of policy was to take place. (1) Organization of minor parties must be free from reactionary elements. (2) Expansion must be restricted to key cities and provincial capitals; small cities and counties would not be suitable for establishment of minor parties. (3) A party may not expand to more than twice its former strength. (4) Members of the Communist Party of China taken in by a minor party are not to exceed one-fifth of the total strength of the minor party; their purpose is to render direct assistance to the minor parties on organizational matters.

The fourth condition, if implemented, might result in the gradual extinction of minor parties. Furthermore, branches offices of minor parties can be abolished any time their services are no longer needed. The Chiang-men-Hsin-hui branch of the Democratic League in Kwangtung was totally dissolved because reactionary elements[79] were reported to have been admitted. 665 668

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[78] Yangtze Daily, May 10, 1951, p. 1.

2. Minor Parties and "Pressure Politics"

In a democracy, the political activity of minor or opposition parties may indicate the measure of practicing democracy. Likewise, special interest groups, as such, can enjoy their political privileges under democratic rule. In Communist China, since public opinion is tightly controlled by the Communist Party, and since the minor parties have only assigned duties to perform, special interest groups and the dissident parties exert no "pressure" upon the state organizations dominated by the Party, nor do they take part in the making of decisions. 665

Deputies of the minor parties were allowed to make speeches at all sessions of the All-People's Conferences, but they limited themselves to praise, criticizing only those minor faults which the Communists themselves had admitted publicly.

Finally, with the retirement of aging leaders, whose authority dates from the pre-Communist period, and with the absence of young and vigorous new members, the value of the minor parties is in rapid decline.

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[79] Yangtze Daily, March 7, 1952, p. 3.

CONCLUSION AND COMMENTS

The Communist Party of China concerns itself with the maintenance of a militant and efficient Party organization and the stimulation of popular enthusiasm and support. Its organizations in the Central-South China region had proven their combative worth in the past -- prior to the assumption of power -- and in the first five years of the new regime. The present task, calling for the execution of policies aimed at the total reconstruction of society and the effective control of all segments of society, is one in which the Party has yet to display its competency. In the rural areas, the lower educational level of the Party members and the maladministration of the rural policies provide the greatest obstacles, and Party members working in the cities are equally susceptible to inefficiency, corruption, and mismanagement. Above all, traditional forces have exercised a retarding effect upon Communist policies. For instance, the peasant resistance is so strong that the regime is forced to tone down its rural policies. In the same vein, resistance to regimentation in the cities is responsible for the threat of renewed suppression of counterrevolutionary activities. Finally, the severe demands imposed upon Party members and the frequent and violent reorganization of the Party intimidate the members and plant seeds of discontent and distrust among the rank and file. These factors could accelerate the disintegration of the Party machine and the collapse of the regime. The control of all state and mass organizations will be possible only if the Communists score a victory over the traditional forces of Chinese society.

COMMUNIST PARTY POLITICAL CONTROL OVER GOVERNMENT LEGISLATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE BRANCHES AT LOCAL LEVELS*


CENTRAL LEVEL
Provincial People's Congress#
Provincial People's Council
Provincial Party Committee (CPC)
Administrative District Government^x
Administrative District Party Committee
County or City People's Congress#
People's Council
City
County
County or City Party Committee
Ch'ü People's Congress
Ch'ü People's Council
Ch'ü Administrative Office ^x
Ch'ü Party Committee
Hsiang or Chen People's Congress#
Hsiang or Chen People's Council
Hsiang or Chen Party General Branch

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* "Constitution of the People's Republic of China," Current Background, No. 297, October 5, 1954; "Organic Laws of People's Congresses and People's Councils," Current Background, No. 302, November 5, 1954.

# Indirectly elected by the congress at the immediate lower level.

x Administrative unit acting as an agent of its immediate superior.

Note: ——→ indicates that members of the council are elected by the congress. ←—— indicates that the Party committee exercises political control over the council.

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PUBLIC ORDER AND SAFETY

In a totalitarian regime the employment of terror is a primary strategy by which public order is maintained and the consolidation of political power is assured. The Communist regime in the Central-South Region has not hesitated to pursue such a policy, employing it on an intensive scale which covers all spheres of activity. Such a policy is insured by maintaining a rigid control over the populace and by employing various means for suppression of opposition. The judicial organ of government is conceived neither as an institution of justice nor as a protector of individual rights, but it is designed to serve as a weapon of the state for the suppression of all opposition, thereby "safeguarding the people's democratic system and protecting public property." Likewise, to insure observance of the law, the local People's Procuratorate, although a "judicial organ," exercises procuratorial authority over all local state agencies, over government workers, and over all citizens in general. The procuratorates serve as instruments of control over the People's courts and public security agencies, particularly since they have the power to supervise the People's courts in adjudication matters, the security agencies in investigation activities, and the execution of judgment in criminal cases. Both the police and public security agencies with their own security forces are instruments of violence. They assume direct responsibility for the maintance of public order and constant vigilance over the entire populace. They are integrated systems, subject to the control of the Central People's

Government and rigidly supervised by the Communist Party.

The use of terror is inherent in a dictatorship, where subordination to a single will is required. The imposition of a single will upon an entire society is certain to meet opposition; the more rapid and drastic the change, the stronger the resistance. To crush this resistance, terror and violence are employed. The Communist regime imposes upon society a new political ideology and its act are calculated to destroy the old order while creating a new one. It is for this reason that violence and terror are widespread and their impact upon the entire society alarming. [The activities of resistance groups will be discussed in the chapter on Subversive Potentialities.]

I. PEOPLE'S COURTS AND PEOPLE'S PROCURATORATE

A. People's Courts

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As political weapons of the state, the People's courts have actively engaged in the suppression of counterrevolutionary activities and maintenance of public order. The Communists established a Supreme People's Court[1] in November 1949; a branch court was established in the Central-South Region a year later.[2] It serves as the representative of the Supreme People's Court and as the final court of this region. At lower levels, the old courts were left intact and were allowed to function. However, centralized control over these local courts was subsequently established. 692

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[1] Official report by Shen Chuen-ju, Jen-min Jih-pao [People's Daily], June 2, 1950, p. 1.

[2] Ch'ang-chiang Jih-pao [Yangtze Daily], Nov. 2, 1950, p. 1.

The courts, like other organs of the state, underwent several stages in development; however, they followed a different course and their functions varied from time to time. For instance, during the first stage, prior to June 1952, the courts served as instruments of violence, carrying out with relentlessness the land reform in the rural areas and the Three-Anti and Five-Anti campaigns in the cities. During the second stage, between June 1952 and the spring of 1953, the courts completed judicial reform that enabled them to legalize their authority, replacing that of the former courts. During the third stage, from September 1954 to the present, they have consolidated their authority and have begun to function as judicial organs in conformity with the Organic Law of the People's courts of the People's Republic of China. Let us now discuss the three stages in greater detail. 692 668

1. The First Stage The distinguishing feature of judicial activities during this stage is the wide use of the People's tribunal in the land reform, and in Three-Anti and Five-Anti campaigns. This devotion to the administration of the criminal code in connection with the suppression of opposition made possible the concentration of judicial authority in the hands of Party functionaries and the complete subordination of judicial functions for political expediency.

According to the regulation and the directive concerning the People's tribunal for land reform[3] issued in 1951 by the Central-South China Military and Political Committee, the county and city tribunals were to be directly under the leadership of the People's governments concerned and to be a component part of the People's court of the respective level. People's tribunals were established in every two or three ch'ü and were given sole authority in dealing with criminal matters, including the authority to impose sentences of not more than five years' imprisonment. They also have the authority to prosecute counterrevolutionaries and to initiate arrests. The political character of the tribunal can be detected by the composition of the adjudication committee, composed of a president, a deputy, and several judges, half of which was to be appointed by the People's government and the rest "elected" by the People's representatives from public security, the Peasant's Association, and other mass organizations. Specifically, the county head in some cases and the ch'ü head in all cases were the presidents of the tribunals. 692 668

Tribunals were rapidly organized during the land reform. By June 1951, there were 366 county tribunals and 1,841 ch'ü tribunals established in the Central-South Region, and 143,761 cases had been tried.[4] However, these figures fail to suggest 692 695 668 the violence and the intensity involved. The operation of these tribunals relied heavily on mass hysteria and mob hatred. The administration of the trials by Party functionaries insured the use of terror. When cases were heard, the judges of the People's tribunals bombarded the masses with propaganda. The masses were sufficiently agitated to denounce as reactionaries those whom the Party had previously singled out for prosecution. After mass emotion was aroused and denunciations were made, judgment was passed by the masses and sentence rendered at the instigation of the adjudication committee controlled by the Party. Such a mass trial could not avoid intimidation and violence toward the accused. 692 695 668

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[3] Text of both in Yangtze Daily, Feb. 1, 1951, p. 2, and ibid., July 29, 1951, p. 1.

[4] Official record of Conference summarizing the work of People's tribunals in the Central-South Region, Yangtze Daily, June 12, 1951, p. 1, and ibid., July 13, 1951, p. 3.

During the Three-Anti and Five-Anti campaigns, People's tribunals were established by the directives of the Government Administration Council.[5] They were organized in the administrative units and in the armed forces. The president of the adjudication committee consequently was the leading figure. Members of the committee were activists representing various Party-controlled organizations. These tribunals were empowered to mete out death sentences. Such a practice illustrates the extent to which a judicial organ can be manipulated by the Communists for political purposes. 692 668

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[5] Directive on the organization of the tribunals in Yangtze Daily, April 1, 1952, p. 1, and ibid., March 26, 1952, p. 1, respectively.

The effective use of People's tribunals as 692
weapons of force was introduced after the judicial 666
reform.[6] During the nationwide elections in
1953-54, People's tribunals were again widely used. 668
Their main function was to suppress and punish violators and unqualified candidates and voters, including those citizens accused of counterrevolutionary activity. These tribunals worked in coordination with the election committees at all levels. As of February 1954, in thirty-six counties in Kiangsi Province, 75 tribunals were established in 312 *hsiangs* and towns.

2. *The Second Stage* Numerous problems 692
faced the judicial organs after the Communist 671
seizure of power. At least two serious changes were contemplated by the Communists -- the elimination of the code system and the replacement of the Nationalist-trained judicial workers. But they were not completed until the judicial reform in 1952. With the exception of the complete abandonment of the Kuomintang code, the *Liu-fa Ch'üan-shu*[7] [*The Compendium of the Six Codes*], the Communists did not attempt to change the Kuomintang court system
or to replace its judicial personnel. This was by 692
no means an indication that the old system would be

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[6] Reports concerning this type of tribunal in *People's Daily*, Feb. 7, 1954, p. 3.

[7] One edition of this work is Wu Ching-hsiung, *Chung-hua Min-kuo Liu-fa Hui-pien*, 6 vols., [*The Compendium of the Six Codes of the Republic of China*], Shanghai, Hui-wen T'ang, 1947.

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retained. On the contrary, by means of People's tribunals, which gave judicial authority to the lower courts, and by strengthening the judicial control organs such as the People's procuratorates, the Communists were able to utilize the old courts and the old judicial personnel for new purposes. This explains in part why judicial reform was delayed until the completion of the several drives in 1951-52.

The judicial reform was primarily a mass campaign. The steps involved included the arousal of the masses to participate in the inspection of prisons and the review of old cases; the use of criticism and self-criticism; and the reorganization of the judicial organs and the reconstruction of judicial authority based upon the new People's court system. During the reform, in the city of Wuhan alone, 6,660 cases were singled out for review.[8]

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To eliminate personnel from the previous regime was the aim of the judicial reform. In the entire region,[9] of the 6,680 court workers in September 1952, some 1,643 (about 24 per cent) had been trained under the Nationalist regime. The percentage was as high as 57 in Hunan, 62 in Hupeh, and 43 in Kwangtung. The percentage was particularly high among employees in the upper courts. Of the sixty-six workers in Kiangsi provincial court, thirty-five trained under the Nationalist regime remained in

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[8] Report of the movement in Wuhan, Yangtze Daily, Nov. 14, 1952, p. 3.

[9] Ibid., September 2, 1952, p. 1; cf. Shih-Liang's reports on the national scene in ibid., Aug. 24, 1952, p. 1, and Sept. 23, 1952, p. 1. English text of the report in Current Background, No. 218, Nov. 5, 1952, pp. 31-34.

service after the Communists assumed control. 693
No doubt this figure was exaggerated by the Communists to illustrate the degree of influence of old-line workers, who were charged with corruption on various counts; cases involving them were reported to be as high as 80 per cent in Kwangtung.[10] This exaggerated percentage served to justify the Communist judicial reform.

In regard to the elimination of old judicial 692
practices, the Communists attacked the old system[11] 695
on four counts: (a) that the judiciary was a weapon employed by one class for the suppression of the opposing class; (b) that the exceedingly mechanical procedure of the old courts should be condemned as a bourgeois practice and was deemed unnecessary; (c) that the assumption of a purely legalistic approach to a case that does not reflect the economic and social relationship of the society was contrary to the socialist view of law; and (d) that the use of precedents for adjudication of a case should also be discarded as a bourgeois practice.

To stress the development of a new judicial system, the Communists introduced several innovations:[12] (a) the simplication of jurisdiction, the

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10. Yangtze Daily, Sept. 12, 1952, p. 3.

11. Articles were found in the Yangtze Daily, Feb. 18, 1951, p. 3. and Li Kuang-ts'an, "P'i-p'ing Jen-min Fa-lü Ti Chiu-fa Kuan-tient" ["Criticizing the People's Law from the Old Jurisprudential View point"], Hsüeh-hsi, No. 7, Oct. 1, 1952, pp. 16-19.

12. Report of Chang Chih-i, Yangtze Daily, Sept. 26, 1952, p. 3.

reduction of appellant cases, and the concentration 692
of judicial authority in the lower courts; (*b*) the 695
adoption of adjudication committees and the administration of law by collegia; (*c*) the review and periodic check of non-appellant cases by the higher courts and the practice in the lower courts of seeking instructions from and reporting to the higher courts; (*d*) the conduct of circuit hearings; (*e*) the use of People's assessors, a system similar to the Western jury system, which includes representatives from various people's organizations; (*f*) the use of trials for cases involving disputes among Party members and workers in factories, offices, and enterprises; and (g) such new techniques as oral inquiries and on-the-spot investigations and the establishment of People's reception rooms and mediation committees as means of enlisting mass support as well as for the intimidation of the masses.

3. *The Third Stage* After judicial reform, 692
further effort was concentrated upon the establish-
ment of the new system and the training of new cadre 693
to fill the vacancies which resulted from large-scale liquidation of the former workers. In 1953, as a result of the second session of the All-China Judicial Conference, a directive was issued calling for the immediate training of 200 to 500 judicial workers and for the drafting of a training plan in each region.[13]
Effort was made to strengthen judicial authority 692
at the lower levels and to set up special courts in 698

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[13] *People's Daily*, Sept. 10, 1953, p. 1.

the industrial and mining centers as well as courts 692
with jurisdiction over railways and waterways. 698
During 1953 and 1954, however, the reorganization was limited to the establishment of model special courts in Central-South China. As of September 1954, only eight railway courts and one waterway court had established in the whole nation.[14] No report is available on the establishment of other special courts. Nevertheless, because of the rising number of cases involving economic matters in the nation (90,000 cases in 1953),[15] the attempt to strengthen judicial work in industry was to be further intensified in 1955.

The introduction of new methods for the administration of law in the courts contered upon the 692
establishment of People's tribunals[16] on a broader and more permanent base. The organization and functions of the People's tribunal remained the same. Whenever it was necessary, they were to hold circuit hearings in villages and towns. In brief, the tribunal was a mobile trial court, a suppressive instrument to be employed in villages which the county People's court could not reach.

Special attention has also been given to the use of People's assessors and open mass hearings[17] as means by which the Communists utilize mass terror. Although the People's assessors system resembles the jury system in Western practice, the assessors are chosen from organizations controlled by the Party. The continuous support of these practices cannot be considered an innovation but is a renewed determination to employ organized terror "to maintain public order and safety."

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[14] Ibid., September 4, 1954.

[15] Ibid.

[16] Report of progress in 1953 in People's Daily, May 20, 1954, p. 1; Enlightenment Daily, April 17, 1955, p. 2.

The selection of judges for the different courts is a means to extend political control to judicial matters. Judges and the presidents of the adjudication committees at local levels are elected by the respective People's congresses, and the other members of the committees are appointed by the People's councils. Such political control by the Communists of the judicial branch of the government is too blatant to be overlooked.

B. People's Procuratorate

The People's Procuratorate is called a "judicial organ" but in reality is a prosecuting agency exercising control over both People's courts and public security agencies. It is in itself a centralized system.[18] Powers exercised by the local offices include the supervision of decisions, orders, and measures of local state organs, inquiry into criminal activities, supervision of the work of the People's courts, guidance in passing judgment on criminal cases and the activities of the agencies for "Reform-through-labor," and the right to prosecute criminal cases or to join in the prosecution of important civil cases involving the interests of the State and the people.

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[17] See Ssu Hsuan, Jen-min Fa-yüan, Shih-hsing Kung-k'ai Shen-p'an Ti I-i [The Meaning of the Open-Hearing Practiced by the People's Courts], No. 3, March 3, 1955, pp. 50-51.

[18] For the organization and operation of the people's procuratorate, consult the organic law of the people's procuratorate. English text in Current Background, No. 303, No. 5, 1954, pp. 8-11.

In the past, a Central-South China branch of the Supreme People's Procuratorate was maintained to represent and act as a leading procuratorate in this region. Since the promulgation of the new Organic Law of the People's Procuratorate, this office has been abolished; consequently, the relation between the central and local agencies is more direct. The appointment by the Supreme People's Procuratorate of chief procurators, deputy procurators, and members of the procuratorial committees of the Provincial People's Procuratorate increases this tendency toward centralization. In the same fashion, the component members of city, county, and ch'ü procuratorial committees are appointed by the procuratorate at a higher level.

The use of the People's Procuratorate in this region as an agency of control and terror can be best illustrated by the manner in which heads or deputy heads of the Public Security Department are appointed as chief or deputy chief of procurators. Notable examples of this type of appointment were seen in the Wuhan and Canton municipal People's

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Procuratorate.[19] Other chiefs or deputy chiefs of the local procuratorates were either the Party District secretary, chief of the organization department of the Communist Party,[20] or other key functionaries in the Party. Party control, together with the fusion in personnel of the public security organs and the procuratorates, insures the exercise of procuratorial power by the Communists, thus securing a tighter control over other agencies of violence and causing additional reasons for terror among the populace.

People's procuratorates have co-ordinated their main task with the key drives of the country. With the nation-wide disclosure of corruption and inefficiency and with the call for suppression of counterrevolutionary activities, people's procuratorates are certain to co-operate with other organizations for the accomplishment of the tasks assigned.[21]

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II. PUBLIC SECURITY ORGANS AND POLICE

A. Public Security Organs

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[19] Chu Ti-hsin in Wuhan and Cheng Pei-ch'en in Canton, Yangtze Daily, Dec. 18, 1951, p. 3.

[20] Wang Li-kuang of Honan provincial people's procuratorate and Chou Nan of Kwangtung, ibid.

[21] Like public security agencies, special people's procuratorate offices were established in all enterprises, transportation center, mining areas and in some cases, in villages. People's Daily, March 20, 1954, p. 1. and ibid., April 1, 1954, p. 3.

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Perhaps the most powerful instrument of violence, with the exception of the armed forces, is the public security organ which exists in all government and functional organizations throughout the land. It maintains close control over the entire populace and assumes the responsibility for arrests and punishment. Furthermore, it has at its disposal the public security forces, which are said to be efficiently staffed. There is no doubt that the public security agencies, by collaborating with other secret organs of the Communist Party and the armed forces, have become the best physical and psychological instruments for the maintenance of public order.

1. Organization For reasons of secrecy and the potentially sinister role played by public security agencies in the structure of the regime, information on their organization and activities is deliberately withheld by the Communists. However, it is known that, in addition to the Ministry of Public Security in the Central Government, each level of government has a department or bureau in charge of matters of public security. This public security system extends from the provincial government down to the hsiang.

In this region prior to 1954, a Public Security Department was maintained in the Central-South China Administrative Committee. This department

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according to a Kuomintang study from Formosa,[22] consisted of eight sections: political security, economic security, border security, armed security, "Reform-through-labor" (Forced labor), intelligence, police, and personnel. In addition to these sections, security cadre schools, security regiments, and other security commands were under the direct ju rsidiction of the department.

Public security agencies are the executive organs of law covering the criminal code and counterrevolutionary statutes. During the land reform period, for example, security agencies were in charge of law enforcement involving the suppression of landlords, "despots," and counterrevolutionaries. Furthermore, the security agencies established in offices, factories, mines, and other industrial enterprises kept a watchful eye on matters relative to public security. In the city and on the farms, security organizations were similarly occuped. They exercised tight control and made certain that every individual remained under their surveillance.

2. Public Security in Rural Areas. During the land reform period, rural security relied on peasant associations and the militia to enforce decrees and destroy the old rural system, to crush the intelligence agencies left by the Kuomintang, to suppress banditry, and to elimimate landlords and "despots."

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[22] Kung-fei Chün-shih Kung-an T'e- wu Tsu-chih Hsi-t'ung T'u-piao Hui-pien [Organizational Chart of the Communist Public Security and Intelligence Organizations], Taipeh, The Sixth Section, Central Committee, the Nationalist Party, 1953.

At the time of the Suppression-of-Counterrevolutionaries Movement in the cities, which was climaxed by the use of violence in 1951, a similar campaign was carried out in rural areas. Official reports during this time indicated the unrest and the resistance of the peasants, expressed in the forms of organized "underground armies," the killing of militia, the burning of granaries, and the slaughtering of cattle. In Hupeh,[23] in one month of 1950, 88 rural robberies were reported, in which 49 military cadre were killed and 264 cattle were slaughtered. In Kwangsi Province during 1950-51, over 3,000 Communist cadres were murdered.[24] 625 669

In connection with the maintenance of rural order, at least two important measures were taken. One was the suppression of the landlords and the other was the establishment of rural security committees. Prior to the issuance of the directive by the Central-South China Military and Political Committee, landlords in the rural areas were placed under the authority of the military command and the militia. According to the order concerning the punishment of landlords issued by the Central-South China Military and Political Committee[25] in November 1950, those who resisted land reform were to be tried by the People's tribunal. Those sentenced to life imprisonment or to imprisonment 625 687 for five years or more were sent to "Reform-through-labor" camps. Those receiving sentences of less than one year were placed under the control of the hsiang government. They were required to sign "patriotic compacts" and pledges. They then were placed in custody, deprived of the right to travel and the right to receive guests, and were compelled to engage in productive activities. A directive in August 1952 provided that landlords could be sent to any area[26] where forced labor was in demand. 625 687

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[23] Report of Li Hsien, Yangtze Daily, April 25, 1951, p. 5.

[24] Official report of P'eng Chen, ibid., Feb. 23, 1951, p. 1.

[25] Ibid., Nov. 17, 1950, p. 1.

The establishment of security committees in the rural areas was a measure taken upon completion of land reform to organize mass participation in public security work. A committee[27] consisting of three to eleven members chosen from activists in various organizations is elected at a mass meeting in each village. Teams of activists are formed under each committee to establish an intelligence network in the village and in industrial groups. These security committees, incollaboration with the Party, the judicial organs, and the mediation committees established in the rural areas, form the backbone of the security system. 625

3. Public Security in the Cities. The maintenance of public order and safety in the cities is more complex than in the rural areas. The Communists approach this problem from at least four different

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[26] Ibid., Aug. 20, 1952, p. 1.

[27] Yangtze Daily, Aug. 11, 1952, p. 1; ibid., Dec. 4, 1951, p. 3; text in Current Background, No. 216, Oct. 21, 1952.

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angles: (a) an extensive public security organization; (b) rigid census control over resident movements; (c) the establishment of resident organizations to watch closely over the entire populace, including committees in all organizations; and (d) the strict regulation of all commercial and recreational activities.

The Public Security Bureau in a municipal government maintains eight sections and several other units. The eight sections include a secretariat, political security (including intelligence, investigation, confidential communication), security administration, police, sanitation, fire prevention, supply, and personnel. Other units under the bureau include prisons, detention houses, and "Reform-through-labor" camps as well as security-training schools, and security forces. Under the bureau, ch'ü sub-bureaus and security sub-stations have been established. The organization of the sub-bureau is an elaborate as that of the bureau itself. The sub-bureau takes charge of detention houses and directs the work of security stations and security committees under them.

In the Central-South Region, the integration of various campaigns and drives -- the Resist-America-Aid-Korea Movement, the Suppression-of-Counterrevolutionaries Movement, and the Land Reform Movement -- resulted in increasingly rigid control over the populace. As well as mass participation in the condemnation and prosecution of counterrevolutionaries, the Central-South China

Military and Political Committee sanctioned the organization of workers' "suppression teams"[28] in all organizations and in each street in order to assist the security agencies. These teams inspired terror among the people during the Three-Anti and Five-Anti campaigns, and by means of such violent measures public order was gradually established in the cities. In the meantime, the Communists began to tighten census control both in the cities and in the rural areas. The directive on census control, issued by the Government Administration Council in July 1951, restricted the movement of city dwellers.[29] Any resident who wished to move had first to obtain a permit from the security station. Likewise, any person who moved into the district had to report his arrival to the station. Even house guests staying three days or more were required to register. The nationwise census taken in 1953 placed urban residents under stricter vigilance. "Planned purchase and marketing," a form of rationing introduced at the end of 1953, has strengthened security control. The recent institution of a regular system of registration increases the burden of established restrictions.[30]

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The Security Committee was first organized in the city during the Suppression-of-Counterrevolutionaries Movement in 1951. Dwellers in a street

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[28] Yangtze Daily, Feb. 24, 1951, p. 3; ibid., Feb. 11, 1952, p. 1.

[29] Ibid., July 18, 1951, p. 4.

[30] Directive of State Council in People's Daily, July 3, 1955, p. 1.

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or an alley form a unit for the establishment of a committee. Under the security sub-station, which might have jurisdiction over several streets, security committees are linked to form a general committee with the sub-station chief as its chairman. The sub-station consists of a chief, deputy chiefs, and several policemen, who have been assigned to maintain public order and enforce decrees pertaining to it. These functions include the enforcement of laws on public security, the suppression of sabotage activities, the prevention and curbing of bandit activities and other criminal acts, the surveillance of counterrevolutionaries, census-taking, and the supervision of the security committees.

Security in factory, business enterprises, and other industrial organizations is the concern of committees established in each of these organizations. These committees are also expected to supervise every phase of industrial production and labor discipline.

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The establishment of regulations governing the conduct of business in the Central-South Region helps to maintain control over all activities. For example, the regulation controlling the supply and sale of radio and electrical appliances[31] requires each

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[31] The four regulations appeared under discussion in Yangtze Daily, Aug. 9, 1951, p. 4.

electrical shop to secure a permit from the security 625
agency before requesting a license from the local 656
Department of Industry. A monthly report of sales and a monthly inventory are also required. Failure to report suspicious patrons to the security agency is a punishable offense. Regulations governing the operation of hotels, warehouses, and recreational facilities follow the same rigid pattern. Owners first must have permits from public security agencies. The procedure regulating the issuance of permits requires the submission of the personal history of the owner, complete information concerning others involved in the business, and a diagram giving the geographic location of the shop or office. Hotels must make daily reports upon their guests, and recreational centers are subject to inspection at any time. Regulation of printing and engraving firms is very strict.[32] These firms are obliged to secure a permit for operation, and their printing activities are subject to inspection by the security agencies. In addition to these regulations, commercial firms are subject to additional controls from other departments, including those in charge of public purchase and marketing.

B. Police

At the First Public Security Conference in 625
Central-South China, previously cited, a call for

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[32] In addition to the 1951 published regulation, publisher and printing house are subject to a more rigid regulation, including the type of materials to be published and the sale of publications; Yangtze Daily, Aug. 21, 1952, p. 4.

the reorganization of the police force was made. The police force was reorganized, as were the public security agencies, during the Three-Anti and Five-Anti campaigns and the judicial reform movement in 1952. The police should be distinguished from the security forces, which are a component part of the reform of the Chinese People's Liberation Army. Effective August 1955, as a result of the State Council Order, security forces at the level of the administrative district and county were organized into an armed police force to perform the same functions as the security forces.[33] According to a report from Formosa,[34] divisions and regiments of the security forces were deployed in provinces and administrative districts. 625

III. CRIMINAL CODES AND LAWS GOVERNING COUNTERREVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES

Although the establishment of a criminal and civil code is assigned to the State Council Bureau of Codification, the former Commission on Codification under the Government Administration Council, 671 to date no report has been made by the committee. However, decrees and orders concerning counterrevolutionary activities have been issued by all levels of government. 671

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[33] The only Communist report on security forces appeared in *People's Daily,* August 11, 1953, p. 1. Text of the State Council order in *ibid.*, July 31, 1955.

[34] *Organizational Chart of the Communist Public Security and Intelligence Organizations,* Taipei, 1953, (previously cited).

A. Criminal Code

The decree[35] promulgated by the Chairman of the People's Republic of China in December 1954 explained the procedure for arrest and detention. As a rule, arrests are not made unless they have first been approved by the People's court or by the People's procuratorates. When making arrests, public security agencies must first obtain a warrant from the People's Procuratorate. However, there are circumstances under which immediate arrests can be made. These exceptions, in fact, grant the security agencies more power than the decree would suggest. For example, persons who are unable to establish their identities or do not have a permanent place of residence are subject to immediate arrest. It is true that certain provisions in the decree guarantee each individual the right to demand a warrant, a minimum period of detention, and an early and rapid trial; nevertheless, at least two factors minimize the value to the individual of these provisions -- first, the arbitrary arrests made by the security agencies, and secondly, the exceptions allowed to facilitate the arrest of counterrevolutionaries. 671 694

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[35] People's Daily, Dec. 21, 1954, p. 1.

Apart from those decrees relating to the punishment of counterrevolutionaries, which will be discussed below, other orders that may be singled out for discussion include the decree on the safekeeping of confidential information[36] and that which is implemented in cases involving the violation of laws concerning the national currency.[37] Since "confidential material" is loosely defined by the Communists, unlawful disclosure of any information can be regarded as a crime. "Confidential information" includes not only national security and military matters in the usual sense, but also any data relating to economic and financial affairs, transportation conditions, and matters of a judicial and legislative nature. In the same fashion, any violation of the laws on national currency committed with the intention of aiding counterrevolutionary activities is regarded as an act of counterrevolution and carries a severe penalty. Other laws[38] passed during the several drives and on various occasions generally are in the form of orders or regulations issued by administrative organs and bear full legal force.

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[36] Yangtze Daily, June 11, 1951, p. 1.

[37] Ibid., April 28, 1951, p. 4.

[38] For the compilation of decrees of all types, consult Chung-yang Ts'ai-ching cheng-ts'e Fa-ling Hui-pien [Compendium of Laws and Regulations Concerning Financial and Economic Policies of the Central Government], Peking, Financial and Economic Committee of the Government Administration Council, 1952. Regulation on punishment of corruption issued at the time of Three-Anti Movement, People's Daily, Apr. 22, 1952. p.

B. Counterrevolutionary Decrees

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According to Communist interpretation, "counterrevolutionaries" are persons who engage in activities contrary to the interest of the state. This term specifically includes bandits of all kinds, landlords, "despots," spies, Kuomintang intelligence agents, former high-ranking Nationalist officers continuing to engage in counterrevolutionary activities, and members of secret societies.

The provincial regulations on the suppression of landlords who attack the land reform, issued by the Central-South China Military and Political Committee[39] in September 1950, was the first counterrevolutionary decree of its kind. "Acts of resistance" include the "spreading of rumors," attempts to avoid the paying of taxes, and acts against the successful completion of spring plowing, summer collection, and autumn harvest. Landlords or other persons engaged in setting forest fires, killing cattle, and destroying farm implements are liable to penalties as severe as life imprisonment or death. No appeal of any sort is permitted in these cases. A supplementary regulation,[40] issued by the same committee in November 1950, deals with the establishment of People's tribunals for the trial of landlords.

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[39] Yangtze Daily, September 15, 1950, p. 1.

[40] Ibid., Nov. 17, 1950, p. 1.

Regulations on the suppression of counterrevolutionaries[41] were first issued by the Government Administration Council in February 1951. These regulations are said to be based on the "spirit" of Article 7 of the Common Program, which registered the determination of the Communist regime to punish all counterrevolutionaries and "other criminals" and to impose upon the "Reform-through-labor." Counterrevolutionaries are those who collaborate with foreign imperialist powers, assist them in actions against the state, instigate mutiny in the militia and armed forces, or organize secret societies. Counterrevolutionaries are subject to trial both by the People's courts and by the military tribunals. Former members of political parties, including the Kuomintang, the Chinese Youth Party, and the Democratic Socialist Party, former intelligence personnel under the Nationalist regime, the officers above the rank of captain are required to register with public security agencies.[42] Their political rights may be withheld for a period of time, depending on their past activities, their property may be confiscated, and they are subject to political surveillance.

The control of counterrevolutionaries is made possible by two laws published by the regime, the law of control of counterrevolutionaries and regulations governing "Reform-through-labor." The

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[41] Yangtze Daily, Feb. 23, 1951, p. 1.

[42] Ibid., Aug. 13, 1951, p. 1.

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July 1952 law concerning counterrevolutionaries was issued by the Ministry of Public Security of the Government Administration Council.[43] Decisions on the means of suppression of counterrevolutionaries can be made either by the People's court or by the public security agencies at county and municipal levels. In the villages, hsiang and ch'ü governments may initiate this control, subject to the approval of the public security agencies at the county level. Likewise, sub-stations in the city may also initiate control, subject to the approval of public security sub-bureaus. Persons under surveillance are deprived of their political rights, including the right to vote. The period of surveillance may be three years or less. During the period, the individual is sent to a forced-labor camp.

The regulations governing "Reform-through-labor," issued by the Government Administration Council in August 1954, provided a detailed scheme for the establishment of forced labor throughout China.[44] This centralized management no doubt facilitates control of counterrevolutionaries, but it imposes undue hardships and cruelties upon them.

COMMENTS AND CONCLUSION

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The reliance upon the use of terror and force for the maintenance of "public order and safety" logically increases the power of the People's courts and of the public security organizations. The wide use of People's tribunals and the arbitrary display of power by the public security agencies hastens the consolidation of political power by the Communists. In order to achieve an effective weapon of terror, the Communists have closely co-ordinated the use of these instruments with the several drives carried out in the past.

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[43] People's Daily, July 16, 1952, p. 1.

[44] Ibid., Sept. 7, 1954, p. 2; English text in Current Background, No. 293, Sept. 15, 1954.

Throughout these drives, mass emotion was aroused and past hatred revived. The Communists have skillfully enlisted informers whose reports sow seeds of distrust among the people. The establishment of security committees in all organizations in the cities and rural districts increases the efficiency of the intelligence network and serves as a basis upon which Communist security policy rests. Nevertheless, these measures for suppression are far from complete. As already pointed out, intensive subordination to a single will creates firmer resistance; the more rapidly a change is imposed on a society, the stronger will be the opposition. It is not surprising to discover that, in spite of the many measures taken by the regime to suppress opposition in the Central-South Region, subversive activities continue.

SUBVERSIVE POTENTIALITIES

INTRODUCTION

The suppression of the opposition of landlords and counterrevolutionaries is the foremost task of the Communist regime in China in its endeavor to consolidate political gains. Hence, in examining the Communist consolidation of power in China, one cannot but notice the forces at work which are either actively or potentially undermining the Communist position. These forces, which can be generally divided into the following three categories, are all regarded as "subversive" by the Communists: (1) the most tangible forces openly hostile to Peking and labeled "counterrevolutionary"; (2) other activities, which are not openly rebellious but equally harmful to the Peking regime, such as corruption, theft, and waste of government property; (3) intangible forces, such as tension and public discontent, which, if not checked in time, may also weaken the Peking regime. In the following discussion, these three categories of "subversive" forces will be separately investigated.

I. COUNTERREVOLUTIONARIES

The Communists in China employ the term "counterrevolutionaries" in at least two senses: by "counterrevolutionaries" they mean foreign agents, Kuomintang agents, and former members of the Nationalist Government who remain in Mainland China and are engaged in activities against the Peking regime; "counterrevolutionaries" may also be applied to armed bandits, landlords, and members of secret societies, in addition to those agents included in the first definition. This means that obviously anyone whose actions seem contrary to Communist principles can be labeled a "counterrevolutionary." In the following discussion, these groups of "counterrevolutionaries" will be treated separately, although it must be noted that clear lines of demarcation do not exist among these groups, and that the Communists in using these terms do not undertake to define them in a clear-cut manner. 668

A. "Bandits"

The Chinese often use the term "bandit" to designate all underground and openly rebellious armed forces. (A current example of this usage is found in the Formosa press, which refers to all the Communists on the China Mainland as bandits.) The particularly intensive Communist campaigns against such armed "bandits" in Central-South China can be attributed to the fact that certain mountainous areas in the region have been used as refuges by rebels. The largest concentrations of bandits in this region have been reported in Kwangsi Province and in western Hunan and Kwangtung provinces. At one time Communist officials admitted the existence of 800,000 bandits in Central-South China.[1] 669

Communist military campaigns against "bandits" in this region may be grouped into three stages,[2] each characterized by different strategic and tactical maneuvers. However, all such campaigns were reported concluded by the end of 1950. During the first stage, regular and militia troops were used in drives against the remnants of Nationalist forces. The main base of operation was in Kwangsi Province, where the presence of 300,000 Kuomintang troops had been reported. The objective of the Communists was to drive the Nationalist forces to areas where the latter's annihilation would be possible.

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[1] Ch'ang-chiang Jih-pao [Yangtze Daily], Hankow, August 30, 1950.

[2] See reports by T'ao Chu and T'an Cheng in Yangtze Daily, Sept. 23, 1950; Sept. 20, 1950, p. 1. Also consult reports on Kwangtung, Kiangsi provinces in same newspaper, Sept. 25, 1950, pp. 2, 3.

During the second stage, regular Communist troops were employed with some militia assisting in key areas. When the Kuomintang forces and other local armed bands were cornered, the fighting grew in intensity. The Communist strategy called for concentrated attack on key points. Communist cadres strengthened the political work in their fighting units to boost morale and spread propaganda among the civilians in Communist-occupied areas to enlist popular support.

Military actions during the third stage were less systematic. After a series of decisive battles, Kuomintang troops and local armed bands broke up into smaller units. Toward the end of this stage Communist troops used small task forces to carry out intensive raids, which were called "campaigns of annihilation." These raids were reported to be successful because the Communists by that time had organized the support of the villagers.

Except for the "bandit extermination" campaigns in Kwangsi Province, which were not completed until April 1951, other provinces in this region declared

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that organized opposition had been wiped out before the end of 1950. According to Teng Tzu-hui, vice-chairman of the Central-South China Military and Political Committee, these campaigns had eliminated a total of 1, 150, 000 bandits and 106, 000 weapons had been seized from the enemy,[3] although later statistics on these campaigns in Central-South China are not available, unrest persisted and found expression in robberies and organized sabotage. An editorial in the People's Daily of Peking for November 11, 1954 warned of renewed "bandit activity."[4] It mentioned in particular the existence of a bandit group, 7,000 strong, in the area of O-hsien in Hupeh Province. This would indicate that, although armed bandits were less active, their potential threat to the regime had not been completely eradicated.

B. Landlords

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The aboliton of the absentee land-ownership system is one of the basic aims of Communism. In Communist China, the elimination of the landlords as a class in the rural community was made the primary goal in the Land Reform Movement. However, an investigation of Communist reports on landlords after the land reform in 1951 shows that here again the term "landlord" is very loosely defined. Many of those who were accused of belonging to the landlord class in Central-South China did not actually own any land. Among them were political dissenters, including expelled Communists.

Since it is impossible to ascertain the exact number of landowners in this region, it is difficult to measure their potential threat to the Communist regime. One unsubstantiated estimate places the number of landlords in pre-Communist Central-South China at four per cent of the total rural population, or approximately 800, 000. In executing the land reform program, the Communists used violence. Many landlords accused of severe "crimes" were put to death; most lost their holdings and were thus deprived of their livelihood; the smallest group of landowners was placed under surveillance. Unfortunately, there are no statistics on any of these groups.

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[3] *Yangtze Daily*, December 13, 1951, p. 1.

[4] *People's Daily*, November 10, 1954. p. 1,

As the land reform drew to a close in 1952 and economic reconstruction got underway, Communist reports revealed the rise of a new-rich class," which the Communists regarded as "potential landlords." Some of the remaining old landlords and new ones were said to be active in rural political organizations and producer's co-operatives. It was reported in 1954 that one out of every ten hsiang was dominated by these unreformed "landlords."[5]

The Communists have tried to blame all criminal and subversive activities on landlords. One report said that among the 44 criminals arrested in 1954 in Yang-ch'un (Kwangtung Province), 14 were landlords.[6] Another report stated that in Canton there were cases of arrests involving "landlords under surveillance" and other types of criminals.[7]

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[5] Wang Ch'ing "Tsai Chi-ts'eng Hsüan-chü Chung Kai-chin Lo-hou Hsiang Cheng-ch'üan Kung-tso" ["Improve Backward Hsiang Government during the Basic-level Election"] , Hsin-hua Yüeh-pao [New China Monthly] , No. 4, Apr. 28, 1954, pp. 18-19.

[6] People's Daily, July 18, 1954, p. 1.

[7] Survey of China Mainland Press, No. 972 Hong Kong, American-Consulate Gen'l, Jan. 20, 1955, p. 4-6.

Such reports point to the possibility that even today the richer elements in rural communities may still constitute a disturbing influence as far as the Communists are concerned 668

C. Kuomintang Elements and Spies

After the "bandits" and "landlords" were brought 687 under control, the Communists in Central-South China launched in 1951 the Suppression of Counterrevolutionaries Movement. It was carried out in three stages: (1) first was the so-called "administrative suppression" stage that stressed the dissolution of "counterrevolutionary organizations"; (2) the second stage was devoted to the arrest of counterrevolutionaries after mass meetings. At these meetings, accusations were made and past injustices reviewed. Most of the arrests were made on the basis of these accusations. (3) The third stage called for the registration of the remaining counterrevolutionaries with public security agencies so that they could be kept under constant surveillance and arrested, if necessary. Although no reliable survey on the number of counterrevolutionaries arrested and executed is available, judging from the intensity and the scope of the movement, the number must have been large.[8] For example, during an unspecified ten-month period in 1950-51, the Communists reported in Kwangtung Province alone the execution of 28,332 people out of 89,701 arrested.[9]

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[8] For additional information, consult Hu-nan Fei-ch'ing [Hunan Under Communist Rule], and Chiang-hsi Fei-ch'ing [Kiangsi Under Communist Rule], published by Sixth Section, Central Committee, Nationalist Party in Taipei, in 1954, 1955 respectively.

[9] Ku Ta-ts'un, lt. governor, Kwangtung Province, reported these figures in Nan-fang Jih-pao [South China Daily], Sept. 10, 1951, p. 1.

1. Extermination of the Remnants of Nationalist Troops

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As has been mentioned, by the end of 1950 most of the remnants of Nationalist troops in Central-South China collapsed as a result of repeated Communist assaults. Some of them, however, managed to escape to the mountains and remained at large. The Communist round-up of these men resulted in the arrest and execution of 44 in Kwangsi Province, early in 1951.[10] They were accused of having served as regimental or other high-ranking commanders in the Nationalist Army, and now commanded new rebellious armed bands. These bands were known as "Anti-Communist National Salvation Armies," "Anti-Communist Self-preservation Columns," "Self-preservation Guerrilla Columns," and "Southeast Asia Democratic Allied Forces." The bands were small, and no attempt had been made to consolidate them under a single command.

2. Liquidation of Former "Counter-revolutionaries"

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The Central-South Military and Political Committee issued a directive in October 1950, stressing the need to investigate persons who had committed crimes against Communism in the past, and mistried cases involving such people. As of July 1951, according to incomplete statistics, 7,598 such mistried cases had been investigated and disposed of in this region.[11] The amazing speed with which they were handled seems to indicate that the investigation process was used by the Communists as a device to suit their own convenience. 687 In Heng-yang (Hunan Province), Ch'ao-chou, and Swatow (Kwangtung Province) Administrative Districts, there were 5,865 cases investigated and disposed of in a very short time.[12] Before the "trials" took place, the usual Communist pattern of holding mass meetings had been called in 315 villages in the Shang-jao Administrative District, Kiangsi Province alone. Some 120,000 people participated in such meetings.[13]

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[10] Yangtze Daily, May 5, 1951, p. 1.
[11] Yangtze Daily, July 27, 1951, p. 3.

3. Roundup of Saboteurs

Scattered cases of sabotage have been reported in the Communist press from time to time. It is hard to determine if any organized groups of saboteurs were at work, but the Communist provincial governors and Public Security Bureau chiefs alike blamed all cases involving sabotage on "counter-revolutionaries." These "criminals," the Communists said, burned granaries, killed draft animals, in order to disrupt farm production, and ambushed Communist militia in the countryside so as to create unrest in rural areas. In the four months beginning October 1950, a total of 4,371 cases of sabotage were reported in the rural communities of Central-South China.[14]

The Communists paid particular attention to 687
sabotage in factories. Severe penalties were imposed 468
on those charged with destruction of factory equipment,

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[12] Ibid., July 27, 1951, p. 3.

[13] Ibid., August 22, 1951, p. 3.

[14] See report by Pu Sheng-kuang, head of Public Security Department of the Military and Political Commitee, Central-South China Region, in Yangtze Daily, April 17, 1951, p. 1.

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those who spread rumors to demoralize the workers, and those who organized strikes. At the launching of the First Five-Year Plan in 1953, labor discipline was tightened up and security committees were strengthened in all factories. These measures, however, failed to eliminate sabotage in factories. As late as May 1955, a strike which disrupted industrial production in that area and brought death to two of the strike organizers, was reported in Wuhan.[15] Another report said that from 1949 to 1954, cases of sabotage in factories and business enterprises in ten major cities in China totaled 11, 094. Of these, 7, 278 were discovered before major damage was done; 2, 039 were serious cases involving industrial accidents caused by saboteurs; the remaining cases involved destruction and/or theft of factory equipment.[16]

4. Extirpation of Spies

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The arrest and execution of many people accused of being Kuomintang intellence agents were widely publicized. Such people included the former personnel of Nationalist intelligence organizations, government agencies, and officers of the Nationalist armed forces. Cases involving former members of a joint Sino-American intelligence agency during World War II were given special publicity. Take the case involving I P'ing-chen and Liu Ming-hsia, for example.[17] Both had received training in intelligence work in the United States during the war. It was played up in the Communist press to arouse public hatred against Americans. However, as Lo Jui-ch'ing, Minister of the Ministry of Public Security of Communist China, admitted[18] at the end of the suppression campaign, of the cases prosecuted in 1951, the majority of them involved bandits, and only a few had anything to do with intelligence agents. 687

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[15] Shih Ch'eng-chih, "I-chiu-wu-ssu-nien Ta-lu Jen-min Ti Fan-K'ang" ["The People's Opposition to Communism on the Mainland in 1954"] , Tsu-kuo Chou-k'an [China Weekly] , No. 106, January 10, 1955, pp. 61-63.

[16] People's Daily, Peking, Sept. 30, 1954, p. 6.

[17] Yangtze Daily, March 21, 1951, p. 1.

Vigorous though the Communist efforts to eliminate the Kuomintang spies may have been, there are indications that the Communist have not yet succeeded in eliminating espionage. Reports from Mainland China early in 1954 revealed the existence in Central-South China[19] of at least two organizations which the Communists regarded as engaged in work. One was the Ch'ing Feng She, the other the New Socialist Party of China, which was said to have its own "underground army" operating in Hunan Province.

Foreign missionaries and the church groups sponsored by them also came under fire as the Communist spy-hunt gained momentum. One case was reported in 1951 in the administrative district[20] of Hsing-ning and Mei-hsien (Kwangtung Province). An American missionary, accused of being a spy himself, was charged with abetting "counterrevolutionary" Chinese in espionage work for the United States government. Immediately after this exposé, a wave of similar cases was reported in the Central-South China press. 687 797

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[18] People's Daily, Peking Oct. 1, 1951, p. 3.

[19] People's Daily, March 9, 1954, p. 3.

[20] Yangtze Daily, April 24, 1951, p. 1; similar cases were reported on April 25, 1951, p. 3, and July 21, 1951, p. 3

D. Secret Societies, Gangsters, and Vagrants

Secret societies in China are generally characterized by their resistance to social changes dictated by a central authority. Their different origins and motives of organization notwithstanding, the above-mentioned common characteristic alone is enough to place all secret societies in China under Communist attack. 575 687

In Central-South China, the Communists made use of the land reform in an attempt to destroy secret socieities in the rural areas. In the cities, the Communists instituted a "democratic reform" in April 1951 to dislodge groups and cliques in control of labor organizations. The "democratic reform" was carried out in consonance with three slogans issued in succession by the Communists. The first slogan -- anti-feudalism -- called for a violent, frontal attack on existing secret societies and obsolete labor union leadership (labeled as "bossism"). The second slogan urged "democratic unity" among the rank and file in labor organizations. The third slogan emphasized the theme of "democratic management," which meant that Communist-dominated labor unions were to be organized to replace the old ones.[21] 576 467 687

Measures employed by the Communists during the Democratic Construction Movement were similar to those used in the movement to suppress counterrevolutionaries. A large-scale propaganda drive was launched to arouse public feeling and was 575 687 followed by many types of mass meetings. As labor unions were disbanded, their leaders were accused of abusing laborers. As to secret societies, many of their leaders were put to death. Some active members of such societies managed to escape death, but not constant police surveillance; others were sent to forced labor camps. 575 687

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[21] Yangtze Daily, July 21, 1951, p. 1. For provincial report on this movement, see article on Kwangtung in ibid., November 26, 1951, p. 2; also on Hupeh, ibid., April 25, 1951, p. 5; and Kwangsi, ibid., November 28, 1951, p. 2.

Two types of secret societies were included in the target of Communist attack. One type consisted of relatively small groups centered around a few individuals. These bore the brunt of the Communist assault at the beginning of the campaign. Samples of this type of society were found in the First Textile Factory and the T'ien-ho Mining Company in the city of Wuhan.[22] These groups were known under such names as "Thirty-six Friends," "Seventy-two Hsiao," "108 Fighters," "Eighteen *Lo-han*," "Ch'ing Pang," "Hung Pang," "Hsiung-ti *Hui*," and "Tzu-mei Hui." Secret societies of this type were formed mainly on the basis of personal relationships and had little or no religious observances.

The other type of secret society found in Central-South China included the I Kuan Tao, Sheng Hsien Tao, T'ien Men Tao, and Ta Tao Hui. The word *tao* shared by the first three organizations implies *a* religious veneer. While all four groups are wide-spread, the I Kuan Tao has become the central target of Communist fire because of its large scope of operation.[23] Started originally in North China, this secret society spreads gradually to other regions of China. In 1954, the Wuhan, Huang-p'i, Hsiao-kan, P;u-ch'i, and Hsien-ning areas in[24] Hupeh Province were the centers of I Kuan Tao activities. Among the conditions of existence advocated by this group are "anticipation of world disaster," and "avoidance of action." Although this doctrine seems to be no more than passive resistance to Communist indoctrination, the society has been accused of having aided the Japanese during World War II and presently working for the Kuomintang against the Communist regime. The exact strength of these secret socieities is not known, but it is understandable that in view of the Communist violence, the theme of passive resistance as advocated by the I Kuan Tao must have a great appeal to the troubled populace in Central-South China. 575 687

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[22] *Yangtze Daily*, July 26, 1951, p. 1.

[23] *Shih-shih Shou-ts'e* [*Current Affairs Handbook*], No. 4, December 1950, pp. 77-81; No. 6, January 1951, pp. 38-43.

Vagrants, habitual thieves, and gangsters are also slated for elimination by the Communist regime because they contribute to unrest and are therefore potential counterrevolutionaries. No specific statistics have bee compiled by the Communists on these "dregs of society," but reports on the "Reform-through-labor" program have indications as to the approximate strength of these groups. (See chapter on Forced Labor.) In announcing their success in dealing with the undesirable elements, the Communists have indluced arson, and sabotage among the crimes committed by these undesirable groups. 689

II. CORRUPTION AND OTHER ACTIVITIES DETRIMENTAL TO THE REGIME

As early as 1950, the Communists in China were 661 687 voicing alarm at the prevalence of corruption, inefficiency, waste and theft of government properties, and other "unhealthy conditions" throughout the country. Steps were taken to correct these conditions. The following is a summary of the development from 1950 up to early 1955.

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[24] Shih Ch'eng-chih, loc. cit.

A. The Three-Anti and Five-Anti Campaigns (1950-1952)

Corruption in government and the Party was first brought to light by the 1950 Communist "rectification movement: designed to halt so-called "bourgeois bureaucratic tendencies." Failure of this movement necessitated the inauguration of the Three-Anti Campaign. Launched personally by Mao Tse-tung in November 1951, this campaign was aimed at corruption, waste, and bureaucracy. Many cases were uncovered in Central-South China.[25] The branch offices of the People's Bank in this region was reported to have spent more than twenty million yüan (US$1, 000) for entertainment of the participants at one meeting. The Finance Department of the regional government spent seventy million yüan (US$3, 500) for a month-long conference. In the Yangtze Navigation Bureau of the Department of Transportation, the sum of thirty billion yüan (US$300, 000) was appropriated for repairs, but the fund was later spent on the bureau personnel. Employees above division heads in this bureau were issued watches, fountain pens, and other luxury items for personal use. Probably the most corrupt organization in this region was the Department of Public Security, which was noted for its misuse of of public funds.

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[25] Yangtze Daily, January 7, 1952, p. 1.

Many officials were implicated in the corruption cases. In the Bureau of Taxation at Wuhan, about 200 civil servants were found guilty of corruption during a mass meeting soon after the start of the campaign.[26] High officials, incluing Pu Sheng-kuang (Chief Procurator of the Central-South Branch of the Supreme People's Procuratorate, concurrently chief of the Department of Public Security for this region), was exposed and ordered to resign.[27] Ch'ien I-min, deputy to Pu, was similarly removed from office. Wu Te-feng, mayor of Wuhan, was accused of dereliction of duty. The embezzlement of billions of yüan ended the public career of the chief of the Non-ferrous Metal Administrative Bureau, who was concurrently the deputy chief of the Department of Industry of this region. Even agencies having little to do with finance and economy were not free from corruption; Liu Hung, deputy chief of the Propaganda Department in the Kwangsi provincial branch of the Communist Party, was accused of embezzling sixty million yüan (US$3,000) from public funds. 661 687

While the Three-Anti Campaign was aimed at government and party officials, the Five-Anti Campaign, instituted a few weeks later, had business and industry as its main object of attack and sough to eliminate bribery, tax evasion, theft of government property, cheating on government contracts, and theft of economic information for private speculation.[28] 662 688

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[26] Ibid., January 14, 1952, p. 1.

[27] Ibid., March 9, 1952, p. 3.

[28] For a record of these two movements in Central-South, see Li Hsüeh-feng"s report in Yangtze Daily, September 29, 1952, p. 1.

Businessmen accused of being criminal during 662 the Five-Anti Campaign were severely punished. 687 Ts'ui Ming-ch'ing, division chief of a state-operated department store, was tried for embezzling sixteen billion yüan (US$900,000).[29] Because his accomplice, T'eng Chen-lu, was a merchant, the case was cited by the Communists as an example of how a government official could be led astray by an unscrupulous businessman. A similar case involved 661 Ho Heng-fu, chairman of the Wuhan Industrial and 687 Busness Association and a high-ranking government official, who was accused of conspiring to smuggle gold, foreign notes, and strategic materials. He was tried and sentenced to death.[30]

Although the Three-Anti and Five-Anti campaigns 661 were launched separately, their aims and results were the same in many aspects. Since Party members 662 were, in most cases, administrative officers, the 687 impact of the campaigns upon the Party and upon its administrative agencies was equally great; since state-operated enterprises and administrative agencies were imbued with private enterprise, attacks on businessmen affected administrators and Party members. The intensity of these campaigns should not be underestimated. The repercussion engendered by the Three-Anti and Five-Anti campaigns were in every way comparable to those of other major "suppression" campaigns launched betwen 1950 and 1952.

B. Subsequent Measures (1953-55)

There were indications that corruption and other activities detrimental to the regime did not cease at the conclusion of the Three-Anti and Five-Anti campaigns in May 1952. According to an incomplete set of figures compiled by the Ministry of Commerce

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[29] Yangtze Daily, January 19, 1952, p. 1.

[30] Yangtze Daily, April 10, 1952, p. 1.

of the State Council, 1,268 corruption cases involving 661
1,826 people were prosecuted during the 662
first six months of 1954.[31] The 1955 Supervisory
Conference devoted a great deal of attention to 687
a study of this issue.[32] A flood of reports on
corruption and waste appeared in the Communist press. One of the most serious cases involved the Mining and Geological School in Changsha, Hunan Province, which was accused of misuse of government rations. The school was reported to have wasted rice rations and falsified personnel statements in an effort to obtain more government rations.[33]

All of these reports indicate that, despite persistent efforts to eradicate corruption, abuses both in and outside the government continue to occur.

III. TENSION AND DISCONTENT

Extreme centralization and control of governmental, 668
economic, and social activities logically lead to discontent and tension. If not checked in time, these undercurrents of public dissatisfaction may create a real threat to the government.

A. Public Discontent

1. Restrictions on Private Life

In Central-South China, as in all other regions 668
of China, the individual citizen cannot choose how
his day is spent; a fixed schedule has been imposed 517
on him. After his working hours, the peasant, for

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[31] Ta-kung Pao, Tientsin, Mar. 24, 1955, p. 1.

[32] For report on conference, see Kuang-ming Jih-pao [Enlightenment Daily], Peking, June 13, 1955, p. 1.

[33] Ta-kung Pao, Tientsin, Mar. 16, 1955, p. 1.

instance, is required to attend meetings, enroll 668
in winter or night schools, and participate in other 517
group activities prescribed by the government. He must accept Party counsel on how to lead his daily life and how to speud his money. These impositions are time-consuming and irritating to those who must endure them.

Labor discipline controls all working hours. Any violation of discipline may provoke servere penalties. Technical schools, cultural classes and other group activities have been arranged for every worker. Since most workers hold membership in a number of Communist-led organizations, such multiple obligations leave them little leisure time, and their days pass in weariness and discontent.

2. Tax Burden and Business Restrictions

In the rural districts, the Communist San 668
Ting Policy, formulated at the end of 1953, fixes 656
quotas for farm production, purchasing, and mar- 651
keting. This policy has aroused resentment. Measures which regulate the sale of farm surplus products -- mainly rice and cotton -- to the centralized market, also meet resistance. But the measure which has provoked the most discontentment among the farmers is "deduction for services rendered by the government to the farmers." During the conversion of the old currency, the Communists in Kwangsi Province admitted that nine deductions were imposed on income.[34] These deductions included shares for the credit co-operatives, shares for the supply and marketing co-operatives, repayment of loans, bond subscriptions, and other items.

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[34] People's Daily, Peking, March 3, 1955, p. 3.

The businessmen do not fare any better. Sale, 668
purchase, sources of supply, and market outlet are 656
regulated and controlled. Government bonds must
be purchased, and exorbitant taxation has been im- 651
posed. Trapped by restriction and taxation, many businessmen have been forced to abandon their enterprises. The general atmosphere is certainly not conducive to public confidence in the government.

3. Compulsory Services

The Communist government frequently drafts 668
rural workers for public labor. For major irri- 466
gation projects, even farmers in distant areas are mobilized. The Ching River flood control project in Hupeh Province, for example, enlisted almost 200,000 "voluntary workers" from Central-South China.[35] To maintain a militia for emergency 668
services, the government requires the young peasant 701
to receive training in his spare time. When he is formally inducted into the militia, he is assigned to patrol the key centers in the village, guard and help to ship government grain, assist in combatting bandits, and take part in group activities organized for militia members.

A parallel scheme is instituted for urban resi- 668
dents, requiring them to render certain services in 466
the areas of their residence. They must attend meetings and stand ready to be called for patrol duties. During 1951-53,[36] citizens of Wuhan were ordered

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[35] Yangtze Daily, March 30, 1952, p. 1.

[36] Ibid., March 4, 1953, p. 3.

to patrol the streets at night

to patrol the streets at night. 000

Other controls imposed by the security agencies and other government branches add to public discontent. Among these measures are the extensive rationing system and the frequent investigations conducted by public security agencies. 668 434

The Communists appear to be cognizant of such inconveniences which cause public dissatisfaction. In order to mitigate the situation, the Communists stress the importance of adopting a "mass line" policy. This means that the government orders its agencies to be mindful, insofar as possible, of public wishes when carrying out government policies. Communist cadres are instructed to report public feeling to the government. Propaganda agencies then attempt to "explain away" public complaints and to restore the public temper. 668 208

B. Tension within Organizations

Extreme control and centralization exercised by the Communist Party result in tension within all Party, state, and mass organizations.[37] By establishing various agencies of control, the Party has achieved centralization of power; however, these numerous control agencies often duplicate their functions. This leads to suspicion, tension, and a growing sense of wasted effort in the control agencies and in the organizations controlled by these agencies. 668

1. Tension within Government

Party control over the government is evident because all key officials in the government are members of the Party, and, as such, subject to control by the Party. Complication stems from the fact that there are three groups of control agencies -- the supervisory offices in the administration, the People's Procuratorates, and the public security agencies -- in addition to the control committee of the Party. Consequently, each government department has four control authorities to please. Although each of these control agencies was intended to stress a different aspect of control, the aggregate pressure is felt by the department staff and the employees in government-operated factories, co-operative stores, and other institutions. 668

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[37] For comparison with tension in Soviet Union, see Merle Fainsod, How Russia is Ruled, Cambridge, Mass, Harvard Univ. Press, 1953; Carryington Moore, Jr., Terror and Progress USSR, Cambridge, Harvard Univ. Press, 1954.

The pressure of multiple control manifests itself when the government institutes a new project. In making the assignment, each level of the government has a goal in mind. As the order reaches the bottom of the hierarchy, where the actual work will be performed, the assignment usually becomes far more complex than intended by the original order. Each level of the government exhorts its subordinating levels to fulfill the planned goal, and the bottom level suffers under the accumulation of pressure and tension.

2. Tension within the Party

The non-partisan in Communist China is subject to government pressure as described, but a Party member has to bear the Party pressure in addition to government pressure. Within the Party, indoctrination of the members is an unending process. Indeed, the demands on a Party member are so great that outsiders hesitate to join the Party. There is some evidence to suggest a decline in Party member- 665 ship because of dissatisfactions resulting from this strict control. 665

The Communist Party, of course, does not hesitate to expel its discontented members. The expelled Party members may form a center around which subversive elements may rally. The Communists are apparently aware of this possibility, and are undoubtedly taking steps to ensure against such a development. The exact Communist method of disposing of expelled Party members is not known. An examination of available reports on expulsion of Party members shows that, if accused of definite offenses, the individuals may be tried by the "People's court," as in the cases of Liu Ching, Sung Ying, and I Chi-kuang.[38] Or the undesirable Party members may simply disappear from the public scene, with no more than a brief announcement of the disciplinary action taken against them. Such was the fate of a county Party secretary in Hsü-ch'uan (Kiangsi Province).[39] There is reason to assume that, unless those banished from the Party were imprisoned or put to death, they will represent an influence constantly disturbing to the Party's stability and power.

3. Tension within Mass Organizations

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Pressure imposed upon the mass organizations by the government and the Party causes the increase of tension within these organizations. To keep these groups under control, the Party expels the undesirable elements and cultivates trustworthy cadres. This action, designed to ensure the allegiance of the mass organizations to the Party, itself forms a link in the cycle of power-control-tension. An atmosphere of fear is engendered in order to keep the members of the organizations from deviations; and yet fear breeds tension and the thought of rebellion. Thus far, the Communists have been able to control the mass organizations by constant vigilance and a steady flow of propaganda. Such organizations as the New Democratic Youth Corps and the Federation of Democratic Women, for example, actively serve the Communist Party without showing any signs of deterioration.

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[38] Yangtze Daily, December 15, 1951, p. 1.

[39] Ibid., January 9, 1952, p. 1.

IV. CONCLUSION

Wherever there is a dictatorship, subversive potentialities exist. No matter how tight a rein the Communists in Central-South China may hold on the populace, three forces will continue to work against the rule of terror. These forces are the victims of Communist power, traditional resistance groups, and discontented Communist Party members.

The victims of Communist power are landlords, former Kuomintang officials, and those included in the general category of "counterrevolutionaries." Although most of these elements are imprisoned in forced-labor camps or are placed under police surveillance, they show an ability to remain resistant whenever the opportunity presents itself. However, as long as the Communists are capable of mustering huge police forces to suppress all opposition, open rebellion will be difficult.

Traditional resistance groups have demonstrated their endurance in the revival of secret societies. They are difficult to eliminate because secret societies attract the great mass of illiterate peasants and laborers. Furthermore, their dissolution by government order before they lose popular support will only serve to add to public discontent.

As to the disillusioned Party members, nothing would please them more than the collapse of a system which has brought about their political ruin. If the Communists continue Party purges, as they have done during the past five years, the strength of this politically subversive group will continue to grow.

The degree of public discontent and tension among the populace and with organizations in Central-South China is by no means an indication of an impending collapse of the Communist power. It is, rather, a natural phenomenon in a regimented society. It is a threat to the Communists only in the sense that, if allowed to develop, it may lead to a total demoralization of the people and the eventual destruction of Party solidarity.

PROPAGANDA AND PUBLIC INFORMATION

> "...When a man of low station is
> well instructed, he is easily ruled."[1]
> -- Confucius

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Ever since its inception, the Communist regime of China has been making concerted efforts to reputidate Confucian principles. But on one point at least the regime seems to be in agreement with Confucius; namely, when a government has well instructed its people, it finds them far easier to govern.

The Communist regime believes in and practices coercion and persuasion. By coercion it suppressess opposition and compels obedience. But it is through persuasion that it attempts to change the attitudes and win the support of the masses. One of the Communists' methods of winning popular support is propaganda.

Like everything else under the Communist regime, propaganda is strictly directed and controlled by a central authority, especially with regard to issues and themes. Reserving the issues and propaganda themes of a national character for detailed analysis in the Over-all China Handbook, the present survey of propaganda in Central-South

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[1] "Confucian Analects," The Chinese Classics, James Legge (trans.), 2nd ed., Vol. I, London, Clarendon Press, 1893, p. 319.

China will be directed primarily toward the propaganda machinery operating in the region, for only in an investigation of the development and operation of specific propaganda machinery can we discover regional variations.

In the course of this survey an attempt will be made to explain the extent to which the people of Central-South China are kept informed of public affairs and to what extent the information made available to them is factual.

I. THE ADMINISTRATION OF PROPAGANDA

The Dual System at the Regional Level Like the administration of propaganda on the national level. propaganda in the Central-South Region is administered under a dual system, consisting of the apparatus of the Communist Party of China and of the government at different levels. Two departments existed prior to the abolition, in November 1954, of the Central-South China Administrative Committee: the Department of Propaganda of the Central-South Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and the Commission on Cultural and Educational Affairs of the regional government. Although these organizations took orders from their respective superiors on both the national and regional levels, the relationship between them appears to have been similar to that between the Department of Propaganda of the Central Committee and the Commission on Cultural and Educational Affairs of the Government Administration Council on the national level.[2]

To put it more concretely, prior to November 1954, the Department of Propaganda of the Central-South Bureau of the Party, like its counterpart on the national level, was not primarily an operational agency. It did not do any major publishing nor did it operate radio stations or cinemas. It was devoted to the transmission of the propaganda policy of its superiors to appropriate agenciws on the regional and provincial levels, drew up regional plans for the execution of the policy, and supervised the execution of that policy by the Party, the government, and the mass organizations which operated the media of propaganda.

As for the Commission on Cultural and Educational Affairs of the Central-South China Administrative Committee, it s functions were essentially the same as its counterpart on the national level. It was mainly charged with the responsibility of day-to-day management of propaganda, which found its expression in cultural and educational activities.

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[2] Specifically, the Department of Propaganda of the Central-South Bureau of the Central Committee operated under the direction of the bureau itself and of the Department of Propaganda of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. The Commission on Cultural and Educational Affairs was directed by the Central-South China Administrative Committee and by the Commission-on Cultural and Cultural Affairs of the Government Administration Council of the Central People's Government.

More specifically, the Department of Propaganda of the Central-South Bureau of the Communist Party of China served primarily as a regional representative of the central authorities of the Party in the supervision of the execution of propaganda policy of a national nature, while the Commission on Cultural and Educational Affairs of the Central-South China Administrative Committee acted to a large extent as the chief regional executor of that policy in the region. But with regard to propaganda issues of a regional nature, the Department of Propaganda of the Central-South Bureau of the Party was the policy-maker. Its policies regarding regional propaganda issues became the policies of the region and were carried out by the Commission on Cultural and Educational Affairs of the Central-South China Administrative Committee. This was achieved not by direct orders, but by placing its own men in the latter organization. For example, when the Central-South China Administrative Committee was in existence, Chao I-min served as the principal personal link between the Department of Propaganda of the Central-South Bureau of the Party and the Commission on Cultural and Educational Affairs of the Central-South China Administrative Committee, by acting concurrently as the director of the former and as the chairman of the latter. This was perfectly in line with the practice of the Communist Party of China of exercising leadership over the government on the China Mainland.

The Dual System at Lower Levels. Such a dual system for the administration of propaganda is found on all local levels within the region. Even the lowliest Party branches or government units have their own propaganda setups,[3] which have the same working relationship with one another as their counterparts on the higher levels and which are supervised by their respective superior authorities. In short, the Department of Propaganda of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China controls and directs all local propaganda activities in the regions.

While speaking of the central control of the propaganda organs in Central-South China, special mention must be made of two agencies: (1) the Department of Propaganda of the South-China Sub-bureau of the Communist Party of China; and (2) the Commission on Cultural and Educational Affairs of the South-China Sub-committee of the Central-South Administrative Committee. Like their respective parent organizations, the South-China Sub-bureau of the Communist Party of China and the South-China Subcommittee of the Central-South China Administrative Committee, these two agencies functioned in the South China area only and had no counterpart elsewhere within the region. They were designed to direct propaganda and other activities in the provinces of Kwangtung and Kwangsi, which are considerably different geographically and socially from the rest of the provinces in the Central-South China region. Although the above mentioned agencies of the Party and government are charged with the primary responsibility of administering propaganda and releasing information on public affairs, other agencies of the Party and government also have a certain role to play in these matters. Indeed, a considerable amount of information, factual or otherwise, on the activities of individual government agencies emanates from the agencies concerned.

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[3] Some Party branch committees have merely a secretary in charge of propaganda and agitation activities. See Articles 31-35 of the "Organic Law of the Local People's Congresses and the Local People's Councils of the People's Republic of China." An English text may be found in Current Background, No. 302, November 5, 1954, pp. 6-14.

II. MEDIA OF PROPAGANDA AND PUBLIC INFORMATION

Like their counterparts in other regions of China, the propaganda agencies and other official organizations in Central-South China use all available means to communicate propaganda and a certain amount of information on public affairs which the people in the region are to know. Newspapers, magazines, books, pamphlets, movies, radio, the stage, painting, songs, posters, exhibits, speeches, handbills, classroom lectures, mass meetings, demonstrations, and even court decisions are permeated with propaganda, even though some of these are not necessarily media of public information. For obvious reasons, this discussion of propaganda and public information media is limited to those which can be best treated on a regional basis.

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The Press as a Propaganda Medium and Its Structure   Characterized by a high degree of specialization, the structure of the press in Central-South China, which is an integral part of the press in Communist China as a whole, is such as to enable each of its parts to reach specific audiences and to serve a definite function in the socialist (and Communist) education of the masses.

Like the press apparatus of the nation, the press in Central-South China is divided horizontally and vertically. The horizontal division follows closely the hierarchical structure of the government and the Communist Party of China. At each level there is an appropriate press to serve the Party, government, and public organizations. Thus, prior to the abolition of the regional administrative system of the government, the Ch'ang-chiang Jih-pao [Yangtze Daily] served as the official newspaper of the Central-South China region.

In addition, there are a number of newspapers on the provincial level. At present each of the provinces in the region has its own official newspaper, as listed below.

Hupeh Jih-pao [Hupeh Daily] (Hankow, Hupei)
Hsin Hunan Pao [New Hunan Daily] (Changsha, Hunan)
Honan Jih-pao [Honan Daily] (Chengchow, Honan)
Kiangsi Jih-pao [Kiangsi Daily] (Nanchang, Kiangsi)
Nan-fang Jih-pao [South-China Daily] (Canton, Kwangtung)
Kwangsi Jih-pao [Kwangsi Daily] (Kweilin, Kwangsi)

Below the provincial level are newspapers on the administrative district level. At the base of the pyramid are newspapers onthe hsien or city level. 204 208

The vertical division follows functional lines. Individual newspapers serve different classes of readers.

By the fall of 1950, the Central-South China region had 51 newspapers above the administrative district level.[4] The exact number of hsien newspapers has never been made known.

Printed newspapers are supplemented by many mimeographed newspapers and hand-written "wall newspapers" and "blackboard newspapers" in small localities, factories, schools, mass organizations, and agricultural producers' co-operatives. These special newspapers are also organs of the Party and the government, and they have regular editors, editorial boards, and correspondents. The local Party branches constantly keep a watchful eye on their operation and development, and from time to time issue new instructions and regulations to keep them in line. 203 208

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[4] Teng Tzu-hui, "Chung-nan I-nien-lai Chih Hui-ku" (1950) [Retrospect on Central-South China During the Last Year"], Jen-min Jih-pao [People's Daily], Peking, October 1, 1950.

203 208 The importance of these special newspapers must not be overlooked. In vies of the fact that all the printed newspapers in the region by the fall of 1950, had an approximate combined circulation of only 50,000 issues daily, it must be obvious that the Communists have been forced to make maximum use of such special newspapers for propaganda and agitation. Like the oral agitator and propagandist, the wall newspaper and blackboard newspapers have the advantages of flexibility and adaptability for mass communication. These advantages are particularly conducive to agitation work. For instance, they can deal more effectively with the problem of production by seizing upon the most appropriate opportunities to criticize indifferent workers and praise energetic ones.

204 208 While an overwhelming majority of the press in Central-South China is owned and operated by the Communists Party of China, the government, or mass oranizations in 1950, there were eight newspapers in the region operated by private interests, the most notable being the Ta-kang Pao [Ta-kang News], published in Hankow. Private newspapers in this region, like other newspapers in Communist China, underwent a thorough re-organization in the years 1951-52. Upon this re-organization they lost their former identity and independent status and have become part of the propaganda apparatus of the Party and the government. The Ta-kang Pao, for example, has been renamed the Hsin Wuhan Pao [New Wuhan News] and serves as the official organ

of the Wuhan Municipal Committee of the Communist Party of China.[5] 204 208

Subscriptions to the newspapers in this region are handled through the local post offices. The Communists claim that this arrangement had brought about at least two good results: greater speed of delivery and a wider circulation.[6] Students and members of the armed forces are reportedly entitled to reduced rates.

Propaganda Work of the Press As an instrument of propaganda, the press devotes a large amount of space to the publication of "lectures," documents, and other pronouncements elucidating Communist theories, the Communist Party line, and the policies of the government, with a view to remolding the ideology of the masses and influencing public attitudes on political issues. Generally, the press is given very little freedom of action. Important material is distributed to the local press by the Hsin-hua [New China] News Agency. According to a regulation promulgated by the now defunct Information Administration of the Government Administration Council,[7] "all large newspapers"

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[6] Chieh-fang Jih-pao [Liberation Daily], Shanghai, March 13, 1951.

[7] "Hsin-wen Tsung-shu Kuan-yü Pao-chih T'sai-yung Hsin-hua-she Tien-kao Ti Kuei-ting" ["The Information Administration's Regulations Concerning the Use of News Releases of the Hsin-hua News Agency by the Press"], People's Daily, January 12, 1950.

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in the country must print in full the important news releases and special articles distributed by the New China News Agency. The newspapers in the region, to further Communist ideology and government policies, write and publish articles supplementary to those distributed by national propaganda organs. Supplementary articles are usually written in a more popular style and expound general themes by linking them with local issues or concrete problems, whenever such an approach is permissible and feasible. In point of fact, newspapers in Central-South China have been praised by the Communists for having done an excellent job in this regard. By way of illustration, the *Yangtze Daily* pointed out on July 13, 1952, that many newspapers in the Central-South China region printed the full text of the 10-plank agricultural-production policy for 1952 and accompanied it with a series of illustrations. It in turn praised other newspapers of the region, such as the *Hunan Ta-chung Pao* [*Hunan Popular Daily*], the *Yüan-chou Pao* [*Yüan-chou Daily*], and the *Tzu-chiang Nung-min Pao* [*Tzu-chiang Farmers' Daily*], for having devoted special columns to a detailed exposition of the agricultural-production policy.

Agitation Work of the Press The press in Central-South China makes a constant effort to eulogize the "People's Dictatorship," Marxism, Leninism, the thought of Mao Tse-tung, and the history and contributions of the Communist Party of China. It even prints ordinary news items in

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such a way as to inculcate in the people a feeling of national pride and to help them develop an unwavering faith in the socialist construction and socialist transformation of China under the leadership of the Communist Party. In treating news involving non-Communist countries, the newspapers find frequent opportunities to assert that the people of the capitalist countries are being exploited mercilessly, that the capitalist system is on its way to destruction, and that present world tensions are caused by capitalist warmongers, especially those in the United States. After the outbreak of warfare in Korea, the anti-America campaign was played up by the press, so that the Chinese people might be called upon to make greater contributions and sacrifices for the attainment of the ambitious goals set by the regime.

The most successful agitation work done by the newspapers resulted in the acceleration of production. This was achieved by summarizing and disseminating information about the most successful economic enterprises and the methods and techniques of "advanced" workers; by explaining to workers and farmers the purposes of the economic measures taken by the Party and government; by bringing to the attention of the population the economic development of the nation; by publicizing the contributions of outstanding individual workers and farmers; by discussing ways and means for the solution of the difficulties facing the country in its economic construction; and by exhorting the people to make even greater efforts.

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The Press as a Medium of Public Information

Although the press is primarily used to conduct propaganda and agitation, it also contains a large amount of more-or-less straightforward information on public affairs. As mentioned in another connection, newspapers in this region, as in Communist China as a whole, usually print the text of important Party or government decisions and the text of the report of some responsible official on the activities of his agency. They also feature some important announcement concerning the commencement of campaigns, the completion of water conservation projects and the beginning of the autumn harvest on the farms.

The newspapers also seek to influence the formation of political attitudes; and for this reason they often accompany such informational material with a front-page leader and other articles to explain and justify the decisions or activities of the Party or government. But if the reader is both judicious and clever in distinguishing the factual presentation of news and efforts toward political propaganda, he will still be able to learn from the Communist newspapers what the latest actions and decisions of the authorities are, especially in the field of internal affairs. Chinese Communist newspapers contain more information on governmental activities than did the former official Kuomintang press. Unlike the former Kuomintang regime, the Communist authorities are apparently not satisfied with the practice of publishing government or Party decisions

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or decrees in official gazettes. It is their intention that such materials shall come to the direct attention of the people, and the most certain way of insuring that the people will see these materials is to order their publication in all newspapers.

By making the texts of official policies or decisions available to the average citizen, the Communist regime hopes to win his support in their execution. What is denied to the Chinese people on the Mainland today is the right to receive public information from sources other than Communist controlled media. Because they obtain news on governmental activities only from official sources, the Chinese people have no way of listening to diversified interpretations of the news, as do people in the United States. By providing the public with the "official version," the Communist press helps the regime to mobilize public opinion and the change people's attitudes, but it refuses to help the people conduct a public debate on national affairs in a manner we would call democratic. Therefore, the charges that the Communist press treats as news social processes rather than events, and that it does not print news until the "official version" has been decided, are matters of secondary importance in an evaluation of the role of the Communist press in the formation of public opinion.

The Press as an Instrument of Public Control

The press in Central-South China performs another function in addition to being a medium of propaganda, agitation, and public information. This function is the responsibility of serving as an instrument of mass or public control, and its importance can be best appreciated if one recalls the complexity of the tasks of a regime seeking to regulate every minute detail of national life. The manifold activities of the regime naturally have rendered inadequate the formal instruments of control such as the law enforcement officers, court machinery, the procuratorates, and other supervisory agencies. To supplement these formal agencies of supervision, the regime found at its inception that it was necessary to establish informal procedures of control over the execution of the tremendous numbers of complex regulations and orders.

The press serves as an instrument of informal control by acting as a medium for official and popular criticism of the course of the development of Chinese society and its component parts. In Communist China, "public criticism" in the press is a formalized phenomenon, actively encouraged and yet carefully guided by the regime. It has little if anything to do with the spontaneous development of public opinion. Like public criticism in the Soviet press, this function of the press in Communist China is an extension of the practice of self-criticism which prevails within the organizations of the Communist Party.

On April 22, 1950, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China promulgated a document called "Decisions Concerning the Conduct

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of Criticism and Self-Criticism in Newspapers and Periodicals."[8] The Central Committee of the ruling party called upon the press to "induce" the masses to undertake "open criticism" of all shortcomings and mistakes in the work of the Party and government. Since that time, the newspapers in Central-South China have tried to perform this function well. They do so by devoting a large proportion of their total space to critical decisions issued by the Party and the government and to editorials and articles exposing deliquencies on the part of functionaries and institutions, in order to uncover manifestations of bureaucracy, opportunism, and deviation from the Party line. They also carry out this task by publishing "letters to the editor." Written by either the average citizen or a non-professional correspondent (the Chinese counterpart of the rabsel 'kor of the Soviet Press), such letters express certain grievances and complaints or address certain appeals to Communist authorities on a higher level. More than most other resources available to the people in the region, such letters frequently prove effective in the expression of popular feeling and in securing ameliorative action from the authorities. In short, the "letters to the editor" columns in the newspapers not only serve as a center to which the grievances of the citizenry against the bureaucratic apparatus are directed, but also provide the Communist Party with an opportunity to check on the activities of local government and public organizations.

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[8] For its text, see ibid., April 22, 1950.

The political impact of self-criticism conducted through the newspapers cannot be evaluated entirely on the basis of the preceding description. "Self-criticism" operates within carefully defined limits which considerably restrict its potential influence as a democratic force. The press is not allowed to criticize indiscriminately. In its decision on April 22, 1950, the Central-Committee of the Communist Party cautioned that it was necessary for the press to distinguish "between true and constructive criticism on the one hand and destructive criticism on the other." By "destructive criticism" the Communists meant any criticism which is aimed at repudiating the "people's democratic dictatorship," opposing the "Common Program," destroying social discipline, shaking people's faith in leadership, and "causing pessimism and disunity among the masses." This means that no criticism can be directed against any basic policy established by the Communist regime. Nor is it permissible for the press to make any open criticism of the top leaders or of the regime itself. What the press can do is to criticize officials on a lower echelon of corruption, disloyalty, or delinquency in the exectuion of policies of the regime. Viewed in this context, it is clear that the press as an instrument of public control is not only relatively harmless to the existing regime but is actually designed and operated to support it. 204 208

Radio as a Propaganda and Public Information Medium Radio, as another medium of propaganda and public information used by the Communists in 207 208

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Central-South China, should be briefly mentioned. Like the press, the radio has been recognized by the Communists as a powerful weapon of political propaganda and education. But when they assumed control of the Central-South Region, the Communists found very few radio broadcasting facilities which could be used. They took immediate steps to set up broadcasting stations in Honan and Kwangsi. The latest statistics on radio broadcasting facilities in the region are not available. As of June 1951, the following stations were in operation.

RADIO BROADCASTING STATIONS IN CENTRAL-SOUTH CHINA
(June 1951)

Classification	Location	Wave Length (Kilocycles)
1 Regional Broadcasting Station	Wuhan - - - -	700, 6645, and 7275
5 Provincial Broadcasting Stations	Honan	-*
	Kiangsi	-
	Hunan	-
	Kwangtung	-
	Kwangsi	-
5 Municipal Broadcasting Stations	Wuhan - - - - - - -	1150
	Canton - - - -	913, 1203 and 1703
	Kaifeng	-
	Changsha	-
	Nanchang	-

* Not available.

Source: Chung-nan Kuang-po [Central-South Broadcasting Journal], Vol. II, No. 2, June 1, 1951, pp. 5-6.

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In line with the general practice in Communist China,[9] radio stations on the regional and provincial levels were used primarily to announce decrees and regulations and to broadcast news of the region or province concerned. The main task of municipal stations was to conduct "social education," essentially a form of propaganda and agitation. These stations did not originate news programs of a national or international nature; they merely transmit such programs emanated from the Central People's Broadcasting Station in Peking.

Administratively, the regional broadcasting station took orders from the Radiobroadcasting Bureau of the Central People's Government, whereas provincial and municipal stations were under the dual supervision of the Central Radiobroadcasting Bureau and the regional station. Their daily activities were controlled by the Party and government agencies on corresponding levels.

No information has been given by the Chinese Communists on the new designation of the regional station after the abolishment of the regional administration. It is possible that this station has been relegated to a provincial status to serve Hupei Province.

Radio Facilities As of June 1951, there were

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[9] Mei I, "Wo-kuo Jen-min Kuang-po Shih-yeh Kai-k'uang," ["General Survey of the People's Radiobroadcasting in China"], ibid., April 25, 1950.

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approximately 100,000 radio receiving sets in Central-South China. An overwhelming majority were concentrated in a few large cities. Radio receiving sets in Canton, Swatow, and Chiang-men, all in Kwangtung Province, accounted for two-thirds of the total number.[10] While about 20 per cent of these radio receiving sets were used "collectively" by listeners in groups, the remainder were owned by individual citizens or commercial firms.

Since June 1951, the Communists in Central-South China have increased the number of radio receiving sets in the region. But such an increase must have been slight, since there is a shortage of radio parts and technicians.

Radio Broadcast Monitors The limited number of radio stations and receiving sets, however, is not an accurate indication of the effectiveness of the radio as a medium of propaganda and public information. Any measurement of such effectiveness must take into account the "broadcast monitors" operating in government offices and units of the armed forces, and in public gathering places such as factories and schools. Some of these monitors are appointed; others are voluntary workers.[11] All are utilized to cope with the problems caused by the shortage of radio reception facilities. The Communists hope that, by appointing monitors they may make the most effective use of the limited number of radio-receiving sets available. The monitors jot down broadcasts, transcribe and mimeograph them, or rewrite them in the form of "wall newspapers," thus making it possible for the material to reach a larger audience.

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[10] "Chung-nan Ch'ü Jen-min Kuang-po Shih-yeh Kai-k'uang" ["General Survey of the People's Radio-broadcasting in Central-South China"], Chung-nan Kuang-po [Central-South Broadcasting Journal], Vol II, No. 2, June 1, 1951, p. 5.

[11] See "Shou-yin-yüan T'iao-li" ["Regulations on the Work of Monitors"], People's Daily, April 30 1950. When the monitors work in teams, their teams are called "monitoring stations." As of June 1951, (continued next page)

The fact that monitors can help increase the effectiveness of radio is enhanced by the two provisions contained in the "Regulations on the Work of Monitors" promulgated on April 29, 1950, by the Central People's Radiobroadcasting Station.[12] One of the provisions requires the monitors to concentrate on receiving programs such as speeches made by the government leaders, social science lectures, government decrees, news reports, and other items which might help to mold the political and cultural attitudes of the listener. The second provision is that the monitors must report to the responsible radio station their reception work and the reactions of their fellow listeners, so that the station can check on their work as monitors and readjust its programs, if necessary, in the light of the reactions of the audience.

Radio-Diffusion Exchanges In connection with broadcast reception, brief mention should be

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11. (continued) there were 536 such stations in Central-South China. Almost every county government had one station.

[12] See Article 2, ibid.

made of the radio-diffusion exchange. Radio 207
diffusion is a device for disseminating broadcasts 208
by means of a network of speakers attached to a single reception set. Each net is called a radio-diffusion exchange. The use of radio-diffusion exchanges has proved of special value in Kwangtung Province. As of June 1955, there were 213 such exchanges, 70 operating in towns and cities and 143 in factories, mines, and business offices.[13] There are at least two major advantages gained by the use of such a device. First, it enables the Communists to use a minimum number of receition sets to reach a maximum number of radio listeners. Second, and perhaps more importantly, the wired network of the radio-diffusion exchange has a greater adaptability to propaganda control. Since the radio-diffusion exchange selects the programs to be relayed by scattered speakers, it is easy to rule out any possibility of intrusion of enemy radio propaganda. In view of the proximity of Kwangtung Province to Hong Kong and the free world, the use of the radio-diffusion exchange by the Communists in that province is quite understandable.

The Stage as a Propaganda Medium The 536
Communists recognize the traditional Chinese drama 208
as "an effective instrument for educating the masses with revolutionary spirit and patriotism."[14] Committees have been formed and charged with the

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[13] Hua-ch'iao Jih-pao [China Daily News], New York, June 2, 1955.

[14] People's Daily, December 17, 1950.

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task of reforming the local theaters by replacing their "feudalistic, superstitious, and anti-labor" themes with those which might help "publicize and eulogize the people's dictatorship, the Communist Party, and the people's government; awaken the political conscience of the people; stimulate the zeal for production on the part of the people; and praise the new personalities and events of society."[15] In 1950, for example, in the city of Wuhan alone, 31 traditional opera scripts were revised, and 75 traditional dramas were staged according to new scripts. It was also reported that some 700,000 people in Wuhan attended performances.[16] During the same year, committees in Hupei Province revised more than 90 scripts of local operas and presented 152 performances based on new scripts.[17]

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15. Ch'en Huang-mei, "Chia-ch'iang T'uan-chieh Kai-chin Hsi-ch'ü Kai-ko Kung-tso", ["Strenghtening the Unity of the Acting Profession and Improving our Drama Reform Work"], Ch'ang-chiang Jih-pao [Yangtze Daily], Hankow, October 16, 1952.

16. Teng's report cited above.

17. Li Hsien-nien, "Hupeh Sheng Jen-min Cheng-fu I-nien-lai Shih-cheng Kung-tso Yü Chin-hou Jen-wu,"] "On the Work of the Current and the Future Tasks of the People's Provincial Government of Hupeh,"] Cheng-fu Kung-tso Pao-kao Hui-pien [A Compendium of Government Reports (1950)], Peking, 1951, p. 871.

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The use of the local stage as a medium of propaganda again indicates the strategy of the Communists, who know that since the Chinese people are fond of their traditional plays, the use of such material in propaganda work will prove effective. Furthermore, the effectiveness of the stage as an instrument for propaganda lies in the fact that plays appeal to both literate and illiterate people. Since about 80 per cent of the Chinese people are illiterate, the medium of drama is ideal for the dissemination of propaganda, especially since there are many local dramatic troupes available. Like every other group in Communist China engaged in propaganda work, dramatic troupes are constantly watched and rigidly controlled by the propaganda authorities in the region.

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Books, Pamphlets, and Comic Strips as a Medium of Propaganda and Public Information In November 1951, immediately following the reorganization of the major publishing houses in such places as Shanghai and Peking, the Central-South Branch of the Hsin-hua Book Store (official book distributor of the Communist regime) launched a drive to collect old books for destruction. The reason cited was an effort to "clean up lingering feudalistic poison."[18] Up to July 1952, tons of old books, mainly Chinese classics, were collected from the people in Hunan and Hupeh. Some of these books were burned, others were shipped to Shanghai and other cities for conversion into paper pulp.

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[18] Kuang-ming Jih-pao [Enlightenment Daily], Peking, January 25, 1953.

The Communists' effort to eliminate books with ideologically objectionable contents was paralleled by endeavors to provide the people with books, pamphlets, comic strips, and other publications designed for political indoctrination. In additional to shipping such books from Peking and Shanghai, where the nation's major publishing houses are located, the Communists in this region also have local presses turning out publications for local readers. At present each provincial government in the region operates a "People's press," which publishes books, pamphlets, and other works of a political nature. In many provinces there are also so-called "specialized presses" devoted to the publication of books in specialized fields for the worker, the farmer, and young people.

Local authorities also make full use of the small number of privately and semi-privately owned publishing houses in publishing literature for purposes of propaganda and mass indoctrination.

Publications are not distributed by the publishers themselves but by a separate book distributing network consisting of two channels, public and private. The public channel consists of the branch stores of the Hsin-hua Book Company. As of September 1950, there were 505 such branch stores of "various grades" in Central-South China.[19] At the same time,

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19. Chao I-min, "Kuan-yü Wen-chiao Wei-yüan-hui Ti Kung-tso Pao-kao," ["Report on the Work of the Commission on Cultural and Educational Affairs"], Cheng-fu Kung-tso Pao-kao Hui-pien [A Compendium of Government Reports (1950)], Peking, 1951, pp. 757-758.

incomplete statistics showed that the private channel 214
of the book distributing network included 448 208
privately-owned bookstores as well as sidewalk book stalls, which numbered 586 in Wuhan alone.[20]

To make publications intended for the masses 368
still more conveniently accessible to the popular 208
reader, the Communist regime has reportedly established an impressive number of "cultural palaces" (community centers) and reading rooms in cities, towns, and villages. For instance, in Kwangsi Province there are 120 "large cultural palaces," 186 "small cultural places," and 973 reading rooms.[21]

Information on other media of propaganda and 208
public information are by no means less important than the press, radio, the stage, and books and other publications. They have been omitted simply because there is less justification for dealing with them on a regional basis. Most if not all are systematically controlled and utilized by the Communists, and the propaganda they communicate and the information on public affairs they provide are similar to those communicated through the media we have discussed.

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[20] Ibid.

[21] The Sixth Department of the Central Committee of the Kuomintang, Kwangsi Fei-ch'ing [Communist Rule in Kwangsi], Taipei, Taiwan, 1955, p. 29.

III. THE MASS PROPAGANDA NETWORK

Besides the conventional propaganda organs, the Communists have established a "mass propaganda network," consisting of so-called propaganda officers and reporting officers. This "propaganda network" is not a unique arrangement in this region; like other propaganda devices, it is an integral part of a nation-wide organization. The mass propaganda network operates under the sole control and direction of the Communist Party of China and has no operational relationship with the governmental hierarchy. It was established in January 1951 in pursuance of a directive of the Central Committee, "Decision Concerning the Establishment Throughout the Party of a Propaganda Network for the Masses."[22] It was designed to intensify and broaden the work of propaganda and agitation, making it a task not only for the working personnel in the formal propaganda organs, but for "every Communist."

The Propaganda Officer: His Selection and Appointment Propaganda officers are selected by the Party branch headquarters from among Party members, Youth Corps members, the masses in direct contact with the branch headquarters, model workers and other active "revolutionary" elements willing to engage in propaganda work. In selection, consideration is given to the degree of political consciousness of the candidate, his sense of duty as displayed in his present work, his personal association with the masses close to him, and his potential ability as a propaganda officer. To insure political reliability and professional competence, the appointment of a propaganda officer is subject to investigation and approval by the Party branch committee as well as approval by the higher Party organization concerned.

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[22] For its Chinese text, see People's Daily, January 1, 1951.

In Central-South China, propaganda officers are chosen from among the activists in factories, villages, or mass organizations after they have demonstrated their fitness for propaganda work during political or production campaigns. For example, during the Three-Anti Campaign, Party authorities in Chengchow, Honan discovered a great number of activists suitable for propaganda and agitation work who were subsequently recruited as propaganda officers.[23]

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[23] Yangtze Daily, July 6, 1952.

There seem to be many advantages in choosing the occasion of some political of production campaign to select and recruit propaganda officers. First, such a campaign usually offers the best opportunity for the Party to find out who are the most politically reliable and professionally competent men. Second, by appointing the politically reliable and professionally competent activists who have emerged in a given campaign, the Party may make the persons concerned think that they have been given some public recognition of their efforts. Thus, the very process of recruiting propaganda officers may serve as a means for giving personal gratification and social prestige to those who have most enthusiastically helped the Communist regime in carrying out a given task.

The Training and Duties of the Propaganda Officers Upon appointment, the propaganda officers are given training in the ideology of the Party, the use of propaganda material and techniques, and other related matters. Training is conducted through the so-called propaganda conferences, Party schools, and propaganda-officer training centers. The propaganda officer is also expected to study, on his own initiative, propagandist handbooks, news handbooks, newspapers, official documents, pamphlets, and other reference materials relating to his work as a propaganda officer.[24]

The propaganda officer's functions include the dissemination and elucidation, under the direction of the Party and by the simplest and most common of means, of current domestic and international developments; the publicizing of the policies of the Party and the People's Government and the duties of the masses, particularly those duties related to the time and locality in question. Furthermore, the propaganda officer is to refute "reactionary rumors" and "mistaken ideas" prevalent among the popular masses, encourage the masses to make a study of typical experiences gained in production and other work, and to exert positive efforts for the fulfillment of assigned tasks, as well as to render regular reports to the Party on the state of mind of the people in order to assist the Party in the choice of appropriate propaganda material.

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[24] Wu Feng, Hsüan-ch'uan-yüan Kung-tso Chiang-hua [Lectures on the Work of the Propaganda Officer], Canton, Hua-nan jen-min ch'u-pan-she, 1952, p. 26.

When the decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China concerning the establishment of a nation-wide propaganda network was announced at the beginning of 1951, there were in Central-South China only some 4,000 propaganda officers. By the end of 1952, incomplete statistics showed that the total number of propaganda officers in this region had been increased to 380,723, distributed as follows:[25]

GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF PROPAGANDA OFFICERS

Name of Administrative Unit or Other Entity	Number of Propaganda Officers	Average Size of Audience per Propaganda Officer
Honan Province	111,652	395
Hupeh Province	109,913	231
Hunan Province	82,840	4,080
Kiangsi Province	41,720	402
Kwangtung Province	14,178	2,453
Kwangsi Province	11,082	1,765
Wuham Municipality	3,377	307
The Heng-yang Railway Administration	2,167	-*
Canton Municipality	1,931	661
The Chengchow Railway Administration	1,863	-*

* Not available

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[25] Yangtze Daily, August 16, 1952.

Most of these propaganda officers operated with mutual-aid teams in factories, towns, villages, agricultural producers' co-operatives, and other mass organizations. They were unevenly distributed. As of December 1952, in a railway engineering plant in Hankow, there was one propaganda officer for every ten workers.[26] In July 1952, it was reported that the Party authorities in Honan Province set as their goal for the end of the year one propaganda officer for every 100 persons in the "progressive areas," and one propaganda officer for every 200 persons in the "general areas."[27]

The propaganda officers carry on their propaganda and agitation work both individually and collectively. While serving as propaganda officers, they retain their regular jobs. In a factory a propaganda officer is also invariably one of the workers. As mentioned above, the propaganda officer takes his propaganda and agitation work as a duty that he owes to his Party, and does not expect to be paid for his work.

The "Non-Party Propaganda Army" The strength of the propaganda officers cannot be gauged on the basis of their total number alone. It is to be noted that the propaganda officers, who are referred to by the Communists as the "propaganda army of the Party," often enlist the assistance of volunteer propagandists, called by the Communists the "non-Party propaganda army." The number of volunteer propagandists in a given unit is usually three or four times that of the propaganda officers. The Hsü

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[26] Ibid., December 25, 1952.

[27] People's Daily, July 20, 1952.

Feng-ch'i Model Propaganda Team in Yung-hsiu hsien of Kiangsi Province had 37 propaganda officers in December 1952, and 168 volunteer propagandists.[28]

The propaganda officers give guidance and direction to the volunteer propagandists in propaganda and agitation work. Hence, the volunteer propagandists are also called by the Communists "the reserve of the propaganda army of the Party."[29]

The Reporting Officer The reporting officer is "an advanced propaganda officer" whose duty it is to render to the people regular reports on current developments, Party policies, working aims, and work experiences. As such, he gives guidance to the propaganda officer, who is required to keep him regularly informed of the state of mind of the masses so that he may be better able to make his political reports in the light of such information. When such a report is made, the propaganda officers under him organize the people to hear it, and afterwards keep him informed of the mass reaction. If for any reason his report is not fully understood, the propaganda officer will clarify it by informal discussions at group meetings in order to dispel doubts or to clear up any misunderstanding.

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28. Tan Ning and T'ien Pai, "I-chih Ch'ien-chin-chung Ti Hsüan-ch'uan Tui-wu" ["A Unit of the Propaganda Army on March"], Yangtze Daily, December 9, 1952.

29. "Chien-chüeh Chih-hsing Tang-chung-yang Kuan-yü Chien-li Hsüan-ch'uan wang Ti Chüeh-ting [Resolutely Put into Effect the Decision of the Central Authorities of the Party Concerning the Establishment of a Mass Propaganda Network], editorial in ibid., January 16, 1951.

Reporting officers are found in all provincial, municipal, local hsien, and ch'ü (district) Party Committees. As of the end of May 1952, incomplete statistics show that Central-South China had 13,990 reporting officers.[30]

GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF REPORTING OFFICERS

Name of Province or Other Entity	Number of Reporting Officers	Average Size of Audience per Propaganda Officer
Honan Province	4,'95	10,539
Hupeh Province	2,945	9,422
Hunan Province	2,532	14,127
Kiangsi Province	2,347	7,146
Kwangtung Province	781	44,519
Kwangsi Province	884	22,127
Wuhan Municipality	231	4,451
The Chengchow Railway Administration	105	-*
The Heng-yang Railway Administration	105	-*
Canton Municipality	48	26,592

* Statistics not available

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[30] Ibid.

Most of these reporting officers were selected from among the secretaries and members of the Party committees on the provincial, municipal, local hsien, and ch'ü people's governments, and other Party members."

The reporting officer makes at least one political report every two months at mass meetings. Generally, additional reports are made at workers' meetings in urban areas. The topics on which the reporting officer speaks are either chosen or approved in advance by the secretary of the Party committee on a given level. After the delivery of a report, the reporting officer is required to submit an account to the Party secretary concerned. All of these devices are designed to enable the Party authorities to maintain close control over the activities of the reporting officer.

According to the Communists, the reporting and propaganda officers have been effective in educating the masses, in mobilizing public opinion, and in enlisting the support of the masses during various nation-wide campaigns such as the Resist-America-Aid Korea Movement, the Land Reform Movement, the Suppression of Counterrevolutionaries Movement, the Three-Anti Campaign, the Five-Anti Campaign, the Campaign for Increasing Production and Practicing Economy, the Drought- and Flood-Prevention Campaign, and the recent campaign for "liberating" Formosa. Because they represent a direct line of communication with the Party and with local authorities, the reporting officers and the propaganda officers are said to be called by the masses the

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"information bureau," the "ministers of thought," and "the messengers of Chairman Mao."[31]

IV. PROPAGANDA STRATEGY AND TECHNIQUES

The strategy and techniques used by propagandists in Central-South China are similar to those used by propaganda organs elsewhere on the China Mainland.

The Saturation Technique One of the most striking features of the propaganda work of the Communists is its saturation technique, make possible by the existence of an all-pervading hierarchy of propaganda apparatus, the extensive use of all conceivable media of mass communication, and the concentrated employment of propaganda forces. Its effectiveness is enhanced by open suppression of competing propaganda and by care in the release of information on public affairs.

The Communist usually try to disseminate only one important idea at a given time. Whenever a major policy is to be disseminated, all propaganda organs, personnel, and media are set in motion to present this material forcefully and effectively. The Chinese Communists, often by means of threats either direct or implied and by persuasion, have succeeded in enlisting the support of numerous non-Communist people to help further their propaganda work. In this way the dissemination of propaganda becomes more thorough, for the Chinese people may be inclined to believe that the ideas propagandized are not exclusively Communist in origin if so many non-Communists give them active support. The Communists permit the operation of some privately financed newspapers in Central-South China, although they remain under strict supervision and control. Many magazines eulogize the Communist regime and its "democratic" policies, since the privately-financed magazines must submit to supervision and control.

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[31] People's Daily, January 1, 1952.

Planned Propanda and Agitation Before launching a propaganda campaign, the propaganda authorities invariably make careful preparations, including the establishment of the over-all plan for the campaign, directives issued to propaganda organs on lower levels, the selection of appropriate slogans, and the orientation of propaganda cadres to the ideological and political implications of the campaign. Once a campaign has been launched, the propaganda administrative organs check the development of the campaign, giving instructions to and supervising the performance of the propaganda cadres. After a campaign is over, all of its aspects are studied by the propaganda organs with a view to evaluating the experiences and criticizing any shortcomings and deviations.

Not only is the propaganda work carefully planned, but the "audience" to whom the propaganda is directed is organized into "newspaper reading groups," "broadcast listening groups," "mass meeting groups," "lecture listening groups," and so on. The propaganda officer on the "grass roots" level perhaps plays the most important role in organizing these receptive groups.

Reason and Emotion in Propaganda and Agitation Finally, it should be pointed out that the Communists have taken both human reason and emotion into careful account in their propaganda and agitation work. The reasoning they use is simple and concrete and often proves effective in convincing the untutored masses. To appeal to the emotions, the Communists attempt to arouse feelings of hatred, patriotism, and so forth. Vivid examples of "feudalistic exploitation," "imperialism," and so on, expressed in the most simple and direct language, are utilized to arouse the emotions of the audience.

V. AN EVALUATION OF PROPAGANDA AND PUBLIC INFORMATION

In the foregoing pages the propaganda machinery, the media of propaganda and public information, and some of the striking features of the Communist techniques and strategy have been surveyed. It is necessary to conclude with a brief evaluation of propaganda and public information in Central-South China as a whole. First, it is clear that the Communist in this region have been building by making use of all available means an organization for mass communication. This organization, on the whole, is systematically and vigoriously administered. Propaganda and public information, as used by the Communists as instruments for remoldimg the ideology of the people, mobilizing public opinion, and enlisting popular support for their policies, are being dealt out to the people. But this does not mean that the Communists have completely succeeded in selling their ideology and policies to the people in Central-South China. The ever-increasing efforts on the part of the Communists to strengthen their propaganda and public information work is a sufficient indication that there still reminas a great deal more work to be done.

Furthermore, even if the Communist regime has succeeded in convincing the people, there is no guaranty that they will not be as susceptible to competing propaganda when it reaches them. At present, only the Communist Party has the right to disseminate propaganda. The people can learn only that which the regime wishes them to know. Consequently there is little opportunity for popular dissent. As long as competing propaganda is strictly prohibited from reaching the Chinese people, the popular response should not be considered voluntary or rational acceptance; the people have been denied the opportunity to exercise, unhampered their free will and faculties of reason. Furthermore, the saturation technique has already produced apathy, boredom, and callousness among some segments of the population.

No matter how effectively the Communist propaganda and public information machine is working, it can be seriously challenged by the free world if some way can be found to exploit all the Communist weaknesses and beam counter-propaganda to the people in Communist China.

APPENDIX

SUBJECT CONTENT OF THE CH'ANG-CHIANG JIH-PAO [YANGTZE DAILY]

Subject	Average Daily Percentage of Space (Square Inch)
News items, articles, and editorials concerning the Three-Anti Campaign in Central-South China as a whole	28.4*
News items and articles concerning the Three-Anti Campaign in other regions	3.2
Texts of decrees and directives of the Central People's Government	0.4
"Activities of the Communist Party"	3.84
"Cultural lectures"	5.23
International News	12.59
News concerning the current festivals	1.41
News items and articles introducing "model experiences" in land reform	2.40

News items and articles introducing "model experiences" in production	4.56
News concerning Public Health Campaigns	0.15
Letters to the editor	6.04
Advertising	9.5
Newspaper title, news Summary, and margins	24.28

* A large portion of space was devoted to the "Three-Anti Campaign" because that campaign was the principal task of the Communist regime during the period surveyed. The press in Communist China is required to give extensive news coverage to current campaigns and drives.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES OF KEY PERSONALITIES

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The Chinese Communists, through their pyramiding units of regional and local governments, have developed a structure of controls which places a near monopoly of local as well as national power in the hands of a small group of senior leaders. Specifically, by means of its bureaus, the Communist Party has achieved a combination of decentralization of administrative responsibility on local levels with centralized control from Peking. Between top administrative positions in central government and regional units, in fact, there is a notable overlapping of personnel. Our analysis is concerned with the pattern of this overlapping and with the actual administrative roles of the men who constitute the official leadership in Central-South China.

We have studied the positions of seventy-nine men whose posts, on a regional level, include that of governor, chairman, and member of Provincial People's Governments; commander of provincial and regional military districts; president of provincial People's High Courts; regional committee member of the New Democratic Youth Corps; and delegate from the Central-South China area to the First National People's Congress (NPC).

These seventy-nine men hold a total of 204 administrative, military or political positions on both national and regional levels. This is an average of 2.5 functions each. To a certain extent, this concentration of administrative function might be explained by a shortage of trained personnel, but the average is misleading when an analysis is made of the nature and number of the positions held by individuals on different levels of authority.

Twenty-two men held only one known position: seventeen deputy-governors, two New Democratic Youth Corps (NDYC) officials, two presidents of People's High Courts, and one vice-chairman of a Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (Chinese People's P.C.C.) Provincial Committee. The remaining fifty-seven men, therefore, average over three jobs each.

Further breakdown, however, reveals that twenty-two of these men hold two jobs each; these are almost equally divided between men whose positions are on a regional level and those who have one regional job and whose other function is as delegate to the First National People's Congress (NPC).

The remaining thirty-five men average slightly under four positions each. These include all of the important national positions -- membership on the National Defence Council, the State Council, the Standing Committee of the First NPC and the Second National Committee of the Chinese People's P.C.C. -- that are noted among the 204 positions held by the group as a whole .

COMMUNIST PARTY OFFICIALS

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These thirty-five key men can be divided into three categories: twenty-four Communist Party officials, six former Kuomintang men who joined the Communists in 1949, and five officials who do not, on the surface, appear to fit any single classification except that of performing three or more functions simultaneously.

We find, among the twenty-four Communists, thirteen members of the Central Committee, six members of Provincial Committees, and five whose exact Party status at present is not known. We can learn something about the road to senior leadership by looking at the careers of these men to see what patterns, if any, are common to their rise to power.

Five of these men are veteran Communist leaders: Fang Fang, Feng Po-chü, Shao Shih-p'ing, Chang Yün-i, and Ku Ta-ts'un. All five have long records of tough preparation for their present jobs. Their careers present an impressive montage of underground activity, guerrilla warfare and participation in revolutionary uprisings. Long before achieving high office they have proved their competence, party loyalty, and dependability.

Three of these men -- Fang Fang, Feng Po-chü, and Shao Shih-p'ing -- have been politically active since the early 1920s; they all took part in student demonstrations (the May Fourth Movement in 1919, Party cell activities at the Ta-hsia University in

Shanghai, and the March 31st Demonstration in 1926). After 1927, and until joining the Border Region governments, all three continued with Party organizational and guerrilla activities. Chang Yün-i took part in the Nanchang Uprising and then continued his military career with Communist forces; from 1937 on, he served in the New 4th Army. The fifth man, Ku Ta-ts'un, began in 1924 as a peasant leader in eastern Kwangtung, and has been a leader of Communist activities in his province ever since.

In addition to these five veterans, we find seven men whose Communist records are known to us since the period of the Border Region governments. Wu Chih-p'u and Chang Chih-i were directors of the department of political affairs attached to the New 4th Army; T'an Cheng was political commissar of the Reserve Command of the 18th Group Army; Liu Tzu-hou, Wang Jen-chung, and Hsing Chao-t'ang were administrators in Border Region governments; and Chao I-min was president of Yenan University.

Although there are no data before 1949 on the others, a significant Communist record can be assumed on the basis of their earliest known status. In 1949 we find, among these men, seven members of the Central Committee of the CPC, four Party Provincial Committee members who were at the same time vice-chairmen or members of Provincial People's governments, and one who was both vice-political commissar of a provincial military district and chairman of a military control committee.

On the basis of these facts, we can make certain generalizations about what the qualifications for senior leadership appear to be. All of the known veteran Communists occupy senior positions, but as there are only five such men among the entire seventy-nine, the need for a wider distribution of the important administrative functions becomes apparent. Even if the known Border Region men are added, the percentage of long-tested Communists is only 15.2 per cent of the seventy-nine men now performing the administrative leadership of the region.

We find, furthermore, that service dating from the Border Region days does not, by itself, guarantee top-level power at present. In addition to the seven noted above, we have data on two other men -- Wen Min-sheng and Chia Hsin-chai -- who have participated in Communist administration since the Border Region period but who do not now appear to have key senior status. Both are deputy-governors; Chia Hsin-chai is also a delegate to the First NPC and Wen Min-sheng is known to have been former chairnan of a local Party committee. Neither is known to hold any other significant posts. We find also that of the seven former Border Region men who hold more positions numerically, only two hold important national positions: Chao I-min is a Natio nal Committee member of the Chinese People's P.C.C. and T'an Cheng is a member of the Standing Committee of the First NPC and of the National Defence Council. The others hold no key national positions.

We must look, therefore, at the more recent careers of the senior Communist leaders to see if

there is any career-pattern which tends to lead to 647
top authority. The largest number of officials have risen to power through administrative or executive specializations; second in number are the military administrators.

In detail, we find certain posts which have been held by a significant percentage of the group: chairman of provincial governments (8); vice-chairmen of provincial governments (7); delegate to the First Chinese People's P.C.C. (6); political commissar (5); directors, department of political affairs (4); and member, military control committee (4). We might assume, then, that men now in these positions, or their equivalents, are considered directly in line for future top posts.

An analysis of the present positions held by the 647
top Communist officials reveals much about the
techniques for control which have been developed by 665
Communist administrators. The twenty-four men under study hold a total of seventy-five extra-Party positions. When the Party posts are added to this figure, the total becomes ninety-nine, or just under half of the 204 positions originally noted.

These figures become more meaningful when we determine the percentage of top-level posts, on both a national and regional level, which are filled by Party officials. Seventeen out of eighteen key regional jobs (governor and chairman of provincial governments, Chinese People's P.C.C. Provincial Committee member, and commander of military districts) are Party-held, as are nineteen

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out of twenty-nine top national posts (member of the Standing Committee of the First NPC National Defense Council member, deputy premier and member of the State Council, and National Committee member, Chinese People's P.C.C.) This means that 65 per cent of the key positions on national and regional levels are held by Party officials.

Superficially, one is impressed by the interrelationship of political and military leadership, with important military men serving also as Party leaders and holding dominant positions in the political administration. But closer scrutiny of the constellation of key incumbencies reveals clearly that the government is, in fact, dominated by the Party and not by military command. The really important military men are Party leaders first and use their military power as an adjunct to Party function.

The provincial distribution of positions among the Communist Party men insures both central and Party authority in sensitive spots throughout the local administrative structure. The four known governors (the governor of Hunan Province is not included among the seventy-nine men under study) are trusted Party men: T'ao Chu of Kwangtung, Shao Shih-p'ing of Kiangsi, Wu Chih-p'u of Honan and Liu Tzu-hou of Hupeh. Communist deputy-governors are also found in five provinces: four in Kwangtung, two in Hunan, and one each in Hupeh, Kiangsi, and Honan provinces. Although there is no known Party official among the deputy-governors in Kwangsi, we find members of the Kwangsi Provincial Committee of the Party in four other positions: a member of the Provincial People's Government, the commander of the Kwangsi Province Air Defense Command, a Kwangsi Provincial Committee member of the Chinese People's P.C.C., and the commander of the Kwangsi Provincial Military District. Members of the Provincial Committees of the Chinese People's P.C.C. in Hupeh, Kwangtung, and Hunan provinces are ranking Party men, as are officials in the military district commands in Kwangtung and Hupeh. This means that there are at least two, and as many as eight, Party officials in each provincial administration. 647 665

On the regional level, we find much the same picture. Almost invariably -- and without any exception in the case of the senior Party men -- these Communists were at least members, and more often chairmen or vice-chairmen, on the Central-South China Military and Political Committee (Central-South China M.P.C.) and the Central-South China Administrative Committee (Central-South China A.C.). We also find two commanders of the Central-South China Military District and two 4th Army Field Army officials among this group.

FORMER KUOMINTANG OFFICIALS

A second group of key men -- the former Kuomintang officials -- hold administrative positions just about equal, proportionately, in both quantity and function, to those of the Communists, with the important omission of Communist Party membership. 647

The six ex-Kuomintang men mentioned above average almost four positions each, and these include ten top-level national positions. In addition to these six men, the three other known former Kuomintang officials are included in the analysis of this group, in order to give a clearer picture of the roles such men have played in the government since they joined it in 1949.

Five of the Kuomintang men -- Ch'en Ming-shu, Lu Han, Ch'eng Ch'ien, Li Ming-hao, and T'ang Sheng-chih -- had military backgrounds. The other four were primarily administrators: Chang Nan-hsien, Li Jen-jen, Ch'en Tzu-sheng, and Ch'eng Hsing-ling. Seven of these men have some explicit record in their Kuomintang careers of participation in factional struggles, sporadic revolt, temporary imprisonment or exile, or personal animosity against the main Kuomintang leadership. Despite such records, five of the nine men had been members of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee.

The importance of the first positions which the Kuomintang men held after they joined the Communists indicates the degree to which men of administrative experience were needed. In 1949-50, Kuomintang men held a total of twenty-nine positions: delegate to the First Chinese People's P.C.C. (6); National Committee member, Chinese People's P.C.C. (3); member of the Central People's Government Council (4); member of the Central-South China M.P.C. (8); vice-chairman, provincial government (4); member, provincial government (2); member, People's Revolutionary Military Council (1); and advisor to a provincial Military Control Committee (1).

Although they no longer hold as many positions, the former Kuomintang officials still occupy key posts in the Communist administration. We find among them five deputy-governors, one member of a Provincial Committee of the Chinese People's P.C.C., four members of the National Committee of the Chinese People's P.C.C., three members of the National Defense Council, three members of the Standing Committee of the First NPC, and eight delegates of the First NPC.

The actual power value of these positions must be assessed in the light of the fact that none of these men holds known Communist Party membership -- though there is always the possibility that one or another may have served as an enemy agent in Nationalist ranks. In any case, since they are outnumbered more than two to one by Party members on top levels, it is fairly certain that their functions are purely administrative rather than policy-making. In time they may well be succeeded by Party men as such replacements are trained. On the other hand, as long as Formosa remains independent of the Communists, the Peking government may keep certain former Kuomintang men in important positions in order to imply that compromise or consolidation is possible.

LEADERS NEXT IN LINE

The five remaining officials in the category of top officials cannot be classified on the basis of background or unity of function. They include one president of a People's High Court (Ts'ao Po-wen), two members of Provincial People's Governments (Li Ti'en-yu and Wang Shu-sheng), and two deputy-governors (T'an Ying-chi and Lu Shao-wu). None of them is noted as a Party official, but they appear to have more status than the others of their administrative groups, not only because of their additional positions but also because these positions are among those held, in the past or at present, by the senior leaders: commanders of military districts, National and Provincial Committee members of the Chinese People's P.C.C., and one director of the department of public safety -- a position indicating Party reliability. It seems safe to assume then, that if these men cannot yet be considered to hold senior status, they are at least high among those next in line.

When we consider the various incumbents according to the positions they hold on the regional level, we learn something of the significance of the positions in themselves and of the type of men who occupy them.

GOVERNORS

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Our study includes the governors of Kwangtung, Kiangsi, Hupeh, and Honan Provincial People's governments. One of these men, Shao Shih-p'ing, has been a Communist leader since 1927; two governors were directors in Border Region governments; the fourth, T'ao Chu, has been known to us only since 1949.

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The careers of the two former Border Region officials -- Wu Chih-p'u of Honan Province and Liu Tzu-hou of Hupeh Province -- have some similarities. Both were first vice-chairmen and, later, chairmen of the governments of their provinces. Liu was a member of the Central-South China M.P.C. and Central-South China A.C.; Wu was a delegate to the First Chinese People's P.C.C. Liu is now deputy secretary of the Hupeh Provincial Committee of the Communist Party; Wu's present Party position is not known -- he is noted only as a delegate to the First NPC.

Shao Shih-p'ing, the governor of the Kiangsi Provincial People's Government, was a guerrilla organizer from 1927 to 1937, when he became associated with the Shansi, Hopei, and Chahar Anti-Japan University. He became president of this university before leaving it, in 1944, to join the Central Party School of the Communist Party of China. He later became chairman of the Kiangsi Provincial People's Government and a member of the Central-South China M.P.C. and Central-South China A.C. In addition to being governor, he is also a delegate to the First NPC. His exact Party status is not known.

T'ao Chu, the governor of the Kwangtung Provincial People's Government, is the only one of the four who did not proceed to his position via the chairmanship, although he was, for a time in 1954, vice-chairman. Other than this we have only a few facts about his past career. His first known positions (in 1949) were as director of the Department

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of Political Affairs of the Central-South China Military District and of the 4th Field Army, and as political commissar of the Kwangtung Province Military District. Except for his membership on the Central-South China M.P.C. and Central-South China A.C., the rest of the data on T'ao are current: in conjunction with his governorship, he also occupied the posts of chairman of the Kwangtung Provincial Committee of the Chinese People's P.C.C., member of the National Committee of the Chinese People's P.C.C., and acting secretary of the South China Sub-bureau of the Central Committee of the CPC.

We find, then, two types of governor: trusted Communist leaders with relatively long records of loyal service, and the Communist official whose multiple positions and high-ranking Party status indicate top level authority in the administrative structure. Keeping in mind our earlier conclusion that a long service record alone does not insure real seniority in terms of power, nevertheless we can see -- as we might expect -- that the governorship is an important instrument for insuring local Party control, and that the men in this position will represent the real source of authority in the government.

CHAIRMEN, PROVINCIAL PEOPLE'S GOVERNMENTS

Only one man is noted as chairman of a Provincial People's Government: Wei Kuo-ch'ing, of Kwangsi. All that is known of his past career is that in 1949 he was chairman of the Fu-chou (Foochow) Military Control Committee, and from 1950 to 1954,

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vice-political commissar of the Fukien Province Military District. His present multiple posts, however, rank him with the top group of leaders. He is a delegate and a member of the Standing Committee of the First NPC, vice-director of the Committee on Nationalities Affairs of the State Council,[a] member of the National Defense Council, and member of the National Committee of the Chinese People's P.C.C. Although his Party status is not known, it may be assumed to be significant on two counts: the nature and number of his posts in the administration, and the nature of the post of chairman itself.

Former chairmen are, with one exception, Party men with senior status. The exception is Ch'eng Ch'ine, a Nationalist leader of long standing who was a candidate for the vice-presidency in the last Kuomintang election on the Mainland, is now the highest ranking of all the ex-Kuomintang men noted in this survey. The nine other former chairmen have all proceeded to positions of considerable importance. We find among them, as noted above, three of the four governors. We also find three members of the Central Committee of the CPC and two veteran Communists whose exact present Party rank is not known; all five are members of the National Defense Council. The ninth man is Hsing Chao-t'ang, former chairman of the Ninghsia Provincial People's Government, who is at present deputy governor of the Honan Provincial People's Government and delegate from Kansu Province to the First NPC.

We may conclude that the chairmanship, like the governorship, is under tight Party control, and has been reserved for men of noteworthy dependability or competence. The only exception -- Ch'eng Ch'ien -- serves to emphasize this point, since he is exceptional among the group of ex-Kuomintang officials, and is the only one to hold the rank of chairman.

VICE-CHAIRMEN, PROVINCIAL PEOPLE'S GOVERNMENTS

When we examine the position of vice-chairman, we find that twenty men out of the seventy-nine have held the position of vice-chairman of a Provincial People's Government. Obviously some of these have gone on up the ladder; we have already mentioned three governors who are former vice-chairmen. In addition, we find five ranking Party members who have held this post and are now members of the senior group of leaders. Four of the Kuomintang men are former vice-chairmen, but they are not among those of their group who hold the most important positions. They are deputy-governors; one is also a member of the National Defense Council and of a Provincial Committee of the Chinese People's P.C.C., and one is on the National Committee of the Chinese People's P.C.C.; otherwise they do not hold top-level posts.

The remaining eight former vice-chairmen are all deputy-governors. Five hold this position only, while the other three are also delegates to the First NPC. Only a small amount of background information indicating previous training or experience is available to us: three were members of the Central-

South China M.P.C. and Central-South China A.C.; two are former members of Provincial People's Governments: one is a former Border Region official; one is a Communist Party Provincial Committee member; and two others are unknown.

DEPUTY-GOVERNORS

Forth-one men are deputy-governors. Thirteen have been considered in detail above -- the six Party officials, the two Border Region members, the five former Kuomintang men. It is worth noting again that in all of these groups, the men who hold the post of deputy-governor also hold, on the whole, other positins less important than those held by their associates in the same groups. Despite their similarity in background to the others, they do not have as many positions, nor do their positions include as many key posts.

We have no information about eleven of the remaining twenty-eight deputy-governors beyond the statement of their present position. On the basis of the available data about the others, we find six posts which many of them have held or now hold: member, Provincial People's Government (10); vice-chairman (7, not including the Party official discussed above); membership on the Central-South China M.P.C. and Central-South China A.C. (7); director, department of public safety (4); Provincial Committee member, Chinese People's P.C.C. (2); and delegate, First NPC (9). Only two of these men hold more than two positions; they have already been studied. None of the others has an obviously significant combination of jobs or, as far as we can tell from the data, a background of particular meaning.

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In connection with our study of the position of deputy-governor, it should be said that only three members of the Democratic League noted among the entire seventy-nine men are deputy-governors. They are also delegates to the First NPC, and two are past members of the Central-South China M.P.C. and Central-South China A.C., but they hold no other positions on either regional or national levels.

MEMBERS, PROVINCIAL PEOPLE'S GOVERNMENTS

Ten men are identified as members of Provincial People's Governments. Each also holds another position of significance: four Presidents of People's High Courts, five commanders of military districts, and one NDYC Provincial Committee member.

Three of these men have already been mentioned because they hold three or more jobs each: Ts'ao Po-wen, president of the Hunan People's High Court; and Li T'ien-yu and Wang Shu-sheng, both commanders of military districts.

Except that three of the other commanders of military districts are past members of the Central-South China M.P.C. and Central-South China A.C., and one of them is a delegate to the First NPC, none of these ten members holds any other post.

We have minimal data especially for the presidents 647
of People's High Courts. Except for Ts'ao Po-wen, 635
discussed above, all that we know of the others is that four are members of Provincial People's Governments, and for the other two on our list, we have no information at all.

NEW DEMOCRATIC YOUTH CORPS OFFICIALS

Our last category concerns five NDYC 647
members. Two have already been noted because of their posts as Central Committee member and provincial government member, respectively. The other three are all former members of the People's Control Committee of their provinces (Kiangsi, Hunan, and Honan), but now hold no other positions except on the NDYC. The fifth man, Huang Huan-ch'iu, is noted only as being secretary of the South China Committee of the NDYC.

CONCLUSION

Investigations of this sort suffer, as yet, from a lack of detailed information not only of many key individuals in higher categories of Party and government, but more especially of second- and third-level men on the way up. We can conclude without meaningful qualification that the central leadership of the Communist Party of China keeps tight control of decisions in regional and provincial governmental administrations, but more revealing analyses of elite patterns will depend upon the continued collection of biographical detail on every important echelon and the expansion of each man's dossier to include material about his origins, social and economic background, education, and earliest advances on the latter to power.

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For the sake of brevity, certain abbreviations have been used in the biographical sketches which follow.

A-C FL -- All-China Federation of Literature
A-C FDY -- All-China Federation of Democratic Youth
A-C FDW -- All-China Federation of Democratic Women
Centr. Com. of CPC -- Central Committee of the Communist Party of China
C.A.P.D. -- China Association for Promotion of Democracy
com. -- committee
CPC -- Communist Party of China
Chinese People's P.C.C. -- Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference
Central-South China A.C. -- Central-South China Administrative Committee
Central-South China M.P.C. -- Central-South China Military and Political Committee
D.L. -- Democratic League
div. -- division
econ. -- economic
Exec. Com -- Executive Committee
JCRR -- Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction
KMT -- Kuomintang
milit. dist. -- military district
NPC -- National People's Congress
NCNA -- New China News Agency
NDYC -- New Democratic Youth Corps

P.A. -- Peasants' Association
pol. -- political
prep. -- preparatory
R.C. of KMT -- Revolutionary Committee of Kuomintang
WDP -- Workers' Democratic Party

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CHANG CHIH-I

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Origin: b. Wuhan.

Background: dir. of Dept. of Pol. Affairs of 15th Brigade of 5th Div. of New 4th Army (during Sino-Japanese War); dir. of Dept. of Pol. Affairs of 3d Milit. Sub-dist. of Honan-Hupei Border Milit. Dist. (during later period of Sino-Japanese War); mem. and Sec.-Gen. of Central South China M.P.C. (1950-52); chm. of Commission on Nationalities of Central-South China M.P.C. (1951-2); V-C of Com. on Pol. and Legal Affairs of Central South China M.P.C. (1952); mem. and Sec.-Gen. of Central-South China A.C. (Jan., 1953-54).

Current Career: dir. of Dept. of United Front Affairs of Central-South Bureau of Centr. Com. of CPC (1949-); del. to 1st NPC. and mem. of Commission on Nationalities of First NPC (Sept., 1954-).

Publications: K'ang-chan-chung Ti Cheng-tang ho P'ai-pieh [Political Parties and Groups of China During the War] (1939).

CHANG MENG-HSÜ

Background: Sec.-Gen. of Hunan Provisional People's Provincial Govt. (1940); mem. and Sec.-Gen.

of Hunan Provincial People's Govt. (1950-54).

Current Career: Dep.-Gov. of Hunan Provincial People's Govt. (1955-).

CHANG NAN-HSIEN

Origin: b. 1974, Mien-yang, Hupei Province.

Background: joined T'ung-meng Hui prior to founding of Republic of China; mem. of Kwangtung Provincial Govt. and dir. of Dept. of Construction of the same govt. (1927); mem. of Hupei Provincial Govt. and dir. of Dept. of Finance (1928); Minister of Personnel Adm. of Natl. Govt. in Nanking (1928); mem. of Chekiang Provincial Govt. and dir. of Dept. of Civil Affairs of same govt. (1930); chm. of Chekiang Provincial Govt. (1930); resigned from above post in 1931 and returned to Hupei; chm. of Hupei Provincial Com. on Party and Pol. Affairs and Chm. of Board of Directors of Hupei Provincial Bank (1932); del. to Chinese People's P.C.C. (1949-54); mem. of Central People's Govt. Council (1949-54); High Advisor to Wuhan Milit. Control Com. (1949); V-C. of Central-South China M.P.C. (1950-52); V-C. of Central-South China A.C. (Jan., 1953-54).

Current Career: del. to 1st NPC (Sept., 1954-); mem. of Standing Com. of 1st NPC (Sept., 1954-).

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CHANG T'I HSÜEH

Background: mem. of Hupei Provincial People's Govt. (1949-55).

Current Career: S c. of Hupei Local Com. of CPC (1949-); Dep.-Gov. of Hupei Provincial People's Govt. (1955-); del. to 1st NPC (Sept., 1954-).

CHANG YÜN-I

Origin: b., 1891, Wen-ch'ang *hsien*, Kwangtung Province.

Background: graduate of Canton Milit. College; graduate of Pao-ting Milit. Acad.; served under Teng Chien when latter was Comdr. of 1st div. of Kwangtung Army prior to KMT Northern Expedition; a lieutenant colonel at headquarters of 4th Army (headed by Li Chi-shen) (1926); dir. of Dept. of Staff of 7th Army (1927); participated in Nan-ch'ang Uprising in 1929 and subsequently entered Soviet district in Jui-ching; after Sino-Japanese War began in 1937, Chang served in New 4th Army; after Gen. Ch'en I became Comdr. of New 4th Army, Chang was promoted as Dep.-Comdr. and concurrently Chief-of-Staff; took part in battles for liberation of North Kiangsu, crossing of Yangtze River, and capture of Shanghai; del. to Chinese People's P.C.C. (1949-54), chm. of Kwangsi Provincial People's Govt. (1949-54); mem. of Central-South Chin a M.P.C. (1950-51); Comdr. and pol. commissar of Kwangsi Provincial Milit. Dist. (1949-54); V-C. of Central-South China M.P.C. (1952); V-C. of Central-South China A.C. (Jan., 1953-54).

Current Career: Dep.-Comdr. of South-China 000 Milit. Dist. (1949-); Second Sec. of South-China Sub-Bureau of Centr. Com. of CPC (1949-); del. to 1st NPC (Sept., 1954-); mem. of Natl. Defence Council (Sept., 1954-).

CHAO I-MIN

Origin: b., Hopei Province

Background: V-Pres. of Yenan Univ. and Pres. of Lu Hsün College of Arts (1943); mem. of Central-South China M.P.C. (1950-52); chm. of Commission on Cultural and Educational Affairs of the Central-South China M.P.C. (1950-52); dir. of Dept. of Cultural Affairs of the Central-South China M.P.C. (1950-52); dir. of Dept. of Propaganda and Sec. of Com. on Youth Affairs of Central-South Bureau of Centr. Com. of CPC (1949-); V-C. of Central-South China Branch of Sino-Soviet Friendship Assoc. (1951-54); del. to Natl. Congress of Sino-Soviet Friendship Assoc. (1954).

Current Career: mem. of Natl. Com. of the Chinese People's P.C.C. (1949-).

CHAO WEN-FU

Background: mem. of Honan Provincial People's Govt. (1954).

Current Career: mem. of Honan Provincial Com. of the NDYC (1954-); Dep. Gov. of Honan Provincial

People's Govt. (1955-); del. to First NPC (Sept. 1954-).

CH'EN HSI-HAN

Background: mem. of Kiangsi Provincial People's Govt. (1950-54); mem. of Central-South China M.P.C. (1950-52); mem. of Central-South China A.C. (Jan., 1953-54).

Current Career: Comdr. of Kiangsi Provincial Milit. Dist. (1950-); mem. of Kiangsi Provincial People's Govt. (1955-).

CH'EN FU-SHENG

Background: mem. of People's Control Com. of the Hupeh Provincial People's Govt. (1949-54).

Current Career: Sec. of Hupeh Provincial Com. of NDYC (1953-); mem. of Central Com. of NDYC (1953-).

CH'EN I-HSIN

Background: mem. of Hupeh Provincial People's Govt. and concurrently dir. of Dept. of Public Security (1949-54); V-C. of Hupeh Provincial People's Govt. (June, 1954-Jan., 1955)

Current Career: Dep.-Gov. of Hupeh Provincial People's Govt. (Feb., 1955-).

CH'EN MING-SHU

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Origin: b., 1891, Ho-p'u, Kwangtung Province

Background: graduate of Pao-ting Milit. Acad.; Comdr. of 11th Army (1927); dir. of Dept. of Political Affairs of Natl. Revolutionary Forces headquarters (1927); Commander-in-Chief of Garrison Forces of Shanghai and Nanking (1932); Pres. of Executive Yüan of Natl. Govt. in Nanking (1932); Comdr. of 19th Route Army (1931-32); took part in People's Govt. established by Gen. Li Chi-shen (1933); mem. of standing com. of the Central Com. of the KMT Revolutionary Com. (1949-); mem. of Central Com. of San-min Chu-i Comrades' Assoc. (1949-); del. to Chinese People's P.C.C. (1949-54); mem. of Central People's Govt. Council (1949-54); mem. of Commission on Pol. and Legal Affairs of Govt. Adm. Council (1949-54); mem. of Central-South China M.P.C. (1950-52); mem. of Commission on Financial and Econ. Affairs of Central-South China M.P.C. (1950-52); dir. of Dept. of Agriculture and Forestry of Central-South China (1949-52); del. to Natl. Congress of Sino-Soviet Friendship Assoc. (1951); V-C. of Central-South China A.C. (Jan., 1953-54); del. to Natl. Congress of Sino-Soviet Friendship Assoc. (1954).

Current Career: del. to 1st NPC (Sept., 1954-); mem. of Standing Com. of 1st NPC (Sept., 1954-); mem. of Natl. Com. of Chinese People's P.C.C. (1954-); mem. of Standing Com. of Natl. Com. of Chinese People's P.C.C. (1954-); mem. of Com. on Bills of First NPC (1954-).

CH'EN MAN-YÜAN

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Origin: Kwangsi Province.

Background: Comdr. of 14th Army Corps of 4th Field Army (1949); V-C. of Kwangsi Provincial People's Govt. (1949-54); del. to Chinese People's P.C.C. (1949-54); mem. of Central-South China M.P.C. (1950-52); mem. of Central-South China A.C. (Jan., 1953-54).

Current Career: sec. of Kwangsi Provincial Com. of CPC (1949-); Comdr. of Kwangsi Provincial Air Defense Command (1949-); del. to 1st NPC (Sept., 1954-); mem. of Standing Com. of First NPC (Sept., 1954-); mem. of Kwangsi Provincial People's Govt. (1955-); chm. of Kwangsi Provincial Com. of Chinese People's P.C.C. (1955-).

CH'EN TSAI-LI

Background: dir. of Dept. of Civil Affairs of Hunan Provincial People's Govt. (1950); mem. of Commission on Nationalities of the Central-South China M.P.C. (1952).

Current Career: Dep.-Gov. of Kwangsi Provincial People's Govt. (1955-); V-C. of Kwangsi Provincial Com. of Chinese People's P.C.C. (1955-).

CH'EN TSAI-TAO

Background: del. to First Chinese People's

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P.C.C. (1949-Dec., 1954); mem. of Central-South M.P.C. (1949-52); mem. of the Central-South China A.C. (Jan., 1953-54).

Current Career: Comdr. of Honan Provincial Milit. Dist. (1950-); mem. of Honan Provincial People's Govt. (1955-).

CH'EN TZ'U-SHENG

Origin: b., 1902, Kuei-hsien, Kwangsi Province.

Background: studied at Fu-tan Middle School; teacher of history and geography at middle school attached to Sun Yat-sen Univ.; principal of Third District Middle School of Tung-wan Hsien ; prior to outbreak of Sino-Japanese War in 1937, Ch'en went to Japan to study Japanese problems; upon return, Ch'en served as sec. to Li Jen-jen, who was then dir. of Dept. of Education of Kwangsi Provincial Govt.; during early stage of Sino-Japanese War, Ch'en founded Kuei-lin Junior College for Teachers and served as Acting President; following dissolution of college, Ch'en was appointed councilor of Kwangsi Reconstruction Research Commission, after V-J Day, Ch'en went to Hong Kong and co-operated with Gen. Li Chi-shen and others in founding of KMT Com. for Promotion of Democracy; mem. of Central Com. of KMT Revolutionary Com. (1949-); del. to Chinese People's P.C.C. (1949-54); mem. of Commission on Cultural and Educational Affairs of Govt. Adm. Council (1949-54); mem. of Kwangsi Provincial People's Govt. (1950-54); mem. of Central-South China M.P.C. (1950-52); V-C. of Consultative Com. of Kwangsi Provincial People's Representatives'

Conference of All Circles (1950-54); mem. of Central-South China A.C. (Jan., 1953-54).

Current Career: del. to 1st NPC (Sept., 1954-); V-C. of Kwangsi Provincial People's Govt. (1954-); Dep.-Gov. of same govt. (1955-); Mrs. Ch'en (an artist) is active in the Women's Federation.

CH'EN JU-T'ANG

Origin: b., Kwangtung Province.

Background: del. to Chinese People's P.C.C. (1949-54); mem. of Natl. Com. of Chinese People's P.C.C. (1949-54); mem. of Kwangtung Provincial People's Govt. (1950-54); dir. of Dept. of Health (1950-54).

Current Career: mem. of Central Com. of KMT Revolutionary Com. (1949-); del. to 1st NPC (Sept., 1954-); Dep.-Gov. of Kwangtung Provincial People's Govt. (1955-).

CH'ENG CH'IEN

Origin: b., 1882, Li-ling, Hunan Province.

Background: graduate of Hunan Milit. Acad.; graduate of Tokyo Milit. Acad.; dir. of Div. of Milit. Affairs of Hunan Milit. Governor's Office (1912); Comdr. of Hunan Road Patrol Corps; Dep.-Minister of Army of Milit. Govt. at Canton (1920); Minister of Army of Generalissimo Sun Yat-sen's Headquarters at Canton (1923); Comdg.

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Officer of 6th Army of the KMT's Northern Expeditionary Forces (1925-26); chm. of Milit. Council of Natl. Govt. of China (1927); mem. of Natl. Govt. Council (1929-35); Chief-of-Staff (1925-37); Comdr. of First War Zone, and Chm. of Honan Provincial Govt. (1938); dir. of T'ien-shui Headquarters of the Generalissimo (1940); mem. of Supreme Defence Council (1941-46); Chm. of Com. on Party and Pol. Affairs of War Zone (1941); Dep.-Chief-of-Staff (1941-46); Acting Chief-of-Staff (1944-46); dir. of Wuhan Headquarters of the Generalissimo (1946-48); mem. of Central Executive Com. of KMT (1935-49); candidate for vice-presidency of Natl. Govt. (1948); chm. of Hunan Provincial Govt. and dir. of Ch'angsha Pacification Headquarters (1948-49); joined Ch'angsha Uprising on Aug. 4, 1949; del. to Chinese People's P.C.C. (1949-54); mem. of Natl. Com. of Chinese People's P.C.C. (1949-54); V-C. of Central-South China M.P.C. (1949-52); V-C. of People's Revolutionary Milit. Council (1949-54); chm. of Hunan Provincial People's Govt. (1952-55); V-C. of Central-South China A.C. (Jan., 1952-54).

Current Career: mem. of Central Standing Com. of KMT Revolutionary Com. (1949-); del. to First NPC (Sept., 1954-); mem. of Standing Com. of 1st NPC (1954-); V-C. of Natl. Defence Council (1954-); mem. of Standing Com. of 2d Natl. Com. of Chinese People's P.C.C. (1954-); V-C. of Natl. Com. of Sino-Soviet Friendship Assoc. (1954-).

CH'ENG HSING-LING

Origin: b., Li-ling, Hunan Province.

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Background: graduate of Hunan First Normal School; graduate of Natl. Peking Univ.; close associate of I P'ei-chi when the latter was Pres. of Labor Univ. and Minister of Industry and Commerce late in 1920's; served under Gen. Ch'en I when latter was chm. of Fukien Provincial Govt.; Sec.-Gen. of Fukien Provincial Govt. when Gen. Liu Chien-shü was its chm.; arrested and imprisoned for three years on Formosa after V-J Day as result of factional struggle; returned to Ch'angsha in 1949 and joined Ch'angsha Uprising; del. to Chinese People's P.C.C.; V-C. of Hunan Provincial People's Govt. (1950-54); councilor of Govt. Adm. Council (1950-54); mem. of Commission on Pol. and Legal Affairs of Central-South China MPC. (1950-52);

Current Career: mem. of 2d Natl. Com. of Chinese People's P.C.C. (1954-); Dep.-Gov. of Huaan Provincial People's Govt. (1955-) .

CHI WEN-FU

Origin: b. Honan Province.

Background: prof. at Honan Natl. Univ. (prior to his departure for Communist territory in 1948); mem. of Central China Provisional People's Govt. (1949); V-C. of Honan Provincial People's Govt. (May, 1940-Jan., 1955); del. to First Chinese People's P.C.C. (1949-Dec. 1954); mem. of Central-South China M.P.C. (1949-Jan. 1953); mem. of Com. on Cultural and Educational Affairs of the Central-South China M.P.C. (1949-Jan., 1953); V-P. of Honan Univ. (1949); mem. of Central-South China A.C. (Jan. 1953-54).

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Current Career: Acting Pres. of Honan Normal College (April, 1954-); Dep. -Gov. of Honan Provincial People's Govt. (1955-); del. to 1st NPC (Sept., 1954-).

CH'I WEN-CHIEN

Background: chm. of Honan Provincial Planning Com. (1954).

Current Career: Dep. -Gov. of Honan Provincial People's Govt. (1955-).

CHIA HSIN-CHAI

Origin: b., 1893, Kansu Province.

Background: mem. of People's Assembly of Shansi-Shantung-Honan Border Region; V-Dir. of Shansi-Shantung-Honan Border Region Govt. (World War II); mem. of North China People's Govt. (1948); V-C. of P'ing-yüan Provincial People's Govt. (late in 1948-52); V-C. of Honan Provincial People's Govt. (Nov., 1952-Jan., 1955).

Current Career: Dep. -Gov. of Honan Provincial People's Govt. (1955-); del. to 1st NPC (Sept., 1954-).

CH'IEN I-MIN

Current Career: Pres. of Hupeh People's High Court (1955-).

CH'IU CHE

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Origin: b., Mei-hsien, Kwangtung Province

Background: studied in Japan; prominent banker in Canton; founder of Kwangtung Provincial Bank when Gen. Ch'en Chiung-ming was governor of province; went to England after Gen. Ch'en resigned from political life; collaborated with Teng Yen-ta in founding of KMT Action Com., which subsequently changed its name to The Peasants' and Workers' Party of China; councilor of Dept. of Pol. Affairs of Milit. Council of Natl. Govt. when Gen. Huang Ch'i-hsiung was one of the dep.-dir. of that dept. (1937-38); resigned from post following Gen. Huang's own resignation but continued collaboration with Gen. Huang in political activities; V-C. of South-China Provinsional Branch Com. of China Democratic League (1949-?); mem. of Kwangtung Provincial People's Govt. and dir. of Dept. of Agriculture and Forestry of same govt. (1949-54); del. to Chinese People's P.C.C. (1949-54); Secretary-General of the Peasants' and Workers' Party of China (1950-?); mem. of Central-South China M.P.C. (1950-52); Second Dep.-Mayor of Canton (1952-?); mem. of Central-South China A.C. (Jan., 1953-54).

Current Career: mem. of Central Com. of Democratic League of China (1949-); mem. of Central Com. of Peasants' and Workers' Party of China (1950-); del. to 1st NPC (Sept., 1954-); Dep.-Gov. of Kwangtung Provincial People's Govt. (955-).

CHOU HSIAO-CHOU

Origin: b., Hunan Province.

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Background: mem. of Hunan Provincial People's Govt. (1950-54); dir. of Dept. of Propaganda of Hunan Provincial Com. of CPC (1950-53).

Current Career: Sec. of Hunan Provincial Com. of CPC (Dec. 1953-); Dep.-Gov. of Hunan Provincial People's Govt. (1955-); chm. of Hunan Provincial Com. of Chinese People's P.C.C. (1955-).

CHOU NAN

Current Career: Pres. of Kwangtung People's High Court (1955-); mem. of Kwangtung Provincial People's Govt. (1955-).

CHU CHIEH-YUNG

Current Career: Dep.-Gov. of Kiangsi Provincial People's Govt. (1955-).

CHU K'AI-CHÜAN

Current Career: Pres. of Kiangsi People's High Court (1955-); mem. of Kiangsi Provincial People's Govt. (1955-).

FANG CHIH-CH'UN

Background: V-C. of Kiangsi Provincial People's Govt. (1950-54); dir. of Dept. of Civil Affairs (1950-54).

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Current Career: Dep.-Gov. of Kiangsi Provincial People's Govt. (1955-).

FANG FANG

Origin: b. 1904, P'u-ning hsien, Kwangtung Province.

Background: student leader at home town during "May 4th Movement" in 1919; joined KMT during Northern Expedition; resigned from KMT after failure of Communist Uprising in 1927; since 1927 has engaged in peasants' and workers' movements in eastern Kwangtung; Party representative of 3rd regiment of Red Guard when Communist forces of Gen. Ho Lung and Gen. Yeh T'ing were in eastern Kwangtung; founder of Soviet regime in eastern Kwangtung; mem. of Fukien-Kwangtung-Kiangsi Border Com. of CPC; editor of Red Star Daily; mem. of Fukien Provincial Com. of CPC and dir. of Dept. of Milit. Affairs of the same Com.; studied in Yenan during the later years of Sino-Japanese War; pol. advisor to Gen. Yeh Chien-ying when latter served as Communist representative at Milit. Mediation Com. at Peking (1946-47); went to Hong Kong after Milit. Mediation Com. was dissolved; assumed milit. command of guerrilla forces in Kwangtung and fought side by side with regular forces of People's Liberation Army in South China (1949); del. to Chinese People's P.C.C. and mem. of Natl. Com. of Chinese People's P.C.C. (1949-54); mem. of Central-South China M.P.C. (1950-52); V-C. of Kwangtung Provincial People's Govt. ('950-54); mem. of Central-South China A.C. (Jan., 1953-54).

Current Career: Third Sec. of South China Bureau of Centr. Com. of CPC (1949-); V-C. of

Commission on Overseas Chinese Affairs of State Council (Sept., 1954-); del. to 1st NPC (Sept., 1954-).

FENG PO-CHÜ

Origin: b., Ch'iung-shan, Kwangtung Province.

Background: studied at Ta-hsia Univ. (Shanghai); joined CPC when studying in Shanghai and became leader of Party cell; since 1928, Feng has taken charge of Party affairs on Hainan Island; arrested by KMT shortly before Chiang Kai-shek's kidnapping in Sian and regained freedom after outbreak of Sino-Japanese war in July 1937; chm. of North Hainan Island Anti-Japan Democratic Govt. (1941-44); Comdr. and pol. commissar of Ch'iung-yai Guerrilla Column of CPC (1944); chm. of Ch'iung-yai Provisional Govt. (1944-49); chm. of Ch'iung-yai People's Govt. (1949); mem. of Kwangtung Provincial People's Govt. (1950-54); mem. of Central-South China M.P.C. (1950-52); mem. of South-China Sub-Com. of Central-South China M.P.C. (1950-52); V-C. of Hainan Island Milit. and Pol. Com. (1950-52); mem. of Central-South China A.C. (Jan., 1953-54).

Current Career: del. to 1st NPC (Sept., 1954-); mem. of Natl. Defence Council (1954-); Dep.-Tov. of Kwangtung Provincial People's Govt. (1955-).

HO CHUNG-SHIH

Current Career: Dep.-Gov. of Kwangsi Provincial

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People's Govt. (1955-).

HO HSI-MING

Current Career: Dep.-Gov. of Kwangtung Provincial People's Govt. (1955-).

HSIA JU-AI

Current Career: Dep.-Gov. of Hunan Provincial People's Govt. (1955-).

HOU MU-HAN

Current Career: Pres. of Kwangsi People's High Court (1955-).

HSIAO I-CHOU

Background: V-C. of Kwangsi Provincial People's Govt. (?-1954).

Current Career: Dep.-Gov. of same govt. (1955-).

HSING CHAO-T'ANG

Origin: b., Kansu Province.

Background: Comdr. of division of 2nd Army of Kuo-min Chün, headed by Gen. Feng Yü-hsiang (1926); Dep.-Comdr. of guerrilla forces in southern

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Hopei, organized by Gen. Sun Tien-ying immediately after outbreak of Sino-Japanese War in 1937; joined Communists in same area in 1938; elected V-C. of People's Assembly of Shansi-Shantung-Honan Border Region (1941); mem. of North China People's Govt. Council and dir. of Dept. of Water Conservation of same govt. (1948); del. to First Chinese People's P.C.C. (1949-Dec. 1954); mem. of Northwest China M.P.C. (1949-Jan. 1953); V-C. of Ninghsia Provincial People's Govt. (1949-51); chm. of Ninghsia Provincial People's Govt. (1952-54).

Current Career: Dep.-Gov. of Honan Provincial People's Govt. (1955-); del. from Kansu Province to 1st NPC (Sept. 1954-).

HSIUNG CHIN-HUAI

Origin: b., Hupei Province.

Background: mem. of Central-South China M.P.C. (1949-52); V-C. of Hupei Provincial People's Govt. (1953-54); mem. of Central-South China A.C. (Jan., 1953-54).

Current Career: mem. Preparatory Com. of Hupei branch of KMT Revolutionary Com. (1950-); Dep.-Gov. of Hupeh Provincial People's Govt. (1955-); del. to 1st NPC (Sept., 1954-).

HSŬ CH'I-WEN

Background: mem. of Hunan Provincial People's

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Govt. and dir. of Dept. of Public Security (1949-54).

Current Career: Dep.-Gov. of Hunan Provincial People's Govt. (1955-).

HU K'O-SHIH

Background: mem. of the People's Control Com. of the Central-South China M.P.C. (1950-52); mem. of Commission on Pol. and Legal Affairs of Central-South China M.P.C. (Aug. 1952-Jan., 1953).

Current Career: V-Sec. of Com. on Youth Affairs of Central-South Bureau of Centr. Com. of CPC (1950-); dir. of Dept. of Organization of Central-South Com. of NDYC (1950-); sec. of same com.[1] (1950-); mem. of the Standing Com. of Central Com. of NDYC (1953-); del. to 1st NPC (Sept., 1954-).

HSUANG HSIEN

Current Career: Dep.-Gov. of Kiangsi Provincial People's Govt. (1955-).

HUANG HUAN-CH'IU

Current Career: Sec. of South-China Com. of NDYC (1953-).

HUNG TE-MING

Current Career: Sec. of Hunan Province Com. of NDYC (1944-); mem. of Central Com. of NDYC

(1953-); mem. of People's Control Com. of Hunan Provincial People's Govt. (1954).

JAO SSU-CH'ENG

Origin: b., Kiangsi Province

Background: V-C. of Kiangsi Provincial People's Govt. (1949-54); mem. of Central-South China M.P.C. (1949-52); mem. of Central-South China A.C. (Jan., 1953-54).

Current Career: Dep.-Gov. of Kiangsi Provincial People's Govt. (1955-).

KU TA-TS'UN

Origin: b., Wu-hua hsien, Kwangtung Province, son of peasant.

Background: leader of peasant uprising in Eastern Kwangtung in 1925; after defeat of 1927 Communist uprising in Kwangtung, continued his guerrilla activities in eastern Kwangtung even after main forces of RedArmy withdrew to Northwest China; reserve mem. of Centr. Com. of CPC (1945-); V-C. of Kwangtung Provincial People's Govt. (1949-54); dir. of Dept. of Civil Affairs (1949-54); del. to Chinese People's P.C.C. (1949-54); mem. of Central-South China M.P.C. (1950-52); mem. of Central-South China A.C. (Jan., 1953-54).

Current Career: del. to 1st NPC (Sept., 1954-); Dep.-Gov. of Kwangtung Provincial People's Govt.

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(1955-); V-C. of Kwangtung Provincial Com. of Chinese People's P.C.C.

LI HSIEN-NIEN

Background: chm. of Hupeh Provincial People's Govt. (1949-54); V-C. of Central-South China M.P.C. (1952); V-C. of Central-South A.C. (Jan., 1953-54); sec. of Hupei Provincial Com. of the CPC (1949-54).

Current Career: del. to 1st NPC (Sept., 1954-); V-Premier of State Council (Sept., 1954-); Minister of Finance (1954-); mem. of Natl. Defence Council (1954-). For more information, see the *Over-all China Handbook.*

LI HSÜEH-FENG

Origin: b. 1905, Yung-chi *hsien,* Shansi Province.

Background: mem. of Central-South China M.P.C. (1950-52); chm. of Com. on Agratian Reform of Central-South China M.P.C. (1950-52); chm. of Commission on Pol. and Legal Affairs of Central-South China M.P.C. (1952); V-C. of Central-South China A.C. (Jan., 1953-54).

Current Career: dir. of Dept. of Organization of Central-South Bureau of Centr. Com. of CPC (1949-); sec. of Com. on Workers and Staff Members of Central-South Bureau of Centr. Com. of CPC (1949-); Second Sec. of Central-South Bureau of Centra. Com. of CPC (1952-); del. to 1st NPC (Sept., 1954-).

LI JEN-JEN

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Origin: b., 1878, Kwangsi Province.

Background: lecturer at Kuei-lin Acad. during last few years of Manchu Dynasty (Gen. Pai Ch'ung-hsi studied under him); collaborated with P'ei Pang-t'ao in training youth for revolutionary purposes during years prior to and during KMT Northern Expedition; after P'ei was executed for Communist affiliation in 1927, Li fled from home province until 1929; once elected mem. of Central Control Com. of KMT; elected chm. of Kwangsi Provincial Assembly (1947); joined KMT Revolutionary Com. in 1949 and elected mem. of Central Com.; del. to Chinese People's P.C.C. (1949-54); mem. of Natl. Com. of Chinese People's P.C.C. (1949-54); V-C. of Kwangsi Provincial People's Govt. (1950-54); mem. of Central-South China M.P.C. (1950-52); mem. of Commission on Pol. and Legal Affairs of Govt. Adm. Council (1950-54); mem. of Central-South China A.C. (Jan., 1953-54); mem. of Natl. Com. of Sino-Soviet Friendship Assoc. (1951-54).

Current Career: del. to 2d Natl. Congress of Sino-Soviet Friendship Assoc. (1954-); del. to 1st NPC (Sept., 1954-); Dep.-Gov. of Kwangsi Provincial People's Govt. (1955-).

LI MING-HAO

Origin: b., 1897, Li-ling, Hunan Province.

Background: graduate of Pao-ting Milit. Acad.;

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graduate of Tokyo Milit. Acad. (1922); instructor at Shao-kuan Milit. Acad., headed by Gen. Ch'eng Ch'ien; during KMT Northern Expedition, served as regimental and later division-commander under Gen. Ch'eng Ch'ien; Comdr. of Chungking Garrison forces (1945-48); because of personal animosity toward Gen. Ho Yin-ch'in, resigned from above post, went to Shanghai, and subsequently entered Communist territory; Gen. Ch'eng Ch'ien's collaboration with Communists in Ch'angsha Uprising on Aug. 4, 1949 was partially instigated by Li; mem. of Hunan Provincial People's Govt. (1949-54); mem. of Central-South China M.P.C. (1949-52); mem. of Com. on Agrarian Reform of Central-South China M.P.C. (1949-52); mem. of Central-South China A.C. (Jan., 1953-54); dep.-dir. of Dept. of Civil Affairs of Central-South China M.P.C. (1949-52).

Current Career: del. to 1st NPC (Sept., 1954-); mem. of Com. on Budget of 1st NPC (Sept., 1954-); Dep.-Gov. of Hupei Provincial People's Govt. (1955-).

LI T'IEN-YU

Background: Dep.-Comdr. of Kwangsi Provincial Milit. Dist. (1950-?); mem. of Kwangsi Provincial People's Govt. (1950-54); mem. of Central-South China M.P.C. (1952); mem. of Central-South China A.C. (Jan., 1953-54).

Current Career: Comdr. of Kwangsi Provincial Milit. Dist. (1954(?)-); del. to 1st NPC (Sept. 1954-).

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LI YING-TAN

Background: mem. of Control Com. of Kwangsi Provincial People's Govt. (1950-54); Sec. of Kwangsi Provincial Com. of NDYC (1953-); mem. of Kwangsi Provincial People's Govt. (1955-).

LIN PIAO

Background: chm. of Central-South China M.P.C. (1950-52); chm. of Commission of Financial and Econ. Affairs of Central-South China M.P.C. (1950-52); Comdr. of 4th Field Army (1940-); Comdr. of Central-South China Milit. Dist. (1949-); V-C. of People's Revolutionary Milit. Council (1949-54); chm. of Central-South China A.C. (Jan., 1953-54).

Current Career: del. to 1st NPC (Sept., 1954-); Dep.-Premier of State Council (Sept., 1954-); V-C. of Natl. Defence Council (Sept., 1954-). For more information, see Over-All China Handbook.

LIU CHI-SUN

Background: mem. of Hupeh Provincial People's Govt. and dir. of Dept. of Finance (1949-55).

Current Career: Dep.-Gov. of Hupeh Provincial People's Govt. (1955-).

LIU TZU-HOU

Origin: b., Hopei Province.

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Background: dir. of Dept. of Finance of Honan-Hupeh Border Region Govt. (World War II); V-C. of Hupeh Provincial People's Govt. (1949-Aug., 1954); mem. of Central-South China M.P.C. (1949-52); mem. of Central-South China A.C. (Jan., 1953-54); Chm. of Hupeh Provincial People's Govt. (Aug., 1954-Jan., 1955);

Current Career: Dep.-Sec. of Hupeh Provincial Com. of CPC (1952-); Gov. of Hupeh Provincial People's Govt. (1955-); dir. of Dept. of Organization of Hupeh Provincial Com. of CPC (1950-).

LU SHAO-WU

Background: mem. of Kwangsi Provincial People's Govt. (1950-54); dir. of Wu-ming Adm. Dist. Govt. (1950-?); Comdr. of Wu-ming Milit. Sub-Dist. (1950-?); Dep.-Comdr. of Kwangsi Provincial Milit. Dist. (1954-55).

Current Career: del. to 1st NPC (Sept., 1954-); Dep.-Gov. of Kwangsi Provincial People's Govt. (1955-); Comdr. of Kwangsi Provincial Milit. Dist. (June, 1955-).

MO NAI-CH'ÜN

Background: mem. of Kwangsi Provincial People's Govt. (1950-54); mem. of South China Branch Com. of Democratic League (1950-); V-C. of Kwangsi Provincial People's Govt. (?-1954).

Current Career: del. to 1st NPC (Sept., 1954-); Dep.-Gov. of Kwangsi Provincial People's Govt. (1955-).

NIEH KUO-CH'ING

600

Origin: b., Hupeh Province.

Background: mem. of Central-South China M.P.C. (1949-52); mem. of Commission on Legal and Pol. Affairs of Central-South China M.P.C. (1949-52); mem. of the Central-South China A.C. (1953-54); V-C. of Hupei Provincial Conference of People's Représentatives of All Circles (1951-54).

Current Career: mem. of the central com. of China Democratic League (1945-); dir. of Hupeh Provincial branch of same league (1949-); del. to 1st NPC (Sept., 1954-); Dep.-Gov. of Hupeh Provincial People's Govt. (1955-).

OUYANG WU

Background: mem. of Kiangsi Provincial People's Govt. (1949-54).

Current Career: Dep.-Gov. of same govt. (1955-).

P'AN FU-SHENG

Current Career: chm. of Honan Provincial Com. of Chinese People's P.C.C. (1955-).

SHAO SHIH-P'ING

Origin: b., 1902, Kiangsi Province.

l:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF14 Central China AF14

Background: active student leader during "March 31st Student Demonstration" in 1926; mem. of Kiangsi Provincial Control Com. of KMT at time when Chiang Kai-shek staged "1927 Purge" against Communist elements in KMT; after purge, Shao went to countryside to organize guerrilla forces; V-Pres. of North Shensi College (in Yenan) (1937-38); Pres. of Shansi, Hopei, and Chahar Anti-Japan Univ. (?-1944); returned to Yenan in winter of 1944 and joined Central Party School of CPC; chm. of Kiangsi Provincial People's Govt. (1949-54); chm. of Kiangsi Milit. Control Com. (1949); mem. of Central-South China M.P.C. (1950-52); mem. of Central-South China A.C. (Jan., 1953-54). 000

Current Career: V-C. of Kiangsi Provincial branch of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Assoc. (1952-); del. to 1st NPC (Sept., 1954-); Gov. of Kiangsi Provincial People's Govt. (1955-).

SHIH FANG-SHENG

Current Career: Dep.-Gov. of Honan Provincial People's Govt. (1955-).

T'AN CHENG

Origin: b., Hunan Province.

Background: name first appeared in Liberation Daily (Yenan) in 1939; pol. commissar of Reserve Command of 18th Group Army (1942); V-C. of

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Tientsin Milit. Control Com. (Jan. -April, 1949); chm. of Wuhan Area Milit. Control Com. (May, 1949-?); mem. of Central-South China M.P.C. (1950-52); mem. of Central-South China A.C. (Jan., 1953-54); dep.-dir of Dept. of Pol. Affairs of People's Revolutionary Milit. Council (1954).

Current Career: reserve mem. of Central Com. of CPC (1945-); dir. of Dept. of Pol. Affairs of 4th Field Army (1949-); pol. V-Commissar of 4th Field Army (1949-); pol. V-Commissar of Central-South China Milit. Dist. (1949-); Third Sec. of Central-South Bureau of Centr. Com. of CPC (1949-); del. to 1st NPC and mem. of Standing Com. of 1st NPC (Sept., 1954-); V-Minister of Defence (1954-); mem. of Natl. Defence Council (1954-); del. to 1st NPC (Sept., 1954-).

T'AN YING-CHI

Origin: b., Kwangsi Province, of Chuang origin.

Background: dir. of Dept. of Public Security of Hopei Provincial People's Gov.t (1949); mem. of Kwangsi Provincial People's Govt. (1950-54); mem. of Central-South China M.P.C. (1950-52); chm. of Western Kwangsi Chuang People's Autonomous Dist. Govt. (1950-?); mem. of Central-South Branch Office of Supreme People's Procuratorate (1950-54); mem. of Central-South China A.C. (Jan., 1953-54).

Current Career: del. to 1st NPC (Sept., 1954-);

Dep.-Gov. of Kwangsi Provincial People's Govt. (1955-); dir. of Dept. of Public Security of same govt. (1955-).

T'AN YU-PAO

Background: V-C. of Hunan Provincial People's Govt. (1950-54); del. to Chinese People's P.C.C. (1949-54); mem. of People's Control Com. of Central-South China M.P.C. (1950-52); mem. of People's Control Com. of the Central-South China A.C. (Jan., 1953-54).

Current Career: mem. of Hunan Provincial People's Govt. (1950-); del. to 1st NPC (Sept., 1954-); Dep.-Gov. of Hunan Provincial People's Govt. (1955-).

T'ANG SHENG-CHIH

Origin: 1885, b., Tung-an, Hunan Province.

Background: graduate of Pao-ting Milit. Acad. (1915); Comdr. of 4th Div. of Hunan Provincial Army (1920); Acting Gov. of Hunan (1926); Comdg. Officer of 8th Army of KMT Northern Expeditionary Forces (1926); Comdr. of 4th Group Army (1927); Comdr. of 5th Route Army (1928); mem. of Standing Com. of Natl. Milit. Reorganization and Disbandment Conference (1929); revolted with Gen. Feng Yü-hsiang in 1929 against Chiang Kai-shek; pardoned for 1929 revolt in 1931; Dir.-General of Military Training Headquarters (1934-37); reserve mem.

of Centr. Exec. Com. of KMT (1934-45); mem. of Milit. Council of Natl. Govt. (1941-46); mem. of Milit. Advisory Council (1948-49); V-C. of Hunan Provincial People's Govt. (1950-54); mem. of Central South M.P.C. (1950-52); mem. of Central-South China A.C. (Jan., 1953-54).

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Current Career: del. to 1st NPC (Sept., 1954-); mem. of Natl. Defence Council (1954-); Dep.-Gov. of Hunan Provincial People's Govt. (1955-); V-C. of Hunan Provincial Com. of Chinese People's P.C.C. (1955-).

T'AO CHU

Origin: b., Hunan Province.

Background: mem. of Central-South China M.P.C. (1949-52); mem. of Central-South China A.C. (Jan., 1953-54); V-C. of Kwangtung Provincial People's Govt. (1954).

Current Career: dir. of Dept. of Pol. Affairs of Central-South Milit. Dist. (1949-); dir. of Dept. of Pol. Affairs of 4th Field Army (1949-); pol. commissar of Kwangtung Provincial Milit. Dist. (1949-); Fourth Sec. of South-China Sub-Bureau of Centr. Com. of CPC (1949-); mem. of Second Natl. Com. of Chinese People's P.C.C. (1954-); Gov. of Kwangtung Provincial People's Govt. (1955-); Acting Sec. of South-China Sub-Bureau of Centr. Com. of CPC (1954-); chm. of Kwangtung Provincial Com. of Chinese People's P.C.C. (1955-).

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TENG TZU-HUI

Background: V-C. of Central-South China M.P.C. (1950-52); V-C. of Central-South China A.C. (Jan., 1953-54).

Current Career: second sec. of Central-South Bureau of Centr. Com. of CPC (1949-); Dep.-Premier of State Council (Sept., 1954-); del. to 1st NPC (Sept., 1954-); For more information, see Over-All China Handbook.

TS'AO PO-WEN

Background: mem. of Hunan Provincial People's Govt. (1950-54); mem. of Standing Com. of Consultative Com. of Ch'angsha Municipal Conference of People's Representatives of All Circles (1950-54); consultant to Hunan Provincial Milit. and Pol. Com. (1950).

Current Career: mem. of Second Natl. Com. of Chinese People's P.C.C. (1954-); mem. of Hunan Provincial People's Govt. (1955-); pres. of Hunan People's High Court (1955-); V-C. of Hunan Provincial Com. of Chinese People's P.C.C. (1955-).

WANG CHO-CH'AO

Background: mem. of Kiangsi Provincial Com. of CPC (1949-54); dir. of Dept. of Public Security (1949-54).

Current Career: dir. of Dept. of Social Affairs of Kiangsi Provincial Com. of CPC (1949-); Dep. -Gov. of Kiangsi Provincial People's Govt. (1955-).

WANG HAI-SHAN

Background: V-C. of Hupei Provincial People's Govt. (1954).

Current Career: Dep. -Gov. of Hupeh Provincial People's Govt. (1955-).

WANG JEN-CHUNG

Origin: b., Hopeh Province

Background: dir. of Dept. of Propaganda of South Hopei Regional Com. of CPC (under North China Bureau) and dir. of South Hopei Govt. (1938); V-C. of Hupeh Provincial People's Govt. (1949); V-Mayor of Wuhan Municipality (1952); mem. of Central-South China A.C. (Jan., 1953-54).

Current Career: pol. commissar of Hupeh Provincial Milit. District (1954-); del. to 1st NPC (Sept., 1954-); Sec. of Hupeh Provincial Com. of CPC (1954-); chm. of Hupeh Provincial Com. of the Chinese People's P.C.C.

WANG KUANG-LI

Current Career: Pres. of Honan People's High Court (1955-); mem. of Honan Provincial People's

Govt. (1955-).

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WANG SHU-SHENG

Background: mem. of Central-South China M.P.C. (1949-52); Dep.-Comdr. of Hupeh Provincial Milit. Dist. (1949-53); mem. of Central-South China A.C. (Jan., 1953-54).

Current Career: Comdr. of Hupeh Provincial Milit. Dist. (1954-); del. to 1st NPC (Sept., 1954-); mem. of Hupeh Provincial People's Govt. (1955-).

WEI KUO-CH'ING

P

Origin: b., Kwangsi Province.

Background: V.-Pol. Commissar of Fukien Provincial Milit. Dist. (1950-54); chm. of Fu-chou Milit. Control Com. (1949-?).

Current Career: del. to 1st NPC (Sept., 1954-); mem. of Standing Com. of 1st NPC (Sept., 1954-); mem. of Natl. Defence Council (1954-); V-C. of Commission on Nationalities of State Council (1954-); mem. of 2d Natl. Com. of Chinese People's P.C.C. (1954-); mem. of Natl. Exec. Com. of Sino-Soviet Friendship Assoc. (1954-); chm. of Kwangsi Provincial People's Govt. (1955-).

WEN MIN-SHENG

Background: pol. commissar of 2d Milit. Sub-Dist. of Honan-Hupah Border Region (World War II);

V-Sec. Gen. of Central-South China M.P.C. (1950-52); sec. of Ching-chou Local Com. of CPC (1950-?); mem. of Commission on Pol. and Legal Affairs of Central-South China M.P.C. (Aug., 1952-March, 1953).

Current Career: Dep.-Gov. of Kwangtung Provincial People's Govt. (1955-).

WU CHIH-P'U

Origin: b., Ch'i-hsien, Honan Province.

Background: dir. of Dept. of Pol. Affairs of 4th Div. of New 4th Army (World War II); dir. of Kiangsu and Anhwei Border Region Govt. (1947); V-C. of Central China Provisional People's Govt. (March, 1949); chm. of Honan Provincial People's Govt. (May, 1949-Jan., 1955); del. to 1st Chinese People's P.C.C. (Sept., 1949-Dec., 1954).

Current Career: mem. of Board of Trustees of All-China Federation of Co-operatives (1950-); Gov. of Honan Provincial People's Govt. (1955-); del. to 1st NPC (Sept., 1945-).

YANG MEI-SHENG

Background: Chief-of-Staff of Hunan Provincial Milit. Dist. (1950-52).

Current Career: Comdr. of same Milit. Dist. (1953-); mem. of Hunan Provincial People's Govt. (1955-).

YANG TSE-CHIANG

Background: mem. of People's Control Com. of Kiangsi Provincial People's Govt. (1950-54).

Current Career: Sec. of Kiangsi Provincial Com. of NDYC (1953-).

YEH CHIEN-YING

Background: V-C. and one time acting chm. of Central-South China M.P.C. (1950-52); chm. of South-China Sub-Com. of Central-South China M.P.C. (1950-52); Sec. of South-China Sub-Bureau of the Centr. Com. of CPC (1950-); chm. of Kwangtung Provincial People's Govt. (1949-54); Comdr. of Kwangtung Provincial Milit. Dist. (1949-?); acting chm. of Central-South China A.C. (Jan., 1953-54);

Current Career: Acting Comdr. of 4th Field Army (1950-); Acting Comdr. of Central-South China Milit. Dist. (1950-); del. to 1st NPC (Sept., 1954-); V-C. of Natl. Defence Council (Sept., 1954-); dir. of Dept. of Milit. Supervision (Sept., 1954-); mem. of Standing Com. of 1st NPC (Sept., 1954-). For moreinformation, see *Over-all China Handbook*.

YIN LIN-P'ING

Current Career: Dep. -Gov. of Kwangtung Provincial People's Govt. (1955-).

1: Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF14 Central ~~C-S~~ China AF14

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
CENTRAL-SOUTH CHINA
RICE
DISTRIBUTION
PROVINCES
A-Honan
B-Hupeh
C-Hunan
D-Kiangsi
E-Kwangsi
F-Kwangtung
A
B
C
D
E
F
108
112
116
36
32
28
24
20
Scale in Miles
0
100
200
300

[facing p. 642 (2)]

1: Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF14 Central ~~C-C~~ China AF14

653
731


CHING-CHIANG
FLOOD DIVERSION
PROJECT
Ching-ling
Sha-shih
Ching River Levee
Ching River
Hu Tu River
Flood Diversion District
Shih-sho
Flood Gate
Forest Safeguard Against Flood
Levee
Safety Zone
Drainage Area
Works to be Abolished
Regulator (Gate)

[facing p. 642 (b)]

1: Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF14 ~~0-9~~ Central China 4F19


CENTRAL—SOUTH CHINA
WHEAT
DISTRIBUTION
PROVINCES
A-Honan
B-Hupeh
C-Hunan
D-Kiangsi
E-Kwangsi
F-Kwangtung
A
B
C
D
E
F
108
112
116
36
32
28
24
20
Scale in Miles
0
100
200
300

[facing p. 642 (c)]

1: Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF14 Central China AF14

244


CENTRAL-SOUTH CHINA
SOYBEAN
DISTRIBUTION
PROVINCES
A-Honan
B-Hupeh
C-Hunan
D-Kiangsi
E-Kwangsi
F-Kwangtung
A
B
C
D
E
F
108
112
116
36
32
28
24
20
Scale in Miles
0
100
200
300

[facing p. 642 (d)]


108
112
116
CENTRAL-SOUTH CHINA
COTTON
DISTRIBUTION
36
32
28
24
20
PROVINCES
A-Honan
B-Hupeh
C-Hunan
D-Kiangsi
E-Kwangsi
F-Kwangtung
A
B
C
D
E
F
Scale in Miles
0
100
200
300
108
116

[facing p. 642 (e)]

Economic Background

AGRICULTURE

I. INTRODUCTION

Agriculture forms the most important part of the economy of Central-South China. It has been estimated that only 10 per cent of the region's production comes from industry and approximately 90 per cent from agriculture. The region ranks first in the nation's production of food grain, and large quantities of raw cotton and a number of other specialties, including tung, tea, tobacco, and ramie, are grown. It has long been known as "China's Granary." This is substantiated by the common saying: "When there is a rich harvest in Hunan, Hupeh, Kwangtung, and Kiangsi, the whole country will live in plenty." The orchards and fisheries of Kwangtung are well known, too, for both the quality and quantity of their products. 241

II. CULTIVATED LAND AND RURAL POPULATION

162

The limited area of arable land in relation to the vast population in the six provinces and two municipalities of Central-South China is

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162

Table 1. Cultivated Land and Rural Population of Central-South China*

(unit: 1,000 shih-mou--1,000 persons)
S-shih-mou
A-acres

Province	Cultivated Land	Rural Population	Farm# Households	Shih-mou per Household	Shih-mou per Farmer
		1946			
Honan	98,499 S (16,416.5 A)	26,220	5,082	19.5 S (3.25 A)	3.75 S (0.63 A)
Kiangsi	43,339 S (7,223.2 A)	10,034	3,292	13.2 S (2.20 A)	4.35 S (0.73 A)
Hupeh	64,500 S (10,750.0 A)	19,046	3,960	16.4 S (2.73 A)	3.45 S (0.58 A)
Hunan	50,206 S (8,368.7 A)	18,992	3,900	13.9 S (2.32 A)	2.70 S (0.45 A)
Kwangtung	40,939 S (6,823.1 A)	19,448	3,479	11.9 S (1.98 A)	2.10 S (0.35 A)
Kwangsi	27,493 S (4,582.1 A)	11,645	2,330	11.9 S (1.98 A)	2.40 S (0.40 A)
Total	324,976 S (54,162.7 A)	105,405	22,023	---	---
Average	---	---	---	14.7 S (2.45 A)	3.08 S (0.51 A)
		1955			
Honan	99,681 S (16,613.5 A)	35,372	7,074	14.1 S (2.35 A)	2.80 S (0.67 A)
Kiangsi	43,339 S (7,223.1 A)	13,418	2,683	16.1 (2.68 A)	3.20 S (0.54 A)
Hupeh	64,500 S (10,750.1 A)	22,292	4,444	14.5 S (2.42 A)	2.90 S (0.48 A)
Hunan	50,457 S (8,409.5 A)	26,581	5,316	9.5 S (1.58 A)	1.90 S (0.31 A)
Kwangtung	40,296 S (6,716.0 A)	27,816	5,563	7.2 S (1.20 A)	1.40 S (0.23 A)
Kwangsi	27,493 S (4,582.1 A)	15,649	3,130	8.9 S (1.48 A)	1.80 S (0.30 A)
Total	325,766 S (54,294.3 A)	141,068	28,210	---	---
Average	---	---	---	11.5 S (1.92 A)	2.30 S (0.38 A)

*For 1946 statistical figures, see The Stutistical Year Book of China, 1948, pp. 70-71. The 1955 data was estimated from Chung-kuo Jen-min Kung-ho-kuo Fen-sheng Ti-t'u, /Atlas of the People's Republic of China, by Provinces /, Shanghai, Ti-t'u Ch'u-pan-she, 1953.

#For calculating the number of farm households, figuring is based on the average of five persons in each farm household as reported by Chou En-lai (NCNA, Sept. 24, 1954).

(Table 1 faces p. 643)

the basic factor in any discussion of Chinese agriculture.[1] According to the census[2] completed on June 30, 1953 by the Communist government, the total population of this region is 176 million. If we calculate the rural and urban population by the ratio[3] of 86.74 to 13.26 as the Communist do, the total rural population amounts to 152 million. How the Communists arrived at this ratio has not been explained. It seems that this arbitrary ratio is too high in comparison with the statistics of 1946 issued by the Nationalist government, which set the rural population figure of Central-South China at 105 million, constituting about 80 per cent of the total.[4] 162

Based on this new census, the cultivated land per farm household and per capita is even lower now than in 1946. Some of these marked changes are shown in Table 1. 162 311

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[1] John L. Buck, Land Utilization in China, Chicago, 1937, pp. 267-69. According to a study which covered 16,786 farms in 22 provinces of the 1929-33 period, the average size of a farm was 25.4 shih-mou [4.26 acres] which is substantially below the minimum size considered necessary by even the most optimistic writers, such as Chin I-hung, on Chinese peasantry.

[2] Jen-min Jih-pao [People's Daily], Nov. 1, 1954, p. 1.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Chung-hua-min-kuo T'ung-chi Nien-chien [The Statistical Yearbook of China], Nanking Bureau of Statistics, 1948, pp. 70-71.

Table 1 indicates that the average size of farms in Kwangtung Province is only 6.7 shih-mou (1.1 acres), the smallest in Central-South China. The farms in Kiangsi Province rank first in average size, 14.9 shih-mou (2.5 acres), but these averages are substantially below the pre-war size of farms in Japan, which was 16.5 shih-mou (2.75 acres).[5] 311

III. THE LAND REFORM PROGRAM OF CENTRAL-SOUTH CHINA

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565

The Chinese Communists' Land Reform Movement followed a deliberate pattern, although methods of implementation varied from place to place, as when the techniques employed were modified in order to conform to special circumstances in different localities. The Land Reform Law in Central-South China was promulgated in July 1950. The law itself is too long to be discussed here, but it was on the basis of class differentiation that land redistribution was begun.[6] (For the methods used by the Chinese Communist Party in carrying out the land reform program, see Section V, "Communist Political Power in the Rural Area" in chapter on "Political Dynamics" of this handbook.)

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5. Wu Yuan-li, An Economic Survey of Communist China, New York, Bookman Associates, 1956, pp. 117-126.

6. The Agrarian Reform Law of the People Republic of China, Peking, Foreign Language Press, 1950.

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565

According to the "Report on the Work of the Central-South Military and Political Committee"[7] by Teng Tzu hui, the Communist deputy chairman, the masses of "hired hands," "poor peasants," and "middle peasants" of Central-South China had been subjected, over a long period of time to persecution and oppression had now become masters of the nation. During the first half of 1951, a campaign began to implement the basic principles, which called for reliance on "farm laborers" and "poor peasants," for unity with the "middle peasants," and neutralization of the "rich peasants" in order to wipe out the feudalistic "landlords." As a result, the redistribution of land in areas with an aggregate population of 68 million was completed between the winter of 1950 and the spring of 1951.

By the end of 1951, nearly 69 million shih-mou (11,500,000 acres) of land, 5 billion catties (2,500,000 tons) of grain, 784,000 head of cattle, more than 12 million farm implements, and more than 9 million houses and huts were "confiscated" or "requisitioned" for redistribution.[8] Based on an investigation of

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7. Ch'ang-chiang Jih-pao [Yangtze Daily], Hankow, December 13, 1951.

8. Teng Tzu-hui, "Chung-nan Chün-cheng Wei-yüan-hui Pao-kao", "Report on the Work of the Central-South Military and Political Committee," Yangtze Daily, December 13, 1951.

16 counties in four provinces in the region, the 423
index of land-holdings of different classes of
peasants and landlords after land reform, using 565
the average land-holding per capita as 100,
was distributed in the following manner.[9]

TABLE OF LANDHOLDING

Landholders	Index No.
Ex-landlords	80
Poor peasants and farm laborers	90
Middle peasants	110
Rich peasants	130
Small land lessors	150

Tu Jun-sheng, the Communist chairman of the Land Reform Committee of the Central-South China Military and Political Committee, reported that land reform was carried out in the Central-South China Region in accordance with the general policy of the Central People's Government. The Communists claimed that they had eliminated the feudal system of land ownership, that ex-landlords were given a chance to "reform themselves through labor," that the "poor peasants" and "farm laborers" were saved from poverty and given an opportunity to improve their livelihood, and that the "middle peasants" were given encouragement, to retain a part of the "rich peasant's" economy.[10] 423 565

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[9] *Ibid.*

In order to determine whether the land reform has been "properly" carried out, the Land Reform Committee adopted a re-examination system. They started to re-examine the land holdings in over 1,100 hsiang. It was found that in nearly half of them the "reform" was not thorough enough, and that in the remaining half, it was "half raw," which propabably meant that the work was inefficient or lacking in thoroughness. As a matter of fact, some landlords were not classified as landlords at all. Consequently some ex-landlords began to clamor for the return of their confiscated property while others became difiant toward the land reform and chanted: "The sky may be red for three days, and the sky may be black for three days, but eventually we'll see it blue again;" or "Although our hat of poverty has been removed, our hat of grief is still on our heads."

It is clear that the Communist cadres had encountered difficulties in carrying out the land reform. After the "re-examination" was completed in groups of villages during 1950, the cadres reported that the "defects" 423 had been "corrected." In order to strengthen the work of re-examination, the following three tasks were urged: (1) re-check land distribution in relation to class status, (2) promote "mass democracy," and (3) enforce self-education among the cadres.

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[10] Ibid.

In 1953, the land reform in Central-South China, except in the minority nationalities areas in Kwangsi, was "basically completed." Its progress is shown below.

THE PROGRESS OF "LAND REFORM" IN CENTRAL-SOUTH CHINA

Period	(Population affected by land reform)
1949--spring, 1950	18,000,000
Spring, 1950--Summer, 1951	50,000,000
Summer, 1951--end of 1952	50,000,000
1953	12,000,000
Total	129,000,000

The progress of "land reform" was accelerated from spring 1950 to the end of 1952, the period when Red China participated in the Korean conflict. Two reasons accounted for this rapid advance. First, in order to support the North Koreans, tremendous manpower was needed for re-enforcement. Should the "land reform" program be completed earlier than scheduled, a strong militia could be organized out of the surplus farm labor in order to serve in Korea. Second, in order to stabilize their political power in China Mainland, it was necessary for the Communists first to gain completed control of the rural masses, who constitute about 80 per cent of the entire population. The only weapon which the Communists could use was "land reform." 423

Generally speaking, the farm size, after "land reform," was more or less equalized. Although the average amount of land held per capita was a little over two shih-mou (1/3 acre) in Central-South China as a whole, in the over-populated areas, the per capita land holdings was even lower than the average.

Regarding the disposition of the ex-landlords, a set of new regulations, promulgated by the Kwangtung People's Government in January 1955, provided favorable treatment for the ex-landlord class among the overseas Chinese families.[11] The essential features of the "favorable treatment" are as follows:[12] (1) the period of "reform through labor" for 565 457 such landlords would be shortened from five years to a year and a half if they had been law abiding and had the support of the rural masses of their own communities; (2) after such "favorable treatment," they were required to write to their overseas relatives about their own experiences; and (3) they were required to participate in productive activities immediately.

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[11] Ta-kung Pao [Ta-kung Daily], Hong Hong, January 23, 1955.

[12] Ibid.

The chief motive of the "favorable treatment" was to encourage more overseas Chinese to send funds to Communist China, hoping that such funds would strengthen the national treasury.[13] It was reported that even the overseas Chinese families who had fled to Hong Kong or Macao during the climax of the Land Reform Movement were also eligible for such treatment.

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[13] In pre-Communist days, the total overseas Chinese remittance constituted from 40 to 50 per cent of China's total international receipts. The amount increased from $93,300,000 U.S. in 1935 to $200,000,000 in 1938. (See C. F. Remer, Foreign Investments in China, Shanghai, Commercial Press, 1933, p. 208; and Tsu-kuo chou-k'an (China Weekly), Hong Hong, No. 120, April 18, 1955, p. 12.) But according to the most recent estimate, the total overseas remittance in 1954 was less than $20,000,000 (Ch'en Yüan-huai, "Lun Chung-kung Ti Ch'iao-hui" ("On Communist China's Overseas Chinese Remittance), China Weekly, No. 120, April 18, 1955, p. 12.

IV. COLLECTIVIZATION IN CENTRAL-SOUTH CHINA

About the middle of 1951, the Central People's Government of China began to emphasize the fact that land reform was only the first step toward a "socialist economy." The development of "collectivized farming" would be the second stage. The essentials of the collectivization process are mutual-aid teams, agricultural producers' co-operatives, and collective farms. According to Chou En-lai's Report on Government Work, 1954, there were only 18,232 agricultural producers' co-operatives in Central-South China by August of that year, representing about 8 per cent of the country's total of 225,405 units.[14] The total number of producers' co-operatives in China was alleged to have increased to 400,000 in December 1954 and further increased to 650,000 before the autumn plowing in 1955.[15] 471

Among the Central-South provinces, Honan took the lead in the development of agricultural producers' co-operatives. According to a Communist report in November 474

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[14] Survey of China Mainland Press, Hong Kong, U. S. Consulate-General, December 14, 1954, p. 30.

[15] Far Eastern Economic Review, Hong Kong, Vol. XVIII, No. 19, May 12, 1955, p. 606. China Daily News, New York, Oct. 27, 1955.

1954 from Chengchow, Honan, there were 22,000 agricultural producers' co-operatives organized compared with 6,000 before the autumn harvest of the same year.[16] The statistics of other provinces are not available, but if estimated conservatively with 25 per cent for Central-South China in ratio to the entire country, there would have to be around 150,000 units in spring, 1955. 474

Regarding the state-owned and state-operated farms, some changes have been made since 1952. Generally, there are two types of state farms -- mechanized and semi-mechanized. The large-scale mechanized state farms are principally located in Northeast China. In Central-South China, there are only a few large farms. Among them, the "Huang-fan-ch'ü State Farm," near the Yellow River in Honan Province is the largest. "Wan-ch'ing-sha State Farm" in Kwangtung and "Ch'ang-te State Farm" in Hunan are also comparatively large in size. There are also a number of small state farms operated by provincial and hsien governments. According to a Communist report, in 1953 in China as a whole there were 2,340 state farms of all sizes, including 59 mechanized farms, with a total of 2.1 million shih-mou of cultivated 475 land and 1,621 tractors of the standard 15-horse-power capacity.[17] 475

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[16] New China News Agency, Chengchow, November 10, 1954.

V. AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION OF CENTRAL-SOUTH CHINA

"Agricultural production" may include all the items grown in the rural area and also the products of forestry, fishery, cattle-raising, and other industries which may be beyond the scope of the present discussion. Only those items which bear special significance in each region have been selected for the present study. Among them, food grains and raw cotton are most important. Other items which deserve our special attention in the Central-South Region are wood-oil, ramie, and tea. 241

In dealing with food grains, the extent of recovery under the Communist regime and the supplies available to fulfill local consumption requirements will be surveyed more or less in detail. Concerning the production of cotton and other crops, availability for export will be discussed. Of the new measures

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17. Chung-yang Cheng-fu Kuo-chia T'ung-chi-chü, 1953, Nien-tu Kung-pao 1953, [Official Statistical Report of 1953 by the National Statistical Bureau of the Central People's Government], Peking, 1953, p. 9.

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Table 2. Acreage of Food-Grain Crops in 1946*

(Unit: Million *shih-mou*

Province	Rice	Wheat	Barley	Oats	Corn	Kaoliang	Millet	Sweet Potatoes	Others	Total
Honan	3.54 (0.59)	63.35 (10.50)	10.50 (1.75)	— —	11.55 (1.92)	9.14 (1.53)	11.95 (1.99)	7.80 (1.30)	7.05 (1.17)	124.98 (20.83)
Hupeh	17.46 (2.91)	19.00 (3.17)	10.22 (1.71)	0.12 (0.02)	3.90 (0.65)	2.17 (0.36)	2.32 (0.39)	1.69 (0.28)	8.94 (1.49)	65.82 (10.97)
Hunan	24.57 (4.09)	6.06 (1.01)	2.13 (0.36	— —	0.65 (0.11)	0.32 (0.05)	0.15 (0.03)	2.55 (0.43)	6.96 (1.16)	43.39 (7.23)
Kiangsi	26.54 (4.43)	5.90 (0.98)	2.89 (0.48)	— —	0.15 (0.03)	0.11 (0.02)	0.41 (0.07)	1.55 (0.26)	4.50 (0.75)	42.05 (7.01)
Kwangtung	40.48 (6.75)	4.66 (0.78)	2.20 (0.38)	— —	0.24 (0.04)	0.08 (0.01)	0.25 (0.04)	6.42 (1.07)	1.92 (0.32)	56.25 (9.38)
Kwangsi	20.28 (3.38)	5.60 (0.93)	3.20 (0.53)	— —	2.22 (0.37)	0.30 (0.05)	0.27 (0.04)	1.83 (0.30)	4.59 (0.76)	38.29 (6.38)
Total	132.87 (22.15)	104.57 (15.76)	31.24 (5.21)	0.12 (0.02)	18.71 (3.12)	12.12 (2.02)	15.35 (2.56)	21.84 (3.64)	33.96 (5.66)	370.78 (61.79)

Statistical Year-book of China 1948, pp. 73-74.

(Table 2 faces p. 654.)

(Table 2 faces p. 654.)

introduced by the Communists after "land reform," the development of water conservation projects which bears the greatest significance for the future of agricultural production will also be studied. 241

A. Grain Production'

Central-South China produces 27 per cent of the country's food grains, including rice, wheat, soybeans, millet, corn, kaoliang, barley, oats, tubers, and pulses. Among these crops, rice plays the most important role. In terms of quantity of production, rice constituted about two-thirds of the total grain output. In terms of acreage for these food crops, rice led by 132,87 million shih-mou (22.15 million acres) in 1946, and wheat was second with 104.57 million shih mou (17.43 million acres). The acreage of different major food-grain crops by provinces in 1946 is shown in shih-mou with acres equivalent in parenthese in Table 2. 433 241

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In analyzing the table above, it will be seen that the rice acreage was more than one-third of the total food grains acreage in 1946; wheat was second with an acreage of 104.57 million *shih-mou* (17.43 million acres), constituting about 22 per cent of the region's grain-acreage planting. Other food crops were much less significance. In terms of production, Central-South China produced 26.9 and 27.6 per cent respectively of the country's grains in 1952 and 1953. The production figures of different grains are shown in *shih-piculs* with tons equivalent in parentheses in Table 3.

Table 3. GRAIN PRODUCTION OF CENTRAL-SOUTH CHINA

(Unit: Million)

Grains	1931-37 Average[*]	1947[*]	1949[#]	1951[#]	1952[x]	1953[y]	1954[z]	1955[**]
Rice	496.20	422.96	374.64	466.64	592.17	603.94	613.72	646.24
	(25.09)	(23.26)	(20.61)	(25.66)	(32.57)	(33.22)	(33.75)	(35.55)
Wheat	127.32	120.76	67.22	56.99	74.79	76.28	77.51	81.62
	(7.01)	(6.64)	(3.69)	(3.13)	(4.11)	(4.19)	(4.26)	(4.49)
Soybeans	27.42	22.94	8.78	18.58	22.88	23.33	23.71	24.97
	(1.51)	(1.26)	(0.48)	(1.04)	(1.26)	(1.28)	(1.30)	(1.37)
Tubers	156.74	221.28	118.88	145.64	80.07	81.66	82.98	87.38
	(8.62)	(12.17)	(6.54)	(8.01)	(4.40)	(4.49)	(4.56)	(4.80)
Others[#]	163.44	160.16	113.02	138.14	109.99	112.17	113.99	120.03
	(8.98)	(8.81)	(6.21)	(7.59)	(6.05)	(6.17)	(6.28)	(6.60)
Total	971.12	948.10	682.54	825.99	879.90	897.38	911.91	960.24
	(53.41)	(52.14)	(37.53)	(45.43)	48.39	(49.35)	(50.15)	(52.81)

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(Table 3 continued)

* Chung-kuo Liang-shih Kai-k'uang [General Survey of China's Food], Nanking, Hsing-cheng-yuan Hsin-wen-chü [Office of Information, Executive Yuan], 1947, pp. 4-5.

# Chung-kuo Nung-pao [Chinese Agriculture Bulletin], Peking, Nung-yeh-pu [Ministry of Agriculture], 1952, No. 1, p. 20. Ta-kung Pao [Ta-kung Daily], Hong Kong, October 1-3, 1952.

x Jen-min Shou-ts'e [People's Handbook], Tientsin, Ta-kung pao, 1955, pp. 511-512. Ching-Chi-Tao-pao [Economic Bulletin], Hong Kong, Chiug-chi tao0pao she, March 10, 1953, No. 309, p. 12. Hua-ch'iao Jih-pao [China Daily News], New York, August 4, 1955; Ch'en Yün's Report to the Second Session of the National People's Congress on July 21, 1955.

y Ibid. Ch'en reported that the total Chinese grain production in 1954 amounted to 3,390 million shih-piculs, using 26.9 per cent for Central-South China's share which was 911.91 million shih-piculs. The proportion distribution between crops was based on the Chinese Economic Bulletin's report, March 10, 1953, No. 309, p. 12.

z Based on Li Hsien-nien's Budget Report of 1955, the projected grain production will be 53 per cent higher than 1954 and allocated the amount of each crop according to the ratio of 1954. (NCNA July 8, 1955)

** "Others" include millet, kaoliang, corn, barley, oats, beans, and peas.

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Table 3 indicates that, during the past five years, although great efforts have been made toward the increase of production of grains, only in 1955 did production exceed the pre-war 1931-37 average of 971 million shih-piculs (53 million tons). A comparison is made in Table 4 of the output of grain in 1949 and 1951 by individual provinces. Production is given in shih-piculs, with tons equivalent in parentheses.

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Table 4. *Grain Production of Central-South China by Province*[*]

(Unit: Million *shih-piculs* and tons)

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Grains	Honan		Hupeh		Hunan		Kiangsi		Kwangtung		Kwangsi	
	1949	1951	1949	1951	1949	1951	1949	1951	1949	1951	1949	1951
Rice. . . .	1.96 (0.11)	2.34 (0.13)	42.00 (2.31)	52.25 (2.87)	107.00 (5.89)	133.46 (7.34)	89.00 (4.90)	111.06 (6.11)	101.04 (5.56)	125.52 (6.90)	33.46 (1.85)	42.0 (2.31)
Wheat	32.26 (1.78)	27.32 (1.50)	10.56 (0.58)	9.10 (0.50)	5.06 (0.28)	4.22 (0.23)	9.50 (0.52)	8.02 (0.44)	2.92 (0.16)	2.44 (0.13)	6.92 (0.38)	5.80 (0.32)
Millet. . .	18.82 (1.04)	23.06 (1.27)	2.08 (0.11)	2.56 (0.14)	0.20 (0.01)	0.25 (0.02)	0.84 (0.05)	1.04 (0.06)	0.20 (0.01)	0.26 (0.02)	0.42 (0.02)	0.52 (0.03)
Corn. . . .	9.86 (0.54)	12.06 (0. 66)	1.75 (0.10)	2.16 (0.12)	0.88 (0.05)	1.08 (0.06)	0.18 (0.01)	0.22 (0.01)	0.36 (0.02)	0.44 (0.03)	3.52 (0.15)	4.30 (0.24)
Barley. . .	3.50 (0.20)	6.74 (0.37)	16.64 (0.92	19.44 (1.07)	2.30 (0.13)	2.82 (0.16)	2.56 (0.14)	3.14 (2.17)	1.28 (0.07)	1.56 (0.09)	2.18 (0.12)	2.66 (0.15)
Kaoliang. .	13.34 (0.73)	17.08 (0.94)	3.38 (0.19)	3.92 (0.22)	0.40 (0.02)	0.48 (0.03)	0.08 (0.01)	0.10 (0.01)	0.10 (0.01)	0.12 (0.01)	0.40 (0.02)	0.48 (0.03)
Oats. . . .	0.16 (0.01)	0.20 (0.01)	0.06 (0.003)	0.06 (0.003)	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Soyabeans .	4.14 (0.23)	8.76 (0.48)	14.20 (0.08)	30.00 (0.17)	0.64 (0.04)	1.36 (0.07)	1.30 (0.07)	2.74 (0.15)	0.64 (0.04)	1.36 (0.75)	0.64 (0.04)	1.36 (0.75)
Broadbeans .	0.14 (0.01)	0. 18 (0.0 1)	5.40 (0.30)	6.64 (0.37)	4.42 (0.24)	5.42 (0.30)	1.96 (0.11)	1.42 (0.13)	0.38 (0.02)	0.48 (0.03)	0.98 (0.05)	1.20 (0.07)
Field Peas.	2.16 (0.12)	3.06 (0.17)	5.04 (0.28)	6.18 (0.34)	1.32 (0.07)	1.86 (0.10)	1.00 (0.06)	1.24 (0.07)	0.50 (0.03)	0.62 (0.04)	2.02 (0.11)	2.48 (0.14)
Sweet Potatoes	31.35 (1.72)	38.42 (2.11)	10.66 (0.59)	13.08 (0.72)	18.82 (1.04)	23.06 (1.27)	16.62 (0.91)	20.36 (1.12)	31.38 (1.73)	38.42 (2.11)	10.04 (0.55)	12.30 (0.68)
Total	119.7	139.0	111.8	145.4	141.2	174.0	123.0	149.3	138.8	171.2	60.8	73.8
Percentage of increase		16.1		30.1		23.2		21.4		45.0		21.4

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[*] *Chinese Agriculture Bulletin*, Peking, 1952, No. 1, p. 20; *Ta-kung Daily*, Hong Kong, Oct. 1, 1952; Hsin-hua yüeh-pao [*New China Monthly*], Peking, Vol. II, Nos. 4-6, 1950, pp. 1336-37; and Tu-pao Shou-t'se [*Newspaper Reading Handbook*], Hankow, Ch'ang-chiang jih-pao-she, 1950, pp. 582, 583, 601.

(Table 4 faces p. 659.)

Table 4 contains the most recently available data for grain production by provinces in Central-South China. In 1951, nearly all of the six provinces showed increases over those of 1949, ranging from 16.1 per cent in Honan to 45.0 per cent in Kwangtung. In terms of total output, Hunan led by 174.02 million *shih-tan* in 1951; Kwangtung was second with 171.22 million *shih-tan*; Kiangsi, Hupeh, and Honan followed, producing 149.34, 145.40, and 139.04 million *shih-tan*, respectively, and Kwangsi lagged behind with only 73.78 million *shih-tan*. 241 433

B. The Adequacy of Food Supply

The most important problem in connection with Central-South China's production is the determination of the adequacy of supply relative to the local demand. In order to approach the problem more logically, the following procedure was established: The gross production of different grains of 1953 was used as the basis for calculation. From the gross amounts of the unprocessed grains, provision for seeds, fodder, and waste were allowed and deducted. The percentage allowed for milling of different grains vary according to the nature of the products as well as the eating habits of the population. After reducing all the unprocessed grains to milled products available for human consumption, for convenience in calculation it is necessary to convert all grains other than rice into "rice-equivalents." 433

In calculating the total demand for food grains in Central-South China, it is advisable tc convert the real population, regardless of age and sex, to the equivalent number of adult males. The coefficient 0.82 is used, every hundred persons including women and children, being considered as the equivalent of 82 adult males. Population before and after conversion is shown in the table below:

Table 5. The Conversion of Population

Provinces	Population (in Millions)	Equivalent Number of Adult Males (In Millions)
Honan	44.21	35.25
Hunan	33.23	27.25
Hupeh	27.79	22.79
Kiangsi	16.77	13.75
Kwangtung	34.77	28.51
Kwangsi	19.56	16.04
Total	176.33	144.59

This table represents the mean between the figure of 76 adult males per 100 persons derived by C. M. Ch'iao in his work China's Food and Population Problem (Shanghai, 1937) and the figure of 88 adult males per 100 persons worked out by T. H. Shen in his book Agricultural Resources of China, (New York, 1951).

Table 6. Grain Supply After Converting Into "Rice-Equivalent" Available For Human Consumption In 1953

(Unit: Million)

Grains	Gross Production	Total Supply After Provision for Seeds, Fodder, and Waste		Total Supply After Milling		Total Net Supply After Conversion to Rice-Equivalent	
		Conversion Standard* %	Quantity	Conversion Standard* %	Quantity	Conversion Standard#	Quantity
Rice	617.00 (33.94)	92.01	567.70 (31.23)	74	420.10 (23.11)	1.00	420.10 (23.11)
Wheat	78.40 (4.31)	86.47	67.80 (3.73)	80	54.24 (2.98)	1.02	55.32 (3.04)
Soyabeans	21.20 (1.17)	81.94	17.37 (0.95)	100	17.37 (0.95)	0.99	17.20 (0.94)
Tubers	82.80 (4.55)	64.00	52.99 (2.91)	100	52.99 (2.92)	0.28	14.84 (0.82)
Others^x	121.60 (6.69)	76.80	93.39 (5.13)	89	83.12 (4.57)	1.00	83.12 (4.57)
Total	921.00		799.25		627.82		590.58

(Table 6 continued)

* FAO Food Balance Sheet for 1931-37, compiled from FAO World Food Survey, Food Balance Sheet for China, 1933-37.

# Derived from the quantity of calories of different grains and tubers by using the standard setup by FAO. 3,430 calories per kilogram (or two catties) of rice as the basis for calculation.

x Include corn, kaoliang, barley, miller, oats, beans, and peas.

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Summarizing Tables 5 and 6, the total number of adult males in Central-South China, as converted from the foregoing table, is 144.59 million. Using the FAO's figure of 217 metric tons or 4,340 shih-piculs per 1,000 adult males per year as the basis of computation, the total amount of "rice equivalent" grains required would be 627.52 million shih-piculs. If the total supply of net "rice-equivalent" available is only 590.58 million shih-piculs, then there was a deficit of 36.94 million shih-piculs of "rice equivalent" grains in 1953 in Central-South China. However, Central-South China is usually a food-surplus region rather than a deficiency region. The discrepancy lies mainly in the treatment of the milling factor of rice. The FAO set the milling factor as 74 per cent, but the Communists use a milling factor of 92 per cent.[18] (The average standard of living in rural communities of China is still at the lowest subsistence level insofar as food is concerned.) If 92 per cent is used for the computation of milled rice in Central-South China, the total supply will be increased by 102.19 million shih-picul (5.62 million tons). In this case, there will be a surplus of 65.25 million shih-picul (3.59 million tons).

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[18] Ta-kung Daily, Tientsin, October 16, 193

C. Food Rationing

The amount of food on hand decreased[19] in the latter part of 1953, although the Communists claimed that the total production of grain was still slightly higher than that of 1952. In the process of grain-tax collection, tremendous losses occurred in transportation, especially in shipments by water, and in warehouse spoilage due to excessive moisture, fermentation, and improper handling. Confronted with the threat of a food shortage, the Central Government of the People's Republic of China introduced grain rationing on November 19, 1953, in a government order for the enforcement of "planned purchase and planned supply of food." Their motives were to secure the food required for the people's livelihood, to stabilize food prices, and to eliminate food profiteering. In accordance with the order, all trade in grains or other essential food items was, in effect, to be taken over by the government, which must fix the official purchasing price and the retail price and handle the entire food trade through a country-wide network.

Up to the end of January 1954, the planned supply of food was reported to have been enforced in 13 municipalities, including Wuhan, Canton, Chengchow, and Kweilin of the Central-

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[19] NCNA, Feb. 28, 1954.

South Region, in 156 medium cities, 11 hsien cities, and in other important towns, with a total population of 60 million.[20] In May 1954 there were 1,448 grain markets established in Honan Province alone and in other provinces of Central-South China an even greater number of grain markets had been established.[21] It was reported that from January 1, 1954, adults in Kwangtung were allotted 1/2 catty (11/20 pound) of rice per day and children under seven 1/4 catty (0.275 pound) per day. Rationing of cooking oil was regulated for adults at 3/4 catty (33/40 pound), and for children under seven, 3/8 catty (33/80 pound) per month.[22] The amount was lowered from March 1 of the same year to 7/16 catty (77/100 pound) per capita per month for adults, but the rationing has not been carried out with any great regularity.

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[20] New China News Agency, Peking, Feb. 28, 1954. According to incomplete statistics, 8.27 million members of the CCP conducted extensive propaganda among the peasants in the provinces of Hopei, Shansi, Liaoning, Chekiang, Hunan, Hupeh, Kwangsi, Kwangtung, and Kiangsi.

[21] Far Eastern Economic Review, Hong Kong, Vol. XVII, No. 2, July 8, 1954, pp. 37-38.

[22] Free Asia Bulletin, telegraph report from Hong Kong, January 7, 1954. Rationing of edible oil was also enforced in November 1954 through a separate governmental order.

D. Cotton Production

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During the five-year period (1950-54) of the Communist regime, the Communists report that a considerable effort has been made to increase the production of raw cotton in China. Since 1949, both acreage and production are reported to have increased. Table 7 illustrates the advance made during the 1949-55 period, according to Communist sources (Figures for 1951, published in Far Eastern Economic Review, a non-Communist publication, were originally derived from a Communist source). The unit is in shih-piculs with tons equivalent in parenthese below.

Table 7. RAW COTTON PRODUCTION*
(Unit: 1,000)

Year	Index	Quantity	(1,000 shih-piculs)
1949	100	8,000	(484)
1950	161	14,220	(782)
1951	229	20,160	(1,109)
1952	293	25,840	(1,421)
1953	268	23,520	(1,294)
1954	274	24,094	(1,325)
1955	338	29,720	(1,634)

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*Jen-min Jih-pao [People's Daily], Peking, April 1, 1953, and January 11, 1954, NCNA, November 3, 1953, and September 13 and 24, 1954. For 1953, see Far Eastern Economic Review, Hong Kong, Vol. XVIII, No. 19; May (continued)

Table 8. Cotton Production in Central-South China*
(Unit: 1,000 *shih-tan* and bales)

Province	1949 shih-tan	1949 bales	1950 shih-tan	1950 bales	1951 shih-tan	1951 bales	1952 shih-tan	1952 bales	1953 shih-tan	1953 bales	1954 shih-tan	1954 bales
Honan	602.2	138	964.3	221	1,409.4	323	1,628.6	373	1,693.1	388	1,661.1	108
Hupeh	951.3	218	1,243.6	285	2,007.3	460	2,631.2	603	3,159.3	724	2,683.8	615
Hunan	139.6	32	209.4	48	576.0	132	702.5	161	486.7	112	716.6	164
Kiangsi	30.5	7	52.4	12	61.1	14	113.4	26	78.5	18	115.7	31
Kwangtung	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Kwangsi	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total	1,723.6	395	2,469.7	566	4,053.8	929	5,075.7	1,163	5,419.6	1,242	5,177.2	1,190

*Newspaper Reading Handbook, Hankow, 1950, pp. 583-85, 589, 590, 600; New China Monthly, Peking, Vol. I, No. 4, p. 915, and Vol. II, Nos. 4-6, 1950, pp. 1111-12; Yangtze Daily, Hankow, Nov. 20, 1951; Jan. 24, 1952.
Preliminary estimates.

#The figure of production for 1954 is slightly higher than that of 1952, estimated by 2% increase. Far Eastern Economic Review, May 12, 1955, p. 601.

x480 pounds.

(Table 8 faces p. 667.)

Table 8 faces p. 667.)

12,, 1955. (Decline of 9% from 1952.) Ibid., p. 601. For 1954, 2% was added to 1953 figure (ibid.). For 1955, Li Hsien-nien's Report on the 1953 Budget on July 9, 1955.

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Hupeh and Honan of the Central-South Region were considered as the two representative areas comprising the five cotton-surplus provinces of China. In order of importance, they are Hopei in North China, Shantung and Kiangsu in the East, Hupeh and Honan in the Central-South, and Shansi in the Northwest region. The Central-South contributed approximately 20-23 per cent of China's total cotton output in 1953. The statistical data for cotton production of Central-South China from 1949 to 1954 is shown in Table 8.

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Table 9. Cotton Acreage in Central-South China[*]

(Unit: 1,000 *shih-mou* and acres)

	1949		1950		1951		1952		1953[#]		1954[x]	
Province	shih-mou	acres	shih-mou	acres	shih-mou	acres	shih-mou	acres	shih-mou	acres	shih-mou	acres
Honan	2,862	477	3,876	646	3,462	577	4,266	711	9,864	1,644	11,064	1,844
Hupeh	4,920	820	5,988	998	7,632	1,272	6,906	1,151	8,286	1,381	9,486	1,581
Hunan	888	148	816	136	2,358	393	1,842	307	2,118	353	2,118	353
Kiangsi	72	12	264	44	234	39	300	50	348	58	348	58
Kwangtung	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Kwangsi	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total	8,742	1,457	10,944	1,824	13,686	2,281	13,314	2,219	20,616	3,436	23,016	3,836

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[*] *Newspaper Reading Handbook*, Hankow, 1950, pp. 583-85, 589, 590, 600; *Yangtse Daily*, Hankow, Nov. 20, 1951; Jan. 24, 1952; New China Monthly, Peking, Vol. I, No. 4, p. 915; Vol. II, Nos. 4-5, 1950, pp. 1111-12.

[#] Preliminary estimates

[x] About 1,200,000 *shih-mou* each were added to the provinces of Honan and Hupeh in 1954, according to NCNA, Peking, March 22, 1954.

(Table 9 faces p. 668.)

Table 9 faces p. 668.)

Assuming that 1949 equals 100, the index 248
tor 1950 increased to 143; for 1951, to 235; 433
for 1952, to 294; for 1953, to 314; and for 1954,
to 323.

In terms of the acreage of cotton plantations in different provinces of the Central-South, an upward trend was marked from 1949 to 1954, as shown in Table 9.

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According to official sources, some of the factors responsible for the rapid increase both in acreage and production were the fixing of a favorable price ratio between cotton and grains and the improvement of yield per unit. Thus preferential treatment, although not consistently, was given to the cotton farmers.

Table 10. THE RATIO OF COTTON PRICE RELATIVE TO GRAIN
(In weight-units of grain to one unit of cotton lint, 7/8" grade)*

	1950	1951	1952	1953	1954
Wheat region	7.0	8.0	7.5-8.5	6.25-7.5	6.75-8.0
Millet region	8.0	8.5	8.0-9.5	6.75-8.0	7.5-8.25
Rice region	6.5	8.5	8.0-9.0	6.75-8.0	7.25-8.25

* Newspaper Reading Handbook, Hankow, 1950, p. 574; Ching-chi Chou-pao [Economic Weekly], No. 14, Shanghai, April 1953, p. 3, and No. 21, May 8, 1953, p. 21, and NCNA, March 3, 1954.

The prices listed under "Wheat region" were in Table 10 used in Honan; those listed under "Rice region" were used in Hupeh, Kiangsi, Hunan, Kwangtung, and Kwangsi either for agricultural-tax payment or for purchases for consumption. The adjustment of the above parity prices has affected the upward or downward changes of acreage and production very considerably. 248 435

Regarding the average cotton yields during the 1949-53 period, an upward trend was noticed throughout these years, except in 1953, when an average decrease of 34 per cent was marked from the yield of 1952. This was due mainly to the floods and drought in Honan, Hunan, and Kiangsi provinces during that year. 248 433

Table 11. Cotton Yield Per Shih-Mou And Per Acre*

Province	1949		1950		1951		1952		1953	
	Shih-Catty per Shih-Mou	Lbs. per Acre	Shih-Catty per Shih-Mou	Lbs. per Acre	Shih-Catty per Shih-Mou	Lbs. per Acre	Shih-Catty per Shih-Mou	Lbs. per Acre	Shih-Catty per Shih-Mou	Lbs. per Acre
Honan	21.1	138.9	24.9	164.2	40.7	268.7	38.2	251.8	17.2	113.3
Hupeh	19.4	127.6	20.7	137.0	26.3	173.5	38.1	251.4	38.1	251.6
Hunan	15.7	103.8	25.6	169.4	24.4	161.2	38.2	251.7	23.1	152.3
Kiangsi	42.5	280.0	19.8	130.9	26.1	172.3	37.8	249.6	22.6	148.9
Kwangtung	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Kwangsi	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Average	24.6	130.1	29.4	148.9	29.4	195.5	38.1	251.6	25.2	166.5

* Newspaper Reading Handbook, Hankow, 1950, pp. 583-85, 589, 590, 600; Ch'ang Chiang-jih-pao [Yangtze Daily], Hankow, November 20, 1951 and January 24, 1952.

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E. Production of Wood-Oil, Tea, Tobacco, and Ramie

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1. Wood-Oil. China was the first country in the world to cultivate tung trees and it leads in supplying tung oil to the world market. On account of the nature of the soil and the climatic conditions, tung trees are grown only in certain sections of south and southwest China. The leading provinces in the production of tung oil named in order of importance, are: Szechwan, Hunan, Kwangsi, Hupeh, and Chekiang. Three of the five provinces are in Central-South China.

Generally, the Central-South China Region produces approximately 60 per cent of the country's stock of tung oil. Hunan takes the lead and Kwangsi and Hupeh come next. The output of the other three provinces is comparatively low:[23] See Table 12.

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[23] Ma Chi, Chung-kuo Ti Shen-lin [China's Forestry], Shanghai, Commercial Press, 1952, pp. 41-44.

Table 12. Tung Oil Production*

	Acreage (Shih-mou)		Production (Shih-mou)	
	1946	1949	1946	1949
Hunan	1,387,200 (231,200 acres)	1,457,000 (242,833 acres)	600,186 (33,010 tons)	510,667 (28,086 tons)
Hupeh	650,000 (108,333 acres)	500,000 (83,333 acres)	260,616 (14,334 tons)	200,000 (11,000 tons)
Kwangsi	968,000 (161,333 acres)	---	532,400 (29,282 tons)	342,000 (18,810 tons)
Kiangsi	50,000 (8,333 acres)	25,000 (4,166 acres)	20,000 (1,100 tons)	10,000 (550 tons)
Honan	48,000 (8,000 acres)	12,500 (12,083 acres)	19,200 (1,056 tons)	5,000 (275 tons)
Kwangtung	80,000 (13,333 acres)	12,500 (2,083 acres)	40,000 (2,200 tons)	5,000 (275 tons)
Total	3,183,200 (530,532 acres)	2,907,000 (334,498 acres)	1,472,402 (80,982 tons)	1,072,667 (58,996 tons)

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2. Tea. Among the twelve tea-producing provinces which contribute about 95 per cent of the tea for both local consumption and foreign export are Hunan, Kiangsi, and Hupeh in the Central-South Region. The average annual pre-war production in Hunan, the leading tea producer of the Central-South, was about 1,600,000 shih-piculs (or 80,000 tons). Although the largest area devoted to tea cultivation is in the Hsiang River Valley, the regions around Tungting Lake produce the largest quantity. There are about twenty tea districts along the Hsiang River, with a total planation area of 386,000 shih-mou (64,333 acres) and a yearly output of 145,000 shih-piculs. The producing districts around Tungting Lake are only two, but the annual output amounts to 168,000 shih-piculs.[24] In the Li and Yuan valleys both the area under cultivation and the annual amount produced are small. The district of Anhua, in the Tzu Valley, though of great renown for its tea, produces only 182,000 shih-piculs (19,010 tons) each year and the area of plantation is no more than 238,000 shih-mou. (39,667 acres).[25]

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3. Tobacco. Tobacco is produced in 18 provinces of China including the six provinces

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[24] Bureau of Foreign Trade, Chinese Economic Journal and Bulletin, Vol. XVIII, No. 2, Shanghai, Feb. 1936, pp. 182-83.

[25] Ibid., p. 183.

of the Central-South Region. Recent statistics giving the total area of tobacco fields and the amount of output in each of these provinces is not available. According to an earlier estimate of 1933, the acreage and output of tobacco in Central-South China were as shown in Table 13.

Table 13. TOBACCO PRODUCTION*

Province	Shih-mou	Acres	Shih-piculs	Tons
Honan	512,340	85,390	1,119,811	61,590
Kwangtung			396,000	21,780
Kwangsi			111,900	6,154
Kiangsi	243,893	40,649	266,374	14,650
Hunan	45,370	7,561	60,641	3,335
Hupeh			300,000	16,500
Total	801,603	133,600	2,254,726	124,010

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* Bureau of Foreign Trade, Chinese Economic Journal and Bulletin, Vol. XVIII, No. 2, Shanghai, February 1936, pp. 182-83.

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4. Ramie. Hunan, Hupeh, and Kiangsi provinces produce the largest amounts of ramie in Central-South China. The entire ramie output is about two million shih-tan annually. The ramie plant is adaptable to regions having a somewhat damp atmosphere and a hot summer season. Kiangsi, situated in the middle Yangtze Valley, possesses all of the requirements for successful ramie-growing. The planting area in 49 hsien of Kiangsi amounted to 146, 480 shih-mou (24, 413 acres) in 1934, with an output of 86, 500 shih-piculs (4, 758 tons). In 1935 the total area in 57 hsien decreased to 111, 032 shih-mou (18, 505 acres), but the output increased to 119, 322 shih-piculs(6, 563 tons).[26] Such a difference was due to the severe drought in the province during 1934. The yeild of ramie fibers per shih-mou of land varies greatly in accordance with the local conditions. In Chiu-chiang (Kiukiang), one shih-mou (1/6 acre) of ramie fields yields 165 catties (182 pounds) of ramie fiber, and in Ihuang, as much as 300 catties (363 pounds).[27] Only a small portion of ramie was consumed locally in making native products, grass-linen and fish nets. The larger portion is usually shipped to other provinces and exported abroad, especially to Japan for making fish nets. In

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[26] Bureau of Foreign Trade, Chinese Economic Journal, Vol. XIX, No. 6, Shanghai, December 1936, pp. 646-48.

[27] Ibid., p. 649.

Hunan and Hupeh, ramie is also produced in comparatively large quantities, but the production data are not available. Liu-yang and Li-ling in Hunan Province are two of the places where ramie is made into grass-linen cloth. 248 433 [286].

VI. FISHERIES OF CENTRAL-SOUTH

Central-South China has abundant fresh and salt water fisher resources. The province of Kwangtung within the Pearl River Valley, and including Hainan Island, markets more fish than any other province of the region. Within the three-year period from 1950 to 1953, the Central People's Government has introducted a series of measures to support the fishing enterprises of this region. A fishery loan of over 53,000,000,000 Yuan ($2,200,000) is claimed to have been distribute throughout the province to help the fishermen to repair their boats, mend their nets, and purchase more gear. Ten large fishery markets were established in fishery centers such as Canton and Chungshan to stabilize the prices and to do away with exploitation by middlemen.[28] In 1950, the abundant catch of fish from the fishing banks of Tongking Bay alone was the largest in twenty-five years, yielding an 228 433 [654]. [443]

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[28] Current Background, Hong Kong, U S. Consulate General, March 1, 1954, No. 281, p. 15.

estimated 15,000 tons; in 1952, the output 228
was again increased to over 30,000 tons. The 433
Central-South China Region is also the main source of fresh-water fry for the entire country. In 1953 alone, the production of pond-bred fish amounted to 112,500 tons, which was about 67 per cent of the pre-war peak year's production of 150,000 tons.[29] During the first half of 1954, about 25,000 tons of fish were caught by deep-sea fishermen, an increase of 30 per cent over the catch of 1953. All of the figures quoted above are derived from Communist sources, and their accuracy may be subject to question. They should be considered with due caution.

VII. WATER CONSERVATION AND FLOOD CONTROL

A. The Nature of Floods

For centuries the Chinese people have 731
waged a stubborn struggle against the floods of their many rivers. Among them, the Yangtze, Yellow, and Huai rivers, which all run through the Central-South Region, are notorious for floods. Generally -- in spring and summer each year -- warm, moist monsoons blowing inland from the sea are met and held over Central China in the region of the Yangtze

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[29] Ibid.

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Valley by dry air currents from the cold northern continental area, resulting in steady seasonal rains, usually in June and July, and, creating a threat of flood on the Yangtze.

The unrestricted felling of timber in the past centuries has led to the complete destruction of forests along the banks of the upper and middle reaches of the Yellow River, causing rapid erosion of the loose soil. The silt is carried in huge amounts by rain-swollen streams into the great river, and over many centuries has silted up the channel in the slow-flowing lower reaches on the plain. A great system of dikes has been built along the banks of the river to prevent it from flooding. Today in some places the river actually flows above the level of the nearby plains. The river, however, has frequently breached its dikes and, flowing over the land, cut a new course to the sea. Because of these terrible floods the Yellow River has been given the name of "China's Sorrow." In the four thousand years of its recorded history; the Yellow River has breached its dikes over sixteen-hundred times and changed its main course seven times. Following the repeated flooding of the silt-laden Yellow River into the Hwai River, the latter river too, has been silted up.

Since the fourteenth century the Huai has had an average of seventy major and minor floods every hundred years.

B. The Flood of 1954

In 1954, flood plagued the Yangtze and the Hwai River basins. As a result of breaches of dikes, inadequate drainage, and failure of some hydraulic structures, 160.5 million shih-mou (26.8 million acres)[30] of farm land, mostly within the Central-South Region, were inundated. The number of people directly affected by the flood is estimated at 50 million, and 10 million refugees from Hupeh, Hunan, and Honan provinces required resettlement in nearby areas. The major portionof the area flooded during July and August 1954 was under early rice to be harvested between August and September, or late rice to be harvested in early November. The loss of food-grains was serious. Up to the latter part of September 1954, over half of the flooded farm land was still under water.

The tremendous damage done by this flood may be attributed partly to the magnitude of the flood itself and partly to inadequate preventive measures for flood control. The Communist Premier, Chou En-Lai, in his report to the First Session of the National People's Congress in September 1954, stated: "The flood of this year [1954] has revealed many errors in the past with respect to water-

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[30] Far Eastern Economic Review, Hong Kong, Vol. XVIII, No. 19, May 12, 1955, p. 601.

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conservation activities; for example, the standards adopted for the design of flood control were generally too low, and many individual structures were not constructed to ensure sufficient safety."

C. Water-Conservation Projects in Central-South China

During the five years of Communist rule, a number of large-scale water conservation works have been built. During the past five-year period, incomplete data showed that some 102,300 million cubic feet of earthworks were completed. According to the Communists, with this amount of earth a wall three feet high and three feet wide, could be built to run 73 times around the equator.[31] Over 670 million cubic feet of stone and more than 27 million cubic feet of cement were used.

Among the most important water conservation projects in Central-South China, those on the Huai River and the Chingchiang tributaries of the Yangtze are significant. Along the Huai River, up to June 1955, work on the harnessing project was progressing at great speed, mostly by "forced labor." Its principal reservoirs are described below.[32]

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[31] People's China, Jan. 16, 1955, p. 12.

[32] People's Handbook, 1955, pp. 519-20; Ta-kung Daily, Tientsin, Jan. 19, 1955.

1. *Nan-Wan Reservoir,* in Honan Province, now partially complete, will irrigate about 440,000 *shih-mou* (73,333 acres) of land and will have a maximum generating power of 2,500 k.w. Its capacity is 805,000 million cubic feet.

2. *Pai-sha Reservoir,* in Honan Province, was completed in 1954. It can irrigate 400,000 *shih-mou* (66,667 acres) of land and has a maximum capacity of 247,000 million cubic feet.

3. *Po-shan Reservoir,* in Honan Province, was completed in 1954. It can irrigate 400,000 *shih-mou* (66,667 acres) of land and has a maximum generating power of 4,000 k.w. Its capactiy is 284,000 cubic feet.

4. *Pan-ch'iao Reservoir,* in Honan Province, was completed in 1954. It can irrigate about 150,000 *shih-mou* (25,000 acres) of land and has a capacity of 200,000 million cubic feet.

5. *Shih-man-t'an Reservoir,* in Honan Province, when completed will irrigate 90,000 *shih-mou* of land and will have a capacity of 50,000 million cubic feet.

The Chingkiang Flood Diversion Works covers an area of over 347 miles and has a capacity of 194,223 million cubic feet.[33]

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[33] *People's China,* Jan. 16, 1955, pp. 11-12.

The entire project, according to the Communists' estimate, will require about twenty years to complete. By April 25, 1954, only the second stage of construction work had been finished. According to reports from Communist China, on August 7, 1954, when the river reached the mark of 182 feet, 10.07 inches at Ichang, just below the Yangtze Gorges, it was calculated that the flood crest would cover the top of the crucial Chingkiang Dike on the middle reaches. Orders were given to open the Chingkiang Flood-Diversion Basin, and the river, although far surpassing its highest record at Shashih, was safely contained by the dike. It was this part of the construction work that saved Wuhan from flood[34] in 1954. As of May 1955, dike repair work in the Tungting Lake area had been completed, and the capacity of this lake was enlarged by 6,200 million cubic meters. At the same time, the dikes around the Chingchiang Water-Detention Basin have been raised from one to three meters.

So far, no major engineering projects have been started on the Yellow River, and only minor work on dike-strengthening has been done from time to time. A new and comprehensive plan, "The Fundamental Water

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34. *Far Eastern Economic Review,* Hong Kong, Vol. XVIII, No. 19, May 12, 1955, p. 606.

Conservation Plan of the Yellow River," was drafted and presented to the Second Session of the National People's Congress by Teng Tzu-hui, Vice-premier of the People's Republic of China, on July 18, 1955.[35] The most important work of the plan within the Central-South Region is the construction of the giant San-men-hsia [Gorge of the Three Gates] Reservoir in Shan-hsien, Honan Province, a project which includes water detention, irrigation, and power. The construction of this reservoir, according to the plan, will begin in 1957 and be completed in 1964. A Communist source reported that the total area of the reservoir will exceed 2,350 kilometers, and thus will be larger than T'ai Lake. 731

Beside the above-mentioned projects, local governments have constructed many small irrigation works with the help of the peasants. They followed the traditional pattern, "small in scale but large in number," and included ponds, ditches, and wells. All these measures can help, directly or indirectly, the improvement of agricultural production. 241

VIII. CONCLUSION

The fundamental defects of agricultural

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[35] China Daily News, New York, July 29, 1955.

production in Central-South China after "land reform" are the small size of the average farm and the inefficiency of its cultivation. In the pre-Communist days, the most efficient farmers were usually "rich peasants" and some of the "landlords." After "land reform" these people were virtually eliminated. The numerous poor people in the rural communities who were not professional farmers, such as members of the families of "revolutionary martyrs" of the liberation army and the unemployed, were usually allotted a piece of land. On account of their inexperience in farm work as well as lack of capital with which to buy farm tools, the majority of them could not efficiently cultivate their lands, and their failure became one of the important factors which hinder the increase in agricultural production. The next step, which the Chinese Communists copied from the Soviets, is "collectivization". of farms. This drastic change hinders the efficiency of the peasants, for it is contradictory to the traditional pattern of the Chinese farm, and will be met by strong opposition. The announcement of a temporary halt to the co-operative movement in 1953 was probably due to peasant opposition. There is a question whether this basic weakness will be remedied in the years to come. 241

After "land reform," the burden of the peasants was actually increased instead of lightened. In the case of the grain-tax collection, although its provisions were concealed, the amount the farmers paid was 651 661 much higher in the newly liberated areas, including the Central-South Region, than the amount the Communists reported officially. For example, Nan Han-ch'en, former director of the People's Bank of China, reported: "The direct burden of an individual farmer comes to about 80 catties (88 pounds) of grain. In addition to this, he also shares the tax burden which his particular village has to bear. Sometimes his total burden may reach 100 catties. The maximum amount of farm yield per peasant is 450 catties. The rate of the public grain levy is fixed officially at from 18 to 20 per cent, but actually it may reach 20 to 25 per cent. In individual cases it may exceed 50 per cent."[36] Besides this official grain-tax collection, there are compulsory purchases of grains under the "planned purchase and planned supply" program, at a rather low fixed price, and, in addition, numerous deductions are made from the sale of grains to the government without the consent of the farmers. It was reported that in one of the agricultural producer's co-operatives, where a year-end distribution of net income is made to members, the following items were deducted: (a) 2,000 yüan (20 million old currency, US$833) for the shares of the credit

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[36] Hsiao Chih-yung, Revenue and Disbursement of Communist China, Hong Kong, 1954, p. 36. The statement of Nan Han-ch'en was taken originally from Shanghai Industry and Commerce Magazine, Vol. I, 11th and 12th issues.

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co-operative; (b) 130 yüan (1.3 million old currency, US $54) for the shares of the supply and marketing co-operative; (c) over 700 yüan (7 million old currency US $291) for bond subscription; (d) and over 12,000 yüan (120 million old currency, US $5,000) for repayment of agricultural loans.[37] After deducting these items, there was almost nothing left for peasants. That means that these peasants worked for nothing, at the expense of their total-year labor and their capital invested. Consequently, exploitation by the Communist regime is harsher than that endured under the former "landlords."

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The preferential treatment of the "landlords" of the overseas Chinese families in Kwangtung Province is, evidently, a departure from the original Land Reform Law which has been applied throughout the Central-South Region. A law once promulgated must be enforced without discrimination, but the Communists, in order to win popular support from the overseas Chinese, have changed the law by conceding overseas Chinese more favorable treatment than that given other "landlords." In consequence, reports of preferential treatment will lead to more discontent and opposition in the rural areas of Central-South China.

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[37] Far Eastern Economic Review, Hong Kong, Vol. XVIII, No. 25, June 23, 1955, pp. 781-82.

1: Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF 14 Central China AF14

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

CENTRAL-SOUTH CHINA
INDUSTRY
1 Iron and Steel
2 Coal Mining
3 Electric Power Plants
4 Cotton Textiles
5 Machinery
6 Flour
7 Sugar
PROVINCES
A-Honan
B-Hupeh
C-Hunan
D-Kiangsi
E-Kwangsi
F-Kwangtung
108
112
116
36
32
28
24
20
A
B
C
D
E
F
Lui-ho-kou
Chiao-tso
Chengchow
Chan-chia-chi
Wuhan
Ta-yeh
Hsiang-t'an
Chu-chou
Heng-shan
Ch'i-yang
Nanchang
Changsha
Chi-an
Chiu-hsien
Chieh-yang
Shun-te
Tung-huan
HAINAN
Scale in Miles
0
100
200
300

[facing p. 689 (a)]

1: Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF14 Central China AF14

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

CENTRAL-SOUTH CHINA

METALLIC ORES

1 Gold
2 Silver
3 Copper
4 Iron
5 Tin
6 Aluminum
7 Zinc
8 Manganese
9 Lead
10 Mercury
11 Antimony
12 Tungsten
13 Molybdenum
14 Nickel

PROVINCES
A-Honan
B-Hupeh
C-Hunan
D-Kiangsi
E-Kwangsi
F-Kwangtung

108
112
116
36
32
28
24
20
A
B
C
D
E
F
Scale in Miles
0
100
200
300

[facing p. 689 (b)]

1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956-AF14 Central China AF14


CENTRAL-SOUTH CHINA
NON-METALLIC ORES
1 Coal
2 Petroleum
3 Natural Gas
4 Phosphorous
5 Sulphate
6 Potassium Nitrate
7 Rock Salt
8 Mica
9 Asbestos
10 Graphite
11 Fluor-spar
12 Barites
13 Magnesite
14 Gypsum
PROVINCES
A-Honan
B-Hupeh
C-Hunan
D-Kiangsi
E-Kwangsi
F-Kwangtung
A
B
C
D
E
F
108
112
116
36
32
28
24
20
Scale in Miles
0
100
200
300

[facing p. 689 (c)]

INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT

Mineral Deposits

The region of Central-South China is of importance in a study of China's industrial development because of the contributions it makes to the country's reserve of certain ferro-alloy and non-ferrous metals. Some 99 per cent of the country's estimated 2.75 million tons of tungsten ore (65% WO_3) reserve is found in the Central-South Region or, more specifically, in the provinces of Kiangsi, Kwangtung, Hunan, and Kwangsi.[1] The area also accounts for 85 per cent of the country's 4.2 million tons of antimony (metal) reserve,[2] which is concentrated in Hunan, Kwangtung, and Kwangsi. The significance of this high concentration is all the more notable in the case of these two metals, because Mainland China is reputed to be the most important producer in the world, although this historical position has been somewhat modified as a result of recent developments in other countries. In addition, according to data collected before the Communists came to power, Central-South China was responsible for the bulk of the country's production of manganese, molybdenum, lead, and zinc;[3] a substantial production of tin and some production of copper were also reported.

In contrast to the relative abundance of the minerals mentioned above, Central-South China is not particularly well-endowed with either coal or iron. According to the last Nationalist reports, the area's iron ore reserve approximated little more than 504 million tons, or just under 10 per cent of Mainland China's estimated reserve;

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[1] Bureau of Mines, *Foreign Minerals Survey*, Washington, D. C., 1948, p. 61.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 55.

[3] [See following page.]

however, on the basis of these figures, it was second only to North China in terms of iron ore reserves in China proper, excluding Manchuria. In the case of coal, total reserves in the area, according to the last report made before the Communists came to power, amounted to only 13 billion tons, or less than 3 per cent of the minimum estimated reserve, and was considerably below the corresponding data for North China, Northwest China, and Manchuria.[5]

According to Sun Chin-chih, noted Communist geographer, Communist China's iron ore and coal reserves now amounted to 11 billion and 110 billion tons respectively.[6] In view of the Communists' inclination to exaggerate the country's physical resources, the accuracy of these figures

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3. Geological Survey of China, General Statement on the Mining Industry, Nanking and Chungking, Nos 4, 5, and 7.

4. Bureau of Information Kang-tieh [Iron and Steel], Nanking, 1947, pp. 11-15; Geological Survey of China, General Statement on the Mining Industry, Chungking, 1945, No. 7, pp. 88-89; and Chung-hua Nien-chien [Chinese Year Book], Nanking, 1948, Vol. II, p. 1,568.

5. Yuan-li Wu, An Economic Survey of Communist China, New York, Bookmen Associates, 1956, p. 26.

6. Sun Chin-chih, Chung-kuo Kung-yeh hua ti Ti-li T'iao-chien [The Geographical Conditions of China's Industrialization], Peking, All-China Association for the Popularization of Science and Technology, 1955, pp. 15-16.

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may be questioned, especially in regard to the economic feasibility of recovering all the iron and coal deposits which may not be readily available. Although it is entirely probable that new discoveries have also boosted the known deposits in Central-South China, the region's relative share of iron ore and coal reserves, with respect to the other regions, has probably actually declined. Of the new discoveries reported, the P'ing-hsiang coal field in Kiangsi has been more frequently mentioned,[7] and there is a possibility that new ore bodies may have been found at Ta-yeh (Hupeh Province), the iron and steel center of Central-South China.

The First Five-Year Plan

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In spite of the fact that the Ta-yeh iron and steel plant was established as one of the first modern industrial enterprises in China, and that iron ore mined in this area was exported to Japan before World War II, the region's relative scarcity of iron ore and coal have had a decisive influence in molding its industrial development, quite apart from the general backwardness of China's heavy industries. With the exception of the mining of non-ferrous and other metals, primarily for export, the region has few industrial centers other than Hankow (now a part of Wuhan) and Canton, and few industries other than light manufacturing, such as cotton textiles, sugar-refining, and tobacco-curing. Since most sections of the provinces in the Central-South Region were under Japanese occupation during World War II, the impetus given to Free China's industry in the Southwest by the demands of war was largely absent in the Central-South. On the other hand, the Japanese also failed to develop industry in this area with any great intensiveness. So far, this general situation has not improved under the present regime.

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[7] China News Service, Nan-ch'ang, Dec. 28, 1952.

According to one compilation, industrial development projects in the Central-South Region under the First Five-Year Plan include the expansion or construction of (1) the Ta-yeh Iron and Steel Works, (2) a manganese mine at Hsiang-t'an (Hunan Province), (3) antimony mines at Hsi-k'uang-shan (Hunan), (4) the Wu-ch'ang (part of Wuhan) shipyard, (5) ordnance plants at Han-yang (part of Wuhan) and Ch'en-ch'i (Honan), (6) power plants at Chengchow (Honan), Chu-chou (Hunan); and Ta-yeh, and (7) the Chiao-tso coal mine in Honan.[8] In addition, a heavy machinery plant may be planned in the Wuhan area.[9] Several new cotton mills have been built at Chengchou and Hsin-hsiang in Honan, Hsiang-t'an in Hunan, Nanchang in Kiangsi and Wuhan in Hupeh.[10] Although a number of manufacturing plants are under construction in this area, it is clear that the Central-South Region is not envisaged as a major base for Mainland China's heavy industries on a part with Manchuria and North China, especially if we bear in mind the small number of large industrial enterprises which were in existence in this region prior to the establishment of the Communist regime.

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[8] Yuan-li Wu, *op. cit.*, pp. 265-69.

[9] Cheng Ch'u-yüan, *Chung-kung Wu-nien Chi-hua P'ou-hsi* [*An Analysis of Chinese Communist First Five-Year Plan*], Hong Kong, 19555, pp. 43-44.

[10] Yuan-li Wu, *op. cit.*, p. 307.

Survey of Selected Industries

A. Coal Mining

Since all industrial activity as well as transportation is dependent upon the availability of adequate power resources, the Central-South Region is under a serious handicap because of the limited local coal supply. The regional deficit in coal, as a rule, is met by imports from both North and East China, although strenuous efforts have been made to expand coal mines in the area. This need for the expansion of coal mining was felt both before and during World War II, when a number of new mines were developed to provide coal for the Hankow-Canton Railway.[11] These mines, which are presumably still in operation, are:

Hunan Province		Kwangtung Province
Li-ling	Chung-hsiang	Pa-tzu-ling
Ch'ing-ch'i	Yun-hu	Kou-ya-tung
San-tu	Hsiang-chiang	
T'an-chia-shan	Yang-mei-shan	

With the exception of the Hsiang-chiang and Yang-mei-shan coal mines, which have been expanded by the Communists,[12] the mines in Hunan and Kwangtung along the Canton-Kankow Railway are extremely small. The major coal mines are located at Chiao-tso in Honan and P'ing-hsiang in Kiangsi. To these may be added such mines as I-lo (Honan Province), Liu-hokou (Honan), and Ta-yeh (Hupeh), which are of secondary importance.

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[11] Chung-yang Yin-hang Yueh-pao [The Central Bank Monthly], August, 1947, Vol. II, No. 8, p. 45.

[12] Yangtze Daily, July 27, 1951, Aug. 26, 1951.

The Chiao-tso coal mine, located in southern Honan and connected with the Peking-Hankow Railway, had an annual production of one-half million tons in 1949.[13] Subsequent Communists reports have indicated substantial increases in production above this level.[14] Following the inception of the First Five-Year Plan, four pits were said to be under construction during 1954,[15] and an increase in anthracite production was expected upon the completion of construction.

As mentioned above, along with Chia-tso, the P'ing-hsiang coal mine in Kiangsi is the site of another major expansion project under the Communists' Five-Year Plan.[16] The plan, as reported, apparently aims at the construction of a pit for producing coking coal by mechanized mining, which is expected to raise its production by 50 per cent.[17] The new mine is located at a previously abandoned pit and will exploit coal deposits reportedly discovered by the Communists.[18] 316

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[13] *Tu-pao Shou-tse* [Newspaper Reading Handbook], 1950, p. 526.

[14] *People's Daily*, Oct. 19, 1951, March 22, 1952, *NCNA*, Dec. 4, 1952.

[15] *NCNA*, Jan 13, 1954.

[16] *Ibid.*

[17] *NCNA*, Feb. 21, 1954.

In addition to such expansion as has already been mentioned, rehabilitation and construction work have apparently been carried out at Yung-shao on the Hunan-Kwangsi-Kweichow Railway, P'ing-ting-shan in Honan, Tzu-hsing in the southern sector of the Hankow-Canton Railway, and the[19] Kuan-yin-t'ang mine in Chia-hsien (Honan Province). However, few details on construction are available.

For the region as a whole, the Communists report, coal production increased from 2 million tons in 1949 to an estimated 6.5 million tons in 1953.[20] The latter figure represented a little over 10 per cent of Mainland China's total estimated coal output for that year. As a result of expansion in Manchuria and North China after 1953, the relative share of coal output in the Central-South doubtlessly has declined even further. While the present regional output, as compared with that of 1949, might be sufficient to meet the region's consumption requirements at the 1949-1950 level, it undoubtedly falls below the present higher consumption level so that regional dependence upon import will continue. 433 316

Electric Power

The relative shortage of coal in the Central- 377

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[18] Ibid.

[19] Newspaper Reading Handbook, 1950, pp. 519-21.

[20] Chung-kuo Kung-yeh [China's Industry] Vol. I, No. 8, Dec. 20, 1949, p. 45; New China News Agency, Peking, Dec. 18, 1954.

South Region is primarily of short-term importance In the long run, the region can turn to its water power resources for the supply of energy. According to Kuomintang estimates, if a large hydro-electric power plant were built at the Yangtze Gorge, some 5 to 12 kilometers (3.1 to 7.4 miles) to the west of I-ch'ang in Hupeh, its maximum capacity would reach 10,560,000 kilowatts. Even during the low-water season, a dependable minimum capacity of 6 million kilowatts would be available.[21] However, since such an undertaking would require both a large initial outlay and a protracted period of construction, apparently no attempt has been made by the Chinese Communists to implement the Nationalist plan.

For the foreseeable future, electric power will continue to be generated in plants using coal as fuel. In this respect, it should be noted that the Central-South Region possessed in early 1953 little more than an estimated one-eighth of a million kilowatts in the total rated capacity of its thermal electric utility plants.[22] This figure represented less than 12 per cent of that of Mainland China as a whole. A large plant built by the Communists at Chengchow and in operation since 1953 no doubt has increased somewhat the region's present generative capacity. The same may be said of expanded facilities at Chu-chou and Ta-yeh, either completed or under way. However, even on the basis of its energy supply alone, it may be safely concluded that the Central-South Region is industrially only 377 a secondary importance, although an exception must be made in the case of ferro-alloy metals.

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[21] Kuo Shao-tsung Chung-kuo Kung-yeh-hua Chih T'u-ching [The Way to Industrialization in China], Taiwan, May, 1955, pp. 136-40.

[22] New China News Agency, Taiyuan, Dec. 3, 1953.

Iron and Steel

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The largest iron and steel works in Central-South China is the Central China Iron and Steel Works at Ta-yeh in the Huang-shih industrial center in Hupeh Province. Depleted by wartime removals, the Ta-yeh plant was the subject of plans for postwar expansion. At the end of World War II, the plant was equipped with one 450-metric ton capacity blast furnace, and a 30-metric ton furnace was under construction in 1948. .The latter was reported to be in operation in 1950, and the plant's total potential at full capacity was then reported to be 121,000 tons of pig-iron per year. Subsequent increases in pig-iron production at Ta-yeh[23] have since been reported in the Communist press. Pig-iron production in 1952, in the Central-South Region as a whole, was reported to be 376 per cent above the 1950 level. The iron ore for the Ta-yeh works is obtained locally, while coal is supplied from P'ing-hsiang in Kiangsi Province.

Apart from Ta-yeh, pig-iron is also produced at a number of smaller plants, the largest of which is at Hsiang-t'an in Hunan Province, which originally had two 250-ton capacity blast furnaces. A number of very small plants are located at Heng-shan, Lu-ch'ang and Ch'i-yang in Hunan, Chi-an in Kiangsi, Ho-hsien and Chung-t'u in Kwangsi,[24] and possibly Liu-ho-kou in northern Hupeh.

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[23] Hsin-chien-she [New Construction], Peking, Vol. II, No. 10, July 2, 1950, p. 30; Ta-kung Pao, Shanghai, Dec. 23, 1952; NCNA, Jan. 30, 1954.

[24] Bureau of Information, Kang-tieh [Iron and Steel], pp. 20-21, 48-49.

As for steel production, at last report the Ta-yeh Central China Iron and Steel Works was equipped with one 1-1/2 ton Bessemer furnace and one 10" rolling mill. Acording to a 1950 report, a second Bessemer converter, a new electric furnace, and an open-hearth furance were to be constructed.[25] Mention was made in Communist reports in 1954 of the expansion of open-hearth ingot capacity to double the plant's ingot production.[26] Under the Five-Year Plan, the Communists apparently hope to expand the capacity for both ingots and rolled products at Ta-yeh to redress some of the imbalance at the plant's production structure to render it more integrated than before. The iron mine at Ta-yeh is also being expanded simultaneously, and a power plant is also under construction.[27] Output at the plant in 1952 included ingot, rolled products, and cold cast steel. The production of such machinery as steam hammers was first reported in 1953.[28] Efforts are being made by the Communists, it appears, to convert the Ta-yeh into a modern center -- an iron and steel complex to serve both the Yangtze Valley and South China.

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[25] Hsin-chien-she [New Construction], Peking, Vol. II, No. 10, July2, 1950, p. 30; Ta-kung Pao Shanghai, Dec 23, 1952; NCNA, Jan. 30, 1954.

[26] Ta-kung Pao, Tientsin, June 5, 1954, NCNA, June 10, 1950.

[27] Economic Bulletin, Nos. 438, Hong Kong, Oct. 1, 1955, p. 26.

[28] Workers' Daily, January 25, 1953.

Apart from Ta-yeh, the only other steel works in Central-South China possessing an electric furnace is located at Canton.[29] But there has been little current information on this plant. 327

Mining of Ferro-alloys

As mentioned before, the principal tungsten-producing mines are in Kiangsi, Kwangtung, and Hunan. The entire area was taken over by the Communists in 1949. At the end of the year, it was reported that 25 of the 30 mines under the control of the Kiangsi Tungsten Mining Corporation, as well as some 107 private native mines, had resumed production. Production in Kiangsi in the final months of 1949 was reported to be 43.8 per cent of that of a like period in 1947. For the entire Central-South Region, production in November 1949 was reported to be 576 tons as compared with only 11.5 tons in August of the same year. Information on subsequent developments has been rather scanty, although production during the first eleven months of 1951 was reported to be 9.2 per cent above the year's planned output, and production of ore concentrates in Hunan in the first ten months of 1951 was reported to be 107.42 per cent that of the year's plan, or 9.3 per cent over that of 1950.[30] 316 328

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[29] Yuan-li Wu, An Economic Survey of Communist China, Bookman Associates, New York, 1956, p. 42.

[30] Tu-pao Shou-ts'e [Newspaper Reading Handbook], pp. 517-18; People's Daily, Feb. 10, 1951; Kung-shang Hsin-wen [Industrial and Commercial News], Shanghai, Dec. 17, 1951, p. 3.

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Reports from Hong Kong have indicated close co-operation between Communist China and the Soviet Union in tungsten-mining and the development of deposits in Kwangtung. The joint management of all tungsten mines in Kiangsi, Kwangtung, and Hunan was said to have been established between China and the Soviet Union in January 1952. Large-scale exploitation of the deposits in Shih-hsing, Jen-hua, Lo-ch'ang, and Ying-te in Kwangtung has been reported, and a new concentration plant has been established at Shih-hsing. New deposits of the metal have also been reported at Pa-tzu-ling and Chiu-shih-ling of Fu-ch'i in Jen-hua.[31]

As for antimony mining, the production of antimony regulus in Central-South China in the first eleven months of 1950 was said to be 25.6 per cent above the year's plan, while regulus production in Hunan, the most important production center, during the first ten months of 1951 was reported to be 109.3 per cent that of the year's plan, or 13.9 per cent higher than that of the preceding year.

Antimony-refining plants are said to have been improved since 1950, according to the Communists. A 1952 report stated that the Hsin-hsiang mining bureau plant had increased its smelting and refining capacity and that the need for secondary beneificiation was eliminated as of February 1952, and that the proportion of refined antimony in total production had increased.[32] As mentioned earlier, among the

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31. Hsin-hua Yüeh-pao [New China Monthly], Peking, October 1951, p. 1, 301.
32. Yangtze Daily, Sept. 24, 1952.

Five-Year Plan projects, the expansion at Hsi- 316
k'uang-shan, largest producer in the country, 328
has begun. Apparently the expansion envisaged
includes increasing mechanization in underground
and ore-transport facilities.[33]

Cotton Textiles

The Wuhan area is being developed by the 288
Communists as a center for metallurgical and related heavy industries, and light manufacturing is being expanded both at the traditional centers, Wuhan and Canton, and elsewhere. In particular, attention is called to the establishment of new cotton mills in the cotton-producing districts of Honan Province.

As mentioned earlier, some cotton mills have been built at Wuhan, Nanchang (Kiangsi Province), and Hsiang-t'an (Hunan). With the exception of Wuhan, which is the largest textile center in Central China and accounted for 163,000 spindles in 1954, the production of the Kiangsi and Hunan mills appears to be intended for the local markets. On the other hand, some five new mills have been built or are under construction at Chengchow (Honan Province) and one mill has been erected at Hsin-hsiang. The three mills which have been completed in Chengchow are said to possess 180,000 spindles and 5,000 machine looms. These figures compare favorably with those of the existing textile industry in Wuhan.[34]

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[33] NCNA, March 1, 1954.

[34] Cheng Ch'u-yüan, *op. cit.*, pp. 159-61.

Sugar Refining

One of the principal light industries of this region is sugar refining, which is concentrated in Kwangtung Province. Before the war with Japan there were six modern sugar refineries in Kwangtung.[35] A 1954 Communist report mentioned the existence of four government plants located at Tung-huan, Shun-te, Shih-t'ou, and Chieh-yang. A fifth plant was scheduled for construction under the Five-Year Plan. Output of the plants accounted for one-third to one-half of the country's total production of refined sugar in 1953.[36] A small sugar refinery is also being built in Hainan.[37] In order to supply the refineries, domestic machinery is produced at the Tung-yung Machinery Plant in Canton.[38] 251 392

Other Industries

Among other industrial activities in this region is the production of the Canton Paper Mill. Expansion of the plant under the Five-Year Plan was reportedly begun in 1954.[39] According to the Communists, the plant will become the largest producer of newsprint in Mainland China. 289

A 1950 report mentioned the existence of 79 mills in Central-South China, with a total daily capacity of almost 49, 000 bags (48. 4) pounds each) daily capacity (24 hours).[40] Actual production in the early phase of Communist rule, however, lagged behind the industry's potential capacity. 289

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[35] Newspaper Reading Handbook, p. 499.

[36] NCNA, Oct. 30, 1954, and Sept. 2, 1954, Hong Kong, pp. 109-13.

[37] NCNA, Feb. 2, 1955.

[38] Ibid., Sept. 2, 1954. [39] Ibid., Sept. 24, 1954.

Finally, the tobacco industry of Honan Province is concentrated in the Hsü-ch'ang area. There were reported to be 172 tobacco manufacturers in the Central-South Region as a whole; production in 1949 approximated 10 per cent of the country's total output. This latter figure excludes the smaller producers and refers only to tobacco produced locally in the Hsü-ch'ang area. 277

Conclusion

The above review of individual industries, while necessarily brief and sometimes incomplete, nevertheless points out quite unmistakably the relative backwardness of the Central-South provinces, even for a country like Communist China, in industrial development. That industrial backwardness may carry with it certain advantages for the Communists' efforts to socialize private business will be discussed in the following chapter. However, it would appear that for some time to come the Central-South Region will remain a primarily agricultural economy. Wuhan, Canton, Chengchow, and Hsiang-t'an are known as major industrial centers, but the region as a whole will continue to be dependent industrially on other regions of China.[41] 178

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[40] China's Industry, Vol. II, No. 6, Shanghai, October 1950, p. 4.

[41] [See following page.]

41. Industrial development in the Central-South Region is subject to the same *national* system of planning as is found in other regions of China. Consequently, no separate discussion of the planning system has been made. For reference, see Yuan-li Wu, *op. cit.*, Chapter VI, pp. 192-237.

Economic Background

BUDGET AND TAXATION

I. THE NATIONAL FISCAL SYSTEM

Since Communist China is a unitary state, its fiscal policy is national in scope and has relatively few regional variations Accordingly, unless otherwise indicated, what is said here of one region is often equally true in the other regions.

From the data shown in the tabulation below, certain facts are obvious.

1. During 1950-54, the revenue derived from the profit of government enterprises rose steadily from 12.76 per cent of the total government receipt in 1950 to 36.47 per cent in 1954. Moreover, profit is not the only contribution that government enterprises made to the government treasury. In the course of these years, they also contributed an increasingly large share of taxes which the People's Republic of China (the Communist government) imposed upon industries and trade. This tendency is clearly shown in the following statistics.

[See following page for chart.]

SOURCES OF GOVERNMENT RECEIPTS */

Year	Government-owned Enterprises	Government-Participating Enterprises	Co-operatives	Farmers	Private Industries and Trade
1950	-	- (combined) 34.08	-	29.63	32.93
1951	-	- 49.35	-	18.17	28.66
1952	-	- 56.33	-	17.08	22.36
1953	-	- 59.79	-	14.56	17.02
1954	65.24	3.65	1.66	14.23	13.34
1955	69.47	3.65	1.98	11.76	10.70

*/ In percentage of the total annual receipt of the current year. Economic Weekly, February 26, 1953, p. 17; People's Daily, June 18, 1954; July 10, 1955.

Unlike the usual concept used in Western countries, the profits of government-owned concerns and enterprises in which the government participates as listed in fiscal reports

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of the Communist government include allowances for depreciation of assets, which according to the Western practice should not be included in net profit. At the same time, all the outlays of government enterprises for improvement and replacement are listed as government expenditures for economic construction. The procedure used by the Chinese Communists means therefore a substantial increase in both government receipts from its enterprises and outlays for economic construction.

2. During the five-year period ending 1954, the relative importance of the agricultural tax has been substantially reduced. In 1950, it accounted for 28.01 per cent of the total government expenditure. In 1954, the percentage declined to 13.33 per cent. The decrease was due to the rapid expansion of receipts from other sources (particularly profits from government enterprises and urban taxes) rather than to the reduction in the agricultural tax itself. This development therefore should be interpreted to mean that the tax on rural economy has not been reduced; it reflects merely that the increase of the agricultural tax has not been as rapid as the increase of other government receipts.

3. Similarly, the fact that the ratio of the taxes on industry and trade to the total government expenditure remained almost constant during these years should not be interpreted to mean a constant tax burden imposed on these sectors of the Chinese economy. In absolute terms, their contributions have continually increased in order to meet the ever-expanding expenditure of the government.

As a whole, the fiscal policy of the Communist government has been more unfavorable to industry and trade than to agriculture. During the five-year period under consideration, private enterprise in industry and trade not only has had to bear a great burden of the increasing expenditure of government, but also has been forced to accept stiff competition from government enterprises, which, according to Communist policy, will ultimately monpolize all the important trade and industries in the country. 652

On the expenditure side, military outlay constituted 41. 5 per cent of total government expenditure in 1950 and 1951, respectively. Since 1952, because of the truce in Korea, the relative importance of the military outlay has been substantially reduced. In 1954, it was only 21. 1 per cent of the year's total expenditure. The outlay for economic construction has become the leading item on the debit side of the government account. 652 659

In making these comparisons, several observations should be noted. First, the military expenditures as listed in the records of the Communist government do not include salaries and maintenance of military personnel, which are classified as government administrative expenses. Military outlays listed in the budgets of the Nationalist Government, on the other hand, consisted mainly of such salary and maintenance payments. If the definition of military expenditure were broadened to include such outlays, and if one-half of the administrative expenses listed in the Communist budget were for the payment of military personnel and administration, then the military expenditure of the Communist government for the years 1950-52 would have been as tabulated here:

Year	Ratio of Military Expenditures to Total Government Expenditures (In per cent)
1950	51.11
1951	49.83
1952	32.15
1953	29.45 (budget estimate)
1954	30.06
1955	32.98 (budget estimate)

In the fiscal report for 1953 the military and government administration expenditures were lumped together under one item. It is rather difficult to separate the military from the non-military outlays on the basis mentioned above. For this reason, the budgetary estimates, where these outlays were separately listed, were used in this tabulation.

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A second point which should be noted concerning the military expenditure of the Communist government is that a part of its expenditure for economic construction might well be considered military rather than economic. In the budget of the Nationalist Government, for example, outlays for developing aircraft-manufacturing industries, ammunition industries, and so forth were usually classified as military expenses, whereas they would probably be considered as economic outlays in the Communists' report.

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A third point to be noted is that, if the depreciation charges and outlays for maintenance and replacement in government enterprises were excluded from government receipt and expenditure, as should normally be the case. the relative importance of military expenditure for the years under consideration would have been much greater than those shown in the fiscal reports.

Even allowing for these adjustments, the fact that government outlays for economic, social, and educational purposes has been substantially increased under the Communist regime is obvious when compared with the conditions under the Nationalist government. Whether these expenditures have actually contributed to improving the economic and social welfare of the people is, of course, another question entirely.

EXPENDITURE AND RECEIPTS OF THE PEOPLE S REPUBLIC OF CHINA *

	1950	1951	1952	1953	1954
Expenditures					
Military	41.50	42.52	26.23	-	24.19
Government Administration	19.21	14.71	11.83	44.62	11.74
Other	2.64	2.01	3.49	-	-
Economic construction	25.51	29.50	44.79	40.38	52.07
Cultural Construction	11.11	11.26	13.66	15.00	12.00
Receipts					
Agricultural tax	28.01	18.24	15.69	14.90	13.33
Taxes on industry and commerce	43.84	49.16	42.28	43.43	36.46
Receipts from govt. enterprises	12.76	25.64	28.55	35.40	40.49
Income from credit and insurance	4.87	4.79	1.53	3.00	1.26
Other	-	-	-	14.41	-

* In percentage of total government expenditure. Compiled on the basis of actual government outlays and receipts as in fiscal reports of the People's Republic of China.

In the discussion that follows, we shall examine at length some phases of Communist China's fiscal policy during the first five years of occupation of Mainland China. They include the agricultural tax the taxation on commerce and industry, and government bonds. As will be seen, the revenues discussed are all recurrent in nature. No attempt has been made to study such non-recurrent levies as those imposed during the Five-Anti Campaign. Because of the nature of these impositions, it is not likely that these measures can be successfully used again in the near future.

II. URBAN TAXATION

In Communist China, the core of urban taxation has consisted of the business tax, the tax on business income, and the commodity taxes.

None of the trio is new in China. Under the Nationalist Government. the business tax was collected as a local tax, the tax on business income was a part of the income-tax system, and the commodity tax constituted one of the main revenues of the Nationalist Government.

Under the Communist Government, all these taxes were drastically reorganized, apparently under the influence of the Russian tax system. From 1949 to date, the system of urban taxation has already undergone several important changes. Its history, which may be divided into two stages, covers the period from January 1950 to December 1952.

During the first period, the industrial and commercial tax constituted the greater part of urban taxation. The tax was a composite levy consisting of an impost based on gross turnover and another on net taxable income. The "business tax," was collected on the basis of a proportional rate schedule. While the tax rates remained constant regardless of how the amount of the tax base changes, they varied according to the nature of the business or industry. The rates on manufacturing industries, for instance, were in general higher than those on undertakings where business consisted only of sales of services (such as public utilities, professional services, hotel services, insurance, banking, etc.). For undertakings deriving their income in the form of commission (such as trade agents, etc.), the rates of business tax were much higher than those of any other businesses previously mentioned.

In addition, the tax rates varied according to the nature of the commodity produced or handled by the taxpayer. Those who deal in such commodities as are essential to the national economy are liable to a lighter tax than those who are associated with the production of non-esssential commodities. The business-tax rate on the production of cigarettes, for instance, was much higher than the rate applicable to the iron and steel industry.

The characteristics of the income-tax system, which was used early in the Communist regime and is still in effect, may be summarized as follows:

A. Like the system in Soviet Russia, the income-tax system in Communist China consists of a series of income taxes applicable to different types of income. Besides the agricultural tax, which may be considered as an income tax or agricultural income, there are income taxes on business profit derived from the earnings of business enterprises and on interest derived from bank deposits. Wages and salaries, however, are not subject to tax. Because of the disappearance of landlords under the Communist system, the tax on rent income is non-existent in the tax system of Communist China.

B. Like the Soviet system, there is more differentiation in the Chinese income tax than in the system commonly used in the West. There is, for instance, the differentiation in favor of military or industrial "heroes," and of earnings from industries against earnings from commercial undertakings (particularly those derived from services, such as commissions, etc.).

C. The progressive rates used in the Chinese income tax are applied on the entire taxable income rather than progressively by income brackets.

D. Inventory valuation for income-tax purposes is computed on the basis of the historical cost. This apparently means an unduly heavy tax burden on taxpayers at the time of rising prices.

E. Depreciation charges are computed on the basis of either the straight-line method or the method of constant percentage. In either case, the income tax will mean, under the condition of rising prices, a tax to be paid out of capital as well as current income rather than a genuine tax on income.

After December 31, 1952, the "tax on commodity circulation," or turnover tax, was introduced. This new tax is a composite lvey consisting of parts of former commodity and business taxes In many respects, it is also reminiscent of the turnover tax of the USSR. The introduction of the turnover tax brought changes in the system of urban taxation in Communist China. In the place of former commodity and business taxes, the turnover tax is applicable to the following 22 commodities: rolled tobacco, tobacco leaf, wine, wheat flour, furs and hides, cotton yarn, matches, phongraph records, acid, salt, chemical fertilizers, paper newsprint, rubber tires, cork, cement, glass plates, metal and metal products, pig iron, coke and its products, and minerals oils and their products. After paying the turnover tax, producers and dealers in these commodities will be subject to no other commodity or business taxes so long as they circulate within the national boundaries of China. The exemption, however, does not apply to the custom duties if they are to be exported or to the income taxes to which such producers are liable. Nor would the payment of a commodity tax on raw materials exempt a product manufactured of such material from commodity tax, if the product itself were a taxable commodity.

Instead of the payment of tax as a product leaves its factory, or additional tax as each business transaction occurred, as was the case of the old commodity tax, the collection procedure of the turnover tax varies according to the nature of the commodity subject to tax. In the case where the sales are to be handled by government agent, the turnover tax is payable when the commodity is sold or transferred from its producers to such a sales agent. In the case where the sales are made by the manufacturer's own agent, the tax is payable at the first sale of the commodity at the wholesale level, or its transfer from producer to the sales agent. In the case where the sale of product is handled by neither a government agent nor its producer, but by the producer himself, the tax is payable at the time when the product leaves the hands of its producer. In the case where the taxable product is not for sale, but for further processing or use in some other department of the producing factory, the turnover tax is payable when the commodity leaves the producing department. In the case of forestry products, the tax is paid by the purchasers at the time when the products are being shipped from their point of origin. In the case of an imported commodity, the turnover tax is collectible by the customs together with customs duties at the point of import. In the case of an export commodity, the ta x is collectible at the time of export.

Which of the above-mentioned procedures of collection is to be applicable to a given commodity is to be decided by the government and not by the taxpayer himself.

Since the turnover tax is to displace both the commodity and business taxes, its rates are higher than those of either of these old taxes The turnover tax rate on wheat flour has been raised to 10 per cent as against a rate of 3 per cent according to the old commodity tax. The new rate applicable to cotton yarn is 22 per cent as compared to 12 per cent charged in the old commodity tax. With the exception of the turnover tax on beer, which is a specific levy, the levy on all other commodities is collectible on an ad valorem basis.

Many changes other than those mentioned above are made in the business taxation following the institution of the turnover tax. Among such changes, the following changes are probably the most important.

Under the new regulations, all the commodities produced within the country and not subject to commodity or turnover tax as previously explained are liable to three business taxes -- one at the level of production, one at the wholesale level, and another at the retail level. All those subject to commodity or turnover tax are liable to two business taxes at the wholesale and retail levels. These regulations will be applied regardless of whether a commodity transaction is an inter-firm sale or merely an intra-firm transfer. As a result of these modifications all the advantages of vertical combination, which were ample under the old system, are eliminated.

Before the tax reform in 1952, all the business taxes at manufacturing, wholesale, and retail levels were payable after the completion of the business transactions. After 1952, the business tax became applicable only to the transactions of those commodities to which the new turnover tax does not apply. But, instead of collecting the tax after the completion of transactions, producers of such commodities are required, in addition to their own tax liabilities, to advance the tax payable by wholesale dealers to whom the products are sold. Such advances are later to be repaid by the wholesale dealers to the producers. Thus, under the new law, the business tax on the wholesale dealer becomes collectible before rather than after the relevant business transactions are effected.[1]

In the case of the commodities subject to turnover taxation, all the business taxes on retailers, under a similar arrangement, are to be advanced by wholesale dealers. The turnover tax and the changes in business tax therefore not only result in speeding up the collection of business tax, but also, through the concentration of tax collection at production and wholesale levels, reduce substantially the cost of tax administration.

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[1] Cheng Ch'u-yuan, Chung-kung Ts'ai-ching Cheng-ts'e Hsin Tung-hsiang [The New Tendencies of the Chinse Communist Financial Economic Policies], Hong Kong, 1953, pp. 73-77.

The stamp tax and all surtaxes attached to the business tax under the old system merged under the new regulation with the business tax. Under the new system, the rates of business tax fall into three categories: those for commercial undertakings, those applicable to industries, and those applicable to incomes derived from sales of personal services. For the cases where the old rates fell within the range of 1 to 3 per cent a new rate of five per cent is used. For the cases where the old rates ranged from 4 to 6 per cent, an additional one per cent is added in the new rate schedule. For the cases where the old rates ranged from 8 to 10 per cent, an additional two per cent is added to form the new schedule. For the cases where the old rates ranged from 12 to 15 per cent a flat rate of fifteen per cent is used.

Besides the institution of the turnover tax and the changes in business tax mentioned above, there are also important modifications in the system of commodity tax. Among these are the following adjustment.

Twenty-two of the commodities formerly subject to commodity tax are under the new regulations subject to the turnover tax.

Fifteen new items are included in the modified system of commodity tax; among these new commodities, the most important item is foodstuffs. In the place of the old transaction tax, the foodstuffs under the new system are subject to a commodity tax.

Several silk textile products which were formerly subject to commodity tax are now exempted from the tax. In addition, several other minor adjustments in commodity classifications have also been made with a view to simplifying tax administration.

In the place of market price, commodity taxes under the new system are assessed on the basis of the relevant wholesale prices as quoted by government sales agents. For the commodities for which government quotations are not available, the market price is used as the basis of the tax assessment. Under the old system, the commodity tax was assessed by the means of the following formulas:

$$\frac{\text{Market price}}{1 - \text{Tax rate}} = \text{Price subject to tax}$$

$$\text{The price subject to tax} \times \text{Tax rate} = \text{The amount of tax}$$

The purpose of using these formulas was to avoid the inclusion of tht tax in the price upon which the commodity tax rate is to be applied. Under the new system, the commodity tax rate is applicable directly to the price quoted by government enterprise, and the price includes the cost of tax. The commodity tax assessed on this basis is apparently higher than that which was derived from the old formula..

Other important changes in the system of urban taxation effected at the end of 1952 are as follows:

A part of stamp duties were transferred to be collected as turnover tax, commodity tax, or tax on butchery.

The business taxes and stamp tax payable by butchers merged under the new system with the butchery tax.

The transaction tax of foodstuffs is being collected in a new system of commodity tax. The transaction tax on cotton was combined under the new system with the turnover tax on textile products.

All the levies on real estate merged into one tax on real estate.

It is clear that one of the objectives for tax reform in 1952 was to transfer, wherever it was feasible, all the old taxes on gross business receipts, the commodity taxes, the transaction taxes, stamp duties etc., into the newly instituted system of turnover tax. In the cases where such transfers are not practical, these levies are collected as much as possible under the system of commodity taxes. Only in the case where neither transfer is feasible do the old taxes on business or turnover continue to exist. Whenever conditions permit, the regular tax and surtaxes imposed by local authorities are consolidated into one single tax. In the case of turnover tax, collections are made, as far as it is administratively feasible, at the wholesale level or at the time when the taxable commodity leaves the hands of its producer. The main purpose for effecting successful reforms is to reduce the cost of tax collection and to improve the efficiency of its administration.

There is little change in the system of income tax.

III. AGRICULTURAL TAX

In Central-South China, the system of agricultural tax is rather simple in comparison with that used in East China. Since no part of this region has been considered as the so-called "old liberated" area, only the agricultural tax designed for the "newly liberated" area with land reform and that for a similar area without land reform have been used in Central-South China.[2]

In the areas where the land reform campaign has already been completed, the features of the tax system may be summarized in the following manner.

All the agricultural taxes have been collected in kind.

The tax has been assessed on the basis of so-called normal production, regardless of what the actual production is. This system not only greatly simplifies the tax administration, but also stabilizes the government revenue from agricultural tax regardless of actual production. It relieves the government from the possible adverse effects upon its revenue of year-to-year fluctuations in agricultural production, and leaves that burden to farmers.

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2. Hua-tung Ch'ü Ts'ai-cheng Ching-chi Fa-ling Hui-pien [Compilation of Laws and Regulations Concerning Finance and Economics in East China], Peking, 1951, Vol. I, pp. 291-306; New China Monthly, July 25, 1951, pp. 676-77; Cheng Chu-yüan, op. cit., pp. 48-69.

The progressive tax rates are applicable to cases where the production, reckoned in terms of the land s main crop, exceeds an average of 150 kilograms per capita. The amount of per capita production is determined by dividing the total production of the entire household by the number of recognized farm hands in the household. The rates applicable to forty separate income brackets range from 3 per cent on an annual production of from 150 to 190 kilograms per head to 42 per cent on an annual production exceeding 3, 410 kilograms per capita.

Besides the variation based on production, the tax rates vary also on the basis of the following factors: (1) the production of a landowner who tills his own land, with or without employing assistance, will be counted toward taxable income at par; (2) the production of a farmer who does not own his land is taxed on the basis of 80 per cent of his actual production. On the other hand, a landowner who does not till his own land but derives income from leasing it to others has to pay a tax on the basis of 120 per cent of the actual production; and (3) veterans, Party workers, and all those who make any "special contribution" to the country may be counted as farm hands in reckoning the per capita production, even though they do not actually work on the farm.

The general features of the system of agriculture tax applicable to the newly liberated areas without land reform are very smilar to those used in the areas with land reform. There are, however, important differences between the rate structures used in the two types of agriculture tax. First, the rates for the area with land reform ranged from 7 to 30 per cent as against 3 to 42 per cent in the case

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ot tne other system. Secondly, the proportional rate of 30 per cent becomes effective when the per capita production, reckoned in terms of the main crop produced on the land subject to tax, eceeds 1, 950 kilograms a year. In the system for the areas without land reform, the proportional rate of 42 per cent is used for production exceeding 3, 410 kilograms. In both cases, an initial exemption of 150 kilograms is used. In other words the income range within which progressive rates are operative is much shorter in the areas which have land reform than those without it. Thirdly, the agricultural tax rates for the areas with land reform would be higher than the corresponding rates for the areas without land reform if the per capita production were lower than 1, 000 kilograms. The reverse is true of the cases where the per capita production exceeds 1, 000 kilograms

It is clear from previous comparisons that, after the completion of the land reform campaign, both the range and the degree of the agricultural tax have been reduced as compared with the rate schedule applicable to the areas without land reform. One possible argument for adopting this policy is that, by reducing the rate of increase of the tax, agricultural production may be encouraged. Another possible explanation is that, after the completion of land reform, the inequality in the distribution of farm income tends to disappear. For this reason it becomes feasible to reduce the rate of increase so that tax administration may be simplified.

Whatever the reason may be, the fact is that, as a result of land reform, low-income farmers tend to pay a higher tax and high-income farmers a lower tax.

As became the experience in other regions, in Central-South China the most common difficulties that have been encountered in implementing the agricultural tax include the following:

The lack of reliable productionstatistics and other relevant production data concerning agricultural production makes it necessary to have recourse at times to such arbitrary measures as "democratic assessments," which means simply an assessment on the basis of the opinion of a specially appointed committee consisting of persons supposed to be familiar with the financial condition of the taxpayer. More often than not, such assessments have little or no bearing upon the ability of the taxpayer to pay the tax.

Difficulties arising from the lack of reliable statistical data, of course will gradually decrease as more information concerning rural economy is assembled and the various "norms" of taxation are established

Another important difficulty encountered in implementing the agricultural tax arises from the system of collection in kind. Reports from China seem to indicate that this system of tax collection has caused a great hardship among the taxpayers, for under the system they have to bear not only the tax but also the cost involved in transporting the tax-in-kind to designated points where the commodities are being assembled by the government.[3]

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[3] Wu Tan-ko Chung-kuo Nung-yeh-shui Wen-ti, [Problems of Chinese Agricultural Taxation], Shanghai, 1952, p. 43.

The agricultural tax is assessed on the basis of the gross income, taking little or no account of the cost involved in production. The system, if strictly enforced, will necessarily result in discouraging such improvements as the use of chemical fertilizers, the use of irrigation systems, etc. Chemical fertilizers have been more commonly used in many parts of Central-South China than in other parts of the country. Failure to allow for such costs of production in the tax system will necessarily mean discouragement to those who are making such improvements in their production. 651 242

In assessing the agricultural tax both for the regions with land reform and for the areas without land reform, the tax rates progress on the basis of the total income rather than by bracket. This could mean in some cases a payment of more tax by a taxpayer with less income than by one with more income. 651

IV. GOVERNMENT BONDS

In 1950, 100,000,000 fen (one fen or unit was worth approximately US$.75) of the Victory Bonds issued at 30 per cent or 30,000,000 fen, were allocated for subscription in Central-South China.[4] This quota is equivalent to two-thirds that of East China, and is twice as high as that of North China. This comparison seems to indicate that the burden of the government bond was relatively lower in North China than in either East or Central-South China. 652

V. REMITTANCES FROM ABROAD

One phase of the financial policy of the Chinese People's Government that has a special bearing 457 upon the people in Central-South China, particularly in the provinces of Fukien and Kwangtung, concerns the remittances from Chinese emigrants residing abroad. Many families of these emigrants rely upon remittances from abroad for their living in China. During the pre-war years, about US$100 million of such remittances were sent to China, mainly from the United States and Southeast Asia. After World War II, because of the Nationalist Government policy of overvaluing the Chinese currency in terms of foreign money, remittances through banks, which were only allowed on the basis of the unrealistic official exchange rate, became prohibitively expensive. Consequently, a large part of such remittances was routed through the black market.

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[4] Tu-pao Shou-ts'e [Newspaper Reading Handbook], Hankow, 1950, p. 384.

After the Communists gained control of Central-South China in 1949, they encouraged such remittances from abroad with a view to strengthening their foreign-exchange reserve.

In the meantime, because of rigid controls under the Communist regime, transactions through the black market became all but impossible without risking heavy government penalty. Consequently, those who wished to continue their remittances to China would have virtually no other choice but to have recourse to the banks, which quote only official exchange rates.

A comparison between free market quotations in Hong Kong and official foreign exchange rates as quoted by banks in China indicated that, even as late as 1954, Chinese currency at its official rate had a value in foreign currency about 50 per cent higher than the corresponding rate quoted in the free

Hong Kong market. That is to say, all those who remitted funds to China through the banks would be liable to a tax equivalent to about 50 per cent of the amount remitted. This has put a great burden on all those in China who rely upon remittances from abroad for their living. 457

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BANKING AND CURRENCY*/

I. ELIMINATION OF PRIVATE AND NATIONALIST GOVERNMENT BANKING

Hankow and Canton in Central-South China, having grown into important communications and trade centers, also became important centers for foreign and Chinese banking When the Communists set up a new banking system which stressed the "equal" distribution of banking facilities in each province, the dominant positions long enjoyed by Hankow and Canton were greatly reduced. Nevertheless, these cities still maintain comparatively important situations; the former is located at the junction of the Peking-Hankow and the Canton-Hankow railways, and is the center of the Yangtze River navigation system; the latter is China's main gateway to Hong Kong and Southeast Asia.

Before the promulgation of the Communist Constitution in September 1954 abolished the Greater Administrative Region of Central-South China, the People's Bank had a regional office in Hankow, and the People's Bank's Canton branch office had been able to maintain a certain autonomy. But after the People's Bank's branch offices in each provincial capital were made the highest level offices in the province, reporting only to the head office, the regional office in Hankow was terminated and Hankow is no longer an important banking center of Central-South China. Its banking position, as is that of Canton, is now ranked equally with that of other provincial capitals, although the volume of business may differ between them.

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*/ Unless otherwise indicates in footnotes, statements in this chapter are based on private information of the author, Dr K. N. Chang.

1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF14 Central China AF14

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In order to establish a new Communist banking system it was necessary to liquidate the old banking structure. The Communists found it easy to achieve this aim in the Central-South Region because there were only a few foreign banks in Hankow and Canton; most of the modern commercial banks in these two cities and in other interior cities were merely branches of those established in Shanghai; the native banks and a few locally registered commercial banks throughout the whole area were poorly capitalized.

When the Communists assumed authority in this area they ordered to be closed all branches of the Central Bank of China and the Farmers Bank of China two government banks established by the Nationalist Government. The branches of two banks jointly financed by government and private interests, the Bank of China and the Bank of Communications, also established before the Nationalist regime, were fitted into the new system. This was followed by the gradual elimination of the native banks and a few locally registered commercial banks. To force their liquidation, the Communists required them to increase their capital, as set forth in new banking regulations, and imposed cumbersome control measures. Most of the banks were unable to increase their capital and found it unprofitable to continue operation under the new controls. The few surviving banks in Hankow were ordered to organize a syndicate and operate jointly. As a result of the merger of all private banks in Shanghai into one Joint State-Private Bank. all of the branches of the merged banks in Central-South China were amalgamated, and the syndicated banks in Hankow were later ordered to merge with the Hankow branch of the Joint State-Private Bank. The two foreign banks, the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation and the Banque de l'Indo-Chine, first withdrew from

Hankow and then from Canton.

Hankow and then from Canton. 000

426 652 Two minor monetary institutions -- pawnshops and firms dealing with overseas remittances -- were treated in different ways; one monetary organization was liquidated and the other is being rigidly controlled. Most pawnshops in Central-South China, particularly those in Hankow and Canton, were small but profitable because they charged exorbitant interest rates. The larger ones were operated less successfully because of the postwar inflation. The Communists considered the pawnshops a credit mechanism which had contact with the poor masses, and took steps to drive them out of business by requiring them to increase their capital and restricting the number of objects against which loans could be made.

By the end of 1952 only a small number of pawnshops had survived; at that time the last ones were ordered closed.

457 652 There had been fifty-four firms dealing with overseas remittances in Canton. Realizing that these firms had close contact with the senders abroad and the recipients at home, and also that they had long experience in handling this kind of business, the Communists believed it necessary to keep them in operation for the purpose of securing foreign exchange. By special regulations governing firms engaged in overseas Chinese remittances, promulgated by the Communists in Canton, these firms were made agents of the government to handle overseas Chinese remittances; every transaction is under government control.

Thus the old banking structure was completely liquidated and the way was paved for the establishment of a Communist banking system.

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II. STRUCTURE OF THE PEOPLE'S BANK AND ITS SUBSIDIARIES

In the banking system as currently developed, the People's Bank of China is the supreme and central financial body, entrusted with the sole authority of issuing bank notes and extending credits. It has gradually built up its network of branches throughout the country with the aim of eliminating other banks, widening the circulation of People's Bank notes, and eventually extending its money and credit control to all levels.

There are five special banks which are virtually subsidiaries of the People's Bank. Entrusted with special functions in the financing of certain branches of industry and business, they are the Bank of China, the Bank of Communications, the Chinese People's Construction Bank, the Agricultural Bank of China, and the Joint State-Private Bank. In addition, there are two other financial institutions: credit co-operatives and the Chinese People's Insurance Company. The former is regarded as the basic level of banking, and the latter as a depository of long-term funds.

A. People's Bank of China

In the area of Central-South China, the regional office of the People's Bank at Hankow, under which there was a branch office in each province, had been the highest organ in charge of monetary matters and monetary administration. But the regional office ceased to function after the abolition of the Greater Administrative Region following the promulgation of the Constitution in September 1954. Now the branch office of each province is under direct control of the head office in Peking and is the highest monetary body at the local level.

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There are six branch offices of the People's Bank in Central-South China, one in each provincial capital: Wuhan, Hupeh; Changsha, Hunan; Nanchang, Kiangsi; Canton, Kwangtung; Nanning, Kwangsi; and Chengchow, Honan.

The branch offices are entrusted with the following functions: [1](1) to adjust the circulation of currency; (2) to act as agents for the state treasury; (3) to accept current accounts and promote savings; (4) to extend credits to industry and commerce, both public and private, either directly or through affiliated banks; (5) to handle clearance of bills and transfers of accounts, and facilitate remittances (6) to extend rural credits either through their own agencies or through co-operatives; (7) to look after receipts and disbursements of foreign exchange handled by affiliated banks; and (8) to handle any other monetary matters within their jurisdiction.

Each branch office has departments controlling currency, rural credit, private enterprise, foreign transactions, and also departments in charge of credit co-operatives, savings deposits, and trusts, thus covering the entire scope of banking functions.

Under each branch office there are sub-branch offices established in counties, cities, and major

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1. Kuo-min Ching-chi Shih-yung Tz'u-tien [Popular Dictionary of Practical Economics], Shanghai, Ch'un-ming Press, 1953.

towns. Sub-branch offices in the larger cities consist of two business departments, one dealing with public organizations and the other with private individuals and firms. 652

At least 570 sub-branch offices are maintained at important political and communication centers in Central-South China. Some are charged with the duty of looking after a few other sub-branches and are designated as "central sub-branch offices." This organizational feature is temporary and may be discontinued when the special conditions surrounding its creation cease to exist. It is reported that there are five to nine central sub-branch offices in each province. Subordinate to the sub-branch offices are the agencies, sub-agencies, and stations in the towns and villages. In July 1951, the subordinate offices in the region were reported to total more than 3, 000.

In several districts in Kwangtung Province, where there are no branch offices of the Bank of China and in which are located the home towns of many overseas Chinese, stations are established for the apparent purpose of rendering service to returned overseas Chinese, but aimed mainly at assuring "repatriation" of their capital. 652 457

B. Bank of China

The Bank of China was inaugurated as a central bank in 1912 and reorganized in 1928 as a special institution for dealing with foreign trade; half its —›

capital was owned by the government. It had branches throughout the country and 19 branches abroad. Its old status was maintained after the Communists assumed control, and directors elected by private shareholders were recognized; the general manager and directors appointed by the previous regime were replaced by Communist appointees. The director general of the People's Bank serves concurrently as the chairman of the board. As a result of this change, the Bank of China has become a virtual subsidiary of the People's Bank.

The Bank of China is charged with the following functions:[2] (1) attention to matters concerning the control of foreign exchange; (2) handling of foreign exchange, foreign securities, bills of exchange, and other commercial documents payable in foreign currency; (3) extension of credits and acceptance of deposits in connection with foreign trade; (4) supervision of accounts and the clearance of foreign trade transactions conducted through government organizations; and (5) control of overseas remittances.

The head office of the Bank of China is in Peking; its branches in China, located at places benefiting from foreign trade or overseas remittances, were reduced to twenty-two, thirteen of which are in Central-South China: Hankow in Hupeh Province; Changsha in Hunan Province; Canton, Shen-ch'uan, Chiang-men, Shih-ch'i, Chan-chiang, and T'ai-shan in Kwangtung Province, Wu-chou, Liu-chou, and Nanning in Kwangsi Province; and Hai-k'ou (Hoihow) on Hainan Island.

Kwangtung has more foreign exchange business than any other province in this area because not only a large part of the trade between Hong Kong and the China Mainland passes through Canton, but also a great number of former Cantonese now residing overseas regularly send money back to their families or relatives. The Hoihow branch on Hainan Island also looks after overseas remittances. Foreign exchange transactions handled by the branches in Kwangsi increased recently when railway traffic between North Indochina and China was opened. 652 457

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[2] Ching-chi Chou-pao [Economic Weekly], No. 31, Shanghai.

The allegiance of the overseas branches of the Bank of China was split: those located in countries which have recognized Communist China are now subject to the control of the head office in Peking, and the rest are controlled by the head office of the Bank of China in Formosa. The former are the branches in Hong Kong, London, Singapore, Penang, Kuala Lumpur, Calcutta, Bombay, Karachi, Chittagong, Rangoon, and Djakarta, and the latter are in Saigon, Phnom Penh, Bangkok, Osaka, Tokyo, Havana, New York, and Sydney.

C. Bank of Communications

The Bank of Communications was chartered in 1907 to promote the development of communications; in 1928 it was reorganized as a special institution to foster and develop industries and internal trade; 60 per cent of the capital was owned by the government. The Bank of Communications was allowed to continue operations under its old status, thus receiving the same "consideration" which the Communists had given the Bank of China. The directors representing private interests were recognized, while the directors representing public interest, the chairman of the board, and the general manager were replaced 652

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with appointees of the new government. The bank's were redefined as follows:[3] (1) to handle government appropriations set aside for basic construction of the state, and screen and approve applications for such construction needs;(2) to organize and lead long-term investment markets; (3) to control ownership rights for public shares of enterprises operated by state- private joint interests; and (4) to handle long-term credits.

The handling of appropriations for basic construction was later transferred to the newly established Chinese People's Construction Bank. The organization of long-term investment markets has been virtually impossible as private capitalists were nearly entirely liquidated. The only function of the Bank of Communications is to handle long-term credits to jointly managed state-private enterprises, the funds being supplies by the People's Bank. The Bank of Communications has, therefore, in fact become an industrial financing department of the People's Bank.

The Bank of Communications has its head office in Peking and branches at places where there is modern industry. Those imporctant ones in Central-South China are: Hankow, Wuchang, Hanyang, Shashih, I-ch'ang, Huang-shih in Hupeh Province; Changsha, Hsiang-t'an, Heng-yang in Hunan Province; Chengchow, Kaifeng, Hsin-hsiang, Anyang in Honan Province; Nanchang, Chiu-chiang, Ching-te-chen, Kan-hsien, P'ing-hsiang in Kiangsi Province; Canton, Swatow, Shao-kuan in Kwangtung Province; and Wu-chou, Kweilin, Liu-chou in Kwangsi Province.

D. Chinese People's Construction Bank

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[3] Cheng Chu-yuan, Monetary Affairs of Communist China. Hong Kong, Union Research Institute, 1954, p. 25.

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In order to step up progress of state-planned basic construction and to enforce supervision over the use of funds appropriated for such purposes, the Chinese People's Construction Bank was established on October 5, 1954, and entrusted with the following specific functions:[4] (1) to look after the funds of basic construction projects, either provided by appropriations from the budget or raised by the projects themselves; (2) to supply short term credits to the contracting organizations undertaking work for projects according to the government's credit plan; (3) to settle accounts and make returns in connection with the government's appropriations for the projects; and (4) to supervise the use of funds appropriated or raised, the arrangement of payment between the projects and contracting organizations, and matters related to finance, cost accounting and investment of the projects.

Although this bank is nominally under the control of the Ministry of Finance, it is in effect another subsidiary of the People's Bank: it receives government appropriations from the People's Bank with which to credit the account of each project; and it draws on the People's Bank for short term credits to other projects in accordance with the government's credit plan. Hence it has no individual discretion over its operations. Its head office is in Peking, and branches are at places where there is state industry or basic construction. Nearly all branches use as their office parts of the buildings of the Bank of Communications or People's Bank. In Central-South China the list of its branches is almost identical with that of the Bank of Communications.

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[4] New China News Agency Release, Peking, September 13, 1954.

E. Agricultural Bank of China

The Agricultural Bank of China, set up on March 25, 1955, is placed under the direction of the People's Bank to carry out the following functions:[5] (1) to extend long term and short term credits to state-private operated agricultural, stock-raising, fishery, and producer mutual aid and co-operative organizations as well as individual producers; (2) to handle capital investments allocated in the state budget for agriculture, forestry, and water conservation; (3) to guide the people's credit co-operative organization; and (4) to provide savings deposit services for rural residents, producer mutual aid and co-operative organizations, collective farms, and state agriculture and water conservation projects.

Officially, the function of handling capital investments appropriated in the budget is temporarily to be conducted by the Chinese People's Construction Bank. It seems that the main function of the Agricultural Bank will be to promote and supervise credit co-operatives and to see that the extension of rural credits is soundly conducted. Accordingly, the function of supervising credit co-operatives, formerly handled by the People's Bank Branch offices, will be turned over to the branch offices of the Agricultural Bank of China.

The first thing done by the Agricultural Bank after it began operations was to grant loans to poor farmers for the purpose of paying their subscriptions in credit co-operatives. This was done allegedly to raise the living standards of the poor farmers.

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[5] _Ibid._, March 25, 1955.

F. Joint State-Private Bank

When the merger of private banks took place in December 1952, the locally chartered small private banks in Hankow and Canton and other cities and the local branches of small banks had all been closed down. The only ones still in operation were branches of the big private banks in Shanghai: eleven in Hankow, eight in Canton, and smaller numbers in other important cities. Following the merger, all branch banks in Hankow, Canton, and Changsha were amalgamated into one unit as branch offices of the Joint State-Private Bank; branch banks in other cities were ordered to close.

The functions of the Joint State-Private Bank are as follows: (1) to handle accounts of private enterprises; (2) to extend short term credits to private enterprises. subject to the advice of the People's Bank; (3) to handle overseas Chinese' remittances through the branches of component banks still operating in Hong Kong for the account of the Bank of China and to handle inland remittances; and (4) to accept savings deposits for the account of the People's Bank.

The way amalgamation was conducted in Hankow furnishes an example of the relentless attitude taken by the Communists towards private banks, and of the pitiful position in which this jointly operated bank has been placed. The assistant manager of the Hankow branch of the People's Bank was appointed to serve concurrently as manager of the business department of the Joint State-Private Bank, assisted by four assistant managers appointed from the staff of the former private banks. Each component bank

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conducts its former business at a single counter, identified with the name of the former bank; only 40 per cent of the old staff were re-employed, and the important positions were given to new employees sent from the People's Bank or to the so-called activists.

It is evident that this bank is only a department of the People's Bank, created to deal with private enterprises, and will be dissolved when most of the industry has been converted to joint enterprises and when private commerce will have been full exterminated.

G. Credit Co-operatives

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At the bottom of the Communist banking pyramid are the credit co-operatives. Their establishment and operation, at earlier stages, seemed to have the welfare of the peasants in mind; rural credit was to be extended through co-operatives. Now emphasis has shifted, and the Communists try to attract peasants' savings deposits and utilize them to subsidize those in need. Moreover, the government is now attempting to contract its note issue, increased by government purchases of grain and cotton, by forcing farmers to deposit the proceeds of their sales with credit co-operatives.

There are three types of credit co-operatives: (1) credit co-operatives, the highest level of co-operative organization, having members and directors; their financial resources consist of members' capital and deposits; (2) credit departments, attached to supply and marketing co-operatives which have neither members nor independent capital and which for financial resources rely upon deposits and some special funds allocated by the co-operatives concerned; and (3) mutual-aid credit, which is of the lowest level. Each credit co-operative is organized among twenty or thirty farmers, each farmer subscribing an equal amount of funds to the group to help those of their own number when in need. Credit is extended by agreement of the subscribers and is redeemable in installments.

At the beginning of the fourth quarter of 1954 it was reported that there were more than 30,000 credit co-operatives in Central-South China, about 42 per cent of the total for all of China.

H. Chinese People's Insurance Company

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The Chinese People's Insurance Company was set up on October 20, 1949, under the direction of the Ministry of Finance and the People's Bank.[6] Its aim was to eliminate foreign-operated and Chinese-owned insurance firms, and to concentrate the insurance business in the hands of the government. Branches and sub-branches were established throughout the country, and where there is no separate branch office of the sinsurance company the People's Bank acts as its agent.

Assets of government organs, state enterprises and co-operatives as well as persons travelling by train, steamer and airplane are compulsorily insured. Group personal insurance and insurance on cotton crops and animals used for ploughing are actively encouraged, while other kinds of insurance are available but not at present actively promoted.

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[6] Hsin Chung-kuo Ta-shih Chi-k'an [New China Events Quarterly] , No. 4, Peking, Jen-min ch'u-pan-she, 1949, p. 125; Cheng Chu-yüan, op. cit., p. 116.

BANKING SYSTEM IN CENTRAL-SOUTH CHINA


People's Bank
Branch Offices
Provincial capital
Shanghai city
Branch Offices
Chinese People's Insurance Company
Branches
Sub-branches
Agencies
Sub-agencies
Central Sub-branches
Sub-branches
Agencies
Sub-agencies
Stations
Joint State-Private Bank
Sub-branches
Agencies
Agricultural Bank of China (no branches)
Credit Co-operatives
People's Construction Bank
Sub-branches
Agencies
Bank of Communications
Sub-branches
Bank of China
Sub-branches
Overseas Chinese Service Stations

(Chart faces p. 743.)

(Chart faces p. 743.)

1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF14 Central China AF14

The Chinese People's Insurance Company is considered by the Communists as a means of accumulating long-term funds. The China Insurance Company, a subsidiary of the Bank of China, has overseas branches in places where there are branches of the Bank of China. Branches located in countries which have recognized the government of Communist China are allowed to continue operations in order to generate foreign exchange; the head office in Shanghai is merely a controlling office; there are no branches in China proper. 456

The banking system in Central-South China may be summarized in the chart which follows: 652

[See following page for chart.]

III. BANKING OPERATION

Although there are several special banks in the Communist banking system, they are merely arms and limbs of the People's Bank of China from which policy and resources spring. All banks operate as one body.

The operations of all banks are designed to draw cash funds from the hands of individuals, firms, and organizations, and to control all credits In this way the use of cash will be minimized, all receipts and payments will be handled through bank accounts, and the People's Bank will, in fact, become a central clearing house for the national economy.

A. Cash Control

All public organizations and enterprises must deposit all their cash holdings, excepting small sums as permitted by the authorities, in the local offices or agencies of the People's Bank; all payments, excepting salaries and wages and purchases of products in rural areas, must be made by check. All persons engaged in business must deposit the net balance of each day's proceeds from transactions into their accounts in the bank and must meet their purchases with checks. Under no circumstances may cash be used. All persons in possession of cash exceeding PB$2 million (about US$80) must deposit their holdings in the banks.[7]

A differential annual interest rate, announced

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[7] Cheng Chu-yüan, op. cit., p. 84.

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in January 1954, is paid on deposits;[8] to state enterprises, 2.52 per cent; to joint state-private enterprises, 3.24-7.2 per cent; to private enterprises for current deposits, 5.10-5.40 per cent; and for time deposits, 9.0-14.4 per cent.

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In order to attract scattered funds held by individuals and prevent them from holding cash beyond the fixed limit, the People's Bank, in addition to sub-branches and agencies, has savings receiving and paying stations in residential quarters of each city. Officers of these stations visit residents frequently to collect their savings. In villages, People's Bank's agencies invite local leaders to organize savings promotion committees to do the work of propaganda and persuasion. By such means most families are forced to open savings accounts with banks. High interest rates of 5 per cent to 5.4 per cent for current savings deposits and 9 per cent to 14.4 per cent for fixed savings deposits are paid.[9]

Bank deposits in Central-South China used to rank last, having totaled only one-sixth of those deposited in East China. This was not only because of the lack of banking facilities, but also because the people of Kwangtung, the richest province in this area, preferred to hold banknotes issued by the foreign banks in Hong Kong rather than to deposit their funds in Chinese banks. Although the Communists boast that as a result of their promotion of savings deposits one out of every six persons in Canton now has a savings bank account, the amount of total

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[8] Jen-min Jih-pao [People's Daily], Peking, January 1954.

[9] Chung-kuo Ching-chi Nien-pao [China Economic Annual], No. 1, Tokyo, China Research Institute, 1952.

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savings deposits in Central South is not available. 454

The Communists regard overseas remittances 652
to families of overseas Chinese in Kwangtung as an
important source of deposits. Each family receiv- 457
ing remittances has to open a bank account, and
always find drawing on it difficult. This has result-
ed in a decrease of remittances.

The government has attempted to attract to the 652
bank the plentiful funds received in lump sums by
peasants after they sell their harvest of grain and 454
cotton to the government monopoly. The bait for
deposits in the banks or credit co-operatives is a
very high interest rate; it is 14.4 per cent for de-
posits under three months and 18 per cent for those
of more than three months. But after the winter
of 1954, only in Kiangsi Province did the deposits
reach 30 per cent of the purchase proceeds; they
were only 5 per cent in Honan Province, and much
less in Hunan, Kwangtung, and Kwangsi.[10] Some
peasants were afraid to expose their cash receipts,
and others prefer to hoard commodities.

Different forms of bank transfers of funds with- 652
in one city or between two different places are avail- 453
able. The limit of cash a person may legally carry
when travelling is limited to PB$1 million, old
currency (about US$40).[11]

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[10] Ta-kung Pao [Ta-kung Daily] , Tientsin January 3, 1955.

[11] Cheng Chu-yüan, op. cit., p. 84.

B. Credit Control

As the Communist banking system developed, the People's Bank has become the only source of bank credit. Branches of the People's Bank are authorized to extend short-term credits to state enterprises, production units attached to armed forces, and co-operatives and private enterprises at places where there is no Joint State-Private Bank. State enterprises and public organizations short of working capital can apply for short-term (one year) credits provided the bank approves their financial statement and plan of repayment. Large private industries which are considered beneficial for the national economy, have promise of further development and, having deposited all their funds in the bank, can obtain a continuing supply of credits under a production and financial plan approved by the bank. Smaller private industrial and commercial enterprises can apply for a fixed amount of credit on condition that they have accounts with the bank and disclose their financial condition to the bank. Any credits must be used for the purpose defined in the application.

The bank's interest rate policy follows the principle of "cheaper for public than for private enterprise," and, "cheaper for industrial than for commercial enterprise." Annual interest rates for loans announced in March of 1955, are 5.58 per cent for public industry, 8.28 per cent for public commerce, 10.80-19.80 per cent for private industry, and 16.20-23.40 per cent for private commerce.

Aiming to eliminate non-bank credit, which provides a way of bypassing the bank's control, the government had prohibited public enterprises to purchase on credit. But, in view of the general failure to observe this prohibition, a conference was recently convened to discuss ways of completely eliminating purchases on credit between all public organizations.[12] The conference is to reaffirm the government's determination on this subject. 652 453

According to Communist policy, capital investments should be provided by the government in budget appropriations; therefore, no banking funds are to be used for long-term credit.

Rural credit funds were almost entirely provided by the People's Bank; the extension of credit was mostly made through the credit co-operatives. Loans were to be repaid with the proceeds of compulsory sales of grain and cotton, which the peasants were forced to deposit with the co-operatives. The co-operatives have been able to attract few deposits besides these proceeds. 652 452

The amount of credit extended by the co-operatives was extremely small. For example, Communist newspapers report that 9,000 co-operatives in Hunan Province granted PB$49 million of credit in June 1954, averaging 5.5. million (US$220) from each co-operative. One village in Hupeh Province, having suffered a flood in mid-1954, obtained PB$ 21 million from 3 co-operatives for 183 farm households, averaging PB$7 million (US$280) granted[13] by each co-operative and PB$114,000 (US$4.56)

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[12] Ta-kung Daily, Tientsin, May 7, 1955.

[13] These figures are in the pre-March 1955 old currency. See People's Daily, Peking, Jul. 13, 1954.

for each farm household. Such amounts are too 652
trifling to relieve the Chinese peasants who are 452
constantly in seasonal financial difficulties, quite aside from the need for funds for increasing production.

IV. CURRENCY

A. Currency System

Notes of the People's Bank of China, first 436
introduced in December 1948 in North China, were put in circulation throughout Central-South China 652
following the Communist victory and the establishment of local People's Bank offices. This paper currency has become the only legal tender throughout the whole country. It was issued at first in denominations of 1, 5, 10, 50 and 100 dollars. By the second half of 1949, currency inflation made it necessary to issue notes of larger denominations of 500 and 1,000 dollars; this was followed by the 10,000 denomination note at the end of 1949, and the 50,000 denomination note at the beginning of 1954.

On February 21, 1955, a government order announced that starting on March 1 new People's Bank notes in denominations of one *yuan*, 2, 3, 5, and 10 *yuan*, one *chiao* (ten cents), five *chiao*, one *fen* (cent), two and five *fen* would be issued, and that the old People's Bank notes would be called in at the rate of 10,000 to 1.[14] After April 1, only small denomination notes of 5,000 and less of the old issue might continue to be used. It was also announced by the People's Bank that 10 *yuan* notes would not be issued for the time being.

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[14] Photo samples of some of the new notes are appended at the end of chapter. New China News Agency Release, Peking, February 21, 1955.

The Communists hailed their currency as one of the most stable in the world. Its stability is not secured by a gold reserve, but is fully backed by the balanced position of fiscal receipts and expenditures, the balanced position of distribution of supplies and the balanced position of cash receipts and payments. This means, when translated into the language of a capitalist economy: the stability of the currency is secured by excess impositions, controlled distrubiton of supplies, forced concentration of cash funds in the government banks, and exports made possible by general starvation.

One of the most serious obstacles to currency unification in Central-South China, and also to the stabilization of the currency, had been the circulation of large amounts of Hong Kong paper currency issued by British banks. The volume was estimated to be more than half of their total issue, amounting to HK$ 900 million (about US$150 million) at the time the Communists took over Canton. On February 3, 1950, the Communists in Canton prohibited further circulation of Hong Kong and other foreign currencies, and ordered their exchange for People's Bank notes at the rate quoted by the Bank of China.[15] Propaganda and coercion were used so successfully to back up the order that Hong Kong notes had almost disappeared from the market by the end of 1950, although a small amount may still be kept hidden.

Silver dollars had circulated freely in Hankow and other interior cities when the Nationalist currency collapsed. Since they were only allowed to be

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[15] New China Events Quarterly, No. 1 1950, p. 72.

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kept but not used in transactions, most of them were surrendered to the People's Bank in exchange for bank notes. Although some may still be hoarded, they will not have much effect on the stabilization of People's Bank currency.

The disappearance of Hong Kong currency and silver dollars from the market does not mean that the people have confidence in the Communist currency. The former were simply driven out by force. On the contrary, the continued preference among Cantonese for Hong Kong currency has been amply proved by the black market rate of People's Bank notes in Hong Kong. Before the issue of the new notes, big denominations were quoted at HK$1.48 per PB$10,000 on January 17-21, 1955, against the official rate of HK$2.34; this is a discount of 37 per cent. The black market rate of People's Bank notes rose to HK$1.85 per Yuan on July 11-16, 1955, because of the contraction of cash notes through the exchange of the old notes for the new ones. Needless to say, the people in the interior still treasure silver dollars if they are given freedom of choice.

B. Currency Control

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At the time of issue of the new currency, the Communist authority boasted of the stability of People's Bank notes as proved by the fact that there had been no change in commodity prices at the time of currency conversion in March 1955 when they were required to be quoted in terms of the new currency, and that retail prices in Hankow even

dropped by 0.83 point from the index before the 652
issue of new currency.[16] True, the price level had 435
been stabilized since March 1950, but this was attained by the control of commodities and, in particular, by currency control. Thus the inflationary trend of the Communist currency was concealed.

Control of the currency has been effected by 652
control over cash through the banking mechanism, 436
as mentioned in the discussion of the banking system, and by the withdrawal of currency from circulation through frequent impositions. The impositions began with an issue of Victory Bonds in 1950, amounting to US$ 70 million, 30 per cent of which was allocated to Central-South China.[17] This was followed by the ammunition contribution for the Korean war made by this area in 1951, which was more than 21 per cent of the total amount of US$ 220 million.[18] During the Nationalist regime, the savings of the people in Central-South China had been relatively the smallest, as indicated by bank deposit statistics. When the Communists attempted to squeeze out people's savings by imposing penalities during the so-called Three-Anti and Five-Anti campaigns, currency held by the people had been so scanty that the People's Bank advertised in newspapers, stating it was prepared to accept silver or silver dollars. The Economic Reconstruction Loan of 1954-55 was mainly aimed at absorbing the savings held by the poorer people; the scarcity of savings was attested by the fact that workers' subscriptions were allowed to be deducted from their wages over a period of from three to ten months.

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[16] New China News Agency Release, Peking, March 1, 1955.

[17] New China Events Quarterly, No. 4, 1949, p. 127.

[18] Ho Yü-wen, Chung-kung Ts'ai-cheng Chieh-p'ou [An Analysis of Communist China's Finance], Hong Kong. Asia Press, 1953, p. 74.

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The above measures resulted in the drainage of all available funds to the government; but by doing so, these measures reduced the people's purchasing power, a heavy price indeed for the stabilization of Communist currency.

Table 1. The Railway Lines of Central-South China, 1956*

Units: Km = Kilometer
Mi = Mile

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Line	Terminals	Length
The Chengchow Railway Administration		
Trunk lines		
Lunghai Line (W.)	Shangch'iu - Lanchow	1,740 Km (1,067 Mi)
Peking - Hankow (S.)	Anyang - Hankow	1,220 Km (762 Mi)
Canton - Hankow (N.)	Wuchang - P'unch'i	132 Km (82 Mi)
Hsinhsiang - Huaiching	Hsinhsiang - Chiaotso	62 Km (39 Mi)
Branch Lines		
Hsienyang - T'ungch'uan	Hsienyang - T'ungch'uan	135 Km (84 Mi)
		3,289 Km (2,034 Mi)
The Canton Railway Administration		
Trunk Lines		
Canton - Hankow (S.)	Ch'aanling - Canton	970 Km (606 Mi)
Chekiang - Kiangsi (W.)	Liushiashan - Chuchou	949 Km (593 Mi)
Hunan - Kwangsi (N.)	Chuchou - Lengshuit'an	274 Km (171 Mi)
Nanchang - Chiuchiang	Nanchang - Chiuchiang	129 Km (81 Mi)
Canton - Sanshui	Canton - Sanshui	59 Km (37 Mi)
Canton - Shench'uan	Canton - Shench'uan	147 Km (92 Mi)
Hainan (including 20 Km branch line)	Sanya - Peili	200 Km (125 Mi)
Branch Lines		
Ch'ānchiang - Kaok'eng	Ch'ānchiang - Kaok'eng	7 Km (4 Mi)
Chuchou— Hsiangt'an	Chuchou - Hsiangt'an	26 Km (16 Mi)
Sungpo - Shuik'oushan	Sungpo - Shuik'oushan	58 Km (36 Mi)
Hsūchiatung - Tzuhsing	Hsūchiatung - Tzuhsing	35 Km (22 Mi)
Paishihtu - Yangmeishan	Paishihtu - Yangmeishan	14 Km (9 Mi)
P'ingshih - Kouyatung	P'ingsh'h - Kouyatung	7 Km (4 Mi)
Canton - Huangp'u	Canton - Huangp'u	6 Km (3 Mi)

[Table 1 fac. p. 754 (a)]

Tayeh - Shihuiyao	Tayeh - Shihuiyao	20 Km (13 Mi)
		2,900 Km (1,812 Mi)
The Liuchou Railway Administration		
Trunk Lines		
Laipin - Munankuan (Construction began Oct. 1950 and was completed Dec. 1951)	Laipin to Munankuan	420 Km (262 Mi)
Hunan - Kwangsi	Lanchiats'un - Laipin	467 Km (292 Mi)
Kweichow - Kwangsi	Liuchou - Chinch'engchiang	161 Km (101 Mi)
Lit'ang - Chanchiang (including 50 kilometers of special lines)	Lit'ang - Chanchiang	396 Km (247 Mi)
		1,444 Km (904 Mi)
	Grand Total	7,633 Km (4,770 Mi)

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* Ito-Toshio Gaimusho / Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan /, Chukyo Tetsudo No Genjo / The Present Conditions of the Chinese Communist Railways /, Tokyo, 1954, pp. 42-73; Ling Hung-Hsün Chung-kuo T'ieh-lu Kai-lan / General Survey of the Chinese Railways /, Taipai, 1950, pp. 27-34; Chin Chia-feng, Chung-kuo Chiao-t'ung Chih Fa-ch'an Chi Ch'i Ch'ü-hsiang / Communications of China and The Trend of Development /, Nanking, 1937, pp. 99-119; Jen-min Shou-ts'e / People's Handbook /, Tientsin, Ta-kung pao, 1955, p. 524; Ta-kung Pao / Ta-kung Daily /. Hong Kong, June 24, 1955.

(Table 1 faces p. 754.) [b]

J. Stanford U. S 4 F 1956 AF14 Central China AF14

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

CENTRAL-SOUTH CHINA
POLITICAL AND TRANSPORTATION
International Boundary
Regional Boundary
Provincial Boundary
Highways
Old Railroads
Newly Constructed Railroads
Proposed Railroads
Established Waterways
HONAN
HUPEH
HUNAN
KIANGSI
KWANGTUNG
KWANGSI
Anyang
Chengchow
Kaifeng
Nanyang
WUHAN
Hanyang
Wuchang
Changsha
Chu-chou
Canton
Hong Kong
Macao
Swatow
Nanning
Scale in Miles
0
50
100
150
200

[facing p. 754]

TRANSPORTATION AND DOMESTIC TRADE

The transportation facilities of Central-South China are more diversified than those of other regions in Communist China. There are many railways, highways waterways, and aviation routes running between the principal cities in the Central-South Region and other important centers in other regions. Among these agencies, railways and waterways play the leading roles in the development of transportation. Motor transportation had been uneconomical in pre-war China, and remains so today because of the high cost of truck operation and limited load capacity. As for aviation in Central-South China, it is curtailed somewhat by the lack of up-to-date planes. 489

I. RAILWAY REHABILITATION AND CONSTRUCTION

Ever since the Communists came into power on the China Mainland, a tremendous effort has been exerted to restore and expand the railway networks in the north, west, and southern regions. The railways which are in operation in the Central-South Region are shown in Table 1: 496

Of the twenty-four lines, two were built by the Communists since 1950. 496

A. The Lai-pin -- Mu-nan-kuan Railway

Originally a section of the Hunan-Kwangsi Railway, this line had already been partially built by the Nationalist Government before World War II. The construction work stopped when Nanning was occupied by the Japanese in 1939. The Communist Government resumed construction in October 1950. It was reported that the whole line would need three million cubic meters of earth-work and four million cubic meters of stone-work. Two large bridges (Yung-chiang and Lai-pin), twenty medium bridges, fifty small bridges, and over a hundred culverts were built.[1] The Chinese Communists mobilized tremendous manpower to facilitate the construction. According to a Communist newspaper, more than 7,000 members of the Railway Corps, 4,000 experienced railway workers, and over 30,000 civilian laborers were organized into two bridge-building teams, nine construction teams, and three rail-laying teams.[2] It was reported that nearly 100,000 peasants in about a dozen *hsien* had been mobilized for the work of construction.[3] 499

The Lai-pin -- Mu-nan-kuan Railway was completed and opened to traffic on November 7, 1951. The purpose of building this line was chiefly military rather than economic, since it would serve to 496 defend China's southern gate. At the completion of this line, trains can run from Manchouli, the northernmost terminal of China, to Mu-nan-kuan on the southernmost border.[4] In other words, this railway can facilitate the flow of military as well as economic aids to Vietminh and can be used as a key route for aggression against the Southeast Asia countries.

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[1] *Nan-fang Jih-pao* [*South China Daily*], Canton, Oct. 19, 1950.

[2] *Ta-kung Pao* [*Ta Kung Daily*] Hong Kong, Aug. 29, 1950.

[3] *Ibid.*, Oct. 26, 1950.

A through-traffic agreement for the railway was signed in July 1955 by the governments of Vietminh and Communist China. The formal through-traffic ceremony was held in Peking in August 1955 as the first passenger and freight train began its run to Hanoi, capital of Vietminh.[5] The section within Vietminh between Hanoi and Mu-nan-kuan, about 200 kilometers (125 miles) long, had not been in use for almost ten years and was completed only in the early part of 1955. The new lines will enable the Chinese Communists to receive strategic materials at Haiphong, bypassing Hong Kong, and then transship them to Central China.[6]

B. The Li-t'ang-Chan-chiang Railway

The second railway which the Communists built in Central-South China is the Li-t'ang -- Chanchaing Railway. Construction was ordered in August 1954 by the Ministry of Railways. Military railway construction units did the major work in building the railway, which extends from Li-t'ang, an important point on the Hunan-Kwangsi Railway, to Chan-chiang (or Kwangchowan; called Fort Bayard at one time) on completion at the end of 1955, but the railway was finished six months ahead of schedule

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[4] Ibid.

[5] Hua-ch'iao Jih-pao [China Daily News], New York, Aug. 23, 1955.

[6] China News Service, New York, Aug. 16, 1955, p. 2.

and officially opened to traffic[7] on July 1, 1955. 496
The completion of the railway provides favorable conditions for the consolidation of national defense, aggression against Formosa, and the promotion of foreign trade. The main line is 345.78 kilometers long; in addition, there are special and service lines; in all, 396 kilometers.[8]

One of the new construction projects is the Amoy--Ying-t'an Railway. The railway is to be about 416 kilometers long. Construction began in October 1954 and is scheduled to be completed[9] before 1957. Like the Li-t'ang--Chan-chiang Railway, it is to be built under the leadership of the Army, and it will be valuable to the military. A report presented to the National People's Congress by the Communist Defense Minister P'eng Teh-huai, stated that when railway engineers and civilian workers were mobilized, construction would be accelerated to complete this strategic railway in order to facilitate the military campaign against Quemoy and Formosa.[10]

II. RAILWAY-BRIDGE CONSTRUCTION

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During the first five years of the Communist regime, a number of projects for the strengthening or

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7. NCNA Release, Peking, June 23, 1955.
8. Ibid.
9. China Daily News, New York, Aug. 8, 1928, 1955.
10. China News Service, New York, August 17, 1955.

construction of railway bridges was under way.

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A. The Yellow River Bridge

This, the oldest railway bridge on the Peking-Hankow Railway in Honan Province, was built by French and Belgian engineers in 1900. The speed of trains crossing the 2-1/2 mile bridge was first limited to 15 kilometers per hour, and since that time the service has grown worse. Before 1949, only the smallest locomotives could be used on the bridge, and only when pulling a very few cars at any one time. After 1949, the Communists began to strengthen the bridge. By 1953, strengthening was completed and haulage increased from 600 tons to the normal hauling capacity of 800 tons or more; the speed was improved to the maximum normal speed of about 45-50 kilometers per hour. The total passing time for crossing the bridge was shortened from 30 minutes to 17 minutes.[11]

B. The Yangtze River and the Han River Bridges

Two rivers, the Yangtze and the Han, separate the Peking-Hankow Railway from the Canton-Hankow line. The Peking-Hankow Railway stopped short at the banks of the Han River, where the Han River Bridge had to be built. The construction of the 300-meter (984 feet) bridge began in November 1953 and was completed[12] in November 1954.

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[11] Ching-chi Nien-pao, 1953 [Economic Yearbook, 1953], Ching-chi tao-pao she, Hong Kong, 1953, p. 23.

[12] Far Eastern Economic Review, Hong Kong Nov. 4, 1954, pp. 594-95.

The Yangtze River Bridge is one of the biggest and most important projects in the first Five-Year Plan of Communist China. The Han River Bridge, described above, is to link Hankow and Hanyang, and the Yangtze River Bridge is a link between Wuchang and Hanyang. This bridge will be the biggest and most modern railway bridge in the Eastern Hemisphere and will be the first large bridge built entirely by Chinese engineers. The work of designing it took about a year's time.[13]

The total span of the double-deck bridge will be over a kilometer (nearly 3/4 of a mile) long, carrying six lanes of traffic and pavements for pedestrians, while the lower deck will carry a double-tracked railway. The bridge will be as tall as a twenty-story building. Although it is a fixed bridge, it is at a height sufficient to permit all-year-round steamers up to 10,000 tons to pass beneath it.[14]

The superstructure and the roadway will have a dead weight of 30,000 tons. The total height from the base of the foundation to the top of the piers will be about 60 meters. River-bed silt below the bridge site varies in thickness from 0 to 40 meters, while the water level varies by some 17 meters during the year. The most difficult task will be the foundation work on rocks below the top soil.[15]

Among those taking part in the construction of the Yangtze River Bridge are twenty-six bridge engineers, with Dr. Mao I-sheng, the former designer and chief engineer of the Ch'ien-t'ang River Bridge, as chairman. Geologists, hydrologists, architects, designers, scientific research workers, and experienced laborers have joined in the planning of the bridge.[16] The construction materials, parts, machines and equipment used are made by various factories in Anshan, Sheng-yang, and Dairen in Manchuria, and in Tientsin and Shanghai in North and East China.[17] It was reported that construction began on July 18, 1955, and it is expected that the railway bridge will be completed during 1958; the highway deck will be finished during the following year.[18] 499

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[13] *NCNA*, Wuhan, April 14, 1955.

[14] *People's China*, Peking, Aug. 16, 1954, p. 24.

[15] *Ibid.*

When the undertaking is completed, two modern steel bridges spanning the Yangtze and Han rivers will bring the Peking-Hankow and Hankow- Canton railways together. Furthermore, all of the main railway lines in the south will connect directly or indirectly by way of the Yangtze River Bridge at Wuhan with the trunk lines of the north. All the highways in the south will also be connected with those of the north. In addition, the completion of the bridge will unite the three adjacent towns of Wuchang, Hankow, and Hanyang into a single unit; thus united, Wuhan a great industrial city of serious importance to the nation's economic construction, will become a unified municipality both in name and fact. 489

III. THE RAILWAY PLANTS OF CENTRAL-SOUTH CHINA

There are seven comparatively large railway plants in the Central-South Region.[19] 498

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16. China Daily News, Aug. 22, 1955.

17. Ibid. 18. Ibid.

19. Chung-k'ung Wen t'i [The Chinese Communist Problems], Hong Kong, Tzu-yu ch'u-pan-she, Series No. I, 1954, p. 76.

Railway Plants in the Central-South

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Name	Location
The San Ch'iao Railway Plant	Honan
The Kaifeng Railway Plant	Honan
The Chiang-an Railway Plant	Wuhan
The Wuchang Railway Plant	Wuhan
The Chu-chou Railway Plant	Hunan
The Heng-yang Railway Plant	Hunan
The Liu-chou Railway Plant	Kwangsi

The Chu-chou and Chiang-an plants are best equipped. According to the general regulation for repairing locomotives and cars, a locomotive is completely overhauled after a run of 300,000 kilometers, and ordinary repairs are undertaken every 100,000 kilometers. Passenger cars are overhauled some time between their sixth and their eighteenth year of service, depending upon the durability of each type of car; for repairs, the service period is halved. The overhaul of freight cars is made on the average of every six to eight years; for repairs, every three to four years.[20]

Communist China manages her railways almost entirely according to the so-called "advanced experience" of Soviet Russia. The "new measures" are simply the experienced advice of the Soviet consultants. The most important measures adopted by the Central-South railways are mentioned below. 497

A. The "Economic Calculation System"

The stock of supplies in each of the railway administration's warehouses is checked in order to to determine the amount of working capital needed. The cost of material resources and manpower participating directly in the railway service is fixed; the amount of work required for a particular job is carefully calculated to determine whether each worker has enough to do to keep him busy eight hours a day.[21] The conservation of materials is another important procedure in this sytem, and includes the care to make economical use of fuel and other railway materials. Concerning coal consumption the Chinese Communists adopt Soviet Russia's "one-two-three" method. That is, for every kilometer a locomotive runs, coal is added twice, each time three shovelfuls. Anti-rust preservative is used in the boiler in order to "soften the water, dissolve the dirt, and prevent rust."[22] The quota system is intended to help prevent excess use of other materials. But in actual practice, this problem has not been solved. For instance, the total amount of materials needed for any job will depend upon a number of factors which may vary, and so a quota of materials cannot be arbitrarily fixed.

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[20] The Chinese Communist Problems, Series No. I, 1954, p. 76.

B. The Full-Car-Load Movement

Because of shortage of locomotives and rolling stock, the Communist government is enforcing the

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[21] Jen-min Jih-pao [People's Daily] , Peking, Dec. 16, 1952.

[22] This method is, in fact out of date in the Western nations. In the west, a kind of super-heater has been adopted. A saving of about 15 per cent coal resulted. Experiments with 8-wheeled freight locomotives also resulted in savings of 25 per cent coal. See Chao Yung-seen, Railways in Communist China, Hong Kong, Union Research Institute, 1955, pp. 51-52.

"full-car-load" movement in all regions. The so-called "Yang Mao-lin loading method"[23] is the model. The essential points of Yang's method are to devise a loading plan by dividing the cargo into different classes according to the shape and nature of the contents, and by pinning small markers on the packages. Workers are supplied with lists showing the loading order, and they load the marked packages into the freight cars which bear the same marked flag as seen on the packages. This is also called the "matching-flag loading method."[24]

C. The Overhaulage Movement

The "overhaulage system" was devised by Cheng Hsi-k'un, an engine-driver who had practiced the method as early as 1949. His locomotive was able to haul 60 tons more than its official haulage capacity. When an overloaded train approached an upgrade, Cheng accelerated and sprayed sand on the rails. To stop an over-loaded train, he had to slow down long beforehand and twice apply the brakes.[25] Cheng's method received so much popular acclaim that it was adopted in order to carry more war materials to North Korea.

At the beginning of the present regime, the Communists encouraged locomotive engineers to make use of their rolling stock to such an extent that each loaded train covered at least 500 kilometers

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[23] Yang Mao-lin was originally a head weigher in Harbin Railway Station.

[24] People's Daily, Peking, May 27, 1952.

[25] Chieh-fang Jih-pao [Liberation Daily], Shanghai, July 5, 1952.

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every 24 hours. In order to achieve this objective, it was necessary to increase the speed of the locomotive, to shorten the time lost in car-switching, checking and assembling at stations, and loading and unloading at terminals, and to increase the speed of other train operations between stations. The so-called "Li Hsi-kuei Train Switching Method" and the "Sun Feng-chi Simultaneous Checking and Repairing Method" were established on all national railways.[26]

A considerable increase of train speed and efficiency has been demonstrated by many railways; for instance, the through-passenger express from Peking to Hankow shortened its running time by 3 hours and 35 minutes, while the running time of the express train from Shanghai to Canton was reduced by 3 hours and 17 minutes.[27]

D. Planned Transport

The basic principle of "planned transport" is to make use of all available railway facilities to transport cargoes and to reduce empty hauls to the minimum level. The promulgation in 1953 of the "Tentative Regulations Concerning the Regional Balancing of Production and Marketing of Coal and Its Reasonable Transport" incorporates this measure.[28] The country is divided into thirteen coal-producing areas, comprising forty-five state-operated and joint state-and-private coal mines.

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[26] Kung-jen Jih-pao [Workers' Daily] , Peking, Dec. 19, 1952.

[27] Ch'i Yü, Hsin Chung-kuo Ti T'ieh-tao Chien-she [New China's Railway Reconstruction] , Peking, 1953, p. 241.

[28] Tsu-kuo Chou-k'an [China Weekly] , Hong Kong, Jan. 10, 1955, pp. 24-25.

The distribution, supply sale, and transport of coal by these mines are completely under government control. The direction of flow and the regions in which coal is to be marketed are fixed for each individual mine in order to avoid the waste of transportation facilities.[29] 497

The Chinese Communists re-classified freight into thirty classes instead of the five which were used during pre-Communist days. Except for a few luxury items, the general level of freight rates applied on all the railways in Central-South China is said to be lower than that of the Nationalist Government. The rate for first-class commodities is about sixteen times higher than that of the thirtieth class. The rates decrease as the distances increase. The lowest freight rates are charged for grains and other food stuffs. Special rates charged for coal are even lower than the cost of operation.[30] The enforcement of the "responsibility system" began in January 1953, but because of the irresponsibility of railway staffs there was much loss in transit, and further damages resulted from train accidents and other causes, for which the rail administrations had to pay a great amount of compensation.[31]

IV. HIGHWAY ROUTES OF CENTRAL-SOUTH CHINA

The exact mileage of the network of highways in the Central-South Region is difficult to determine. The amount given in provincial reports does not agree with the amount given in national reports. There is no distinction made between provincial roads and county roads, nor is there any consistency 491

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[29] *Ibid.*, p. 25.

[30] *New China's Railroad Reconstruction*, pp. 32-33.

[31] *The Chinese Communist Problems*, Ser. #1, Hong Kong, 1954, p. 77.

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Table 2. National Highways of Central-South China*

Unit: Km = Kilometers
Mi = Miles

Highway	Terminals	Principal Cities Served	Length	Remarks
Basic No. 1	Shanghai - Lhasa, Tibet	Chiuchiang, Hankow, and Ich'ang	5,221 Km (3,263 Mi)	completed Sikang - Tibet Highway
Basic No. 2	Chiuchiang - P'angchiang	Canton, Ch'ü-chiang, Hankow, and Kaifeng	3,411 Km (2,132 Mi)	
Basic No. 3	Mawei - Huoerhkuosu	Lin Ch'uan, Nanchang, Wuchang, and Hankow	5,386 Km (3,366 Mi)	
Lateral No. 1	Amoy - Munankuan	Kanhsien, Ch'üchiang, P'inglo, Nanning, Munankuan	1,921 Km (1,201 Mi)	
Lateral No. 2	Shanghai - Tienshengch'iao	Nanchang, Changsha, and Ch'angte	2,782 Km (1,739 Mi)	
Lateral No. 3	Lüssukang - Paocheng	Nanyang and Laochok'ou	2,053 Km (1,283 Mi)	
Lateral No. 4	Lienyünkang - Mingt'akai	Kaifeng and Loyang	5,759 Km (3,599 Mi)	
Longitudinal No. 1	Haian - Shanhaikuan	Chanchiang, Canton, and Meihsien	4,297 Km (2,686 Mi)	
Longitudinal No.2	Swatow - Chouchiak'ou	Kanhsien, Chian, and Fengch'eng	2,042 Km (1,276 Mi)	
Longitudinal No. 3	Ch'ang-te - P'angchiang	Li-hsien, Chingmen, Hsiangyang, and Fanch'eng	2,128 Km (1,330 Mi)	
Longitudinal No. 4	Chanchiang - Pailingmiao	Lienchiang, and Pinyang	3,614 Km (2,259 Mi)	
		Total	38,614 Km (24,134 Mi)	

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* Hsing-cheng-yüan, Hsin-wen-chü [Bureau pf Information, Executive Yüan], Kuo-tao Wang [Highway Network], Nanking, 1947, pp. 2-20, 21-50.

(Table 2 faces p. 766.)

in the various records concerning the completion of new roads, or when such roads are open or closed to traffic.

In the present study, all the major national highways which pass through Central-South China are considered first; then some of the provincial highways connecting cities and towns of the region are discussed.

Table 3. The Inter-Provincial Highways of Central-South China Operated in 1952*

Highways	Terminals	Length (Kilometers and Miles)
Kaifeng-hsiaochiehling Line	Kaifeng - Hsiaochiehling	434 Km (271 Mi)
Kaifeng - T'ungkuan Line	Kaifeng - T'ungkuan	455 Km (283 Mi)
Kaifeng - Nanyang Line	Kaifeng - Nanyang	398 Km (249 Mi)
Kaifeng - P'uyang Line	Kaifeng - P'uyang	130 Km (81 Mi)
Jufenk'ang - Kaifeng Line	Jufenk'ang - Kaifeng	178 Km (111 Mi)
Hunan - Kiangsi Line	Ch'ang-te - Nanchang	566 Km (354 Mi)
Hupeh - Kiangsi Line	Wuchang - Nanchang	380 Km (238 Mi)
Nanchang - Mawei Line	Nanchang - Mawei	338 Km (211 Mi)
Nanchang - Changwangmiao Line	Nanchang - Changwangmiao	335 Km (209 Mi)
Changsha - Hsiaot'ang Line	Changsha - Hsiaot'ang	387 Km (242 Mi)
Hsiaotang - Shench'uan Line	Hsiaot'ang - Shench'uan	644 Km (402 Mi)
Changsha - Nienyüp'u Line	Changsha - Nienyüp'u	626 Km (391 Mi)
Wuchang- Changsha Line	Wuchang - Changsha	387 Km (242 Mi)
Kweilin - Hengyang Line	Kweilin - Hengyang	361 Km (226 Mi)
Kweilin - Ch'inglungchieh Line	Kweilin - Ch'inglungchieh	154 Km (96 Mi)
Kweilin - Huangshaho Line	Kweilin - Huangshaho	159 Km (99 Mi)
Lip'u - Kweilin Line	Lip'u - Kweilin	104 Km (65 Mi)
Lip'u - Mengchiang Line	Lip'u - Mengchiang	584 Km (365 Mi)
Lip'u - Sansui Line	Lip'u - Sansui	
Liuchou - Lip'u Line	Liuchou - Lip'u	326 Km (204 Mi)
Liuchou - Liuchai Line	Liuchou - Liuchai	
Nanning - Munankuan Line	Nanning - Munankuan	——
Canton - Hsingning Line	Canton - Hsingning	375 Km (234 Mi)
Canton - Swatow Line	Canton - Swatow	472 Km (295 Mi)

[Table 3 fac. p. 767 (a)]

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Canton - Hsintu Line	Canton - Hsintu	279 Km (174 Mi)
Canton - Haian Line	Canton - Haian	640 Km (400 Mi)
Ch'üchiang - Kanchou Line	Ch'üchiang - Kanchou	229 Km (143 Mi)
Canton - Kanchou Line	Canton - Hsingning - Kanchou	-
Hainan Circular Line	East Line)) West Line)	1,347 Km (842 Mi)
K'aip'ing - Yüehnan Line	K'aip'ing - Fangch'eng - Yüehnan	-
Changchou - Swatow Line	Changchou - Swatow	298 Km (186 Mi)
	Total	10,582 Km (6,614 Mi)

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* Fei-ch'ü Ti Kung-lu Chiao-t'ung /The Highway Transportion of Communist China/, The Central Committee of the Chinese Nationalist Party, Taipei, 1953.

(Table 3 faces p. 767.) [b]

Before the Sino-Japanese War, the Central-South Region had opened to traffic 15, 409 kilometers (9, 631 mi.) of national highways, and 13, 272 kilometers (7, 247 mi.) of provincial highways in the six provinces (excluding Hainan Island). Most of these highways were seriously damaged during the war.[32] After the war, progress was made in highway repair work. In February 1950, the Communists reported that a total of 16, 559 kilometers (10, 290 mi.), or 59 per cent of all the highways in the five provinces of Honan, Hupeh, Kiangsi, and Kwangtung had been repaired. In these five provinces, 1, 021 bridges and 65 large culverts with a total length of 15, 060 meters (49, 397 ft.) were rebuilt or strengthened,[33] and 64 ferry stations were re-established. At the same time, there were 5, 279 motor vehicle and 10, 537 rubber-tire carts in operation in the five provinces.. By October 1950, about 64 per cent of the highways in the region had been repaired and opened to traffic. From January to June 1950, the volume of traffic on the highways in this region amounted to only 12, 595 tons. If all the highways in this region were properly repaired, there may be as many as 41, 966 kilometers (25, 064 miles) in operation by 1955. The best highways are located in Hunan Province, and they can be regarded as China's "model highways."[34]

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32. Teng. Tzu-hui "Chung-nan Chün-cheng-wei-yuan-hui Pao-kao" 1950, The Report of the Central-South Military and Political Committee, 1950, Hsin-hua Yüeh-pao [New China Monthly] , Peking, Vol. II, No. 6, Oct. 1950.

33. Mao, Shou-chin, Kung-lu Ch'ang shih [General Knowledge about Highways] , Shanghai, 1951, p. 8.

34. Ibid.

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Because of the limited supply of gasoline and the limited number of motor vehicles, the cost of motor transportation is still high in China. In spite of the improvements in roadbeds and the reduction of fuel consumption, it is necessary to maintain a comparatively high freight rate. Generally speaking, in the coastal regions of South China where imported fuels are available, freight rates may be lower than in the provinces of the interior. Under these circumstances, the development of large-scale motor transportation is still remote. Motor transportation is employed mainly in short-haul passenger services in those areas where neither rail nor water transportation facilities are available.

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Table 4. The Inland Water Routes of Central-South China *

Unit: Km = Kilometers
Mi = Miles

Waterway		Distance	Grade ∮
Yangtse River	Shanghai - Hankow	1,120 Km (700 Mi)	1
	Hankow - Ich'ang	673 Km (421 Mi)	2
	Ich'ang - Ipin	1,082 Km (676 Mi)	3
	Yüehyang - Hsiangyin	100 Km (63 Mi)	4
	Yüehyang - Ch'angte	205 Km (128 Mi)	5
Yüan-shui	Hsiangyin - Ch'angte	200 Km (125 Mi)	5
	Ch'angte - Shihping	661 Km (431 Mi)	5
Tu-shui	Yüanling - Tuyang	255 Km (159 Mi)	5
Li-shui	Tungting Lake - Ts'uli	152 Km (96 Mi)	5
	Li-hsien - Lin-li	55 Km (34 Mi)	5
Tsu-shui	Yüanchiang - Shaoyang	350 Km (219 Mi)	5
Hsiang-ch'iang	Hsiangyin - Hsingan	776 Km (486 Mi)	4
	Hsingan - Tayungchiang	33 Km (21 Mi)	4
Han-shui	Hankow - Hanchung	271 Km (169 Mi	5
	Hanchung - Mienhsien	54 Km (34 Mi)	5
Kan	Huk'ou - Tayü	630 Km (394 Mi)	5
	Tayü - Nanhsiung	29 Km (18 Mi)	5
Poyang Lake	Tuch'ang - Poyang	72 Km (45 Mi)	5
	Juihung - Yüshan	375 Km (234 Mi)	5
	Nanchang - Shankuan	250 Km (156 Mi)	5
Pearl River	Hong Kong - Canton	130 Km (81 Mi)	1
Tu	Canton - Ts'angwu	280 Km (175 Mi)	3
Hsün	Ts'angwu - Kueip'ing	196 Km (123 Mi)	4
Ch'ien	Kueip'ing - Shihlung	186 Km (116 Mi)	5

[faces p. 769 (2)]

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Liu	Shihlung - Liuchou	189 Km (118 Mi)	5
Yü	Kueip'ing - Tungning	427 Km (267 Mi)	4
Tso	Tungning - P'ingerhai	379 Km (237 Mi)	5
Yu	Tungning - Poai	608 Km (380 Mi)	5
Pei	Sanshui - Shuhhsing	458 Km (286 Mi)	5
Tung	Canton - Polo	73 Km (46 Mi)	4
	Polo - Hoyüan	130 Km (81 Mi)	5
Kuei	Ts'angwu - Tayungchiang	409 Km (256 Mi)	5
	Total	10,808 Km (6,756 Mi)	

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* Hsing-cheng-yüan, Hsin-wen-chü, [Bureau of Information, Executive Yuan], Hang-tao-Wang [The Navigation-Route Network], Nanking, 1947, pp.23-40.

ǂ Grade 6 water routes are not included in this table. How rivers are graded for navigability isexplained below.

(Table 4 faces p. 769.) [b]

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V. INLAND WATER ROUTES

Next to railways, water routes play a very important role in transportation in Central-South China. The two major navigable rivers of this region are the Yangtze and Pearl rivers. Other minor waterways are tributaries of these two. Up to the end of 1950, there were 174 wholly or partly navigable waterways of different grades (according to tonnage carried) in the five provinces of Hunan, Hupeh, Kwangsi, Kwangtung, and Kiangsi, with a total distance of 29,130 kilometers (See Table 4.)

The waterways in Table 4 are navigable for steamers ranging from 300 to 10,000 gross tons. Those waterways below Grade 5 accommodate 60-ton steamers or wooden junks. The different grades of waterways are determined by the navigability of each river.[35]

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[35] The Navigation-route Network, pp. 3-5.

Navigability Grading of River

Rating	Depth of River	Tonnage of Carrier
Grade 1	5 to 8 meters (16' -26')	10,000 tons
Grade 2	3.8 meters (12')	2,000 tons
Grade 3	3.2 meters (11')	1,000 tons
Grade 4	2.8 meters (9')	600 tons
Grade 5	2.5 meters (8')	300 tons
Grade 6	1.5 meters (5')	60 tons

The section of the Yangtze River between Shanghai and Hankow and the section of the Pearl River between Canton and Hong Kong are considered Grade 1 water routes. Ocean steamers above 10,000 metric tons can move freely along these routes. On waterways graded from 2 to 5, small steamers may be used. Only wooden junks and small steamers below 60 tons can be employed in the Grade 6 rivers. The inland waterways have been much improved during the 5-year period of the Communist regime. Navigability of the inland waterways was estimated at 95,000 kilometers in 1955, representing an increase of 27 per cent[36] over 1950.

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[36] NCNA, Peking, May 7, 1955.

VI. THE COASTAL SHIPPING ROUTES

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In dealing with the subject of coastal shipping of Central-South China, the coastal shipping routes and the principal harbors are of first importance. Ten routes connect the South China ports. These are shown in Table 5.

Table 5. The Coastal Shipping Routes of Central-South China */

NAME	ROUTES	DISTANCE
Canton--Chan-chiang Line	Canton--Shui-tung--Chan-chiang	406 Km. (254m.)
Canton--Hai-k'ou Line	Canton--Hai-k'ou	435 Km. (272m.)
Canton--Hai-k'ou--Pei hai Line	Canton--Hai-k'ou--Pei-hai	643 Km. (402m.)
Canton--Yü-lin Line	Canton--Chan-chiang--Yü-lin	
Canton--Chan-chiang--Pei hai Line	Canton-Chiang-men--Chan-chiang Pei-hai	
Canton--Chan-chiang--Shih tao Line	Canton--Chan-chiang--Shih-tao	
Chan-chiang--Pei hai--Tung-hsing Line	Chan-chiang--Pei-hai--Tung-hsing	
Canton--Shan-wei Line	Canton--Ta-ch'an--Shan-wei	
Canton--Swatow Line	Canton--Shan--wei--Swatow	320 Km. (200m.)
Amoy-Swatow Line	Amoy--Swatow	200 Km. (125m.)
	Total	2,004 Km. (1,253mi.

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*/ Fei-ch'ü T'i Hang-yün Chiao-t'ung [Navigation in the Communist Area], Part II, The Sixth Section, Central Committee, Nationalist Party, Taipei, 1953, pp. 2-3.

504 The most important harbors in connection with these routes are Canton and Huang-p'u, the Great South China Harbor; Swatow; Chan-chiang, (or Kwangchowan), and three harbors in Hainan Island, namely, Hai-k'ou, Yü-lin, and San-ya.

503 The improvement and expansion work at Huang-pu Habor continued during 1953 and 1954. On July 3, 1955, the State Council decided to rebuild Chan-chiang (Kwangchowan) as one of the most important harbors along the South China Coast. The completion of the new Li-t'ang--Chan-chiang Railway adds to the importance of this new development.[37] Among the three Hainan harbors, Yü-lin is the best and can be called the key harbor of South Hainan. The depth of the water of the Yü-lin harbor is from 10 to 30 meters, and large ocean ships can enter easily. There are still stone snags and rocks in some places within the harbor which may do harm to boats and which should be marked or removed in order to insure safety.[38]

VII. SHIPPING AND TRANSPORTATION

501 Before World War II, China's shipping tonnage was 576,000 tons, including 124 ocean steamers totaling 367,383 tons and 3,333 river steamers totaling 208,617 tons. During the war it was estimated that about 495,320 tons of both types of steamers were lost.[39] After the war 2,751 Japanese ships of various

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[37] Ya-chou Tien-hsün, [Asia Foundation Bulletin], San Francisco, July 5, 1955.

[38] Ch'en Chih, Hai-nan-tao Hsin-chih [A New Gazeteer of Hainan Island], Shanghai, 1949, pp. 40-43.

[39] Hsing-cheng-yüan Hsin-wen-chü [Bureau of Information, Executive Yuan], Hang Yün [Navigation], Nanking, 1947, p. 24.

types with a total of 251,288 tons were confiscated, including 590 ships in the vicinity of Wuhan and 511 ships in the vicinity of Kwangtung, with a total of 75,886 tons.[40]

According to 1947 statistics of the Ministry of Communications, the total number of various types of ships under national, public and private ownership in the Central-South Region[41] was 1,327, with a total tonnage of 134,704, as shown in the following tabulation:

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[40] *Ibid.*, p. 23.

[41] *Ibid*, pp. 25-28.

Table 6. Shipping Tonnage in 1947

Shipping Classification	Yangtze River Area No. of Ships	Yangtze River Area Tons	Canton Area No. of Ships	Canton Area Tons	Combined Total No. of Ships	Combined Total Tons
By Usage:						
Ocean	-	-	289	40, 347	289	40, 347
River	507	62, 375	531	31, 982	1, 038	94, 357
Total	507	62, 375	820	72, 329	1, 327	134, 704
By Tonnage:						
60-200 Tons	460	25, 964	774	48, 912		
	47	36, 411	46	23, 317		
Total	507	62, 375	820	72, 329		
By Ownership:						
National	160	28, 959	19	1, 683		
	347	33, 416	801	70, 645		
Total	507	62, 375	820	72, 329		

The Nationalist Government managed to save a 501 number of government-owned ships from Communist confiscation by moving them to Formosa at the time of evacuation in 1949. It was estimated that less than 20 per cent of the shipping tonnage of the government-owned China Merchant Steamship Company was left to the Communists. Therefore, the total shipping volume available to the Mainland by 1950 was estimated to be not more than 200,000 tons.[42] But because of the Communists' vigorous efforts, building new ships as well as salvaging and repairing sunken and damaged ships, a substantial recovery was made during the three-year period of 1951-54. In the Central-South Region, by [396] 1951 the Canton and Huang-p'u dock yards are reported to have built 1,200 motor-sailing boats, and the Changsha Steamship Company had repaired 22 steamers.[43]

In the first half of 1953 about 2,500,000 tons 505 of essential commodities for daily use were shipped from Shanghai by steamer to Chungking and I-pin through Hankow. The total amount of freight shipped on the Yangtze River in 1953 amounted to 5,300,000 tons, representing an increase of 18 per cent[44] over 1952. In the South China area, the shipments on the Pearl River and its tributaries constituted about 60 to 80 per cent of the total[45] local freight traffic in 1953.

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[42] Economic Weekly, Shanghai, Jan. 1950, Vol. X, No. 1, pp. 7-8.

[43] Navigation in the Communist Area, Part I, p. 17.

[44] The Economic Year Book, 1954, 1954, p. 51.

[45] Ibid., pp. 51-52.

Improvements in transportation facilities and 505 techniques contributed to the volume of water transport in Central-South China. For instance, in 1952, the length of time for the round trip of a steamer running between I-Ch'ang and Chungking was shortened from[46] 6 to 4 days. Similarly, a round trip between Shanghai and Hankow took only 6 days in January 1954 instead of the 10 days formerly required.[47] An increase of shipping capacity 502 resulted from the changes in towing practice. 505 "Single-file towing" methods suggested by Soviet experts have increased both the speed and the volume of the shipping handled.

Before the end of 1952, the entire Yangtze River section within the Central-South Region adopted the "single-file towing" method. The Ch'ang-chiang Navigation Administration reported an increase of several hundred thousand tons[48] in freight volume between March and December of 1952.

By lowering transportation costs, the Commu- 505 nists have attempted to reduce the freight rate. For example, the freight rate in the Yangtze River area was reported to be 50 per cent lower in 1950 than in 1949. In 1951 and 1952, reductions to 30 and 20 per cent respectively were announced.[49] In the Pearl River district, the freight rates of steamships at the end of 1952 were about 50 per cent lower than those existing early in 1952; the

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[46] *Navigation in the Communist Area*, p. 17.

[47] *NCNA*, Wuhan, Jan. 13, 1954.

[48] *Navigation in the Communist Area*, p. 16.

[49] *Ibid.*, p. 14.

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passenger rate dropped about 15 per cent during the same period.[50] But after three years' effort to reduce the freight rates on the inland waterways, it was reported that only certain sections of the Yangtze and Pearl rivers had established freight rates below those of the railways on certain essential commodities.[51] Other rivers in the Central-South Region charged higher rates than those current for these two large rivers.

The improper classification of different commodities with respect to rate-charging is a common defect of the system of rate-fixing. In the Pearl River district the freight rates of the first class are 6.8 times those of the tenth class.[52] Seasonal factors and the direction of commodity movements were also neglected in the rate-fixing.

VII. NAVIGATION ADMINSTRATION AND SHIPPERS

The system for navigation administration in Central-South China can be divided into two categories, ocean shipping and river traffic. These are represented by the South China Ocean-shipping Administration governing coastal shipping, and the Yangtze River District Navigation Administration and the Canton District Navigation Administration governing inland waterway transportation.[53] 505 These district administrations are under the supervision of the two chief administrations for inland and ocean shipping of the Ministry of Communications in the capital. The original China Merchant Steamship Company of the Nationalist Government was changed to the People's Steamship Company in 1950, and then changed to the Ocean-Shipping Administration in 1951. The former Min-sheng Industrial Corporation, the largest privately-owned shipping company in China, was reorganized into a joint public-private ownership firm in 1952, and its name was changed to the Min-sheng Shipping Corporation.[54] After reorganization, the company made considerable progress in achieving efficiency of operation and in increasing the volume of traffic. New ships totaling about 15,000 tons were built, and the expansion of transport activities ranged from the Yangtze River to the coastal ports of Canton, Chan-chiang, and Hai-k'ou. The volume of traffic showed an increase of 27 per cent. The company showed a profit during 1953, instead of suffering deficit as in pre-Communist days.[55]

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[50] Ibid.

[51] Ibid.

[52] Ibid., p. 15.

In order to transform privately owned water- 506
transportation into state or semi-state capitalism, 471

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[53] *Ibid.*, pp. 1-2.

[54] Huai Fu, "1953 Nien Chiao-t'ung Yün-shu Shih-yeh Ti Hsin Fa-chan ["The New Developments of Communication and Transportation Enterprises in China, 1953"], *The Economic Yearbook, 1954*, p. 52.

[55] *Ibid.*, p. 34.

great efforts have been exerted in the Central-South Region. In Kwangtung Province, eleven private shipping companies were consolidated into Lien Hsing Steamship Company, Inc., under public-private ownership.[56] The same tendency was evident in other provinces of Central-South China, but necessary data are not available. 505 471

IX. AIR TRANSPORTATION IN CENTRAL-SOUTH CHINA

When the Nationalists were evacuated from China in 1949, the two aviation companies, the China National Aviation Corporation and the Central Aviation Transport Corporation, left no planes on the China Mainland. But in November 1949, because of the sudden defection of the two leaders, Liu and Chen, over a dozen of the passenger planes were flown back to the Mainland from Hong Kong. Some of the employees in Hong Kong returned to China to serve the People's Republic. These employees repaired about sixteen more planes[57] during the period of 1950-51. 509

In the early part of 1955 there were five civil air lines operated by the People's Aviation Company in the Central-South Region: (1) the Peking-Chengchow-Hankow Line; (2) the Hankow-Hengyang-Canton Line; (3) the Shanghai-Nanking-Hankow Line; (4) the Hankow-Ichang-Chungking Line; (5) the Canton-Nanning-Kunming Line.[58]

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[56] Asia Foundation Bulletin, July 27, 1955.

[57] Far Eastern Economic Review, Hong Kong, Vol. VII, No. 22, Dec. 1, 1949, p. 693.

[58] China Weekly, No. 106 Jan. 10, 1955, p. 25.

509 The Communists claim that there has not been a single serious accident in civil aviation; they also claim that they have maintained an average of 84.6 per cent of the tonnage capacity of planes in operation.[59] With reference to the expansion of traffic, the total air miles flown in 1953 was 282 per cent above the record for 1950. The ton-kilometers increased to 570 per cent and the number of passengers[60] increased to 191 per cent in 1953. Communist China claims that its civil-aviation goals for the first half of 1955 have been over-fulfilled. The number of passengers carried was 13 per cent above the goal set, and the freight was 5.9 per cent above that of the same period in 1954.[61]

X. TRANSPORTATION OF THE KEY-COMMODITIES AND THE TRADE ROUTES

A. Grain Transportation and Trade Routes

438 489 The Central-South Region is normally one of the grain-surplus regions in China. Among the six provinces. Hunan, Hupeh and Kiangsi contribute the greatest amount of grain. Since 1952, Kwangtung has changed from a grain-deficit area into a self-sufficient province. Central-South's volume of inter-regional trade in food grains in 1949 was about

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[59] People's China. Peking, No. 8, Apr. 16, 1954, p. 16.

[60] Ibid., No. 28, April 16, 1954, p. 14.

[61] NCNA, Peking, July 20, 1955.

10,350,000 *shih-tan* (569,250 tons), of which 4,000,000 *shih-tan* (220,000 tons) were shipped to North China and 5,150,000 *shih-tan* (283,250 tons) to East China by rail and 1,200,000 *shih-tan* (66,000 tons) were shipped by water to East China ports along the Yangtze River. The distribution between rail and water traffic is calculated on the assumption that Kiangsi and Hunan grains are shipped principally on the Chekiang-Kiangsi or Hankow-Canton railways, whereas Hupeh shipments are by water, chiefly by way of Hankow.[62]

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B. Cotton Transportation and Trade Routes

Honan, Hupeh, and Hunan are surplus-cotton provinces in Central-South China. The trade routes of this region, according to the sources of demand for cotton, are probably as follows:

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[62] *Liberation Daily*, Shanghai, May 23, 26, 27, 1950; June 18, 26, 1950; cf. New China Monthly, Vol. II, Nos. 1-3, May-July 1950, p. 607.

Province of Origin	Means of Transportation	Destination
Honan	Rail	Hopei, North China Kiangsu, East China Shantung, East China Hupeh, Central-South
Hupeh	Rail	Hupeh, Central-South
Hupeh	Inland Waterway	Kiangsu, East China Kiangsi, Central-South Szechwan, Southwest
Hunan	Inland Waterway	Hupeh, Central-South

Honan, the chief cotton-producing province in the Central-South Region, has the important consumption centers, Chengchow, Anyang; and Wei-hui, Chengchow, Shan-hsien, Anyang, and Ling-pao as the provincial trans-shipment centers. A part of the cotton produced in Shensi is shipped to Chengchow,

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Shen-ch'ou, and Anyang for trans-shipment to Shanghai, Wu-hsi, Shih-chia-chuang, Tientsin, and other East China cities, mostly on Lunghai and Peking-Hankow railways.[63] All the cotton produced in Hupeh is concentrated in Wuhan and Sha-shih for use in the local mills. Parts of the cotton produced in Honan, Shensi, and Hunan are shipped to Wuhan, Wu-hsüeh, Sha-shih, and I-ch'ang for trans-shipment to Shanghai and Szechwan by Yangtze River ships.[64] In Hunan, most of the cotton is concentrated in Changsha and Yüeh-yang and a part is shipped to Hankow, Tsao-yang, and Lao-ho'k'ou in Hupeh Province.[65]

C. Coal Transportation and Trade Routes

Generally speaking, Central-South China is a deficit region for the supply of coal; the exception is Honan Province, where a considerable quantity of coal is still available for export. The principal production centers of Honan are Chiao-tso, Liu-ho-kou, Kuan-yin-t'ang mines, and Wu-an mines. The coal is usually contrated in Tao-k'ou, Hsin-

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[63] Yü O Wan Kan Chu Sheng Chih Mien-ch'an Yün-hsiao [Cotton Transportation and Sales of Honan, Hupeh, Anhwei, and Kiangsi Provinces] , Nanking University, Nanking, 1934-35.

[64] Ching-chi Hui-pao [Economic Reports] , Chungking, Central Bank of China, May 16, 1944, Vol. IX, No. 10, p. 46.

[65] Chung-kuo Shih-yeh Chih, Hunan [Chinese Industries, Hunan] , Chungking, Ministry of Industry, 1935, Section 4, pp. 87-96 .

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hsiang, and Chengchow, and then trans-shipped by rail to Han-tan, Tientsin, Peking, Hankow, Hsi-an (Sian), and Shanghai.[66] Hupeh depends upon Honan, Hopei and Manchuria for coal supplies which are transported chiefly by railway lines.[67] The coal production in Hunan can supply a large part of the local demand, except for that of Changsha, which depends upon the shipments from P'ing-hsiang in Kiangsi Province.[68] Kiangsi is self-sufficient in production and can export a part of its surplus to Hunan, Hupeh, Anhwei, Kiangsu, and Chekiang.[69]

Little coal is produced in Kwangtung Province. The local output is negligible in relation to demand. Kwangsi, Kiangsi, Hupeh, Hopei, and Manchuria are the main sources of coal supply, generally transported by both coastal shipping and rail lines to Canton and Swatow for trans-shipment.[70]

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66. Chung-kuo K'uang-yeh Chi-yao [General Statement on Chinese Mining Industry], Nanking, Geological Survey of China, 1932-34, No. 5, pp. 70-78, 99-101.

67. Ibid.

68. Ibid., No. 5, pp. 542-43, No. 7, pp. 447-59; Chung-yang Yin-hang Yüeh-pao [Central Bank of China Monthly], Shanghai, Central Bank of China, No. 8, June 1947, p. 43.

69. Ibid., No. 5, pp. 542-43.

70. Ibid., pp. 73, 87, 553; no. 7, pp. 78, 611-14; Bank of China Monthly, Shanghai, Chung-kuo Yin-hang [Bank of China], Vol. V, No. 6, March 16,

Coal production in Kwangsi is sufficient for local consumption, but there is little surplus to be exported to Kwangtung by the inland water transportation route.[71] 438 489

XI. THE DOMESTIC TRADE OF CENTRAL-SOUTH CHINA

"State Socialism" is the guiding element of the Chinese Communist economy. This is especially true in industry and trade. Article 10 of the Constitution states: "The policy of the state towards capitalist industry and commerce is to use, restrict, and transform.... The state uses the positive qualities of the capitalist industry and commerce which are beneficial to the national welfare and the people's livelihood, restricts negative qualities...., encourages and guides the transformation of capitalist economy, and step by step replaces capitalist ownership with ownership by the whole people."[72] With Article 10 as a guiding principle, the final goal of the trading machinery of Communist China is a state-owned, co-operative, and state-capitalist economy. During the present stage of transition, there are five separate arrangements current in China's economy. These are the state-owned enterprise, the co-operative, the private corporation, the individual, and the state capitalist. 471

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[71] General Statement on Chinese Mining Industry, No. 5, p. 87; No. 7, pp. 77, pp. 572-75.

[72] People's China, No. 13, July 1, 1954, Supplement, p. 6.

A. State-owned Trading Companies

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Six domestic trading companies were established in 1950: the China Food Company, the China Textiles Company, the China Salt Company, the China General Merchandise Company, the China Coal and Building Materials Company, and the China Native Products Company.[73] All of these trading companies have established branches and sub-branches in nearly all of the major cities of Central-South China. Some companies, such as the China General Merchandise Company and the China Native Products Company, have established branches in rural areas. In 1953, the state introduced a system of planned purchase and supply of grain and edible vegetable oils. The state grain markets were established throughout the country. In June 1954 there were approximately 1,200 such markets in Central-South China, and the number increased to about 9,000 at the end of July in the same year.[74] The progres of the planned purchase and supply of grain was rapid during the second half of 1954. In Central-South China 69.4 per cent of the projected target was completed[75] by November 20, 1954.

In September 1954 the planned purchase of cotton and the planned purchase and supply of cotton cloth, were introduced. The primary aim was to eliminate the private wholesale and retail dealers in cotton cloth and to stabilize the prices. As a result of these new measures, the majority of the cotton and cotton-cloth shops were liquidated and such shops changed to other trades. In Kwangtung, approximately 110 branches of the China Cotton Textile Company were organized at the end of August 1954, with about 5,000 civilian retail shops acting as company agents.[76] 655 443

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[73] Tu-pao Shou-ts'e [Newspaper Reading Handbook] , Hankow Ch'ang-chiang jih-pao she [Yangtze Daily Co.] , 1950, pp. 422-23.

[74] China Weekly, No. 106, Jan. 10, 1955, p. 38.

[75] Ibid., p. 39.

B. Supply and Marketing Co-operatives

The supply and marketing co-operative in Communists China is an organization formed on a "voluntary basis" by the peasants. Its capital is made up of shares held by the members; it supplies members with farm implements, fertilizer, and daily necessities, and markets their agricultural produce and products of the local industries. The state trading companies and their branches often make advance contracts with these co-operatives by supplying them their products at fixed low prices. The Communists reported that about 32,625 supply and marketing co-operatives including 1,868 consumer co-operatives, with a total membership of 166 million, had been organized by the end of June 1954. At least, 10,000 such co-operatives were estimated to have been set up in Central-South China during the same period.[77] These co-operatives did an 474 443 average of 25 per cent of the total retail trade in 1953, namely, 18 per cent of the retail trade in the cities and 30 per cent of that in the countryside. About 75 per cent of all the purchases by the co-operatives in 1953 were made on behalf of the state.[78] In most cases, purchases of raw materials and also such export items as cotton from Honan and Hupeh, hemp from Kiangsi, tobacco from Honan, tea from Hunan, silk from Kwangtung, and tung oil from Hunan were made through the co-operatives.[79] 473 474

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[76] Ibid.

[77] Far Eastern Economic Review, Hong Kong, Vol. XVIII, No. 19, p. 597.

C. The Private Sector

With respect to private commerce, the State has adopted the policy of utilizing their "positive" activities and restricting their "negative" ones. At the same time, the state is leading them, allegedly at their own insistence on the road to state capitalism. In view of the monopolistic position of the state-owned trading companies, the private wholesale and retail dealers would be automatically squeezed out of business, or would be forced to act as distributing agents for the state-trading firms. In the cotton trade, for example, Section 4 of the "Temporary Regulation of the Supply of Cotton Yarn in the Central-South Area" announced 472 656 by the Central-South Military and Political Committee, provides a form of control over the cotton-yarn and cloth market. In order to keep enough finished goods on hand and provide sufficiently for the market, the state-owned trading companies were allowed to control, according to their needs, a part or the whole of the products of private enterprises.[80] In Canton, public and private factories and the cotton textile merchants were required to register the amount of cotton cloth bought, produced, and kept in inventory. Private and public institutions were also required to apply to the Municipal Industry and Commerce Bureau for permission to transport their cotton goods to the suburb of Canton.[81] Under these circumstances, the private cotton and cotton-cloth dealers were, naturally, forced either to change their occupation or to be reorganized to state capitalism.[82] 472 656

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[78] Ibid.

[79] Ibid.

After the abolition of about three million private peddlers in Central-South China, the supply of necessary commodities was curtailed, causing great inconvenience to the rural communities. The Ministry of Agriculture issued new directives to Party and government workers to allow the peddlers to handle all retail sales throughout the rural districts in order to stabilize the trade channels between city and rural areas.[83] 443 656

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80. People's Daily, Peking, Aug. 22, 1951.

81. Hsing-tao Jih-pao [Sing-tao Daily] , Hong Kong, Oct. 12, 1951.

82. Ibid.

83. New China Monthly, Peking, No. 65, March 1955, p. 153.

D. State Capitalism

The main forms of state capitalism are as follows: (1) the state designates private merchants as distributors on its behalf, the commodities are sold as property of the state, and the merchants work on a commission basis. (2) Private merchants purchase controlled commodities from state stocks and resell them at fixed retail prices regulated by the state. (3) Joint state-private ownership replaces private capitalist ownership, and the state invests some capital in business under joint management. In Canton up to June 1954 there were 9,700 trading firms, among them those handling grains, edible oil, chemical dyes, metals, medicines, communications, electrical appliances, silk and cotton cloth, cigarettes, wines, coal, and lumber. All of these firms were converted to state capitalism in one of the several arrangements listed above.[84] This transformation was carried out soon after the large-scale "Wu-fan" (Five-Anti) Campaign[85] launched in 1952. 475

Domestic trade in Central-South China is for the most part under the monopoly of the government. The private sector of trade is decreasing while the state-owned sector, including the co-operatives, increases very rapidly. According to the goal established by the first Five-Year Plan, state-owned 471

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[84] Ta-Kung Daily, Tientsin, Oct. 4, 1954.

[85] "Wu-fan" was a campaign launched in 1952 immediately after the "San-fan" Campaign to eliminate bribery, evasion of taxes, shoddy work and use of inferior materials on government contracts, stealing of state property, use of confidential economic information from governmental sources for speculation on the market.

Table 7. The Native Products Fairs of the Central-South China Area in 1952 *

	Fair	Total Trading Volume (Millions)
443	Chungnan Native Products Fair Hankow, April	¥102,900 ($4.3)
438	Chungnan Commodity Fair Wuhan, July	¥2,323,200 ($96.8)
543	Hunan Native Products Fair Changsha, May	¥110,600 ($4.6)
	Changsha Commodity Fair Changsha, October	¥180,000 (7.8)
	West Hunan Native Products Fair Yüanling, June	¥21,400 ($0.9)
	Honan Third Commodity Fair Chengchow, November	¥527,800 ($22.0)
	Kiangsi Native Products Fair Nanchang, April	¥30,000 ($1.2)
	Nanchang Commodity Fair Nanchang, July	¥117,000 ($4.4)
	Kwangsi Commodity Fair Nanning, August	¥188,000 ($7.8)
	Kweilin Commodity Fair Keilin, July	¥ 56,600 ($2.4)
	South-China Commodity Fair Canton, November-December	¥1,600,000 ($66.7)
	Central Kwantung Commodity Fair Chiangmen, October	¥165,000 ($6.9)
	Hainan Commodity Fair Haik'ou, February	¥8,000 ($0.3)
		¥5,430,200 ($225.8)

* Economic Weekly, Shanghai, No. 21, May 28, 1953, p. 7.

(Table 7 faces p. [illegible].)
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trade will reach 55 per cent, state capitalism 24 471
per cent, and private trading will be reduced to
21 per cent or less.[86]

In order to facilitate the interflow of commodi- 443
ties between rural district and city, the Chinese 438
Communists have held numerous "Native Products
Fairs" in big cities since 1951. Nine fairs were 543
held in the Central-South China area during 1951,
and the total trade amounted to 2, 247. 8 billion yuan
(US$76. 77 million).[87]

During 1952 there were 13 fairs held in different localities throughout Central-South China, as shown in Table 7.

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[86] Ching-chi Tao-pao [Economic Bulletin] , Hong Kong, Ching-chi tao-pao she, No. 26, July 11, 1955, p. 11.

[87] Ching-chi Chou-pao [Economic Weekly] , Shanghai, No. 21, May 28, 1953, p. 7.

The total trade volume of these fairs during 1952 was reported to have been 5, 430 billion yuan, 438 which would represent, if accurate, an increase 543 of 141. 5 per cent over that of 1952. In terms of ownership of the trading concerns, the state sector contributed 61. 21 per cent; co-operatives, 8. 97 per cent; joint public and private operation, 1. 17 per cent; and the private concerns, 28. 65 per cent.[88]

To sum up, the commodity movement between 489 South and North China is mainly by way of railways and partly by coastal shipping, but between Central-South and East China inland waterways and railways are the principal means of transportation. Transportation facilities betwen the Central-South and the Southwest of China are inadequate because projected railway lines have not been completed. Highway and air transportation as a whole play only a minor role in Central-South China's trade. The two nearly built railways to the border of Indo-China are for military rather than for economic use.

The purpose of building the Lai-pin--Mu-nan- 496 kuan Railway was purely military. The Chinese 724 Communists, in order to facilitate their southern expedition and expand their military strength in Southeast Asia, had to extend substantial aids to Ho Chih-minh, chairman of the Vietminh government in Indo-China. The completion of this railway in December 1951 had a direct bearing upon Ho's military success in 1954. Military supplies, including men, weapons, and approximately 500, 000 tons[89] of grain were shipped during the three-year period, 1952-54, of the war in Indo-China.

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[88] Ibid., p. 8.

[89] Ta-lu Liang-Huang Ti P'ou-hsi [An Analysis of Grain Shortage in Mainland China], The Sixth Section, CentralCommittee, Nationalist Party, Taipei, June.14, 1954, p. 13.

Furthermore, if war should begin in Southeast Asia, military supplies of Russian origin could be shipped to Mu-nan-kuan directly by train and then trans-shipped to Vietminh. The Lai-pin--Mu-nan-kuan Railway can be considered as a most strategic line which would not only enable Communist China to render direct aid to Vietminh, but would also facilitate Soviet control over the whole of Southeast Asia.

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The newly built Li-t'ang--Chan-chiang Railway has a similar strategic value. Chan-chiang (Kwangchowan), the southernmost terminal of the railway, is an important harbor opposite the Lei-chou Peninsula. Harbor-improvement work is underway and is expected to be completed by the end of 1955. The motive of building this new railway, and the reason for the construction of a new harbor in Chan-chiang, becomes evident when the following facts are considered: in order to avoid difficulties similar to those caused by the blockade of Formosa, strategic materials from Communist satellite countries can be imported through the port of Chan-chiang. This railway serves as a short-cut from Kwangtung to Kwangsi and reaches the Leu-chou Peninsula, gateway to Hainan Island. An important military base in the event of a Formosan invasion, the peninsula is reported to be guarded by 50,000 troops and equipped with six newly constructed air fields. In short, the Li-t'ang--Chan-chiang Railway will not only facilitate importation of strategic materials, but will also provide conditions favorable to the consolidation of military strength against Formosa and other parts of Southeast Asia.

SOCIALIST TRANSFORMATION OF PRIVATE INDUSTRY AND COMMERCE[1]

Central-South China has two important industrial cities: The Wuhan tri-city, composed of Hankow, Wuchang (The capital of Hupeh Province), and Hanyang (on the left bank of the Yangtze and the right bank of the Han River), and Canton, capital of Kwangtung Province.

Both Wuhan and Hanyang have been noted as the birthplace at the turn of the century of Chinese state-owned industry. The first modern blast furnace and steel mill in China were built in Hanyang; and cotton, ramie, and silk textile factories were constructed in Wuchang At the same time, the development of private industry in the tri-city lagged far behind that of Shanghai and Tientsin. Before China's War of Resistance against Japan, the main private industries were the manufacturing of cotton textiles and machinery, flour milling, the production of tobacco, and match manufacturing. The number of spindles of cotton yarn produced amounted to only 11 per cent of the amount produced in Shanghai; the production of flour mills was only 10 per cent that of Shanghai;[2] the machine manufacturers and tobacco and match factories were all poorly capitalized and equipped. This flimsy foundation of private industry, partly destroyed and dismantled during the war, had recovered to only half of its pre-war level when the Communists took over the tri-city.

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[1] Unless otherwise indicated, statements in this chapter are based on private information of the author, Dr. K. N. Chang.

[2] *Mei-yuan Yun-yung Wei-yuan-hui Mien-hua Hsiao-tsu Wei-yuan-hui Tiao-ch'a Pao-kao* [*Statistical Report of the Cotton Commitee of the Council for United States Aid*], Taipei, 1948, p. 22; *Chung-kuo Ching-chi Nien-chien* [*China Economic Yearbook, 1935*], Commercial Press, Vol.II, pp. L4-8.

Canton, although it was the first port opened to foreign trade, was also backward in industrial development. Though there were more small private industries in Canton than in Hankow, such as rubber-goods manufacturing, household cotton weaving, small-machine shops, electrical-equipment manufacturing, tobacco-and match-manufacturing, and vegetable-oil refining, very few of them had been equipped with fair amounts of capital. Besides Canton, there are two minor industrial cities in Kwangtung Province, Swatow and Chiang-men (Kongmoon), the former being known for embroidery and the latter for its modern paper mill. Hainan Island lacked any important private industries.

In the provinces of Hunan, Kiangsi, Honan, and Kwangsi, a few private industries of moderate size which had existed before the war were either damaged by the war or dismantled and removed. Least affected by the war were hundreds of small rice-milling establishments in Changsha, Hunan Province, and in Nanchang, Kiangsi Province; a great number of small cotton-ginning factories in Chengchow, Honan Province; and many small tobacco-curing factories in Hsü-Hsien, Honan. Kwangsi, poorly endowed with natural resources and lacking in private capital, had few private industries.

The lack of political stability and of sea transportation facilities were the main causes of the slow development of private industry in Central-South China. However, there are special reasons for the backwardness of Kwangtung Province, although it enjoys the advantage of being located along the seacoast First, the free port of Hong Kong is at the door of Canton, and manufactured goods of any kind and origin are obtainable there. Thousands of travelers daily between Canton and Hong Kong can bring in small quantities of goods as their own possessions, and the long coastline facilitates smuggling. Under these conditions it was difficult for infant industries to survive. Secondly, there was a sharp contrast of political atmosphere between Canton and Hong Kong. Canton, the cradle of revolution, has had incessant political disturbances. In Hong Kong, peace and order reigned and the rights and interest of private enterprise were adequately respected and protected, which helped to attract Chinese investments. Thirdly, excessive taxes imposed by the local government frightened domestic capital away from investing in industry; instead, it was kept in foreign banks in Canton or Hong Kong. 178

The small number of manufacturers and the larger proportion of small to big factories made it both easier and simpler for the Communists to transform private industrial enterprises into joint state-private concerns in Central-South China than in East China. The government was relatively little concerned about capitalist sabotage, the lack of cooperation of entrepreneurs and technicians, and the need for great amounts of working capital. Moreover, the process could be quickened by the amalgamation of the small factories The rapid progress of transformation was shown by the fact that during July 1954 the proportion of industrial output of private industry in Central-South China was reduced 471 to 14.39 per cent, as against 68.48 per cent in Shanghai at about the same period.[3]

In the Wuhan tri-city all enterprises with larger capitalization were transformed by the Communists into joint state-private enterprises during 1954. They were cotton textile firms totaling 163,000 spindles the flour-milling industry, the Nanyang Tobacco Co., the Hankow Water and Power Co., and the Hankow Packing Factory. They were followed by a number of match factories enamel-manufacturing companies cotton-weaving factories, and dyeing establishments. Two paint factories were amalgamated, and three machine shops and five small steamship companies were merged with Ming Sheng Steamship Co., a joint enterprise, during the same period.

In Kwangtung and Hunan provinces, the number of private industrial enterprises which were transformed into joint state-private enterprises was larger than that in Wuhan. By the end of 1954, the number of joint enterprises in Canton had reached 130, including one 20,000-spindle cotton-textile mill in Canton and a modern paper mill in Kongmoon,[4] the two largest enterprises in Kwangtung Province; most of the others were amalgamated into larger units. Private enterprises in Hunan

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3. Ch'ang-chiang Jih-pao [Yangtze Daily], Hankow, January 1954.

4. Statistical Report of the Cotton Committee of the Council for United States Aid, p. 25; Nanfang Jih-pao [South China Daily], Canton, July 27, 1954.

Province which were made into joint concerns reached 471
102 during 1954, including two cotton-textile mills totaling 35,000 spindles; amalgamation was carried out in most of these enterprises.

The number of private industries in Kiangsi, Honan, and Kwangsi provinces was much smaller than that in Kwangtung and Hunan provinces. The only large enterprises were two cotton-textile mills in Kiangsi totaling 30,000 spindles; these were transformed into joint enterprises. However, the Communists did not lose sight of the many small industries, such as the famous ceramic industry in Ching-te Chen, Kiangsi Province, and the tobacco leaf-curing industry in Hsü Hsien, Honan Province.

Industry in Kwangsi and on Hainan Island had been least developed, and most of it had been owned by the government. Therefore, the Communists found little transformation work to do.

In contrast to its backwardness in modern industry, Central-South China has been rich in 438
native products, and it has been estimated that 441
there are 140 different kinds, including the straw and bush mats and palm leaf fans produced in Kwangtung Province; glasscloth, hand-made paper, and chinaware of Kiangsi Province; wood oil, ramie, bamboo-ware, and silk embroidery of Hunan Province; and herbs, medicines, copperware, and lacquer of Hupeh Province. According to Communist statistics in 1951, 35 per cent of the gross income of agriculture in Central-South China was derived from the production of these commodities.[5]

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[5] Wang T'ing-chieh "I-nien-lai Chung-kuo Kuo-ying Mao-i Ti Chü-ta Ch'eng-chiu ["Great Achievements of China's State Enterprises during Past Year"] *Ching-chi Tao-pao* [*Economic Bulletin*] , Hong Kong, January 15, 1952.

This means that a greater number of people were 438
engaged in domestic trade. Consequently, elimina- 441
tion of the merchant class would seem to be more
urgent to the Communists than transformation of
private industry.

The Communists made great efforts to force 441
the merchants to transfer their capital into joint
state-private industry and to act as agents of the 471
government-trading organizations. They thought
this would solve the problem of unemployment and
absorb commercial capital into industry. But in
practice industry was willing to accept capital
but not the personnel, while the merchants insisted
on the inseparability of capital and personnel.
Therefore, many preferred to sit by idly, spending
their capital, and only those who had no capital became agents of the government-trading organizations.

The transformation of small industries, coupled with amalgamation and the elimination of private trade, affected the life of a large number of people and made the Communist regime in Central-South China an object of distrust. The Cantonese in particular are pugnacious and enterprising people who like wealth, and the Hunanese are noted for their obstinacy and dogged persistence. Many mass killings are reported to have resulted from the people's open defiance of government orders in Kwangtung and Hunan provinces.

The general strategy of using certain local leaders of the business community as a spearhead for government participation in private enterprise, by giving them high-sounding positions in government and newspaper commendation, was also used in Central-South China. The more notable appointments follow:

Chou Ts'ang-po, former manager of the Shanghai Commercial and Savings Bank in Hankow and Chairman of the Board of the Hua Chung Chemical Industries was appointed to membership on the First National Committee of the People's Political Consultative Conferece, the Military and Political Committee of Central-South China and the Hupeh Provincial People's Council.

Ch'en Ching-yü, general manager of the Han-ch'ang Chemical Industries was appointed deputy mayor of Hankow, and was made a member of the Military and Political Committee of Central-South China.

Li Kuo-wei, general manager of the Shen-hsin Hankow Branch Mill and the Fu-hsin Flour Mill, was made a member of the Second National Committee of the People's Political Conference and a member of the Hupeh Provincial People's Council.

Chien Yü-chieh, general manager of the Nanyang Tobacco Company, was a member of the First and Second National Committees of the People's Consultative Conference, the Military and Political Committee of Central-South China, and the Kwangtung Provincial People's Council.

The above examples show the general pattern of socialization which, together with industrial development, is one of the twin objectives of the first Five-Year Plan of Communist China.

LABOR

I. ORGANIZATION OF TRADE UNIONS

The number of wage-earners and salaried employees (exclusive of farm labor) in the six provinces and two municipalities of Central-South China amounted to 23,000,000 in October 1950. From 1950 to 1952 industrial production trebled, with a corresponding increase in the number of workers. Since the launching of the Communist's first Five-Year Plan and the building of three new industrial districts in this region,[1] the working class of Central-South China has had a greater share of the burden of national reconstruction of China under the Communist regime. 464

Having had experience in labor organization in other regions which had been "liberated" before Central-South China, the Communists encountered relatively few difficulties in their work of unionization. By October 1950, as many as 60 per cent of the workers of this area had been unionized.[2] The Preparatory Committee of the Central-South Federation of Trade Unions was established in July 1950, but was dissolved October 1952. The Central-South 465

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[1] The three new industrial districts are: (1) the Chengchow-Loyang area of Honan Province; (2) the Wuhan area in Hupeh Province; and (3) the central part of Hunan Province.

[2] Kung-jen Jih-pao [Workers' Daily], Peking, Oct. 3, 1950, p. 4.

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office of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions was established after the Communists decided to centralize the trade-union structure and tighten Party control in this region.

The Wuhan area is the largest industrial and commercial center in Central-South China. By the end of 1950, there were 22 industrial trade unions organized, and 660 basic unions were formed in individual factories, mines, and workshops; 58 per cent of the 260,000 workers were unionized.[3] Because Wuhan was a transit port in both domestic and foreign trade, half of its working population worked directly or indirectly for the transportation system and most of the transportation workers employed on wharves, warehouses, piers, and ferries were organized in 1950.

According to incomplete statistics at the time of "liberation," there were 152,613 workers in Honan Province, 47 per cent of whom were unionized by the end of 1949. The lack of large-scale industries and the political "backwardness" of workers in Honan made the Communists' efforts to organize labor there less fruitful than in other provinces of this region.[4]

Kiangsi is another place in Central-South China where trade-union organization lagged behind. In mid-1950, after two years of work by the Communists, only 10 per cent of the workers in that province had

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3. Cheng-fu Kung-tso Pao-kao Hui-pien [Compendium of Government Reports], Peking, 1951, pp. 830-31.

4. Workers' Daily, Jan. 19, 1950, p. 4.

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joined unions. Conditions in Nanchang, the provincial capital, were better; 80 per cent of the textile and telecommunication workers were unionized, while 12,000 stevedores and porters were organized[5] by the end of 1949.

The Preparatory Committee of the Hunan Office of the Central-South Federation of Trade Unions was established by the end of 1949. Workers in such cities as Changsha, Heng-yang, Hsiang-t'an, Yüeh-yang, and Chu-chou organized their trade unions in 1949.

Canton in Kwangtung Province had been one of the centers of light industry in Central-South China. The working class of that city had been well organized before the Communists took over. At the time of the occupation by the Communists in December 1949, Canton had 340,000 workers (including clerks and employees of stores), or about 26 per cent of the city's population of 1,300,000. The Preparatory Committee of the Canton General Trade Union was established by the Communists in December 1949. Immediately after this, 26 of the major trade unions were taken over by the Committee.[6] Because Canton was a main port in the Central-South handling foreign trade, a seamen's union and unions of stevedores were formed in August 1950.

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[5] Ibid., May 20, 1950, p. 1.

[6] Chuang-kuo Kung-jen [Chinese Worker Monthly], Feb. 15, 1950, p. 82, and March 4, 1950, p. 1.

Some of the Communist press reports have indicated that the Communist work on the organization of trade unions in Central-South China has not been without its difficulties. According to the Communists, both the leaders of the trade unions and the rank and file of the working class seemed unable to understand fully the significance of the "new democracy." The union cadres adopted a "closed door" policy, excluding most of the technicians, ordinary employees, and temporary workers from the trade-union organization. As to the workers, they had not enough confidence in those who led them. For instance, some shop clerks in Kaifeng instead of asking help from their trade union, negotiated directly with the owner of the shop for a wage raise without notifying their union. They thought that the union was a nuisance rather than a help. Workers still did not realize that they were "masters of the nation."[7] 467

It was a lack of "democratic spirit" on the part of the trade-union leadership as much as political awakening on the part of the working class that inspired the "Democratic Reform" Movement in the Central-South region about the middle of 1950.

II. LABOR DISPUTES

In a speech delivered by Teng Tzu-hui on the occasion of the formal opening of the Office of the Preparatory Committee of the Central-South 468

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[7] Workers' Daily, Oct. 5, 1950, p. 1.

Federation of Trade Unions in July 1950, the relation between labor and capital (or management in the case of public enterprises) was defined. According to Teng, in the Communist society, labor and capital (or management) perform different functions but strive for the same goal, i.e., increase of production; therefore, labor disputes should not be allowed to develop into strikes, sabotage or lockouts which would disturb production. All labor disputes in publicly-owned or privately-owned enterprises should be resolved in accordance with the interests of both labor and capital or management.[8]

The first step toward settling labor disputes is consultation between the trade union and the owner in the case of privately-owned enterprises, and between the trade union and the management in the case of publicly-owned enterprises. If consultation fails, the disputes may be brought to the Labor Bureau for mediation or arbitration. A labor bureau is established at all levels of local government.

The agency for settling labor disputes in publicly-owned enterprises was the Factory Administration Committee, on which labor and management were representated. By the end of 1949, in the Wuhan area of Hupeh Province, seven of the public utility companies, such as telecommunications, the post office, and water supply, established factory administration committees. In March of 1950, the

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[8] Tsu-kuo chou-k'an [China Weekly], Jan. 26, 1953, p. 10.

Wuchang No. 1 Cotton Mill, a privately-owned enterprise, ventured to establish a Labor-Capital Consultation Council to tackle labor disputes and other problems of production. Labor and capital were equally represented in the council. In other privately owned cotton mills in Wuhan, collective contracts were signed between labor and capital to settle disputes.[9]

In Canton, there were many cases of labor disputes reported in cotton mills, rubber factories, and cigarette-manufacturing companies in 1949. Within the four months between January and April, 1950, the Labor Bureau of the Canton People's Government handled 72 cases involving labor disputes.[10] In the provinces of Honan, Hunan, Kiangsi, and Kwangsi, where industrial development had lagged behind in comparison with Wuhan and Canton, the settlement of labor disputes more or less followed the old tradition and were handled by the local trade unions.

According to a Communist report from Hupeh, the trade union leadership in that province made some mistakes in handling relations between labor and capital. In some cases, the local People's Government and the Party workers organized without any authority production management committees in privately-owned enterprises. They took over the control of finance and production, although they had no experience in running factories. This mistake of Party leadership led to the closing of some factories and to the increase of unemployment and caused bad feelings among workers toward the Party 468 in Hupeh.[11] This state of affairs had been common in other parts of the country but was avoided in later stages of the labor movement.

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[9] Workers' Daily, Jan. 19, 1950, p. 1, and March 4, 1950, p. 1.

[10] Compendium of Government Reports, p. 804.

III. DEMOCRATIC REFORM AND POLITICAL INDOCTRINATION AMONG THE WORKING CLASS

In the course of organizing the Chinese working 668 class in 1949 and 1950, the Communists discovered 467 that "reactionary elements" were still active in factories and mines and on wharves and docks. Some of these "reactionary elements" were organizers of secret societies such as the I-kuan-tao [the Unity Society], the Chiu-kung-tao [the Nine Palace Society], the Hung-pang [the Red Society], and the Ch'ing-pang [the Green Society]; others were alleged to be Nationalist agents or remnants of the Nationalist army. To the Communists, it seemed necessary to start a political movement among the masses to clean such remnants of feudal rule from industry in order to prepare the country for socialization.

A conference called in Hankow by the Central-South Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party in May 1951 initiated the "Democratic Reform" Drive among the working class in this region. The movement as defined by Yeh Chien-ying, Chairman of Kwangtung Province, covered workers in four main industries: (1) public factories and enterprises; (2) shipping stevedores or dock coolies; (3) inland river transportation; and (4) private factories and enterprises. Schools and government departments did not come within its

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[11] Workers' Daily, Dec. 11, 1949, p. 4.

scope and were not to be affected by the movement.[12] 668
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By the end of July 1951, more than forty enterprises in the Wuhan area had developed a "Democratic Reform" Drive. The separate stages involved in developing such a movement within an enterprise were: (1) the launching of propaganda for "New Democracy" among the workers; (2) the organization of small units of workers for a struggle against "reactionary elements"; (3) the identification of the most obvious examples of such "reactionary elements"; and (4) the encouragement of workers to make accusations against those suspected of counterrevolutionary activities.

The Communists said that through these procedures many members of secret societies, escaped "landlords," local "despots," bandits, and Kuomintang officials were discovered hiding among the working class in this region.[13]

After the movement began in Canton, the local People's Government made 214 arrests within four months among the workers. Those arrested were sentenced to death, imprisonment, or public surveillance in accordance with the degree of their guilt.[14]

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[12] Current Background, Hong Kong, U. S. Consulate General, Oct. 15, 1951, No. 128.

[13] Ch'ang-chiang Jih-pao [Yangtze Daily], Oct. 3, 1951, p. 1.

[14] Nan-fang Jih-pao [South China Daily], August 20, 1951, p. 1.

The "Democratic Reform" Drive was aimed at the purge of trade unions and the political indoctrination of the working class. The Communist press claimed that, after their successful struggle against these "reactionary elements," the political consciousness of the workers was higher and the trade-union organizations were stronger than they had been. 668 467

The "Five-Anti" Campaign and the "Resist-American-Aid-Korea" Movement were two other drives launched among the working class by the Communists to give workers political indoctrination.

IV. LABOR EMULATION AND PRODUCTION

"Labor emulation" is the Communist means of increasing labor productivity without increasing cost of production. In organizing "labor emulation," the following steps are involved: (1) workers are organized to discuss the state's production plans; (2) the trade unions, on behalf of the workers, sign collective contracts with their respective administrations; (3) production meetings are held to discuss production problems; (4) workers plan and submit "rationalization" proposals to increase efficiency and popularize "advanced" methods of work.[15] 461

Labor emulation began in China proper in 1950. By 1953, about 80 per cent of the workers of the country had participated in this drive, and, according to Communist reports, production has been increased.

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15. People's China, Peking, May 16, 1954, pp 6-8.

At the end of 1950, the Communists used the "Resist-America-Aid-Korea" Movement to step up the tempo of the labor emulation drive. The workers of factories and mines and other enterprises in Central-South China were mobilized to sign "patriotic emulation pacts." Four large cotton mills in Wuhan reported a 16 per cent increase in daily production during the month of November. The workers of the Wuchang Electric Company set their goal to increase production by supplying the same amount of water and electricity while reducing the cost of production. The Communists boast that the railway workers of the Chiang-an section of the Peking-Hankow Line, after signing patriotic-emulation pacts, ran the services for two months without a single accident.[16] 461

In the Communist newspapers, reports of increase in production are frequently followed by reports of an increase in industrial accidents and loss of working days due to sick leaves. For instance, in the Heng-yang Railway workshop, two weeks after the beginning of labor emulation in April 1950, there were 545 persons (58.4 per cent of the total workers) reported absent because of accidents or sickness, thus causing the loss of 727 working days.[17] The I-Lo Coal Mine (a state-owned-enterprise located 25 miles southwest of Loyang, Honan Province) reported the most serious case of 466

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16. Workers' Daily, Nov. 7, Dec. 15 and 26, 1950; Chinese Worker Monthly, Oct. 1950, p. 36, and Oct. 15, 1950, p. 18.

17. Ibid., June 15, 1950, p. 33.

gas explosion in its history, which resulted in more than 100 deaths. The investigation committee found out that the main cause of the accident was a mistake made by management, which had carried out "production emulation" at the cost of labor safety.[18]

V. WAGES AND PURCHASING POWER

In the early period of the Communist regime, apart from individual adjustments, no significant change in the wage system was made. In order to insure the stable income of the working class against the fluctuation of commodity prices, wages at first were calculated in terms of some essential commodities such as rice or millet. In Central-South China the wage-unit system was put into practice in March 1951. The Central-South Military and Political Committee issued the decree on "Measures Concerning the Calculation of the Wage Unit in the Central-South Region" on March 11, 1951, according to the Yangtze Daily. One wage unit in this region was worth the sum of the retail values of the following daily necessities of which the government had control.

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[18] Ibid., June 15, 1950, p. 34.

Food grain	0.80 catty*
White cotton cloth	0.20 ch'ih#
Edible oil	0.05 catty
Salt	0.02 catty
Coal	2.00 catties

* one catty - 1.1 lb.
# one _ch'ih_ - 1.09 ft.

The money value of the wage unit was announced daily by the local People's Government. It was first quoted[19] at 2,348 _yuan_ (old currency) on March 15, 1951. The average gross earnings[20] for each worker were 190.02 units per month, which amounted to 427,165 _yuan_ in money value (about US $18,70).[21]

The Chinese Communists had not overlooked the direct effects of the wage system on labor productivity. They thought that a wage system based only on time lacked incentive to make workers work harder. They adopted an Eight-Grade System in the Central-South in 1952. The workers were classified into eight grades according to their skill. In this region, the lowest grade worker earned 100 to 137 wage units per month, while the highest grade earned 381 units per month as the basic wage.[22]

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19. _Yangtze Daily,_ March 15, 1951, p. 1.
20. _Ibid._, Sept. 29, 1951, p. 2.
21. One U.S. dollar was quoted in the _Canton Daily_ at 22,890 _yuan_ on March 19, 1951.
22. _Kung-tzu Ch'ang-shih Chiang-hua_ [_Lectures on Wages_], published by the Central-South Wage Reform Committee, Hankow, 1952, p. 17.

The relative levels of basic wages in the Central-South in 1952 compared with the average basic wages in all industries were: 465

Industries	Index
Cotton textiles	135.32
Tobacco	132.85
Coal mining	110.20
Iron and steel	101.79
Non-ferrous metals	86.51

The Central-South Region is one of the principal centers of China's light industries. The workers in the cotton textile and tobacco factories are the highest paid among the working population. This situation, however, is more common in Wuhan and Canton than in other cities in this area.

The Communists claimed that labor productivity had increased since the adoption of the Eight-Grade Wage System in Central-South China, because workers had more opportunities to advance to a higher grade and earn more pay. For instance, one month after the adoption of the new wage system in the Ch'i-i Factory in this region, labor productivity increased 20 per cent.[23] In a bookstore in Nanchang in Kiangsi Province, all books about machines were sold out a few days after the new wage system was put into practice in this city. The 465 461

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[23] Ibid., p. 21.

Communists said the workers became more 465
ambitious and wished to improve their technical 461
knowledge in order to earn more pay.

The Communists told the workers that it was to 465
their advantage to produce more in order that all of the people could share the increase. But according to Communist statistics for 13 major enterprises in Central-South China, the value of production increased 88 per cent in 1951 in comparison with that of 1950, while wages increased only 13.29 per cent in the corresponding period.[24] Increase in wages was far behind the increase in production.

After the reform of the wage system in 1952, the wage level in Central-South China increased 15 per cent in comparison with that of 1951. The average number of wage units each worker earned per month was raised from 190.02 in 1951 to 218.52 in 1952. One unit[25] was quoted at 2,168 yuan (old currency) in September 1952. The average basic money wage for each worker per month grossed 473,751 yuan (about US$ 20.10).[26]

According to the Communists, the increase 465
of wages in China today is not the result of an 434
effort to keep pace with the rise of commodity prices but represents a real increase in the workers' living standard. They reported that in Central-South

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[24] Ibid., p. 5.

[25] Yangtze Daily, Sept. 1952, p. 2.

[26] One U. S. $ was quoted as 20,040 yuan in Canton Daily, Sept. 2, 1952, p. 4.

the people's purchasing power had increased 30 per cent[27] in 1952 in comparison with that of 1950. In the spring of 1953 the sales of commodities such as cotton underwear, woolen cloth, socks, toothpaste, rubber shoes, and thermos flasks in the State department store in Wuhan were one to four times more[28] than those in the spring of 1952. 465 434

Besides the basic wages, the workers earn additional income through piece-rate payments, bonuses, and participation in production contests. On the other hand, gross income is subject to various deductions in union fees, "voluntary" contributions, and purchase of government bonds. The last item is a kind of compulsory savings imposed upon the workers by the government to prevent inflation and to cover up the fact of undersupply of consumers' goods in Communist China. When the Chinese People's Government issued Victory Bonds in 1950, 30,000 points[29] were allocated to Central-South China. Party members and cadres of trade unions advised workers to buy bonds. The floating of National Reconstruction Bonds in 1954 again absorbed one portion of the increase in wages. Accordingly, Communist reports of the rise of the living standard of the Chinese working class are open to suspicion. 465 454

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[27] Ching-chi Tao-pao [Economic Bulletin], Hong Kong, Feb. 24, 1953, p. 10.

[28] Ibid., Sept. 8, 1953, p. 5.

[29] Cf. Workers' Daily, Dec. 31, 1949, p. 1. One point represents the total value of 6 catties of rice, 1 catty of flour, 4 ch'ih of cotton cloth, and 16 catties of coal. (One catty = 1.1 lb., one ch'ih = 1.09 feet.)

V. LABOR WELFARE

A. Labor Insurance

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Under the Labor Insurance Regulations of Communist China published in March 1951 and revised in January 1953, there were 5,380,000 workers insured in 1954 against losses[30] caused by old age, illness, and disability. In Central-South China, 317 organizations with a total of 155,000 workers were covered by the Labor Insurance Regulations in the first year of their implementation.[31] After 1950, all enterprises employing more than 300 workers in this region had established their own clinics to give free medical care to their workers.[32] Many workers in Central-South China were sent under the provisions of the labor insurance to Lu-shan, a famous summer resort, for rest and convalescence.

During the last quarter of 1950, many workers enlisted to fight in Korea as volunteers. The family dependents of those who were killed in action received a monthly pension from the labor insurance fund. In Wuhan, the family dependents of 11 seamen killed in Korea in September 1950 were alleged to have been awarded from 50-60 per cent of the men's original wages for a period of ten years.[33]

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[30] People's China, May 1, 1955, pp. 3-5.
[31] Yangtze Daily, Oct. 1, 1951, p. 3.
[32] China Daily News, May 14, 1955, p. 6.
[33] Chinese Worker Monthly, Oct. 15, 1950, p.86.

Such sporadic examples notwithstanding, a letter from a worker in a Hsin-yang factory in Honan Province indicates that labor insurance regulations have not been enforced in many cases. The letter stated that the manager of the factory did not want to give sick leave to a worker who fell ill, and so the man was forced to spend half of his wages in order to pay for a substitute worker for a few days, over and above his expenses for treatment and medicine.[34] 466 745

B. Labor Safety and Industrial Accidents

The Communists allege that the Central People's Government enacted 119 decrees, rules, and regulations concerning labor safety and sanitation[35] between 1949 and 1953. On the basis of press reports about industrial accidents emanating from the China Mainland, it is doubtful that these rules and regulations have been carried out. At the end of 1949, the Chinese People's Government initiated a nation-wide check-up on industrial safety and sanitation in all factories and mines. When this investigation started in the Central-South Region early in 1950, it was discovered that not a few factories and mines had completely neglected labor-safety measures. Conditions in the coal mines in Honan and Hunan provinces were the worst. After a serious accident resulting in more than one hundred deaths at the I-lo Coal Mine in Honan in February 1950, the Provincial Government issued 466 new detailed regulations concerning labor safety in coal mining, and conditions in the coal mines in Honan were said to have since improved.[36]

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[34] Yangtze Daily, Aug. 25, 1951, p. 5.

[35] People's China, July 1, 1953, p. 11.

In order to keep their labor-safety record perfect, the administrations and the trade unions of some factories and mines in Central-South China concealed industrial accidents from the local labor offices and governments. On October 9, 1952, the Labor Department of the Central-South Military and Political Committee issued a notice calling upon all enterprises to carry out "Measures Concerning the Report of Occupational Accidents and Deaths in Industrial, Transportation and Construction Enterprises" published by the Central Government. It was stated that all industrial accidents and deaths should be reported to the respective labor office or local government. The labor office or local governments at all levels might investigate any accident or death. If it should be discovered that the responsible administration or trade unions intentionally concealed the accidents or deaths from the labor office or local government, they would be punished according to the regulations.[37] This warning implies that some reports about labor safety had been falsified by the factory administration and the trade unions.

C. Labor Education and Recreation

Before the Communists took over the China Mainland, from 60 to 80 per cent of the Chinese

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[36] *Chinese Worker Monthly*, June 15, 1950, p. 36.

[37] *Yangtze Daily*, Oct. 9, 1952, p. 1.

workers were illiterate (that is, could read less than 1,000 Chinese characters). "To do away with illiteracy" has been a slogan used by the Communists as an aim of the new regime. Illiteracy had been a great obstacle to the improvement of Chinese workers on certain technical levels and thus had hindered the increase of labor productivity. At the beginning of the new regime, the Communists encouraged workers to take advantage of the night classes run by different enterprises, and the workers were said to have been very enthusiastic about their studies. For instance, according to the statistics for 33 factories in 1949 in Chengchow, Honan Province, 84 per cent of the total workers were illiterate or were on the lower grade school level. In the first quarter of 1950, there were 34 night schools opened for the workers in Chengchow.[38] Li Hsiu-ying, a 37-year-old woman worker of the Wuhan No. 1 Cotton Mill, had worked for twenty-nine years without a chance to study, but supposedly learned over 2,400 characters within a few months.[39] "The quick method of learning Chinese characters" began in 1952, and it has been of great assistance in accelerating the elimination of illiteracy among the workers.

In the region as a whole only sixteen newspapers [204] and periodicals were published for workers in 1950. The Short Course School for workers[40] was started

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[38] Chinese Worker Monthly, May 15, 1950, p. 48.

[39] People's China, May 1, 1953, p. 12.

[40] Yangtze Daily, August 29, 1950, p. 4.

in Wuhan in 1950. The workers who left their 466
production work for schools received their original 873
pay. It was for the Party, the trade union, and management to decide who would be qualified for additional technical training. In 1950, Central-South China sent 110 workers to the Chinese People's University in Peking.[41] The Communists had decided to create a "new intelligentsia" among the working class.

As for recreation, by the end of 1954, 466
11,929 clubs had been set up in factories, mines, and other enterprises in the country. In the Central-South Region, the unions in Kwangtung Province had established 34 cultural centers for workers. In the cultural centers, there were libraries and recreation halls so that the workers could enjoy their leisure time. But after political studies, criticism meetings, and participation in all kinds of campaigns and movements such as "Suppression-of-Counterrevolutionaries;" "Resist-America-Aid-Korea," and the "Five-Anti" and "Three-Anti" campaigns, it is a miracle that the Chinese workers still manage to find time to eat and sleep. They have very little leisure time.

D. Housing Conditions of the Chinese Workers

According to Communist reports, the Chinese 466
People's Government spent more than 286,000,000 362
yuan (new currency) on housing projects for workers

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[41] Workers' Daily, June 6, 1950, p. 1.

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in 1952. In 1953, the government allocated 130,000,000 square feet of floor space for building workers' living quarters. In the Central-South Region, the housing projects for workers were concentrated in Wuhan and Canton, the two industrial centers in this region. Canton started its housing projects in 1952. By May 1955, they had built 62 one-story houses and 3 large apartment buildings. About 30,000 workers and their families moved in. One unit consisted of two rooms, kitchen, and bath. Each tenant pays 1.80 yuan (new currency equivalent to US$ 0.72) maintenance fee per month. In the Wuhan area, new houses for workers were said to have replaced dilapidated huts and tenements. The drainage system in the factory districts had also been improved.[42]

Reports of improvement of housing conditions in other areas in Central-South China are scattered, but they all indicate that the solution of the housing problems for the Chinese workers has a long way to go in Communist China. Since the initiation of the Communist first Five-Year Plan in 1953, reports about plans for labor welfare occur less frequently. The cost of production has been cut as low as possible in order to fulfill the production goals of the plan within the limits of the straitened economy.

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42. People's China, August 16, 1953, p. 38 and May 17, 1955, p. 2; China Daily News, New York, May 20, 1955, p. 6.

VII. UNEMPLOYMENT

Since the Constitution of Communist China guarantees the right to work to everyone, the Chinese Communists have always maintained that "unemployment" constitutes a problem generated by the nature of a capitalist society and that it will disappear eventually.

In July 1950, there were 396,404 unemployed workers registered with labor offices or local governments in Central-South China after the Political Administration Council had issued the "Provisional Measures Concerning Unemployment Relief"[43] on June 17, 1950. The methods of the Communist unemployment relief included substitution of work for relief, a back-to-the-village drive, an "increase in production," and "self-help." Under these methods, recruits from among the unemployed workers in the Wuhan Area did most of the municipal public work from June 1950 to the end of 1951. In the spring of 1952, the Wuhan municipal government organized more than 100,000 unemployed workers and sent them to the Ching River Harnessing Project.[44]

Canton, like Wuhan, is a city with serious unemployment problems. Communists here tried every effort to reduce the number of unemployed workers, but peasants kept flocking to the city. The "Back-to-the Village" Campaign was renewed recently. The authorities of Kwangtung Province

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[43] Chinese Worker Monthly, July 15, 1950, pp. 10-12.

[44] Yangtze Daily, Sept. 30, 1952, p. 2.

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issued a notice calling for the cessation of the flood of peasants into cities where the evacuation of the unemployed is going on. Any peasant who wants to leave his village must do so with reason and only with the permission of his local peasant's association.[45] According to the Chinese Communists, the unchecked flow of peasants into cities is the main cause of the unemployment which endangers economic stability and national defense.[46]

VIII. THE FIVE-YEAR-PLAN AND CHINESE LABOR

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The first step toward preparing China for the Communist first Five-Year-Plan was the tightening of Party control over trade unions, which were considered by the Communist as spheres of Party influence or as a "transmission belt" between the Party and the masses.[47] In the early 1950's, trade unions under the leadership of Li Li-san were striving to strike some balance between the interests of the workers and the requirements of the production plan. It was in this period that many reports about the establishment of workers' hospitals cultural centers, creches, sanatoria, and rest homes appeared in Communist newspapers. After the Seventh All-China Congress of Trade Unions held in Peking in May 1953, Li was replaced by Lai Jo-yü. One criticism of Li was that his "leadership of the union has led it away from leadership of the Party by treating the trade union as the highest form of the working class," and that the trade union overemphasizes attempts to raise the living standard of the people at the cost of their long-term interests.[48]

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[45] Asia Foundation Bulletin, Sept. 29, 1952, p. 2.

[46] Union Research Service, Hong Kong, Sept. 16, 1955.

[47] People's China, June 7, 1953, p. 13.

During the first half of 1953, production in the steel industry and in mines was very unsatisfactory; 33 per cent were unable to fulfill their pledges. Light industry also lagged behind the scheduled production plan.[49] A campaign to "increase production and practice economy"[50] was launched again during the last half of 1953, and the All-China Federation of Trade Unions issued a directive calling for the further development of the labor-emulation drive[51] in April of 1954.

Accounts of industrial accidents in newspapers in Central-South China increased during the second half of 1953 and the first half of 1954, when frantic efforts were made to fulfill lagging schedules. According to reports from 64 factories and mines in the Wuhan area, a total of 1,857 accidents had occurred from January to March 1954, including 6 deaths and 19 serious injuries. During the same period, the total of sick leaves taken by the injured workers and staff reached 17,700 days and caused financial losses amounting to over 850,000,000 yuan (old currency). The number of accidents in three months amounted to 44.7 per cent of the total for the entire year of 1953.[52]

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[48] Far Eastern Economic Review, Hong Kong, June 16, 1955, p. 753.

[49] Current Background, U.S. Consulate, Hong Kong, No. 322, March 20, and No. 323, March 25, 1955.

[50] "Practice Economy" is a Communist term

(continued next page)

At the No. 4 Engineering Company in Canton, a worker fell from a high ledge and sustained severe injuries. When the case was reported to the plant supervisor, he said, "If there are going to be a lot of accidents, let them be big ones. Do not bother me with small ones."[53] A section chief in Chengchow Railway Administration, who had failed to fulfill his pledge to repair 45 cars in one month, "borrowed" hours from the workers and made the workers finish after their regular shift by work on Sundays. As a result, 13 per cent of the workers fell ill because of exhaustion.[54]

"Factories are battlefields and casualties are inevitable"[55] has been the Communist slogan during the increase in the tempo of production under labor emulation. Industrial accidents in factories and mines have increased to an alarming degree throughout China.

Since the initiation of the Five-Year Plan in 1953, all activities of the trade unions have led to an increase in production. The Communists plan to concentrate all manpower and materials in order to fulfill the plan, and since 1953 the workers have been driven harder than ever.

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50. (continued) for decreasing cost of production.

51. People's Daily, April 11, 1954, p. 1.

52. Yangtze Daily, June 30, 1954; China Weekly, June 10, 1955, pp. 52-53; Survey of China Mainland Press, Hong Kong, U. S. Consulate-General, No. 963, Jan. 6, 1955, p. 13.

53. Canton Daily, Feb. 8, 1955.

54. Hsin kuan-ch'a, New Observation, Peking, Aug. 16, 1953, p. 12.

55. Yangtze Daily, F b. 21, 1955; People's Daily, March 1955.

FORCED LABOR

I. RECRUITMENT AND SIZE OF FORCED LABOR

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The organization and employment of forced labor, including both conscript and civilian and prisoner labor, in the Central-South provinces follow the same pattern in the country as a whole.[1] Consequently, as far as prisoner labor is concerned, the forced labor contingents in the Central-South area are also recruited from (1) members of the "landlord" and "rich peasant" classes during the "land reform" program, which was completed in 1952, (2) "counterrevolutionaries" sentenced under the drive begun after the entry of Communist China in the Korean war, (3) and "criminals" sentenced under the "Three-Anti" and "Five-Anti" campaigns. Probably the largest number of recruits are derived from "counterrevolutionaries" and "landlords."

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According to a report by Teng Tzu-hui, then Chairman of the Central-South Military and Political Committee, dated November 21, 1951,[2] "counterrevolutionaries" were dealt with in two broad categories--those whose sins against "the people" were written in blood and those whose crimes were less grievous. People in the first category were given the death

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[1] The employment of forced labor, recruited from among the state's active and potential opponents, on economic projects in which mass labor and/or cheap labor can be used advantageously as an integral part of the country's economic planning is derived from Soviet experience. The general philosophy has been consistently expressed in Mao Tse-tung's "On the People's Democratic Dictatorship," the Common

[continued on following page]

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sentence, which, in a number of cases, was stayed for a period of two years so as to permit the prisoners "reform through labor." People in the second category were placed under surveillance and were also required to "reform through labor." This practice in the Central-South, while doubtless reflecting general practice, anticipated some of the provisions in the national Regulations Governing Reform-through-Labor, promulgated on August 26, 1954.[3]

During 1951, according to Ten Tzu-hui, of all persons arrested in Central-South China, 28 per cent were put to death; 2 per cent were given death sentences which were suspended so that the prisoners could "reform through labor"; 50 per cent were required to "reform through labor" while under detention, including persons awaiting trial; the remaining 20 per cent were placed under surveillance and were also obliged to "reform through labor." Thus some 72 per cent of the region's prisoners were recruited into forced labor contingents. In addition

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[Footnote No. 1 continued]
Program of 1949, and the 1954 Constitution. Since any civilian who refuses to answer the draft of the state to perform labor automatically becomes a "counterrevolutionary," there is no clear distinction between civilian labor and prisoner labor except in the manner of recruitment and the possibility that non-prisoner labor may on occasions receive wage payment.

2. Ch'ang-chiang Jih-pao [Yangtze Daily], Hankow, December 13, 1951.

3. Jen-min Jih-pao [People's Daily], Peking. September 7, 1954.

to the above groups, a number of persons not formally under arrest were put under surveillance and required to render labor service. These totaled about one-half of the number of all persons arrested. An unconfirmed estimate put the number of persons drawn into forced labor during 1951 in Central-South China at 1.9 million.[4] A Taiwan report has estimated the cumulative total of all persons engaged in forced labor at one time or another from the end of 1949 to 1954 at 42.3 million for the country as a whole.[5] If the share of the Central-South provinces is at all proportionate to the population ratio, the five-year (1950-1954) cumulative total would be in the neighborhood of 12.7 million. Obviously, these figures can neither be confirmed nor, for that matter, conclusively refuted.

Under the 1954 forced labor regulations, workers are organized in prisons, detention houses, institutions for young delinquents and "reform-through-labor" corps. This grouping corresponds to the classification of prisoners given by Teng Tzu-hui -- persons whose death sentence has been suspended work in prisons; persons awaiting trial or sentence, or serving a sentence of two years or less, work in detention houses; all other "counterrevolutionaries" except young prisoners (13-18 years old) who can be trusted to work under minimum security conditions work in units of the "reform-through-labor" corps.

It may be safely assumed that there are prisons, detention houses, and institutions for delinquent

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[4] Cheng Chu-yüan, Chung-kung Ti Nu-kung Chih-tu [The Slave Labor System of the Chinese Communists] , Hong Kong, Tzu-yu ch'u-pan-she, 1952, p. 76.

[5] Fei-ch'u Nu-kung Kai-shu [Survey of the Forced Labor in Communist China] , Taipei, Chung-yang wei-yuan-hui ti-liu-tsu, December 1954.

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youths scattered throughout the Central-South provinces. Workers in these institutions are more or less restricted to their place of detention. There is no official account of the location and number of prisons. However, according to 1948 statistics, there were 556 prisons and detention houses in the Central-South provinces.[6] Since the 1954 regulations governing forced labor provide for the establishment of detention houses at the hsien level, it may be assumed that there are a minimum of 664 prisons and detention houses in the 618 hsien and 46 municipalities of the area. The actual number is likely to be appreciably larger. On the other hand, units of "reform-through-labor" corps are highly mobile. Subject to the overall control of the national Ministry of Public Security and its agencies, they may be transferred to places where cheap mass labor may be used, and are often found on important construction sites within the Central-South. Some of the activities in which forced labor has been engaged will be briefly described in the following sections.

II. THE CHING-CHIANG PROJECT (HUPEH AND HUNAN)

The section of the Yangtze between Chih-chiang in Hupeh and Ch'eng-ling'chi in Hunan, also known as the Ching-chiang, is the site of a major water-

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[6] Chung-hua Min-kuo T'ung-chi Nien-chien [Statistical Yearbook of China], Nanking, Bureau of Statistics, 1948, p. 392.

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conservation project in Central-South China in which mass labor has been employed. A 133-kilometer (about 83 miles) dyke had been built under the Nationalists, which served to protect some seven million mou (about 1. 05 million acres) of farm land, with a population of three million, against the annual flood in August-September. Known as the "life line" of the people, the dyke had fallen into disrepair. Accordingly, strengthening of the original dyke became the first part of the Ching-chiang project under the Communists. The second part of the project consisted of the construction of a large flood-water reservoir (projected capacity, 5. 5 billion cubic meters or about 194 billion cubic feet) east of the Hu-tu River and west of the Ching-chiang.[7]

The directive to proceed with the harnessing of the Ching-chiang was issued by the Central-South Military and Political Committee on March 15, 1952. At the same time, it was announced that "voluntary" labor, meaning "unpaid" labor as a rule, would be recruited as was the case in the Hwai River project.[8] In addition, flood victims and refugees, as well as the army, were called upon to take part. The army was assigned to dredge the Huang-t'ien (Yellow Sky) Lake, one of the most difficult parts of the project. The

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[7] Ch'ih-se K'ung-pu-hsia Ti Hu-pei [Hupeh Under the Red Terror] , Taipei, Chung-yang wei-yüan-hui ti-liu-tsu, October, 1954, p. 22.

[8] Hwai River Project is discussed in the East China Region study.

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entire labor force was organized in the fashion of an army, directed by General Headquarters and Command posts which were in turn supervised by a Flood Control Committee.

Working conditions at the Ching-chiang project may be glimpsed from Communist press reports extolling the project workers' achievements. One such passage reads: "Right after lunch, the fighters went back to work. When their primitive tools broke down, they just jumped into the bone-chilling water and dug out the sticky mud with their bare hands. On the eleventh day (from the beginning of the project), they worked past midnight, but returned to work the following day in spite of their exhaustion."[9] Another report states: "When the tempo of work was stepped up, the workers had only one meal a day, and they worked day and night for seven consecutive days. . . On one occasion, workers on the Hu-tu River did not have enough time to place wooden blocks on the river bed, and one whole company jumped into the river to block the sliding of the mud."[10] "Some of the fighters formed three-man teams. One person would lie down on the mud serving as a dredge, the other two would pile mud on him and in this way drag the mud out of the river bed. Besides the man's two twinkling eyes, there was no other sign of human life."[11]

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[9] Ch'ang-chiang Jih-pao, March 16, 1952.
[10] *Ibid.*, March 26, 1952.
[11] *Ibid.*, June 21, 1952.

Work on the Ching-chiang project commenced 466
on April 5, 1952, and the first part of the plan was 731
completed on June 20 of the same year. The volume[12]
of earth excavation totaled 23.1 million cubic meters, 653
approximately equivalent to over 20 million man-days, taking into account the almost complete absence of construction machinery. However, since further construction and annual maintenance and repair in view of the recurrent floods have had to be carried out, the continued employment of mass labor on the same general construction site may be expected.

III. LABOR CONTINGENTS IN HIGHWAY AND RAILWAY CONSTRUCTION (KWANGTUNG AND KWANGSI)

In the building of railways and highways both 466
civilian labor and inactive troops are also used. 499
According to a central government directive of March 31, 1951, civilians may be conscripted to work on highways at the rate of ten man-days a year. They have to supply their own tools and food and are given no monetary remuneration.[13] Only two railways have been built in the Central-South provinces since 1950, one from Lai-pin to Mu-nan-kuan (formerly Chen-nan-kuan) in Kwangsi, the other from Li-t'ang in Kwangsi to Chan-chiang (Kuang-chou-wan) in Kwangtung. Although highway construction has been concentrated in Northwest and Southwest China, some lines have also been built with mass labor in the Central-South, including the lines from Mei-hsien

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[12] Ronald Hsia, The Role of Labor-Intensive Investment Projects in China's Capital Formation, Cambridge, Mass., Center for Internat'l Studies, M.I.T., summer, 1954, p. 90.

[13] [See following page.]

in Kwangtung to Shang-hang in Fukien and the one 466
from Ch'ing-yüan to Fo-kang in Kwangtung. The 499
location of mass labor contingents in the future will doubtless depend upon the selection of the routes to be built.

IV. A TYPICAL "REFORM-THROUGH-LABOR" CAMP IN CANTON

Railway and highway building, as well as construction of large water conservation projects, are all examples of the concentrated employment of mass labor. A somewhat different case is found in the employment in Kwangtung of forced-labor groups in various agricultural, mining, and industrial undertakings. A typical case is provided by the "reform-through-labor" units under the direction of the Canton Public Security Bureau.[14] 697

According to the Canton Public Security Bureau, at one time, municipal construction received the largest allocation of labor force under the control of the Bureau. However, the prisoners were also put to work in producing bricks and tiles, reclaiming waste land, planting fruit trees and food and commercial crops, raising farm animals, and manufacturing various handicraft products, including rope and wooden and bamboo wares.

The bureau stressed that forced labor was supple- 697
mented by political education. Many prisoners were 668

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[13] Chung-yang Ts'ai-ching Cheng-ts'e Fa-ling Hui-pien [Compilation of Laws and Regulations Concerning Financial and Economic Policies], Vol.III, Peking, Ts'ai-ching wei'yüan-hui, 1952, pp. 713-15.

[14] Ta-kung Pao, Hong Kong, December 15, 1951.

said to have been lazy when they first joined the "reform-through-labor" camps. Some attempted to use illness as an excuse to stay away from work while others tried to escape or even committ suicide. According to the Bureau, these conditions were surmounted by pointing out to the prisoners that "reform-through-labor" was the only way to start a new life, and political indoctrination was conducted by organizing the prisoners in groups studying systematically the history of social development, the people's democratic dictatorship, the new philosophy of life and the achievements of the People's Government during recent years.

According to the same report, prisoners were classified into separate groups according to the terms of sentence, age, phsyical condition, and former occupation. A brief period of work training was usually provided. Definite norms or quotas, which had to be observed by the prisoners in their work, were fixed in both qualitative and quantitative terms. Labor competitions were organized, and criticisms and commendations of individual workers were published in wall newspapers.

The report contended that as a result of "reform-through-labor" some prisoners worked very hard and changed their ideological outlook and were either given special rewards or had their sentences reduced, while others who refused to reform were punished. Especially interesting is the statement that after five months of forced labor and political education, most of the "counter-revolutionaries" had changed their ideological points of view and had acquired the habit of working. The Bureau also reported that prisoners released from the camps were sent back to their villages to start a new life, while those without homes were sent to production reformatories. 697 668

The report on Canton is probably representative of many a "reform-through-labor" camp. Life in such camps is described as serene, productive, and not at all harsh. "As to the prisoner's daily life, every farm has its own reading room. Officers in charge have taught them to sing. Every Saturday night there is either a discussion meeting or a recreation program. Proper attention is paid to diet and hygienic condition..."[15] Official Communists comments have also occasionally pointed to individual instances in which persons were said to have regained their physical health and spiritual well-being as a result of ideological reform and physical labor.[16] 697

The official account mentioned above does not agree with some other reports on treatment within such camps. One such report, for instances, states that prisoners in Canton labor camps received in 1952 only 12 shih-liang (about 13.2 ounces) of rice per day,[17] supplemented with only such vegetables as the prisoners grew themselves. The daily food ration for each prisoner was valued at ¥ 1, 500 (old currency, approximately 6-1/2 cents in U. S. currency). In the same period the wage of the lowest-paid workers in industrial enterprises in Central-South China amounted to 100 "wage units" a month, each unit being equivalent to about ¥ 2, 800 (approximately 12 cents in U. S. currency). This means that the prisoner's monthly wage amounted to some 16 wage units or about 16 per cent of the earnings of the lowest-paid industrial worker.[18]

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[15] Nan-fang Jih-pao [Southern Daily], Sept. 8, 1951.

[16] Ibid.

[17] Thirteen and two-tenths ounces of rice are equivalent to 1,270 calories, which is below the level of normal subsistence.

V. OTHER "REFORM-THROUGH-LABOR" CAMPS IN KWANGTUNG, KWANGSI, AND KIANGSI

Some scattered reports on a few labor camps in Kwangtung, Kwangsi, and Kiangsi are also available. These may be mentioned below:

1. The Ch'ü-chiang (Kwangtung) labor camp, which started with 1, 190 prisoners in February 1951, had 3, 500 prisoners in June of the same year. The latter were drawn from the ten hsien on the Pei-chiang (North River) and consisted of "counter-revolutionaries" serving long sentences. They were employed on construction and agricultural production. A group of 100 prisoners was reported to share one face towel and one tooth brush. Freedom of movement was completely absent, and guards were posted even along passages leading to lavatories. Prisoners were warned against casting sidelong glances, which might be interpreted

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[18] Tsu-kuo Chou-k'an [China Weekly], Hong Kong, Vol. IV, no. 13, June 28, 1954, pp. 11-14.

as planning for escape.[19]

2. The Shun-te (Kwangtung) camp, established in May 1951, is located in a valley outside the city limits. It contains major "counterrevolutionaries" serving sentences of more than 15 years. The number of camp inmates grow from an initial 3,000 to 30,000 by the end of 1951. The daily ration consisted of 12 *shih-liang* (13.2 ounces) of rice per person plus one kind of vegetable. Communication with the outside world was completely prohibited.[20]

3. The Ts'ung-hua (Kwangtung) camp, established in January 1951, contained only 500 prisoners organized into 18 groups. The prisoners were assigned to land reclamation, vegetable gardening, and manufacture of handicraft products.[21]

4. The Chan-chiang (Kwangtung) camp, established in October 1951, had 2,500 prisoners engaged in the construction of some small water works.[22]

In addition to the above, other "reform-through-labor" camps are known to exist at Ying-teh, Lien-hsien, Yun-fu, Chiao-ling, and Ho-p'ing in Kwangtung province, as well as on Hainan Island, and about 60,000 prisoners are working on the state farms in Lo-ting, Weng-yüan, Lo-ch'ang, Jen-hua, and Nan-hsiang in Kwangtung. The total prisoner population in Kwangtung was said to number 400,000 in 1953,[23] and similar reports are available concerning Kwangsi and Kiangsi. 697

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[19] Li, T'ien-min, *Wu-nien-lai Chung-kung P'o-hai Jen-ch'üan Chi-shih [Facts about the Violation of the Human Rights by the Chinese Communists in the Past Five Years]*, Taiwan, March 1955, pp. 25, 30.

[20] *Ibid.*, p. 31. Also: *Chin-jih Shih-chieh [World Today]*, Hong Kong, June 15, 1952, p. 24.

[21] Cheng, Chu-yuan, *op. cit.*, p. 77.

[22] *Ibid.*

VI. STATE FARM IN HONAN

According to a Taiwan report, there were about 100,000 "counterrevolutinaries" undergoing "reform-through-labor" in Honan Province during 1953.[24] In addition to water conservation work on the upper course of the Hwai River, some of the prisoners work on state farms. One example may be found in the report of three American POW's who refused repatriation after the Korean War, but returned to this country in 1955.[25] 697 668

The 1,500-acre state farm where they worked is located in Honan. It had 35 tractors and 965 laborers sent there for political reorientation from other parts of the country. All laborers worked 9 hours a day and six days a week. Food was said to be of the average Chinese standard. The monthly wage of an ordinary laborer was between ¥ 150,000 and ¥ 200,000 (old currency), the equivalent of US$6-8. All expenses except housing had to be met by the individuals. Political education, lasting several hours a day, followed a

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[23] Fei-tang Hsun-lien Ti P'ou-hsi [An Analytical Study of Indoctrination of the Communist Party], Taipei, Chung-yang wei-yuan-hui ti-ssu-tsu, March 1953, p. 14. [24] Ibid.

[25] "Turncoat GI's Tell Story of Red China," U.S. News and World Report, July 22, 1955, pp. 21-26, 113-15.

definite program which in this case was: Monday 697
review of world affairs; Tuesday, discussion of 668
the world situation; Wednesday, criticism of individuals; Thursday, China's internal situation; Friday, criticism of individuals again; Saturday, the discussion of the criticisms for the whole week. The "criticism of individuals" is what the people on the farm feared most, because when a person came up for criticism, his fate was virtually sealed. Fear of the leader and fear of each other constitute an essential part of political reeducation.

VII. COMMENTS

Although official Communist Chinese sources 466
have been notably reticent on the development of 697
"reform-through-labor" establishments in individual areas which are sometimes camouflaged by being called factories,[26] such information as is available in connection with the Central-South provinces points to certain considerations to which attention may be directed. It is entirely possible that these characteristics are by no means restricted to conditions in the Central-South.

1. "Reform-through-labor" establishments such as the ones in Central-South China serve the dual purpose of providing political punishment and large reserve pools of cheap labor, endowed in the majority of cases with high mobility. The presence

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[26] Freedom Front, Hong Kong, April 25, 1955, p. 22.

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of the former consideration leads inevitably to excessive discipline, overwork, and probably a high incidence of sickness and mortality. However, these establishments should not be generally identified with extermination camps, because there are occasional releases in the case of lesser "criminals." Extermination is reserved only for the politically incorrigible, and the differentiation between those who can be reformed and those who cannot is an effective means of bringing about the acceptance of the Communist ideology. Where no practical alternative is available, outward acceptance may in time become genuine acceptance. In this connection knowledge about life within the refugee camps in Hong Kong and of escapees from Communist China in general can be of major influence on propaganda about forced labor in Communist China.

2. Conscript labor is not unknown in Chinese history. What is significant in the Communist Chinese practice is the length of service, integration of forced labor into national economic planning, and the systematic liquidation of political opposition to the ruling party. The combination of these factors serves to identify the Communist Chinese system of forced labor with the methods of Soviet dictatorship, a fact which can be profitably pointed out.

3. The harsh treatment of prisoners doing forced labor may be compared with the extremely low wages of that part of free labor which is worst paid. The disparity in real "wages" poses a serious threat to free labor inasmuch as it is a powerful factor in labor discipline. The lack of a clear-cut distinction between conscript labor and prisoner labor and the flexibility of the term "counterrevolutionary" must be fairly obvious to all workers.

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Consequently, it would be futile merely to point to wage and other differences between free and forced labor in present-day Communist China without presenting a third alternative.

4. Much of the worst aspect of forced labor, such as the working conditions of water-conservation workers on the Ching-chiang project, owes its origin to the complete lack of mechanical tools and equipment. This is a situation inherent in the present stage of Chinese economic development. However, it may be conveniently related to the limited scope of Soviet assistance and used as a wedge in undermining Soviet-Chinese relations.

FOREIGN TRADE AND EXCHANGE

RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF THE CENTRAL-SOUTH PROVINCES AS FOREIGN TRADE CHANNELS

Two important factors serve to distinguish Kwangtung, one of the Central-South provinces, from the rest of China in the field of foreign economic relations. First, easy access to Hong Kong and Macao[1] provides a vital channel for Communist China's trade with countries outside the Soviet bloc. The significance of this factor varies directly with the severity of external trade sanctions against Communist China, as well as the effectiveness of external interference with the operation of other major seaports such as Shanghai. Second, the province of Kwangtung is the home province of the majority of Chinese residents in Southeast Asia, the United States, and other countries, and thus it represents the terminal of the bulk of remittances from abroad.

Besides Kwangtung, which borders on British Hong Kong, Portuguese Macao, and, since the latest boundary change in July, 1955, Indo-China, Kwangsi is the only other province in the Central-South Region that has an international boundary, although direct trade with Indo-China has not been important in the past. Honan, Kiangsi, Hupeh, and Hunan, on the other hand, are internal and inland provinces; consequently, as channels of foreign trade none of the latter provinces can be compared with Kwangtung. In the past, when Shanghai was the most important port in China's foreign trade,

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[1] What is said of Hong Kong is equally applicable to Macao, except the latter is less significant.

Hankow (Hupeh) was also of considerable importance 439 because of its commanding position as a distribution center on the Yangtze River, and because of the large flow of transit trade between Shanghai and central and western China passing through Hankow. With the decline of Shanghai under the Communist regime in this respect, the position of Hankow has also suffered.

MARITIME CUSTOMS ESTABLISHMENTS

The significance of the preceding remarks is 502 clearly reflected in the distrubiton of customs offices, which are as a rule, located at the principal ports. Within the Central-South Region there are now nine principal customs offices and four sub-offices. Seven principal offices and the four sub-offices are in Kwangtung; Hupeh and Kwangsi each has one principal office. There are no customs establishments in Honan, Hunan, and Kiangsi.

LOCATION OF CUSTOMS OFFICES IN CENTRAL-SOUTH CHINA */

Province	Principal Office	Sub-Office
Hupeh	Wuhan	
Kwangtung	Swatow	
	Canton	Huang-p'u
	Kowloon (At Shen-ch'uan or Shum-chun)	Wen-ching-tu Kung-men Tung-yü
	Chiang-men	
	Pei-hai	
	Chan-chiang	
	Hai-k'ou	
Kwangsi	Wu-chou	

*/ [See following page.]

EXPORT AND IMPORT

The importance of the individual provinces in foreign trade, however, must not be assessed merely from the point of view of trading channels.

Although geographical and historical factors have made Kwangtung the most important province in this area in trading with the outside world, the other provinces are no less important as producers of exportable goods. Since the bulk of Chinese exports consists of food grains and other agricultural products, the Central-South Region, as an area in which there is normally a food surplus, is of vital importance in Communist China's export program and, indirectly, in the Chinese five-year industrialization plan. Kiangsi and Hunan should be singled out in this respect because of their large rice surplus. In addition, production of several exportable ores is concentrated in this area; namely, tungsten in Kiangsi, Kwangtung, and Hunan; antimony in Hunan; and tin in Kwangsi. To the above list may also be added the tobacco of Honan and the wood oil of Hunan.

The provinces of the Central-South Region are considerably more important as producers of Chinese exports than as consumers of imports, because imports are now restrcited primarily to capital equipment and industrial raw materials, which are shipped to large industrial centers either in existence or under construction. With the exception of Wuhan, the Hsiang-t'an area in Hunan, and to a lesser extent, Canton, as well as some mining centers, the rest

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*/ Lun-hsien Hou Ti Ta-lu [The Mainland Under Occupation] , Taipei, Chung-hua wen -hua ch u-pan shih-yeh wei-yüan hui, 1953, pp. 140-61.

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of the Central-South Region apparently has relatively low priority in Chinese industrial planning. This means that while the production of exportable goods in the Central-South Region is a key factor in financing Chinese imports, the region does not derive any large benefit directly from such imports.

VOLUME OF EXPORTS FROM CENTRAL-SOUTH CHINA

According to one official report,[2] the total value of exports of "native" and "special" products in 1950 from the Central-South Region amounted to $180,000,000. The estimated value[3] of Communist China's total exports in the same year was about $466,500,000. The so-called "native" and "special" products consisted of various agricultural and handicraft products, as well as the several ores specified above. However, since the food grains exported in 1950 consisted mostly of soya beans, which were shipped chiefly from Manchuria, and no large rice export was reported for the country as a whole, it may be assumed that the $180,000,000 represented virtually all of the exports derived from Central-South China in that year. Thus it may be said that 38 per cent of Communist China's exports in 1950 were derived from the Central-South Region.

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[2] Nan Han-ch'en, "Ti-i-chieh Ch'uan-kuo Nung-ts'un Chin-yung Hui-i Ti Tsung-chieh Pao-kao ["Summary Report to the First National Conference on Agricultural Credit], Chung-yang Ts'ai-ching Cheng-ts'e Fa-ling Hui-pien [Compilation of Laws and Regulations Concerning Financial and Economic Policies] , Vol. III, Peking, Ts'ai-ching wei-yüan-hui, 1952, p. 261.

[3] Yuan-li Wu, (1), "Communist China's Trade with the West," The Pacific Spectator, Vol. VII, no. 4, Stanford, Autumn, 1953.

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According to one estimate,[4] the value of total exports from Communist China rose over $670,000,000 in 1951; it fell to $478,000,000 in 1952 and reached the level of $636,000,000 in 1953. This general trend coincided with an increase of food exports to which the Central-South provinces doubtless contributed substantially, especially with respect to rice export. While the relative share of the Central-South Region in total exports may have undergone some change, there is every reason to believe that since 1950 approximately one-third of Communist China's exports have originated in this area.

CENTRAL-SOUTH PORTS IN TOTAL FOREIGN TRADE

It should be noted at this juncture that ports of the Central-South provinces accounted for fifteen per cent of the value of total exports from China, excluding Manchuria, in 1936, the year before the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War. This ratio[5] rose to twenty per cent in 1946. Although no recent official data are available, the relative importance of the ports of the Central-South Region may be gauged on the basis of Chinese exports to Hong Kong and Macao, the nearest foreign-controlled ports to Kwangtung. The relative share of such trade in Communist China's estimated total exports[6] amounted to 35.3 per cent in 1950, 25.1 per cent in 1951, 32.6 per cent in 1952, and 25.4 per cent in 1954. Over one-half of the recorded exports to Hong Kong, according to the Hong Kong Government Gazette, came from Chinese ports in the Central-South Region.

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[4] Yuan-li Wu, An Economic Survey of Communist China, New York, Bookman Associates, Inc., 1956, p. .

[5] Computed from Chinese Maritime Customs, Trade of China, 1936 and 1946, Shanghai.

[6] Yuan-li Wu, (2), loc. cit.

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As points of entry for imports, the Central-South ports accounted for 19 per cent of China's imports in 1936, but only for eight per cent in[7] 1946. In 1950, however, nearly 66.9 per cent of Communist China's total imports was derived from Hong Kong and Macaco and some forty per cent of this trade was conducted with the South China ports,[8] partly as a result of the Nationalists' blockade of Shanghai. Although the relative quantitative importance of Hong Kong has declined since that time, the position of the Central-South ports with respect to trade with non-Soviet Bloc countries has not.

TRADE BETWEEN HONG KONG AND KWANGTUNG

The special position occupied by Hong Kong in trade with China is based on several factors. The keen desire of British merchants to trade with China, geographical proximity, and the existence of a predominantly Chinese population in Hong Kong have helped to determine the nature and the extent of trade with China.

The fact that the Hong Kong Chinese population is, to a large extent, albeit not completely, dependent upon Communist China for the supply of foodstuffs and other consumer goods, is clearly reflected in the relevant trade statistics. For instance, during 1948, Kwangtung accounted for 99.5 per cent of the life fowl exported by China. In other cases, the figures were 99.9 per cent for firewood, 97.3 per cent for live hogs, 98.5 per cent for bamboo mats, 86 per cent for tea oil, and 80.5 per cent for cassia bark.[9] According to trade returns for the three months following the Communists' occupation of Canton, 70 per cent of exports from Canton were composed of four items -- tea oil, wood oil, live hogs, and tin.[10] In China's over-all exports, the relative share of these and similar commodities exported to Hong Kong from Kwangtung and the Central-South provinces as a whole has decreased since 1950, but the importance of such articles in Chinese exports to Hong Kong has not changed appreciably. This assertion finds support in Hong Kong s trade returns, which reported for 1954 among the greatest share of imports from China such items as live hogs, eggs, fowls, fresh vegetables, beans, and other food products.[11] The upshot of this is that Communist China can count upon Hong Kong as a reliable market for its exports from Kwangtung and, consequently, as a good source of foreign exchange income.

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[7] See footnote no. 4.

[8] Yuan-li Wu, (2), and Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. XII, No. 2, p. 56. Hong Kong, January 10, 1952.

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9. The figures are for Jan.-Sept., 1948. See Ching-chi tao-pao she (ed.), Ching-chi tao-pao, (Economic Bulletin), No. 163, pp. 7-8, Hong Kong, March 21, 1950.

10. Ibid.

11. Ching-chi tao-pao (Economic Bulletin) Nos. 240-241, pp. 23-24, Hong Kong, October 1, 1951.

The geographical proximity of Kwangtung to Hong Kong further means that whenever necessary it is possible to rush imports from Hong Kong at short notice. This is aptly illustrated by the spectacular upsurge of imports from Hong Kong to South China following Communist China's intervention in the Korean conflict and the freezing of Mainland China's dollar assets in the United States in December 1950. According to one Communist report,[12] the volume index of the average monthly imports from Hong Kong to South China in the first seven months of 1951 stood at 183.6 (October 1950 = 100) as compared with 92.4 for the last quarter of 1950.

COMMODITY SMUGGLING

Even when trade restrictions imposed by Hong Kong prevent the free flow of certain types of imports to Communist China, Hong Kong's geographical position makes smuggling a distinct possibility. In fact, smuggling may be conducted in contravention to either Hong Kong's or Communist China's trade regulations, or to both, and is known to have been active at times. For instance, there have been some reports on the smuggling of liquid fuels from Hong Kong to Kwangtung and of narcotics from Kwangtung to Macao and Hong Kong.[13] Smuggled imports of various consumer goods prohibited by the Chinese Communist authorities were also reported in 1950 and 1951, although since that time such information[14] has been heavily censored. The major smuggling routes are from Shen-ch'uan (Shumchun) to the adjacent Kwangtung villages, and thence to Canton, from Macao to Shih-ch'i (Shekki), from Macao to Hsiang-shan, Fan-yü, and Ho-shan, and from Hong Kong to Ch'ao-chou and Swatow.[15] 439

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[12] Ching-chi tao-pao she (ed.), *Ching-chi tao-pao* [Economic Bulletin], Nos. 240-41, pp. 23-24, Hong Kong, October 1, 1951.

[13] *Wah-kiu yat-pao*, *Hua-ch'iao Jih-pao* [Overseas Daily], Hong Kong, April 27 and 29, 1955.

[14] Ching-chi tao-pao she (ed.) *Ching-chi tao-pao* [Economic Bulletin] , #229, pp. 3-4, HongKong, July 3, 1951; #176, pp. 17-18, Jun 20, 1950.

CONTROL OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE

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Prior to the Communist regime some export commodities had been traded in Hankow along the Yangtze River and in Swatow along the South China coast. But the volume of foreign exchange transactions there remained comparatively small because most were carried out either in Shanghai or in Hong Kong. However, Canton had been the threshhold for the flight of capital in defiance of government control. Export commodities were shipped by railway to Canton and sold to local merchants for Hong Kong currency, which had a large circulation in Canton. The local merchants bought the commodities at a discount and trans-shipped to Hong Kong, surrendering the foreign exchange to the government banks. Meanwhile, people in Kwangtung Province received large amounts of overseas remittances, mostly through private banks or firms dealing in this business. These remittances then entered into the black market, constituting a main source of supply of foreign exchange for the black market. Both Hong Kong currency and the oversea remittances were convertible in the Hong Kong free market into any kind of foreign currency.

The Central-south China foreign-exchange control system, similar to that of North and East China,

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[15] *Ibid.*

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aims to suppress the free market and to concentrate foreign-exchange transactions in the hands of the Bank of China. In addition, overseas remittances in Kwangtung Province were controlled more strictly. Firms and banks dealing in overseas remittances were ordered to turn over all the foreign-exchange to be remitted by them to the Bank of China in Hong Kong, accompanied by notification of the beneficiaries. Periodic reports itemizing the daily dealings are submitted to the local offices of the Bank of China. Recipients are encouraged to open accounts with the Bank of China or the People's Bank. However, ever since the outbreak of Korean hostilities remittances have been held by the bank, and the amounts which recipients can withdraw vary according to their financial condition as determined by the basic-level administrative organs. Recipients were forced to buy bonds or to give donations if the remittances exceeded limits of about one hundred American dollars. Large-scale interceptions of overseas remittances took place with the introduction of this measure, thereby plunging the families of overseas Chinese into destitution and discouraging the inflow of funds. The amount of each remittance has recently been reduced to between US$10-20.

While the possibility of using Hong Kong as a transit point for both overt and illicit trade with Kwangtung has probably worked to the advantage of Communist China, the free exchange market in Hong Kong has certain serious disadvantages from the Communist point of view. An indication of this situation is found in the possibility of trading in Communist China's currency in Hong Kong. Since currency export from China is prohibited,

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the fact that it can be traded in the British colony signifies that it can be smuggled both into China and out of China, which, in this case, means primarily Kwangtung. Similarly, it is frequently possible to conduct remittances outside official Communist Chinese channels between Hong Kong, on the one hand, and Canton and Swatow in Kwangtung on the other. Quotations of black market exchange rates of Communist Chinese currency are usually available.[16]

Black-market transactions in Chinese currency in Hong Kong do not appear to have reached serious proportions so far, except for the period immediately after the Communists' occupation of Kwangtung and during the Korean conflict whenever Communist Chinese troops suffered reverses. However, such transactions pose a potential threat to Communist efforts to channel overseas Chinese remittances through the official Bank of China. The bulk of such remittances, which averaged $100,000,000 a year before the Sino-Japanese War, has Kwangtung as its destination.

In order to foster such remittances, strenuous efforts have occasionally been made by Communist China to grant them favorable treatment, including the institution, in the early phase of Communist rule, of favorable exchange rates and of various

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16. See, for example, reports in the Far Eastern Economic Review, a Hong Kong publication.

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types of bank deposits, designed to protect the purchasing power of the deposit, which may be opened by recipients of such remittances. The Bank of China and the People's Bank of China have set up many local offices and agencies at such places as Szu-i, Mei-hsien, Hsing-ning, Hui-chou, Chung-shan, Hai-lu-feng, Ch'ao-chou, and Swatow, while special services, such as the handling of trust matters and the tracing of lost relatives, are offered.[17] However, the attractiveness of fringe benefits is predicated upon the maintenance of the stability of Communist Chinese currency and the absence of any large divergence between the official and black-market exchange rates. Absence of official information on overseas remittances in Kwangtung, and continued sporadic activity on the Hong Kong exchange market, do not constitute a firm indication that all is well.

In view of the complaints by overseas Chinese, and of the rapid decrease of remittances, the Communist government on March 2, 1955, (New China News Agency, Peking, March 2, 1955) issued a State Council order affirming the right of free use of overseas remittances by recipients. It was stated that no individuals or entities may compel loans from dependents of overseas Chinese, withhold payment of their remittances, or encroach upon remittances on any pretext. However, the spirit of this order was impaired by another statement that overseas Chinese and their dependents were to be encouraged to invest in production or in

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17. For discussion of this problem, see, for example, various articles in Ching-chi tao-pao [Economic Bulletin] as follows: [See next page.]

state investment companies. This "encouragement," which means order in the Communist state, is bound to lead to encroachment upon the right to a free use of remittances.

COMMENT

It would appear that the peculiar position of Kwangtung as the home of many overseas Chinese and the terminal of remittances from abroad has presented Communist Chinese authorities with the special problem of having to be at times relatively conciliatory to a particular group of the population; namely, the families of overseas Chinese. Although this attitude has not been consistently maintained, insofar as it has been evident it affords a rather interesting example of unequal treatment to different groups of the population and of the Communist authorities' tactical maneuvers for the sake of expediency. The need to be less repressive in order to induce a larger flow of inward remittances, and the attraction of a consistent policy of equal treatment to all groups for the valuable propaganda which results, constitute a dilemma that cannot be easily resolved. Occasionally, when the Communist authorities are compelled to use extortion methods to force overseas Chinese to send money home, as has been widely reported, they betray not only desperation but also a serious conflict of interests with established policy.

[Footnote No. 17 continued.]
No. 153, pp. 6-8, 13, Hong Kong, Jan. 10, 1950; No. 155, pp. 1-3, Jan. 31, 1950; No. 155, p. 18, Jan. 31, 1950; No. 160, pp. 12-13, Feb. 28, 1950; No. 160, p. 28, Feb. 28, 1950; No. 161, p. 12, Mar. 7, 1950; No. 163, pp. 7-8, Mar. 21, 1950; No. 164, pp. 15-16, Mar. 28, 1950; No. 167, pp. 1-3, April 18, 1950; No. 167, pp. 6-7, April 18, 1950; No. 168, pp. 7-8, 1950; No. 176, p. 17, June 20, 1950.

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If any unequal treatment accorded to different groups is a source of potential popular dissatisfaction the same may be true in the case of different regional interests. In this connection, the fact that the Central-South provinces derive less benefit from foreign imports than their contribution to the country's foreign exchange income would warrant offers another interesting point for thought. The people in Kwangtung, for example are well aware of the possibility that they may obtain cheap imported consumer goods of good quality from Hong Kong, which they now have to forego, in exchange for their exports. The national policy of trade controls and domestic self-sufficiency inevitably discriminates against a region of export surplus.

The possibility of smuggling between Hong Kong and Kwangtung, as mentioned before, can be either harmful or beneficial to Communist China depending upon who the smugglers are and what types of goods are involved. In order to eliminate undesirable smuggling, the Communist authorities have imposed severe restrictions on the movement of goods and persons between Hong Kong and Kwangtung. That this has worked hardship on peasants in the border area is beyond dispute. Nor should one fail to emphasize the effect on the Chinese trade-control machinery of any potentially corruptive influence to which the Communist customs service may be exposed through the effort of smugglers.

[APPENDIX A]

CONSTITUTION OF COMMUNIST CHINA

I. INTRODUCTION

The general character of the Chinese Communist Constitution -- and its relation to the 1936 Soviet Constitution -- may be indicated by an account of the way in which it was produced. In January 1953, a constitutional-drafting committee was formed, consisting of thirty-two members, of which a majority of seventeen were from the Communist Party. The drafting committee then sat idle for a year without a meeting. The Communist members made necessary revisions and decided on a draft without consulting the other members of the committee. According to a leading party theoretician, Liu Shao-ch'i,

> "While drafting the Constitution, the committee for drafting the Constitution referred to all the constitutions, past and present, of the Soviet Union as well as to the constitutions of the People's Democracies. It is obvious that the experience of the advanced socialist states, headed by the Soviet Union, has been of great help to us. Our draft constitution embodies the experience of our own country and that of other countries. It is not only the product of the People's

> Revolutionary Movement in China, but also a product of the international socialist movement."[1]

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This draft was presented as a finished product to the Constitutional Drafting Committee as its first meeting in March 1954. The Central Government announced that the Draft Constitution would be discussed by the Political Consultative Conference, the governments of the regions, the provinces, the municipalities, the democratic parties, the local branches of the People's organizations, and the military forces. This was little more than a gesture to enlist popular support. When the National People's Congress was convened, nineteen days were devoted to organizing the work of the congress, and then the Constitution was unanimously passed within one hour. The only changes made were minor changes in wording.

The Chinese Communist Constitution contains a few features which are reminiscent of the highly authoritarian and centralized imperial Chinese state and a number which are reminiscent of the structure of the Kuomintang after 1924. But in the present context the resemblance to Chinese precedent is of less significance than the resemblance to the Stalin Constitution of 1936. This is scarcely suprising in view of the manner in which the document was written. In analyzing either constitution, it is essential to remember that to the Communists a

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[1] Liu Shao-ch'i, Report on the Draft Constitution; see Current Background, No. 294, Hong Kong, American Consulate-General, Sept. 20, 1954, p.8.

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constitution is not a statement of abstract and enduring principles but one of many instruments forged to speed the struggle toward a socialist, and ultimately Communist, society. Therefore, every article must be examined in the context of what seem to be the ultimate goals of the international Communist movement.

The Chinese and Russian Constitutions are generally similar not only in basic principles, but also in wording and style, as the following juxtaposed passages will show:

USSR	COMMUNIST CHINA
Art. 1. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is a socialist state of workers and peasants.	Art. 1. The People's Republic of China is a democratic state led by the working class and based on the alliance of workers and peasants.
Art. 2. The political foundation of the USSR is the Soviet of Working People's deputies which grew and became strong as a result of the overthrow of the power of the landlords and capitalists and the conquest of the dictatorship of the proletariat.	Art. 2. All power in the People's Republic of China belongs to the people. The organs through which the people exercise power are the National People's Congress and the local People's Congress. The preamble of the Chinese Constitution says: The Chinese people led by the Communist Party finally achieved their great

	victory in the People's revolution against imperialism, feudalism, and bureaucrat-capitalism.
Art. 4. The economic foundation of the USSR is the socialist ownership of the instruments and means of production... Art. 5. Socialist property in the USSR exists either in the form of state property (belonging to the whole people) or in the form of co-operative and collective farm property.	Art. 5. At present the following basic forms of ownership of means of production exist in the People's Republic of China: state ownership, that is ownership by the whole people; co-operative ownerships, that is, collective ownership by the working-masses; ownership by the individual working people; and capitalist ownership.
Art. 6. The land, its mineral wealth, waters, forests, mills, factories, mines, rail, water, and air transport, banks, communication ...are state property, that is, belong to the whole people.[2]	Art. 6. Socialist Ownership; All mineral resources and water, as well as forest undeveloped land, and other resources which are state-owned by law, are the property of the whole people.[3]

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[2] J. H. Meisel and E. S. Kozera, Material for the Study of the Soviet System, Ann Arbor, The George Wahr Publishing Co., 1950, p. 243.

[3] The Constitution of the People's Republic of China, Peking, The Foreign Languages Press, 1954.

II. THE NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS AND SUPREME SOVIET

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While the USSR and the Supreme Soviet is composed of two chambers, the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities, the Chinese People's National Congress is a unicameral system. The Chinese State has been unitary for two millennia and the Communist Constitution contains no provisions parallel to those concerning the Federal Republics of the Soviet Union.

USSR	COMMUNIST CHINA
Art. 30. The highest organ of state power in the USSR is the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.	Art. 21. The National People's Congress is the highest organ of state authority in the People's Republic of China.
Art. 32. The legislative power of the USSR is exercised by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.	Art. 22. The National People's Congress is the only legislative authority in the country.

As the power of a national congress is a unitary state is unlimited, it can make laws on any subject. The drafters of the Chinese Communist Constitution failed to understand the distinction between the Soviet federal state and the Chinese unitary state and have quite unnecessarily specified the powers of their national congress as if China were a federal union.

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The Chinese National People's Congress is indirectly elected. According to Article 23 of the Constitution: The National People's Congress is composed of deputies elected by the provinces, autonomous municipalities directly under central authority, the armed forces, and the Chinese residents abroad. There are several electoral levels within each province. The _hsiang_ is the lowest unit of local government, and the congress of a _hsiang_ is elected by the population. Above it, the county congress is composed of deputies elected by the _hsiang_ congresses, and the provincial congress is then composed of deputies elected by the county congresses. Members of the National People's Congress are elected by the provincial congresses. Under this system of election, the intermediate layers -- the _hsiang_ congress, the county congress, and the provincial congress -- make it difficult for the public to see the true relation between promises made by members of congresses and their fulfillment to their ultimate constituencies. The Chinese Communist Party can easily manipulate the small number of deputies involved on each level.

After the military conquest of the Mainland, Communist prestige reached a new high. When the election of people's congresses was instituted, the Communists generally won a majority of at least 60 per cent on all levels of government. The Chinese Communist Party is confident of its powerful influence over the people and over all other political groups.

This one-party rule is somewhat obscured because other democratic groups are allowed to exist and to sit in the National People's Congress. Their leaders have been elected as deputy-chairmen under Liu Shao-ch'i. The preamble of the Constitution explicity states: "In the course of the great struggle to establish the People's Republic of China, the people of our country forged a broad people's democratic united front, composed of all democratic classes, democratic parties, and groups, and popular organizations, and led by the Communist Party of China."[4] In reality, these non-Communist leaders have no power and are used by the Communists as a facade. 000

III. THE CHAIRMAN OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND THE STATE COUNCIL

The position of Mao Tse-tung as the Chairman of the People's Republic of China is unique in the Communist world. This position is found neither in the Soviet government nor the People's democracies." Stalin said, "The USSR should not have an individual president elected by the entire population on an equal basis with the Supreme Soviet, who might essay to stand out against the Supreme Soviet."[5] It was explained by Soviet jurists that Stalin was referring to men like Napoleon and Hindenburg who rose above the state they were to serve. This consideration does not appear to have concerned the Chinese Communists. While the president of the Presidium of the USSR is a titular head, Mao Tse-

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4. The Constitution of the People's Republic of China, Peking, The Foreign Language Press, 1954.
5. Julian Towster, Political Power in the USSR, Oxford Press, New York, 1948, p. 263.

tung represents the People's Republic in its relations 000 with foreign states, commands the armed forces of the country, promulgates laws and decrees, and appoints or removes the Premier, Vice-Premier, and ministers. It is clear that Mao is an individual president, deviating from the collective presidency system of Soviet Russia, regardless of Liu Shao-ch'i's statement that "Ours is a collective head of state."[6]

Another divergence from the Soviet Constitutional pattern is the Chinese State Council. In the USSR the Council of Ministers, including its chairman or premier, is appointed by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, but in China the premier is recommended first by the Chairman of the People's Republic and then accepted or rejected by the National People's Congress. Again, the ministers of the State Council are not, like the Council of Ministers in the USSR, appointed by the Presidium, but are recommended first by the premier and then accepted or rejected by the National People's Congress, or by the Standing Committee when the Congress is in recess. The Chinese Standing Committees' inability to appoint the premier means that it is less powerful than its counterpart, the Presidium of the USSR. The division of powers to appoint the premier and ministers in China may in part result from concern over the personal relations of the three top leaders. Mao Tse-tung, as Chairman of the Republic, may wish to have a share in the choice of Premier; Chou En-lai may be reluctant to have his premiership decided by Liu Shao-ch'i, who, as Chairman of the National Congress and the Standing Committee, would then appear superior to Chou. 000

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[6] Liu Shao-ch'i, op. cit., p. 15.

In both China and the Soviet Union the ministers are directly subordinate to the State Council. In the Constitution of the Soviet Union, thirty all union ministries are enumerated. Communist China has the following, similar list: Internal Affairs, Foreign Affairs; National Defense; Public Security; Justice; Control; State Planning; State Construction; Finance; Food; Commerce; Foreign Trade; First Ministry of Machine Building; Second Ministry of Machine Building; Fuel Industry; Geology; Building-Industry; Textile Industry; Local Industry; Railways; Communication; Post and Telecommunication; Agriculture; Forestry and Reclamation; Water Consdrvation; Labor; Cultural Affairs; Higher Education; Education; Public Health; Physical Education; Nationalities Affairs; and Overseas Chinese Affairs. Eight administrative offices attached to the State Council co-ordinate the elaborately subdivided work of the ministries.

IV. THE STANDING COMMITTEE AND THE PRESIDIUM OF THE SUPREME SOVIET

The functions of the Standing Committee in China are the same as those of the Presidium of the USSR, except that the Standing Committee's power of appointment is limited to vice-premiers and ministers.

USSR	COMMUNIST CHINA
Art. 49. The presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR: (a) convenes the session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR; (b) issues decrees; (c) gives interpretations of the laws of the USSR in operation; (d) dissolves the Supreme Soviet of the USSR in conformity with Article 57 of the constitution of the USSR and orders new elections; (e) conducts nationwide polls (referendum) on its own initiative or on the demand of one of the Union Republics; (f) annuls decisions and orders of the Council	Art. 31. The Standing Committee of the National People's Congress exercises the following functions and powers: (1) to conduct the election of deputies to the National People's Congress; (2) to convene the National People's Congress; (3) to interpret the laws; (4) to adopt decrees; (5) to supervise the work of the State Council, the Supreme People's Courts, and the Supreme People's Procuratorate; (6) to annul decisions and orders of the State Council which contravene the Constitution, laws, and decrees; (7) to revise or annul inappropriate decisions issued by the government authorities of provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities directly

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of Ministers of the USSR and of the council of ministers of the Union Republics if they do not conform to law; (g) in the intervals between sessions of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, releases and appoints ministers of the USSR on the recommendation of the chairman of the council of ministers of the USSR subject to subsequent confirmation by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR; (h) institutes decorations (orders and medals) and titles of honor of the USSR, (i) awards orders and medals and confers titles of honor of the USSR; (j) exercises the right of pardon; (k) institues military titles, diplomatic ranks, and other special titles; (l) appoints and removes the high command of the Armed Forces of the USSR; (m) in the intervals between

under the central authority; (8) to decide on the appointment or removal of any Vice-Premier, Minister, head of commission, or secretary-general of the State Council when the National People's Congress is not in session; (9) to appoint or remove the vice-presidents, judges, and other members of the Judicial Committee of the Supreme People's Court; (10) to appoint or remove the deputy chief procurators, procurators, and other members of the Procuratorial Committee of the Supreme People's Procuratorate; (11) to decide on the appointment or recall of plenipotentiary representatives to foreign state; (12) to decide on the ratification or abrogation of treaties concluded with foreign states; (13) to institute military, diplomatic and other special titles and ranks; (14) to institute and decide on the award of state orders, medals, and titles of

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sessions of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, proclaims a state of war in the event of military attack on the USSR or when necessary to fulfill international treaty obligations concerning mutual defense against aggression; (n) orders general or partial mobilization; (o) ratifies and denounces international treaties of the USSR; (p) appoints and recalls plenipotentiary representatives of the USSR to foreign states; (q) receives the letters of credence and recall of diplomatic representatives accredited to it by foreign states; and (r) proclaims martial law in separate localities or throughout the USSR in the interest of the defense of the USSR or of the maintenance of public order and the security of the state.

honor; (15) to decide on the granting of pardons; (16) to decide, when the National People's Congress is not in session, on the proclamation of a state of war in the event of armed attack on the country or in fulfillment of internation treaty obligations concerning common defense against aggression; (17) to decide on general or partial mobilization; (18) to decide on the enforcement of martial law throughout the country or in certain areas; and (19) to exercise such other functions and powers as are vested in it by the National People's Congress.

Art. 48. The presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR is accountable to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR for all its activities.[7]

Art. 33. The Standing Committee of the National People's Congress is responsible to the National People's Congress and reports to it.[8]

V. THE JUDICIARY

Article 78 of the Chinese Communist Constitution states that in administering justice the People's Court is independent, subject only to the law. And, according to Article 85, "citizens of the People's Republic are equal before the law." However, the first article of the Constitution says that the People's Republic is based on the alliance of the workers and peasants. This wording clearly shows that capitalists and landlords are much less privileged than workers and peasants.

The president of a People's Court is not a judge appointed for life. He is elected by the People's Congress on the corresponding level. In addition to the judge, there are assessors, according to Article 25 of the organic law of People's Courts and People's Procuratorates. With the exception of those deprived of political rights, citizens who have reached the age of twenty-three, and have the right to elect, may be elected as assessors.

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[7] The Constitution of the People's Republic of China, Peking, The Foreign Languages Press, 1954.

[8] Meisel and Kozera, op. cit., p. 236.

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Cases of the first instance in the People's Courts are heard in full court composed of judges and People's assessors. The People's Court is responsible to the People's Congress on the corresponding level; it is not independent. The Six Codes instituted during the Kuomintang period have been declared null and void; the newly issued Communist laws and ordinances are instruments of Communist political policy.

The judicial systems of Soviet Russia and Communist China are similar in spirit and letter, as the following comparisons will show.

USSR	COMMUNIST CHINA
Art. 112. Judges are independent and subject only to the law.	Art. 78. In administering justice the people's courts are independent, subject only to the law.
Art. 103. In all courts cases are tried with the participation of people's assessors, except in cases specially provided for by law.	Art. 75. The system of people's assessors applies, in accordance with law, to judicial proceeding in the People's Courts.
Art. 110. Judicial proceedings are conducted in the language of the Union Republic, autonomous republic,	Art. 77. Citizens of all nationalities have the right to use their own spoken and written languages in court proceedings. The

or autonomous region, persons not knowing this language being guaranteed the opportunity of fully acquainting themselves with the material of the case through an interpreter and, likewise, the right to use their own language in court.[9]

People's Court are to provice interpretations for any party unacquainted with the spoken and written languages commonly used in the locality.[10]

VI. LOCAL GOVERNMENT

An examination of the powers of annulment in local government from the province down to the *hsiang* will show how the power of governing the localities is centralized according to an hierarchical principle. The fourth paragraph of Article 40 of the Constitution reads, "The People's Congresses at county level and above have power to revise or annul inappropriate decisions issued by People's Congresses at the lower level as well as inappropriate decisions issued by People's Councils at the next lower level."[11]

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[9] *The Constitution of the People's Republic of China*, Peking, The Foreign Languages Press, 1954.

[10] Meisel and Kozera, *op. cit.*, p. 236.

[11] *Ibid.*

VII. CITIZENS RIGHTS

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Communists believe that class determines the rights of the individual in society. They disavow the theory of natural rights, and argue that the rights of landlords and capitalists should be eliminated. When the proletarian dictatorship was established in Soviet Russia , the property of the landlords and the capitalists was confiscated. The same thing happened to Chinese landlords and capitalists throughout the country after 1949. Under the Chinese Communist Constitution, the right to property is not guaranteed.

With regard to other rights, the language of the Chinese Constitution is generous only on the surface. According to Article 87: "Citizens... have freedom of speech, freedom of press, freedom of assembly, freedom of association, freedom of procession, and freedom of demonstration. By providing the necessary material facilities, the state guarantees to citizens enjoyment of these freedoms." However, "freedom of association" in Communist China does not apply to groups which are deemed subversive, and anything which challenges orthodox Communist teaching is deemed subversive. The great majority of the newspapers are government-owned or Party-owned, and the news to be published is under the control of the New China News Agency; the newspapers of the other democratic groups can only publish or write as they are instructed.

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Article 89 says that "freedom of the person of citizens... is inviolable." In reality, each person is a member of the urban street office, or urban inhabitants' committee, with the result that he is under the watch of Party members. Each must deposit his cash in a bank, which is situated at the corner of a street, and his bank account can be examined, so there is little freedom to dispose of one's own money. A Party member or a policeman may question anyone about his neighbors, and visitors must be reported.

The Russian Communists call the modern Western European and American views of civil rights "formal." By this, they insinuate that, while according to the letter of the Western European and American constitutions each citizen supposedly enjoys the same rights, in fact, however, a workman or a peasant never enjoys the same rights as a landlord or a capitalist. The Russians claim to reject this Western interpretation and to look at the question in the light of the common practice. Stalin says in his article, "The Principal Specific Features of the Draft Constitution,"

> "Bourgeois constitutions usually confine themselves to stating the formal rights of citizens, without bothering about the conditions for the exercise of these rights.... What distinguishes the draft of the new Constitution is the fact that it does not confine itself to stating the formal rights of citizens, but stresses the guarantees of these rights, the means by which these rights can be exercised. It does not merely proclaim

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> equality of rights for citizens, but insures it by giving legislative embodiment to the fact that the regime of exploitation has been abolished, to the fact that the citizens have been emancipated from all exploitaton."[12]

VIII. CONCLUSION

Because the Chinese Communist Constitution is only a legal document, one must seek the reality behind it.

The Chinese Communist Party has always aimed at seizing and maintaining power; its war machine, its organizations, its propaganda, and its discipline are directed to this end.

In order to attain a monopoly of power, the Chinese Communists have worked to remove all obstacles. From Lenin, they have learned that civil rights are an obstacle, that separation of powers is an obstacle, that direct elections are an obstacle. Since there had been little knowledge of these democratic ideas among the people of China, their elimination has proved relatively easy. The Chinese Communists have been able to use new and effective techniques of control to consolidate a dictatorial power beyond the dreams of earlier Chinese autocrats.

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[12] Meisel and Kozera, op. cit., p. 236.

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[For details of Communist policies toward various sociological, political, and economic aspects of present-day China, see the entire text in category 116.]